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
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CINCUSAREUR

REFORGER 83



AFTER ACTION REPORT (4019X)(U)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Part</u>		<u>Page</u>
	Table of Contents	i thru v
	Section I--Executive Summary	I-1 thru I-9
	Section II--Statistical Data	II-1 thru II-30
A	Force Package Identification	II-1 thru II-2
B	Personnel Statistics	II-3 thru II-9
C	Logistics Statistics	II-10 thru II-23
D	Public Affairs Statistics	II-24 thru II-28
F	Visitor Statistics	II-29
G	USAREUR JCS Funding Statistics	II-30
	Section III--Lessons Learned	III-31 thru III-195
A	Exercise Related Lessons Learned	III-32 thru III-122
	Ground Guides for Vehicles	III-32
	Accident Cause Factor (Failure to Yield the Right of Way)	III-33
	Accident Cause Factor (Lack of Convoy Discipline)	III-34
	Finance Service Support	III-35
	Reserve Component Augmentee	III-36
	Vehicle Warning Lights	III-37
	Visitor Operations	III-38
	Inconsistent Policies	III-39
	Life Preservers for Water Operations	III-40
	Red Cross Vehicles and Drivers	III-41
	REFORGER Tours	III-42
	Visitor Operations (Late Acceptances by CINCUSAREUR Invitees)	III-43
	Visitor Operations (Last-Minute Uncoordinated Itinerary Changes)	III-44
	Visitor Operations (Excessive Length of Visit)	III-45
	Visitor Operations (Visitor Support Operations Personnel Expertise)	III-46
	Visitor Operations (Contingency Visitor Plan for Scaled-down FTX)	III-47
	Visitor Operations (Aviation Support)	III-48
	MWR Support	III-49
	Book Kits	III-50
	Budgeting MSA Requirements	III-51

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Intelligence Information	III-52
FTX Participation	III-53
Provisioning of a Forward Area Support Team (FAST) for 3 ACR	III-54
Exercise Planning and Coordination	III-55
Tactical Realism	III-56
REAR Area Play	III-57
Public Affairs (Need for Close Coordination and Liaison With Operations Center)	III-58
Public Affairs (Still Photography)	III-59
Airspace Restrictions	III-60
Communications and Missile Maintenance	
Equipment of CONUS Deploying Units	III-61
Redeployment	III-62
Exercise Realism	III-63
Joint Air Attack Tactics (JAAT)	III-64
Airspace Management	III-65
Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (JSEAD)	III-66
ARRED LNO	III-67
G3 Participation at Past Maneuver Claims Conference	III-68
Coordinating Authority	III-69
Reserve Component (RC) Two-week Cycle	III-70
Planning and Execution Coordination	III-71
Exercise Planning and Coordination (Marshaling and Staging Area Activities)	III-72
Exercise Planning and Coordination (Host Nation Support Coordination)	III-73
Preparation of Contact Requirements	III-74
Contracting Officers Representatives	III-75
Patient Returnees--BENELUX	III-76
Contracting	III-77
Logistics Interoperability	III-78
Class III (Bulk) Supply and Distribution	III-79
Nontactical Vehicles	III-80
Redeployment (CONUS-Deployed Equipment Left Behind)	III-81
Deployment	III-82
POMCUS Operations	III-83
COMMZ Operations	III-84
Non-demand Supported Stockages of Class IX and VIII Repair Parts and Assemblies	III-85
Deployment of Missile ADA Systems Maintenance Capability	III-86
Class I and Food Service (Reefer Support During REFORGER)	III-87
Class I and Food Service (B-Ration Menu Change)	III-88
Class I and Food Service (Support From CONUS-Based Veterinary Food Inspectors)	III-89
Exercise Planning and Coordination (AAFES, Eur, Representation on the USAREUR Central Planning Team)	III-90
Movement Coordination (Changes to the Rail Schedule)	III-91

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Movement Coordination (Late Identification of Convoy Routes by BENELUX)	III-92
Redeployment (Redeployment Aircraft Cargo Planning)	III-93
Aerial Resupply	III-94
Exercise Planning and Coordination (Fuel Coupons, Expiration and Renewal)	III-95
Reception and Onward Movement	III-96
Rough Terrain Equipment	III-97
Exercise Realism (Out-of-Sector Support of a US Brigade)	III-98
Exercise Realism (General Observation)	III-99
EOD Exercise	III-100
Class V Basic Load Upload	III-101
Inconsistency in the Use of Terms	III-102
Visits to Allies	III-103
Movement Coordination (Reporting)	III-104
Tactical Operations	III-105
Mobile Radio Telephones	III-106
Communications Equipment of CONUS Deploying Units	III-107
Belgium Military Communications Network	III-108
DBP Telephone/TELEX Instruments	III-109
Radio Frequency Management	III-110
Systems Automation	III-111
Public Affairs (Necessity for Media Pre-brief)	III-112
Public Affairs (Lack of Influential CONUS Media Participation in DOD Media Tour)	III-113
Movements Coordination (Reporting) (FORSCOM WWMCCS Teleconference)	III-114
Movements Coordination (Air Flow Data)	III-115
APIC Site	III-116
Exercise Realism (Realism in LOC Facilities)	III-117
Exercise Planning and Coordination (Submission of Temporary Loan Requests)	III-118
Planning and Execution Coordination (Delay in Granting WIN Permission)	III-119
Movement Coordination (Inaccurate Redeployment Rail Schedules)	III-120
Interoperability Training	III-121
SPOD Operations	III-122
NATO War Plans, Related Lessons Learned	III-123 thru III-145
Inflight Reporting	III-123
Tactical Reconnaissance Results Reporting System (TARRRS)	III-124
Forward Air Control Post (FACP) Employment	III-125
Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) Targeting	III-126
Airspace Control Order (ACO)	III-127
Interoperability with 15th PZ Bde	III-128
Dissemination of Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Status to Field Units	III-129
Exercise Planning and Coordination (US Employment of ASG in the GTNC)	III-130

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Interoperability with 15th PZ Bde (15th PZ Bde Assembly Area Organization)	III-131
ASOC G3 Air Representation	III-132
Exercise Realism (OPSEC)	III-133
Host Nation Support	III-134
Logistics Interoperability (Use of NATO Weigh Ticket)	III-135
Automated Port Computer Documentation	III-136
COMMZ Operations	III-137
Staging and Marshaling Area (STAMA) Operations	
Provision of Host Nation Support	III-138
C3CM	III-139
NBC Operations (Interoperability)	III-140
COMAAFC SUPLAN 35001M	III-141
Movement Coordination (BENELUX Road Movement Clearance)	III-142
ASOC and TACP COMSEC Materials	III-143
Movement Coordination (HEROS-5 Computerized Highway Movements System)	III-144
Movement Coordination (Collection of German and US Movement Control Elements in the USAREUR Movement Control Center)	III-145
US Lessons Learned	III-146 thru III-195
Army/Air Force Communications	III-146
Targeting Process	III-147
Intelligence Dissemination	III-148
Long-range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Requirements	III-149
LRRP Requirements (Availability of Training)	III-150
Weapons Control Orders (WCO)	III-151
C-130 Airfield	III-152
Force Tracking	III-153
Joint Deployment System (JDS)	III-154
Information Flow and Impact on Communications Requirements	III-155
Maintenance Support	III-156
POMCUS Operations (NBC Overgarment Issue)	III-157
Class III (Bulk) Supply and Distribution (Procedures for Establishing Rail Heads and FSSP)	III-158
Class III (Bulk) Supply and Distribution (Petroleum Tank Truck Inspection)	III-159
Bulk Fuel Aerial Resupply Operations	III-160
Class III (Bulk) Supply and Distribution (Requirements Forecasting)	III-161
Class III (Bulk) Supply and Distribution (Requirement Reporting)	III-162
Out-of-sector Support	III-163
Self-sufficiency of Deploying Formations	III-164
Reception and Onward Movement	III-165
Tray-Pack Foods (T-Rations)	III-166
Class I and Food Services	III-167
SPOD Operations (Maintenance of Deployed Equipment)	III-168
Class I Resupply and Movement Control	III-169

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Movement Coordination (Convoy Discipline)	III-170
Movement Coordination (Identification of POMCUS Rail Requirements)	III-171
Reception and Onward Movement (MHE at Railheads)	III-172
Class III (Bulk) Supply and Distribution (Saturation of Rail Heads Facilities)	III-173
Engineer Equipment Requirements in NORTHAG	III-174
Liaison Personnel and Communications	III-175
Update RAOE MTOE	III-176
SPOD Operations (Mission of Advance Party Port Driver Teams)	III-177
Training	III-178
Centralized Tasking of EW Assets	III-179
Communications	III-180
Vulnerability/Insufficiency of Communications System	III-181
Communications for RAOE Liaison Teams	III-182
Communications for Marshaling Areas	III-183
Tactical Weather Communications Deficiencies	III-184
Tactical Air Control Party Equipment Capabilities and Limitations	III-185
Secure Communications Equipment	III-186
Movement Coordination (Reporting) (Rail Reports)	III-187
Movement Coordination (Movement Information Reporting)	III-188
Movement Coordination (STANAG Submission)	III-189
Test Kit Equipment	III-190
Exercise Logistics Realism	III-191
Logistics Standardization	III-192
Airdrop Requests	III-193
Logistical Realism	III-194 thru III-195

v

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6 March 1984

CINCUSAREUR REFORGER 83 AFTER ACTION REPORT (4019X) (U)
SECTION I--Executive Summary(U)

1. (U) HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:

a. (U) The Return of Forces to Germany, REFORGER, 83 was the fifteenth strategic mobility exercise executed under the 1967 London Tripartite Agreement among the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. The agreement allowed the U.S. 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), located in Germany to restation its division base and two brigades in the United States, while leaving one brigade in place. The agreement further stipulated that the 24th ID(M) would return the division(-) annually, draw Prepositioning of Materiel Configured To Unit Sets (POMCUS), link-up with the forward stationed brigade, and then participate in a European field training exercise (FTX). In 1970 during REFORGER II, the 24th ID(M) was replaced by the 1st Infantry Division(Mech), making the 1st ID(M) the REFORGER designated division. As POMCUS sets were increased, the annual REFORGER strategic deployment expanded to include different CONUS divisions. Continued refinement of U.S. support to NATO necessitated the addition of non-divisional combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Additionally, the deployment of a non-POMCUS division in 1976, the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT), added a new dimension to the original REFORGER concept. Subsequent REFORGERs have added numerous innovations including deployment of reserve components units and no-notice emergency deployment readiness exercises (EDREs). The major participants in REFORGER 83 were the 3d (US) Corps Battle Staff; 1st Cavalry Division (-); 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (-); 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry(Ranger); and the 1st Battalion, 198th Armor(MS ARNG). These forces in concert with reserve components and active duty combat and combat service support units participated in or in support of either 1st (NL) Corps FTX ATLANTIC LION or V (US) Corps FTX CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE. REFORGER 83 exercised wartime operational plans, offered excellent training, and demonstrated the flexibility and resolve of the U.S. to reinforce NATO. A total of 16,044 CONUS personnel deployed.

b. (U) REFORGER 83 was based on the current USAREUR-REFORGER Five-Year Plan. Detailed planning and coordination began in April 1982 at the Initial Planning Conference (IPC) held at HQ USAREUR. Subsequently, a deployment troop list was developed and approved in coordination with HQ FORSCOM.

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I-1

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2. (U) MISSION: Under provisions of USCINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR OPLANS 4102 and CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4360, CINCUSAREUR assumed OPCON(US) of 3d (US) Corps Battle Staff, 1st Cavalry Division (-), 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) and selected non-divisional and reserve components units from CONUS upon arrival on the continent of Europe; provided for reception, equipping as required and onward movement of these forces to staging areas as necessary; when combat forces were operationally ready and supportable, offered forces to USCINCEUR for transfer of authority (TOA) as required to appropriate commands for participation in FTXs in NORTHAG and CENTAG. At ENDEX, CINCUSAREUR reassumed OPCON(US) of CONUS-based forces through his major subordinate commands (MSCs) for: clean-up; return of POMCUS to storage sites; sea deployed equipment to POEs; participation in post-FTX interoperability training; and for strategic aeromedical evacuation exercise and redeployment from Europe.

3. (U) EXECUTION: REFORGER 83 covered the period 25 August - 28 October 1983.

a. (U) The exercise was divided into the four phases outlined below:

(1) ~~(C)~~ Phase I - Deployment (25 Aug - 19 Sep 83): CONUS forces moved selected equipment by sea and personnel and equipment by air. The majority of the 16,044 personnel were moved by air on 130 flights from twenty-three CONUS Aerial Ports of Embarkation (APOEs) to six Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODs) located at Brussels; Belgium; Schipol; Netherlands; Luxembourg City; Luxembourg; Dusseldorf; Germany; and Ramstein and Rhein Main Air Bases in Germany. A strategic airborne operation utilized five C141's. POMCUS shortages, other required equipment and non-POMCUS units equipment (5,235 short tons of equipment including 711 wheeled, 50 tracked vehicles) departed CONUS ports and Puerto Rico aboard the American Eagle, the Cygnus and the American Rapid.

(2) (U) Phase II - Reception, Preparation for Combat, and Onward Movement (21 Aug - 13 Sep 82): During Phase II units continued deployment to aerial ports in Germany and the BENELUX under provisions of OPLANS cited in paragraph 2 above and the newly approved Joint Support Plans with Belgium and the Netherlands. Elements arriving at Luxembourg City airport were moved by Canadian and US C130's to Germany. CONUS POMCUS units drew POMCUS and moved by road and rail to Tactical Assembly Areas (TAAs) in the Central Army Group (CENTAG) area of Germany or a staging area in the Netherlands to prepare for the REFORGER-affiliated tactical exercises. The American Eagle, Cygnus and American Rapid arrived at Seaports of debarkation (SPODs) on 12-13 Sep 83 (Antwerp, BE; Rotterdam; and Vlissingen, NL respectively) and completed discharge on 13 Sep 83. Priority personnel and equipment were flown from Durne, BE, and Gilze-Rijen, NL on US and CA C130's and GE C160 aircraft into Germany for participation in FTX CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE. Other personnel and equipment road or rail marched to TAAs in the CENTAG area for participation in CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE or a staging area in the Netherlands for preparation for participation in 1(NL) Corps exercise ATLANTIC LION.

(3) (U) Phase III - Exercise Participation (19-29 Sep 83): U.S. units participated in 1st (NL) Corps FTX ATLANTIC LION or V (US) Corps FTX CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE.

(4) (U) Phase IV - Recovery and Redeployment (18 Sep - 28 Oct 83): 27 platoon-sized elements from CONUS units trained with counterparts from German, British, and Belgium Corps. One CONUS company from 1st CD(AR) conducted Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) training in Berlin. The remainder of CONUS forces cleaned, performed maintenance and turned in POMCUS to Combat Equipment Company (CEC) sites. Equipment being redeployed to CONUS by sea was cleaned and moved to Bremerhaven, GE, for loading aboard USNS Callahan and American Eagle. The last ship sailed on 24 Oct 83.

I-2

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Personnel redeployed by air using one hundred nineteen MAC and commercial aircraft; the last flight departed on 27 Oct 83.

b. (U) REFORGER-Affiliated Tactical Exercises:

(1) (U) 1st (NL) Corps FTX ATLANTIC LION (19-29 Sep 83):

The 1st Cavalry Division was the major CONUS force participating. After staging in the Netherlands, 1st Cav Div units moved under the Netherlands Territorial Command control to river crossing sites on the MAAS. From the German border units moved under the control of German Territorial Northern Command to crossings of the Rhein river and onward into tactical assembly area. Offensive and defensive operations were conducted in Germany. III (US) Corps Battle Staff assisted 1st (NL) Corps in controlling the exercise. Of special note is the participation of the 1st Battalion, 198th Armor from the Mississippi Army National Guard as a round out unit to the 1st Cav Div. This battalion drew POMCUS and participated in the first week of the FTX. 1st (NL) Corps objectives to promote interoperability and exercise general defense and contingency plans were met.

(2) (U) V (US) Corps FTX CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE (19-29 Sep 83):

V (US) Corps conducted a free play exercise in which the 8th Infantry Division, as the aggressor, conducted offensive operations against the 3d Armored Division during the first week. Through shifts in combat power, the 3d AR Div was weighted for offensive operations during the second week. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry(Ranger) were the major CONUS participants. The exercise included a strategic airborne operation involving the Rangers. V Corps exercise objectives were centered on improving air-land force applications and exercising rear area operations.

(3) ~~(S)~~ USAREUR Sponsored FTX CARSON WOODS (9-29 Sep): Elements of 1-10 SFG(A) and 1-11 SFG(A) (NY USAR) participated in this unconventional warfare exercise by collecting strategic intelligence.

4. (U) REFORGER 83 OBJECTIVES: USAREUR exercise objectives were met, with exceptions noted. Lessons learned based upon these objectives are identified in the annexes to this report.

a. (U) To demonstrate U.S. resolve and ability to honor NATO commitments by exercising strategic rapid reinforcement of Europe.

b. (U) To deploy, receive, equip for combat, move forward, and exercise reinforcing forces (including Reserve Component, CAPSTONE units) IAW supporting and component OPLANs 4102 and CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4360-82 insofar as possible.

c. (U) To improve NATO interoperability and utilization of Host Nation support (HNS).

d. ~~(S)~~ To exercise and refine intelligence procedures.

e. (U) To exercise and evaluate the interface between JDS and deployment execution systems of the services, Transportation Operating Agencies (TOAs), and participating commands/agencies.

f. ~~(S)~~ To exercise, as realistically as possible, logistics, legal services, intelligence, communications-electronics, OPSEC/COMSEC, NBC operations, engineer activities, public affairs, personnel support systems, and area finance support.

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5. (U) MAJOR INNOVATIONS AND ITEMS OF INTEREST:

a. ~~(C)~~ A seven day arrival window in 1982 was reduced to ninety-six hours this year. Reception of 71% of the force in four days resulted in 88% of the units initiating POMCUS draws within a seventy-two hour period. This is the most compressed schedule ever attempted. There were no insurmountable problems created.

b. ~~(C)~~ For the first time, the new Lines of Communication (LOC) support plans and agreements were used. Coordination and understanding were greatly improved and should continue to improve as familiarity with provisions of agreements develop and implementing instructions are finalized. Worthy of special mention was food service and Class I support in Belgium, flexibility of facilities support when adverse weather occurred in the Netherlands, and outstanding support by Luxembourg in air-to-air interface operations. To insure necessary wartime HNS, exercise use of these agreements must be expanded. REFORGER offers the best medium in which to do this.

c. ~~(C)~~ Tactical communications systems provided the primary means of communications support for REFORGER 83. The tactical systems were augmented by the Defense Communications Systems (DCS) fixed facilities, Host Nation Support (leased circuits), commercial telephones, TELEX the Dutch military tactical systems. Communications support for the BENELUX LOC operation was provided by leased Host Nation and Belgium and Dutch Military fixed plant interfaces. In past REFORGERS, the Belgium interface has been nonexistent. Utilization of these assets provided communicators limited training on LOC agreements and laid the groundwork for future expanded REFORGER LOC communications support. Tactical satellite terminals were employed throughout the exercise area for command and control communications. Equipment interoperability was successfully tested and operator interoperability demonstrated Dutch and U.S. communicators can work extremely well together.

d. (U) The Army Command and Communications Systems (ACACS) was installed in increments beginning 29 August and terminated on 30 September at the end of Phase III. Through use of bulk encrypted multichannel systems and physical security of unencrypted wirelines, the Tactical Automatic Switching System (TASS) was installed to provide secure voice communications among all major units participating in REFORGER 83 and to augment the AUTOSEVOCOM and NATO secure voice (ELCROVOX) networks. Combined a total of twelve LOC APODS and SPODS and twenty-four equipment draws and onward movement locations were supported by Host Nation leased communications. Leased communications cost approximately \$850,000. Cable construction projects of the 6981st Civilian Support Group provided both fixed type multipair cable and tactical cable at the V Corps Exercise Control Center and Joint Visitors Bureau. Commercial multipair cable to extend DBP telephones was installed at III(US) Corps Headquarters/FTX ATLANTIC LION Exercise Control Center.

e. ~~(C)~~ The overall intelligence interface for REFORGER 83 worked well, though more effective support was provided to V Corps than to the III Corps Battle Staff that was assisting the 1st (NL) Corps. V Corps intelligence operations were able to function well because Aerial Exploitation Battalion Capabilities and direct interface [REDACTED] enabled the Corps to receive and process substantial amounts of timely intelligence. III Corps needs to have Aerial Exploitation Battalion assets and better intelligence communications if the Corps is deployed to Theater.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

I-4

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE, and SEVENTH ARMY
APO NEW YORK 09403

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Date: MAR 27 2013

AEAGC-EX

6 March 1984

SUBJECT: ~~Classified~~ CINCUSAREUR REFORGER 83 After Action Report (4019X)(U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) Enclosure 1 is the classified CINCUSAREUR REFORGER 83 After Action Report (4019X)(U). Section I is the executive summary of the exercise. Section II is a statistical summary of the exercise. Section III is the lessons learned report based on input from participants in the exercise and United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), staff observers.
2. (U) This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States (sec 793 and 794, chap 37, part I, title 18, United States Code). Transmitting or revealing information in this document, in any manner, to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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5. (U) Topics requiring coordination with NATO commanders for corrective action have been included in the report.
6. (U) This letter is regraded UNCLASSIFIED when separated from the classified enclosure.
7. (U) Point of contact, HQ USAREUR/7A, is LTC Blue (AEAGC-EX, clas: msg or sec comm; unclas: HDG Mil (2121-)7149/7271).

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

1 Encl
as (clas)

Dennis M. Foley
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OSD 3.3(b)(1), (5)

f. ~~(C)~~ Special Forces collection elements provided timely intelligence information to HQ, USAREUR which demonstrated the effectiveness of the SF strategic intelligence collection capability. In addition, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] capabilities.

g. ~~(C)~~ The 66th MI Group provided multi-disciplined intelligence and security support to major Theater participants. This support involved [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] efforts targeted against REFORGER 83.

h. (U) Finance service for REFORGER 83 were provided on an area support basis. Directives in CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4102-83 were exercised but altered to maintain regularly scheduled paydays. To provide this uninterrupted payday support, which is a peacetime mission, USAREUR finance was augmented by a CONUS finance team (mostly from the 1st Cavalry Division, Ft. Hood, Texas) which acted as a Division Finance Support Office (DFS0). The DFS0, in keeping with new finance doctrine, is the primary source of information on the locations of deployed units and the finance services desired by commanders.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

i. (U) To insure mid-month and end of month (EOM) pay checks would be in country and ready for distribution to service members on payday, CONUS finance offices furnished a listing to United States Army Finance and Accounting Center (USAFAC) of their soldiers who had mid-month and EOM checks to units. There, at USAFAC, a check pull was made for those service members. The JUMPS-Army pay checks were then carried by courier to Germany and subsequently distributed to the units. United States Army Reserve and Army National Guard soldiers received their pay IAW HQ, FORSCOM directives which resulted in the majority of units being paid approximately a day before departure from Germany and subsequent completion of active duty for training.

j. (U) USAREUR Major Subordinate Commands, limited to the 21st Support Command, V Corps and VII Corps, had primary responsibility to coordinate and direct the activities of finance service support within their respective areas of responsibility. Under new doctrine, finance services are provided to all soldiers within a specific area without regard to the unit assigned. All finance elements were able to provide the following services:

- (1) (U) Personal check cashing - in amounts from \$20.00 to \$200.00 in multiples of \$5.00.
- (2) (U) Conversion/reconversion of local currency.
- (3) (U) Casual Payments.
- (4) (U) Pay inquiry.

k. ~~(C)~~ Although improvement is needed in the NATO arena, Air-Land force application is moving toward more joint and combined solutions and a willingness to discuss problems and propose solutions. Targeting and intelligence, Tactical Air Control Systems (TACS), airspace management, Electronic Warfare (EW), Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (JSEAD) and Command, Control and Communications Countermeasures (C3CM) are the focus of Air-Land Battle lessons learned.

I-5

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1. (U) The REFORGER 83 objective to demonstrate U.S. resolve to rapidly reinforce Europe and to efficiently operate in the NATO framework was accomplished. Media coverage of U.S. participation in REFORGER was the responsibility of HQ, USEUCOM. U.S. commands responsible for coordination of media coverage in the affiliated exercises were as follows:

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| (1) (U) AQUA MARINE/ATLANTIC LION | AFCENT Reserve Corps (FWD) |
| (2) (U) CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE | V Corps |
| (3) (U) Line-of-communications (LOC) | 21st SUPCOM POMCUS |
| (4) (U) POMCUS | 21st SUPCOM |

The HQ USAREUR Audio-Visual Division covered the activities in the BENELUX and Germany. They established the only video editing cells in the exercise areas producing 47 video features which were distributed in Europe and the U.S.

m. (U) Including the 27 observers who visited under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe/Confidence Building Measures provisions of the Helsinki Pact of 1975, there were a total of 375 USAREUR-sponsored visitors to REFORGER 83. Seventy-three percent (73%) of the REFORGER visitors attended during the FTX Phase, for a total of 1,215 visit days. Ninety-five percent (95%) of these visit days were in V Corps FTX CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE. Counting USAREUR-sponsored visitors, V Corps-invited visitors, and unexpected FTX visitors, V Corps provided some form of support to 851 visitors during the exercise. This heavy visitor density resulted in several mis-coordinated program execution efforts, but incredible flexibility and responsiveness on the part of the USAREUR Joint Visitor Coordination Center and the V Corps Joint Visitor Bureau solved most problems before they were perceptible to the visitors. Training disruptions during future REFORGER exercises will be reduced significantly by implementation of the program to limit the length of each visitor's stay and to limit the activities which can be visited. Overall control will be maintained through a modified visitor operations organization which will facilitate an effective visitor flow plan.

n (U) Contracting, though accomplished, has not improved from previous REFORGERs. Difficulties continue to center on late submission and improper identification of requirements by both USAREUR MSCs and CONUS deploying units. Fragmented submission resulted in confusion as to what had been obtained and what remained to be contracted.

o. ~~(C)~~ Logistics initiatives and supporting logistics objectives were developed and exercised with the goal being to provide the fielded force the realistic type support expected to be available in times of increased tension and/or war as outlined in current doctrinal documents. With minor exceptions (as noted at Lessons Learned), the following objectives were successfully exercised:

- (1) ~~(C)~~ Maximize use of HNS through exercising of US Host Nation LOC support plans & the NATO Mutual Support Act of 1979 of HNS.
- (2) ~~(C)~~ Minimize US Army personnel in LOC and reception operations.
- (3) ~~(C)~~ Assess the viability of current out-of-sector logistical support plans.
- (4) ~~(C)~~ Assess the capability of Corps to effect requisite resupply of bulk POL using organic and augmentation bulk petroleum tank truck assets.

I-6

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- (5) ~~(C)~~ Determine capability for allied nations to provide food service support.
- (6) ~~(C)~~ Evaluate the capability of host nation support to meet laundry & bath requirements that exceed unit capabilities.
- (7) ~~(C)~~ Compress MAC air flow to test reception capability.
- (8) ~~(C)~~ Exercise and train CONUS CS and CD teams.
- (9) ~~(C)~~ Exercise US and NATO Transportation systems including Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg (BENELUX) lines of communication (LOC).
- (10) ~~(C)~~ Maximize deploying units self sustaining capability.
- (11) ~~(C)~~ Exercise US and Host Nation capabilities for strategic diversions and sea/air interface during onward movement.
- (12) ~~(C)~~ Review and evaluate applicable STANAGS.
- (13) ~~(C)~~ Deploy and exercise and automated port computer documentation systems (DASPS) elements at SPOD.
- (14) ~~(C)~~ Verify conditions and maintenance of POMCUS equipment and capability to expedite issues.
- (15) ~~(C)~~ Exercise USAREUR emergency air drop request procedures.
- (16) ~~(C)~~ Exercise Class V unit basic load upload.
- (17) ~~(C)~~ To exercise USAREUR's selected subordinate Class V resupply operations while in a high intensity battlefield environment.
- (18) ~~(C)~~ To evaluate capability of the Corps to manage internal bulk petroleum distribution in a decentralized mode.
- (19) ~~(C)~~ To evaluate combat service support for bulk petroleum resupply and distribution maximizing truck resupply east of the Rhine River.
- (20) ~~(C)~~ To evaluate interoperability procedures for the use of NATO documentation for bulk fuel uplifts from Central European Pipeline System (CEPS) fuel depots.
- (21) ~~(C)~~ To exercise and evaluate the HEROS-5 computerized road movement system during onward movement of CONUS deployed forces.
- (22) ~~(C)~~ To maximize host nation LOC operations through multiple seaport discharge and clearance operations.
- (23) ~~(C)~~ To exercise reinforcing unit organic capability to maintain missile and air defense gun systems.

6. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. ~~(C)~~ That compression of deployment and reception continue. Following

I-7

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measures are next steps toward making REFORGER a fully effective assessment tool.

(1) ~~(C)~~ Alternate exercise of Belgium and Netherlands LOCs to simulate surges of facilities expected in a rapid reinforcement situation:

- (a) ~~(C)~~ 84 Belgium LOC, 1 SPOD and 1 APOD
- (b) ~~(C)~~ 85 the Netherlands, 1 SPOD and 1 APOD

(2) (U) Activate fewer reception facilities ('84 and '85).

- (a) (U) 1 German reception APOD
- (b) (U) 1 BENELUX reception APOD
- (c) ~~(C)~~ Diversionary APODS

(3) ~~(C)~~ Further compress airflow and reception with goal being a division equivalent in 48 hours.

b. (U) That tactical realism in RCZ and COMMZ be developed by implementation of the following measures:

(1) ~~(C)~~ Development of a coordinated REFORGER and FTX OPFOR scenario, to include a NATO alert scenario.

(2) ~~(C)~~ Expansion of Host Nations rear area operations and security roles in REFORGER.

(3) (U) Expansion of COMMZ and RCZ interdiction by OPFOR:

(a) (U) UW OPFOR attacks on POMCUS sites and marshalling areas.

(b) (U) UW OPFOR attacks on reception facilities (APODS, SPODS, Staging Areas, etc).

(c) (U) Convoy route interdiction by UW OPFOR. (NOTE: All of these actions are proposed to develop the situation in the RCZ and COMMZ in line with the air-land battle doctrine).

C. (U) That logistics realism continue to be developed by implementation of the following measures:

(1) ~~(C)~~ Imaginative NATO interoperability initiatives.

(a) ~~(C)~~ Maximum host nation support.

(b) ~~(C)~~ Maximum cross-servicing agreements.

(2) ~~(C)~~ Further reductions of temporary loans.

(3) ~~(C)~~ Exercise operational project 39.

(4) (U) Exercise inland waterway movement of non-unit cargo.

(5) (U) Standardize Class I, II, and III (package) basic loads and resupply for participating units (Units Configured Loads).

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(6) (U) Exercise the air-lines of communications (ALOC) and the extended ALOC.

(7) ~~(C)~~ Exercise the USAREUR Wartime Movements Program (UWMP).

(8) (U) Eliminate "Iron Mountains".

(9) ~~(C)~~ Exercise self-sustaining capability of units whose equipment is deployed by sea.

(10) ~~(C)~~ Exercise self-sustaining capability of POMCUS units advanced parties.

(11) ~~(C)~~ Exercise fast sealift capability (SL-7).

(12) ~~(C)~~ Issue from POMCUS and sustain a modernized Armor Bde.

(13) ~~(C)~~ Eliminate unrealistic CL I and services practices.

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CINCUSAREUR REFORGER 83 AFTER ACTION REPORT (4019X) (U)
SECTION II--Statistical Data (U)

A. (U) REFORGER 83 FORCE PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION

1. (U) ACTIVE COMPONENT UNITS DEPLOYING FROM CONUS:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
Battle Staff, 3d Corps	Div Arty (-)
712th ASOC	- HHB
1st CD (-)	- 1-77th FA Bn (155)
	- 1-82d FA Bn (155)
	- 1-21st FA Bn (203)
	- E Btry (TAB) 82d FA
Division Troops	
- HHC	16th Sig Bn (-)
- 545th MP Bn	3d ACR(-)
- 15th FIN Co	1/75th Ranger Bn (-)
- 15th AG Co	11th Med (ACR)
- 312th MI Bn	105th Med Det Env
Division Base	293d MP Co
- 13th SIG Bn	595th Med Co (Clearing)
- 1-68th AD BN	140th TC (Contact Sup Tm)
- 8th ENG Bn	157th TC (Cargo Doc Tm)
- 1-9th Cav	160th TC (Contact Sup Tm)
- 227th AVN Bn	392th TC (Contact Sup Tm)
- 68th Chem	491st TC (Cargo Doc Tm)
DISCOM	11th MP Det (CID)
- HHC	16th AG Det (Postal)
- DMMC	61st ORD Det (EOD)
- 15th S & T Bn	1st Med Gp HHD*
- 15th Med Bn	15th MD (Combat Supt Hosp)
- 27th Maint Bn	227th Med Det (ENV)
1st Bde	248th Med Det (VET)
- HHC	514th Med Co (AMB)
- 2-8th Cav (AR Bn)	593d ASG
- 2-7th Cav (IN Bn)	702d Med Co (Clearing)
- 1-198th AR Bn (MS ARNG)	13th PA Det
2d Bde	50th PA Det
- HHC	
- 1-7th Cav (AR Bn)	
- 1-5th Cav (IN Bn)	

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2. (U) RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS DEPLOYING FROM CONUS:

UNIT

211 JAG (Intl Law)
1175th MP Co
363d AG Det (Postal)
11th SFG
HHD, 146th Trans Bn
180th Med Trk Co
412th ENCOM
221st AG Det (Repl)
867th AG Repl Det (Reg)
197th EW Element
331st MI Co (CI)
115th ASG
204th ASG
221st Int Law Tm
HHC, 377th TAACOM
544th MP Co
114th PA Det*
HHD, 210th MP Bn
213th ASG
273d MP Co
275th MP Co
277th Maint Co
300th ASG
HHC, 310th TAACOM
315th S&S Co
354th CA Bde, HHC
388th MEDSOM
403d AG Repl Det (Reg)
HHC, 413th S&S Bn
415th Chem Gp
435th Decon Det
436th Decon Det
HHD, 633d Maint Bn
1018th S&S Co
1729th Maint Co
2d POC
4th POC
14th PO Bn
20th POC
29th ATC Det (-)
54th CS Center
HHB, 2-103d FA

UNIT

C Btry 2-103d FA (-)
121st Med Trk Co
HHD, 130th Eng Bn
Co B, 130th Eng Bn
133d PA Det
Co G, 143d IN
240th Eng Gp
250th Eng Co
301st SC Co
HHD, 308th CA Gp
395th Ord Co (Ammo Convl)
441st Chem Det
443d CA Co
758th Maint Co
1009th S&S Co
2123d TC Co (Hvy Trk)

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B. (U) REFORGER 83 PERSONNEL STATISTICS

1. (U) PERSONNEL SERVICES:

a. MORALE SUPPORT

(1) (U) RECREATION KITS ISSUED

	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
SMALL GAME KITS	455	220
PAPERBACK BOOK KITS	<u>715</u>	<u>787</u>
TOTAL	1160	1007

(2) (U) ACTIVITIES AND PARTICIPATION:

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>		<u>PARTICIPATION/AUDIENCE</u>	
	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
BORDER TOURS	33	14	1,696	622
RECREATION TOURS	285	168	18,645	8,084
COMMERCIAL SHOWS	<u>147</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>56,667</u>	<u>26,542</u>
TOTAL	465	278	77,008	35,248

b. (U) POSTAL:

- (1) (U) MONEY ORDERS - \$25,613.14 sold.
- (2) (U) STAMPS SALES - \$3,025.92 sold
- (3) (U) CHECKS/MONEY ORDERS PAID - \$24,733.14

c. (U) USAPPCE DISPATCHED 20,098 RATIONS CARDS.

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2. (U) REFORMER 83 SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORTS (SIR):
- a. (U) TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS: FATAL/NONFATAL:
- | | | |
|---------------|-----|-------|
| CONUS BASED | - 3 | 1/10 |
| USAREUR BASED | - 8 | 10/30 |
- b. (U) TRAINING ACCIDENTS FATAL/NONFATAL:
- | | | |
|---------------|-----|-----|
| CONUS BASED | - 1 | 0/1 |
| USAREUR BASED | - 0 | 0/0 |
- c. (U) CRIMES OF VIOLENCE:
- | | |
|---------------|-------------------------------|
| CONUS BASED | - 1 (Foreign National Victim) |
| USAREUR BASED | - 0 |
- d. (U) CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY:
- | | |
|---------------|-----|
| CONUS BASED | - 2 |
| USAREUR BASED | - 7 |
- e. (U) DRUGS:
- | | |
|---------------|-----|
| CONUS BASED | - 0 |
| USAREUR BASED | - 0 |
- f. (U) WPN/AMMO: LOST/RECOVERED
- | | | |
|---------------|-----|-----|
| CONUS BASED | - 1 | 1/1 |
| USAREUR BASED | - 2 | 2/2 |
- g. (U) OTHER INCIDENTS: FATAL/NONFATAL:
- | | | |
|---------------|-----|-----|
| CONUS BASED | - 1 | 1/0 |
| USAREUR BASED | - 2 | 0/5 |
- h. (U) TOTAL SIRS RECIEVED:
- | | |
|---------------|------|
| CONUS BASED | - 9 |
| USAREUR BASED | - 19 |

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

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3. (U) REFORGER 83 MEDICAL SERVICES STATISTICS:

a. (U) PATIENT WORKLOAD: The following table summarizes the cumulative patient workload as of 1800Z, 31 Oct 83. Outpatient visits are not included.

<u>PATIENTS ADMITTED</u>	<u>USAREUR BASED UNITS</u>	<u>CONUS BASED</u>	<u>1983 TOTALS</u>	<u>1982 TOTALS</u>	<u>1981 TOTALS</u>
MEDDAC/MEDCEN	66	67	133	298	207
FIELD UNIT	206	108	314	177	271
TOTAL	272	175	447	475	478

b. (U) AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION (ARMY)

	<u>FLT HOURS</u>	<u>PATIENTS</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>
FTX CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE	317	145	92
FTX ATLANTIC LION	121	42	70
PHASE I, II, IV			
TOTAL	438	187	162
REFORGER 82 TOTALS	553	154	89
REFORGER 81 TOTALS	334	106	132

Page determined to be Unclassified
 Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
 IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
 Date: MAR 27 2013

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4. (U) REFORGER 83 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS:

a. (U) FATIGUE: (12 HRS OR MORE OF CONTINUOUS DUTY)

(U) AVERAGE TIME ON DUTY:

	TRACKED VEH	AMV	OTHER
USAREUR	8.5 HRS	8.1 HRS	7.6 HRS
CONUS	7.6 HRS	8.7 HRS	10.2 HRS

b. (U) DAY VS NIGHT OPERATIONS:

	DAY	NIGHT
TRACKED	21	11
AMV	85	33
OTHER	18	16

c. (U) POPULATION VS ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE:

CONUS	USAREUR	PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPANTS
32%	68%	PERCENTAGE OF ACCIDENTS

d. (U) CASUAL TOTALS:

CAUSE FACTOR	TOTAL ACCIDENTS	FATIGUE RELATED	INJURY RELATED
FAILURE TO MAINT CONTROL	15	3	6
EXCESSIVE SPEED	13	3	4
FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE	9	0	0
FAILURE TO YIELD	32	6	7
MISJUDGED CLEARANCE	16	0	4
ARMY NOT AT FAULT	42	9	14
MECHANICAL FAILURE	4	0	0
LIFTING, CONNECTING			
MISHANDLE OF EQUIPMENT	14	2	14
FALLS/SLIPS	5	1	5
PYROTECHNICS	2	0	4

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

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e. (U) COMPARISON OF ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE REFORGER 82-83

TYPE ACCIDENT		MILITARY			CIVILIAN	
		ACCIDENTS	INJ	FAT	INJ	FAT
		82-83	82-83	82-83	82-83	82-83
ARMY AIRCRAFT	CONUS	0-0	0-0	0-0	0-0	0-0
	USAREUR	4-6	0-4	0-0	0-0	0-0
ARMY MOTOR VEHICLES	CONUS	53-34	14-3	3-0	5-1	1-2
	USAREUR	76-84	20-21	0-0	9-6	4-4
TRACKED VEHICLES	CONUS	17-10	4-1	1-1	0-5	0-2
	USAREUR	22-22	11-1	1-0	3-2	2-2
FIRES	CONUS	1-0	1-0	0-0	0-0	0-0
	USAREUR	0-1	0-1	0-0	0-0	0-0
OTHER	CONUS	40-18	40-21	0-1	0-0	0-0
	USAREUR	50-16	48-11	0-0	0-4	0-0
SUB-TOTAL	CONUS	111-62	59-25	4-2	5-6	1-4
	USAREUR	152-129	79-38	1-0	12-12	6-6
TOTAL		263-191	138-63	5-2	17-18	7-10

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

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f. (U) REFORGER 83 ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE

<u>TYPE ACCIDENT</u>		<u>MILITARY</u>			<u>CIVILIAN</u>	
		<u>ACCIDENTS</u>	<u>INJ</u>	<u>FAT</u>	<u>INJ</u>	<u>FAT</u>
ARMY	CONUS	0	0	0	0	0
AIRCRAFT	USAREUR	6	4	0	0	0
ARMY MOTOR	CONUS	34	3	0	1	2
VEHICLES	USAREUR	84	21	0	6	4
TRACKED	CONUS	10	1	1	5	2
VEHICLES	USAREUR	22	1	0	2	2
FIRES	CONUS	0	0	0	0	0
	USAREUR	1	1	0	0	0
OTHER	CONUS	18	21	1	0	0
	USAREUR	16	11	0	4	0
SUB-TOTAL	CONUS	62	25	2	6	4
	USAREUR	<u>129</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTAL		191	63	2	18	10

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:

MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

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5. (U) REFORGER 83 AAFES FIELD SITE SUPPORT

<u>TYPE OF SUPPORT PROVIDED</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
a. (U) MOBILE UNITS (FOOD/RETAIL)	28
b. (U) CAMOUFLAGED RETAIL TRAILER	7
c. (U) BACK-UP STORAGE TRAILERS	14
d. (U) REFRIGERATION UNITS (TRAILERS/TRUCKS)	7
e. (U) MILITARY CLOTHING SALES TRAILERS	3
f. (U) AUV (SEDANS, COURIER VEH, RESUPPLY TRUCKS, ETC)	24
g. (U) CATALOG MAIL ORDER SERVICE	10
h. (U) CONCESSIONAIRE UNITS (PICK-UP POINTS-2)	15
i. (U) AMUSEMENT MACHINES	83
j. (U) NO FEE 16MM FILMS	117
k. (U) ADDITIONAL VENDING MACHINES (PRODUCT/SERVICE)	117
l. (U) DEPOT OPERATIONS (REFORGER MERCHANDISE SHIPMENTS)	87

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

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b. ~~(S)~~ ISSUE TIME SUMMARY

<u>SITE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ELAPSED TIME</u>	<u>WHEELS</u>	<u>TRACKS</u>	<u>TR.LRS</u>
1	545 MP CO	3:50	53	0	53
	1/77 FA BN	3:55	68	51	35
	1/5 FCAV (M)	9:05	70	95	51
	595 MED CLR	1:39	14	0	11
3	2/8 CAV (AR)	5:45	71	68	47
	1/9 CAV	8:26	60	62	39
4	13 SIG BN	10:17	119	0	51
	68 CHEM CO	2:34	28	0	14
5	11 MED CO	1:55	27	0	14
	1/3 ACR	9:21	82	147	49
	1/7 CAV (AR)	9:04	73	69	46
6	HHT/3 ACR	5:58	45	9	25
	ACT/3 ACR	2:58	17	0	12
	2/3 ACR	7:50	81	154	47
	43 ENG CO	5:36	23	11	19
	66 MI CO	7:21	50	9	35
	507 CHML	2:30	7	0	3
	89 CHML	:30	1	0	1
	15 CSH	3:50	24	0	32
	3/3 ACR	10:11	83	136	43
	702 MED CLR	3:25	15	0	11
7	HHC/2 BDE	3:25	24	6	18
	HBB/DIVARTY	3:30	53	1	22
	27 MAINT BN	10:45	182	4	98
	1/68 ADA	7:00	87	17	68
	1/21 FA	7:00	69	33	37
	1018 S&S CO	5:30	34	0	16
	312 MI BN	8:00	122	14	71
	277 MAINT CO	3:55	34	0	28
8	513 MAINT CO	5:40	71	1	37
	15 MED CO	4:50	78	0	50
	8 ENGR BN	12:50	135	33	63
	15 AG CO	2:10	11	0	8
	15 S&T BN	5:30	96	0	76
	HHC/1 CD	4:05	33	1	29

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

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<u>SITE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ELAPSED TIME</u>	<u>WHEELS</u>	<u>TRACKS</u>	<u>TLRS</u>
14	1/82D FA	3:58	74	57	37
	DMMC/1 CD	2:20	12	0	4
	275 MP CO	3:15	28	0	21
	HHC/1 BDE	1:40	24	6	17
	2/7 CAV (M)	5:58	68	94	55
15	HHC, 16 SIG BN	5:18	25	0	10
	A, 16 SIG BN	4:02	45	0	16
	B, 16 SIG BN	3:48	45	0	16
	514 AMBL CO	2:41	40	0	7
	1/198 AR	6:25	75	69	51
	HHC DISCOM	1:50	16	0	9

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

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c. (c) TURN-IN SUMMARY

	QTY ISSUED	QTY TURNED-IN BY UIC	% TURNED-IN BY UIC	QTY TURNED-IN BY 27 OCT	% TURNED-IN BY 27 OCT
WHEELS	2492	2469	99.1%	2480	99.5%
TRACKS	1147	1060	92.4%	1127	98.3%
TRLS	1502	1481	98.6%	1492	99.3%
TOTALS	5141	5010	97.5%	5099	99.2%

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

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d. ~~(C)~~ POMCUS EQUIPMENT MORTALITY SUMMARY

<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>QTY ISSUED</u>	<u>QTY FAILED</u>
M151A1	170	34
M151A2	444	56
M35A1	130	30
M35A2	438	73
M109A2	3	3
M109A3	57	3
M880	57	13
M882	40	1
M887	4	3
M885	21	2
M886	36	8
M52A2	12	2
M54A2	97	9
M50	11	1
M51	14	1
M543	3	3
M816	35	3
M818	57	11
M813A1	90	2
M113A1	379	17
M106A1	67	1
M548	12	3
M577A1	118	8
M901	15	1
M60A1	338	14
M110A2	11	1
M127	27	1
M101A1	56	1
M105A2	378	1
ANPRC-77	50	1
PU620 GEN	63	1
3KW GEN	81	1
10KW GEN	6	2

(U) NOTES:

~~(C)~~ M-151 Series 1/4 ton - 40% of problems attributed to the preservative oils used in preparation for storage (fogging).

~~(C)~~ M-35 Series 2 1/2 ton - 61% of problems attributed to a bad LOT # on Hydro-Vacs and Silicone Brake Fluid.

~~(C)~~ M-880 Series 1 1/4 ton - 60% of problems attributed to the preservative oils used in preparation for storage (fogging).

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

II-14

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e. ~~(S)~~ TURN-IN STATISTICS

UIC	UNIT	ELAPSED DAYS	ISSUED WH/TR/TL			TURNED-IN WH/TR/TL			% TURNED-IN BY UNIT	% TURNED-IN BY 27 OCT
AHA	545 MP	1	53	0	53	53	0	53	100%	100%
AHN	1/77 FA	7	68	51	35	67	51	34	99%	99%
AND	1/5 CAV	8	70	95	51	70	95	51	100%	100%
BN8	595 CLR	1.5	14	0	11	14	0	11	100%	100%
		1st CEC	205	146	150	204	146	149	99.6%	99.6%
HXF	2/8 CAV	7	71	68	47	70	68	47	99%	99%
AHM	1/9 CAV	7	60	62	39	59	61	39	99%	99%
		3rd CEC	131	130	86	129	129	86	99%	99%
AH2	13 SIG	5.75	119	0	51	119	0	51	100%	100%
A81	68 CHEM	1.75	28	0	14	28	0	14	100%	100%
		4th CEC	147	0	65	147	0	65	100%	100%
		CEBE	483	276	301	480	275	300	99.5%	99.5%
G2L	1/3 ACR	7	82	147	49	82	135	47	95%	95%
ASP	1/7 CAV	7	73	69	46	73	68	46	99%	99%
BMX	11 MED	2.75	27	0	14	27	0	14	100%	100%
		5th CEC	182	216	109	182	203	107	97%	97%

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

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QVP	702 MED	3.5	15	0	11	15	0	11	100%	100%
BH2	15 MED	2.75	24	0	32	24	0	32	100%	100%
G2N	3/3 ACR	7.5	83	136	43	83	113	40	90%	98%
E1T	507 CHEM	1.25	7	0	3	7	0	3	100%	100%
G8U	89 CHEM	1.25	1	0	1	1	0	1	100%	100%
DEG	43 ENG	4.5	23	11	19	23	11	19	100%	100%
AY8	HHT, 3 ACR	4.5	45	9	25	45	9	25	97%	97%
G2K	ACT, 3 ACR	2	17	0	12	17	0	12	100%	100%
GX5	66 MI	2.25	50	9	35	49	9	35	99%	99%
G2M	2/3 ACR	6.5	81	154	47	80	127	47	90%	99%
		6th CEC	346	319	228	343	268	225	94%	98%
AGG	HHC, 2 BDE	4	24	6	18	24	1	17	88%	100%
AJ6	HHB, DIV	4	53	1	22	53	1	22	100%	100%
XB5	158 MNT	5	34	0	28	33	0	25	94%	100%
AKT	27 MNT	6.5	182	4	98	180	4	95	98%	98%
A1A	1/68 ADA	6.5	87	17	68	87	17	68	100%	100%
H62	312 MI	4	122	14	71	122	14	70	99%	99%
EYM	1018 S&S	4	34	0	16	32	0	14	92%	100%
D3E	1/21 FA	5	69	33	37	68	19	37	88%	100%
		7th CEC	605	75	358	599	56	348	92%	99.4%
AGEA	HHC, 1 CAV	3.25	33	1	29	33	1	29	100%	100%
AGY	15 MED	6.5	78	0	50	78	0	49	99%	100%
AGQ	8 ENG	6.75	135	33	63	132	32	63	98%	99%
AGX	15 AG CO	2.25	11	0	8	11	0	8	100%	100%
E3D	513 MNT	5	71	1	37	68	1	35	95%	99%
AGZ	15 S&T	5	96	0	76	96	0	76	100%	100%
		8th CEC	424	35	263	418	34	260	99%	99.6%

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
 Authority: EO 13526
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
 Date: MAR 27 2013

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		CEBW	1557	645	958	1542	561	940	96%	99%
AGF	HHC, 1 BDE	3	24	6	17	24	6	16	98%	100%
AD1	2/7 CAV	3	68	94	55	68	94	55	100%	100%
AEA	1/82 FA	7.75	74	57	37	72	56	37	98%	100%
TJ9	273 MP	1	28	0	21	28	0	21	100%	100%
		14th CEC	194	157	130	192	156	129	99%	100%
AD5	1/198 AR	4.75	75	69	51	74	68	51	99%	99%
ADV	HHC, DISCOM	2	16	0	9	16	0	9	100%	100%
CECT	HHC, 16 SIG	4.5	25	0	10	25	0	10	100%	100%
CECA	A, 16 SIG	8	45	0	16	44	0	15	97%	98%
CECB	B, 16 SIG	8	45	0	16	44	0	16	98%	100%
P94	514 AMBL	2	40	0	7	40	0	7	100%	100%
H4Y	DMMC	1.5	12	0	4	12	0	4	100%	100%
		15th CEC	258	69	113	255	68	112	99%	99.5%
		CEBN	452	226	243	447	224	241	99%	99.8%

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

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2. (U) TRANSPORTATION AND MOVEMENTS.

a. (U) AIRFIELD OPERATIONS:

(1) (U) DEPLOYMENT (Reception Airfields)

<u>ARRIVAL AIRFIELD</u>	<u>TOTAL FLIGHTS</u>	<u>TOTAL PAX</u>	<u>CARGO (S/TON)</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>LATE FLIGHTS</u>	<u>% ON TIME</u>
RAMSTEIN	41	6,961	403	C141-21 C5A-1 DC8-3 B707-7 B747-9	5	88%
DUSSELDORF	36	2,951	272	C141-36	4	89%
RHEIN MAIN	23	2,819	180	C141-16 DC10-2 DC8-5	2	92%
LUXEMBOURG	10	1,054	41	C141-10	1	90%
BRUSSELS	9	669	74	C141-9	0	100%
SCHIPOL	12	1,168	30	C141-12	1	92%
TOTALS	131	15,622	1,000	N/A	13	90%

(2) (U) REDEPLOYMENT (Departure Airfields)

<u>DEPARTURE AIRFIELD</u>	<u>TOTAL FLIGHTS</u>	<u>TOTAL PAX</u>	<u>CARGO (S/TON)</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>LATE FLIGHTS</u>	<u>ON TIME</u>
Rhein Main	88	14,833	873	C141-55 1-DC8-11 DC10-5 B707-3 B747-14	15	83%
Ramstein	5	93	107	C141-5 C5A-1	1	80%
Schipol	5	272	50	C141-5	2	60%
TOTALS	99	15,198	1,030	N/A	18	82%

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

b. (U) SEAPORT OPERATIONS:

(1) (U) DEPLOYMENT (SPOD):

<u>PORT</u>	<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>ARRIVAL</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>	<u>WHEELED VEH/TLR</u>	<u>TRACK VEH</u>	<u>CONEX/ MILVAN</u>	<u>LONG TONS</u>	<u>MEASUREMENT TONS</u>
ROTTERDAM	CYGNUS	130750Z SEP	131357Z SEP	181/97	42	33/18	1,871	11,675
VLISSINGEN	AMERICAN RAPID	122150Z SEP	131850Z SEP	182/130	0	2/20	1,686	9,531
ANTWERP	AMERICAN EAGLE	121645Z SEP	130345Z SEP	<u>349/201</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>8/111</u>	<u>2,366</u>	<u>13,748</u>
TOTALS				712/428	48	43/149	5,923	34,954

(2) REDEPLOYMENT (SPOE):

<u>PORT</u>	<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>SAILED</u>	<u>WHEELED VEH/TLR</u>	<u>TRACK VEH</u>	<u>CONEX/ MILVAN</u>	<u>LONG TONS</u>	<u>MEASUREMENT TONS</u>
BREMERHAVEN	AMERICAN EAGLE	120620Z OCT	358/203	43	6/131	3,261	18,532
	ADM CALLAGHAN	250700Z OCT	<u>299/184</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>45/103</u>	<u>2,877</u>	<u>16,672</u>
TOTALS			657/387	51	51/234	6,138	35,204

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11-19

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Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RPD, VHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

c. (U) CONVOY OPERATIONS (CONUS FORCES ONLY):

(1) (U) DEPLOYMENT:

	<u>CONVOYS</u>	<u>WHEELS</u>	<u>TRACKS</u>
EXERCISE ATLANTIC LION	43	571	216
EXERCISE CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE	26	586	59
TOTAL	86	1,157	275

<u>CONVOY ORIGINS</u>	<u># OF CONVOYS</u>
POMCUS:	53
PORTS:	16

(2) (U) REDEPLOYMENT

<u>TOTAL ORIGIN</u>	<u>TOTAL VEHICLES</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>CONVOYS</u>
NORTHAG	325	POMCUS	12
CENTAG	430	POMCUS	16
	755		28

Page determined to be Unclassified
 Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
 IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
 Date: MAR 27 2013

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d. (U) RAIL OPERATIONS:

(1) (U) DEPLOYMENT:

ORIGIN	DESTINATION	TOTAL TRAINS	TOTAL LATE	% ON TIME
PORT	CENTAG	1	0	100%
PORT	NORTHAG	6	0	100%
POMCUS	CENTAG	15	3	80%
POMCUS	NORTHAG	55	25	55%
IN-COUNTRY	CENTAG	54	34	37%
IN-COUNTRY	NORTHAG	20	5	75%
TOTALS		54	34	66%

84 - TRAINS ARRIVED ON TIME
 22 - TRAIN ARRIVED LATE 1 HR
 9 - TRAIN ARRIVED LATE 2 HRS
 36 - TRAIN ARRIVED LATE 3 HRS+

(2) (U) REDEPLOYMENT

ORIGIN	DEST	TOTAL TRAINS	LATE ARRIVAL TRAINS	% ARRIVED ON TIME
CENTAG	PORT	15	0	100%
NORTHAG	PORT	17	1	94%
CENTAG	POMCUS	18	4	78%
NORTHAG	POMCUS	61	8	87%
CENTAG	IN-COUNTRY	61	23	62%
NORTHAG	IN-COUNTRY	24	1	96%
TOTALS		196	37	81%

159 - TRAINS ARRIVED ON TIME
 15 - TRAINS ARRIVED LATE 1 HR
 6 - TRAINS ARRIVED LATE 2 HR
 16 - TRAINS ARRIVED LATE 3 HR+

Page determined to be Unclassified
 Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
 IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
 Date: MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

e. (U) INTRA-THEATER TACTICAL AIRLIFT:

(1) (U) AIR-AIR

<u>DEPARTURE</u> <u>AIRFIELD</u>	<u>ARRIVAL</u> <u>AIRFIELD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>FLIGHTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>(S/TON)</u>	<u>TYPE</u> <u>A/C</u>
LUXEMBOURG	KARLSRUHE	5	287	14	C130
	MOENCHENGLADBACH	7	424	19	
	ZWEIBRUECKEN	8	470	24	
TOTAL		20	1,181	57	

(2) (U) SEA-AIR

<u>DEPARTURE</u> <u>AIRFIELD</u>	<u>ARRIVAL</u> <u>AIRFIELD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>FLIGHTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>(S/TON)</u>	<u>TYPE</u> <u>A/C</u>
GILZE-RIJEN, NL	HANAU	29	162	158	C130
DUERNE, BE	HANAU	15	40	102	C160
DUERNE, BE	WIESBADEN	13	45	64	
TOTAL		57	247	324	

(3) (U) AERIAL RESUPPLY

- (A) (U) TOTAL MISSIONS REQUESTED: 38
- (B) (U) TOTAL MISSIONS FLOWN: 35 (34 CONTAINER DELIVERY SYSTEMS (CDS) AND 1 LOW ALTITUDE PARACHUTE EXTRACTION SYSTEM (LAPES)).

Page determined to be Unclassified
 Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
 IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
 Date: MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

3. (U) POL USAGE:

(U) PRODUCT

TOTAL QUANTITY ISSUED (GAL)

DF2 (F54)	2,034,000
JP4 (F40)	1,617,000
MG1 (F46)	885,000

4. (U) PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY SUMMARY (REPORTS OF SURVEY):

CEC	NO OF SURVEYS	LIABILITY	LOSS OF GOV'T	TOTAL
1	3	855.00	72,687.89	73,542.89
3	5	0	13,714.33	13,714.33
4	3	0	5,619.28	5,619.28
5	26	965.10	242,226.88	243,191.88
6	40	1,417.50	47,641.68	49,059.18
7	37	5,351.93	36,643.5	41,995.43
8	15	0	17,267.91	17,267.91
14	15	0	15,405.82	15,405.82
15	13	2,165.30	19,116.97	21,282.27
TOTALS	157	10,754.83	470,324.26	481,078.99

Page determined to be Unclassified
 Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
 IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
 Date: MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

D. (U) REFORGER 83 PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. (U) USAREUR AUDIO VISUAL OPERATIONS:

a. (U) AUDIO VISUAL SERVICES SUMMARY

VIDEO PRODUCTION FEATURES RELEASED:	47
BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOS RELEASED:	762
COLOR SLIDE ROLLS 35MM (36 EXP)	348
COLOR NEGATIVE 35MM ROLLS (20 EXP)	45

b. (U) DISTRIBUTION VIDEO FEATURES

AFN-E, FRANKFURT, GERMANY
DA-SAPA, ELECTRONICS MEDIA SERVICES BRANCH, WASHINGTON, D.C.
AUDIO VISUAL DIVISION (DoD), OASD-PA, WASHINGTON, D.C.
SOLDIER'S TV MAGAZINE, SAPA-CI, WASHINGTON, D.C.
CABLE NEWS NETWORK, FOREIGN DESK, ATLANTA, GA
BELGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH USDAO AMERICAN EMBASSY
SEB (SOUTHERN BROADCASTING), ITLAY
USAREUR LIAISON OFFICE, PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C.
SATELLITE NEWS CHANNEL, STAMFORD, CT
HOST NATIONS, USAREUR HQ (HEIDELBERG, GERMANY)
AFCENT RESERVE CORPS (FWD), MAASTRICHT, NETHERLANDS
CEGE (COMBAT EQUIPMENT GROUP, EUROPE), MANNHEIM, GERMANY
USEUCOM, PAO, EUROPE (STUTTGART, GERMANY)
SWEDISH DEFENSE ATTACHE, STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN
ODCSOPS/EXERCISE DIVISION AND FORCE MODERNIZATION DIVISION
(HEIDELBERG, GERMANY)
MTMC (MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND), WASHINGTON, D.C.

c. (U) DISTRIBUTION STILL PHOTOGRAPHY

EURARMY MAGAZINE, EUROPE
ARMY TIMES, WASHINGTON, D.C.
STARS & STRIPES, DARMSTADT, GERMANY
SOLDIER'S MAGAZINE, ALEXANDRIA, VA
HQDA (SAPA-MRD), WASHINGTON, D.C.
ARMOR MAGAZINE, FT KNOX, KY
DEFENSE MAGAZINE, ARLINGTON, VA
ARMY RESERVE MAGAZINE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
INFANTRY MAGAZINE, FT BENNING, GA
AUDIO VISUAL DIVISION (DoD), OASD-PA, WASHINGTON, D.C.
CEGE (COMBAT EQUIPMENT GROUP, EUROPE), MANNHEIM, GERMANY
USEUCOM PAO, GERMANY
JVCC, RHEIN MAIN, GERMANY
AMERICAN EMBASSY, BONN GERMANY

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

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USNMR-SHAPE, NATIONAL MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE
POLAD, KEYES, BUILDING
MG BALL, PROGRAM MANAGER M-1 ABRAMS TANK SYSTEMS, WARREN, MI
AFCENT RESERVE CORPS (FWD), MAASTRICHT, NETHERLANDS
OPCA, USAREUR/PAB BRIEFING
AUSA CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
ODCSOPS/EXERCISE DIVISION AND FORCE MODERNIZATION DIVISION
MTC (MILITARY MANAGEMENT COMMAND), WASHINGTON, D.C.

d. (U) PERSONNEL

CIVILIAN		4
MILITARY		21
ATLANTIC LION	12	
CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE	9	
TOTAL PERSONNEL:		25

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:

MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

2. (U) FTX PRESS COVERAGE

a. (U) CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE

WIRE SERVICES:	AP UPI	SYGMA PHOTO SERVICE DPA
TELEVISION:	ABC CBS ZDF WESTDEUTCHER RUNDFUNK NOS	ARD NBC SATV HESSISCHER RUNDFUNK JAPAN BROADCASTING ARMY/AIR FORCE HOMETOWN NEWS CENTER
MAGAZINES:	US NEWS & WORLD REPORT NEWSWEEK DER SPIEGEL AFRICAN DEFENSE	TIME NAVY TIMES ARMY TIMES
NEWSPAPERS:	NEW YORK TIMES WASHINGTON TIMES NAVY TIMES CHICAGO SUN TIMES NUMEROUS LOCAL GERMAN PAPERS HOKAIDO SHIMBUN NEW ZEALAND PRESS ASSOCIATION	BILD AM SONNTAG DIE WELT FRANKFURT RUNDSCHAU ARMY TIMES FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG SANKI SHIMBUN
TOTAL REGISTERED:	201	

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

b. (U) ATLANTIC LION

WIRE SERVICES:	AP UPI REUTERS ANP, ANP PHOTO PHOTO PRESS INTERNATIONAL	DPA WORLDWIDE NEWS SERVICE NETHERLANDS PHOTO & FILM SERVICE
TELEVISION:	ABC ARD SATV NCRV EO JAPAN BROADCASTING	NBC ZDF TROS KCNA WESTDEUTCHER FUNDFUNK
MAGAZINES:	US NEWS & WORLD REPORT NEWSWEEK READER'S DIGEST LLFA LEGER KORPS	TIME AVIS NATIONAL RESERVE DEFENSIE KRANT
NEWSPAPERS:	NEWSWEEK NEW YORK TIMES WASHINGTON TIMES BOSTON GLOBE ARMY TIMES OFF ROYAL MAGAZINE KILLEN DAILY HERALD DE TELEGRAF ONS LEGER LA TIMES	DER SPIEGEL BILD AM SONNTAG DIE WELT FRANKFURT RUNDSCHAU NUMEROUS LOCAL GERMAN PAPERS DE STEM EINDHOVEN DAGBALD WNSCHEDE DAGBKAD
TOTAL REGISTERED:	410	

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

c. (U) RECEPTION AND ONWARD MOVEMENT

WIRE SERVICES: RUSH PHOTO SERVICE AP PHOTO
CAPITAL PRESS & PHOTO SERVICE

TELEVISION: ARMY/AIR FORCE ABC
HOMETOWN NEWS CENTER
SATV

MAGAZINES: TIME DEFENSIE KRANT
NEWSWEEK US NEWS & WORLD REPORT
SOLDIER'S

NEWSPAPERS: EINDHOVEN DAGBLAD
KILEEN DAILY HERALD

TOTAL REGISTERED: 278

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

F. (U) REFORGER 83 VISITOR STATISTICS

1. (U) FOLLOWING IS A COMPARISON TO THE 1981 AND 1982 ATTENDANCE FIGURES:

<u>PHASE</u>	<u>TOTAL NUMBER OF VISITORS</u>		
	<u>1983</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1981</u>
LOC	39	50	8
POMCUS	73	89	29
FTX	<u>295</u>	<u>395</u>	<u>225</u>
TOTAL	407	534	262

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

G. (U) REFORGER 83 STATISTICAL FUNDING:

1. (U) PROGRAM 208011 EXPANDED IN (\$000)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
V CORPS	4441	1,159	5,600
VII CORPS	2776	883	3,659
21 SUPCOM	7359	3,800	11,159
4th TRANS	422	109	531
32 AADCOM (JVCC)	310	81	391
7 MEDCOM	99	354	453
USBA	716	207	923
ALL OTHERS	24	1	25
	16,147	*6,594	22,741

* PROJECTIONS SUBJECT

2. (U) PORT HANDLING/INLAND TRANSPORTATION - (\$000)

	<u>FY 83 (DEPLOYMENT)</u>	<u>FY 84 (REDEPLOYMENT)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
4 TRANS	1,426	*775	2,201

* PROJECTED FINAL COST

20,8011	22,741
PH/IT	<u>2,201</u>
TOTAL	24,942

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MINOR SUBJECT AREAS Continued

PSYOPS	PY	Reconnaissance OPS	RC
Rules of Engagement	RE	Civil Comm Systems	SC
Security Assistance	SA	Security, General	SE
Supply/Maintenance	SM	Special Networks	SN
Supply	SP	Switched Systems	SS
Subsistence	SU	Threat Assessment	TA
Traffic Management	TM	Training	TN
Transportation	TR	Tactical Systems	TS
Unconventional Warfare	UW	Exercise Design	XD

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-31

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

CINCUSAREUR REFORGER 83 AFTER ACTION REPORT (4019X) (U)

SECTION III--Lessons Learned (U)

(U) The coding system used in numbering each lesson consists of four letters and a two-digit number. The first letter corresponds to one of the three parts of this section. The second letter and the third and fourth letters pertain respectively to the major and minor subject areas as established by USEUCOM for After Action Reporting (see below). The number corresponds to the sequential paging of this report.

MAJOR SUBJECT AREAS (U)

SUBJECT	CODE	SUBJECT	CODE
Personnel	PER-P	Intelligence	INT-I
Operations	OPS-O	Logistics	LOG-L
Plans & Policy	APP-A	Communications	COM-C
Exercise Design	EXD-E	Non-Military	NON-N

MINOR SUBJECT AREAS

Alert/Warning System	AW	Base Development	BD
Crisis Action System	CA	Command and Control	CC
Civil Disturbance	CD	Casualties	CL
Comm Security	CS	Defense Comm System	DS
Engineer	EN	EOP/FAP/...	EO
Personnel	ER	Electronic Warfare	EW
Industrial Base	IB	Joint Reporting System	JR
Manpower	MA	Mobilization	MB
Mapping Charting & Geodesy	MC	Medical	MD
Maintenance	MN	Medical Supply	MS
Mobility	MT	MEFCN/ERCS/...	ME
Naval Operations	NA	NBC Operations	NB
NCA/NSC/WASG/...	NC	Noncombatant Evacuation	NE
No-Notice	NN	Naval Control Shipping	NO
National Comm Systems	NS	Intelligence	NT
	NU	Navigation	NV
Order of Battle	OB	Logistics	OG
Communications	OM	Non-Military	ON
Operations Security	OS	Public Affairs	PA
Property Disposal	PD	Political	PL
Planning	PN	Pol & Fuels	PO
Plans & Policy	PP	Operations	PS
Prisoners of War	PW	Pre-Exercise Play	PX

OSD 3.3(b)(1),(5)

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III-31-A

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: ODCSPER (SAFETY)

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
HQ USAREUR (ODCSOPS, ODCSPER - SAFETY)
NUMBER: A-PCL-32

(U) TITLE: Ground Guides for Vehicles

(U) PROBLEM: Improper Use of Ground Guides

(U) DISCUSSION: Several accidents occurred because of improper use of ground guides.

A. (U) Several backing accidents occurred because ground guides were not properly used.

B. (U) Several accidents occurred when oversize vehicles were moved through limited clearance areas without ground guides.

(U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. (U) Insure vehicle drivers are instructed to use ground guides when backing vehicles, particularly in congested and bivouac areas.

B. (U) Insure ground guides are utilized when moving oversize vehicles through limited clearance areas such as towns.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-32

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: ODCSPER (SAFETY)

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
HQ USAREUR (ODCSOPS, ODCSPER - SAFETY)
NUMBER: A-PCL-33

(U) TITLE: Accident Cause Factor

(U) PROBLEM: Failure to Yield the Right of Way

(U) DISCUSSION: A large number of Army vehicles were involved in accidents where the Army driver failed to yield the right of way.

A. (U) Several accidents involved Army vehicles turning left and striking passing vehicles.

B. (U) A number of accidents occurred as Army vehicles entered a primary road from a secondary road and struck vehicles on the primary road.

(U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. (U) Insure drivers in vehicles equipped with turn signals utilize the turn signals and verify the road is clear before initiating a left turn.

B. (U) Insure all drivers are briefed prior to the exercise, and as needed, on rules of right of way in Germany.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-33

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: ODCSRM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSRM
NUMBER: A-PMA-35

(U) TITLE: Finance Service Support

(U) PROBLEM: Accurate identification of Finance Service Support Requirements was not provided in a timely manner.

(U) DISCUSSION: Experience has shown that the problem of rendering efficient finance service support during REFORGER revolves around timely coordination and accurate identification of unit finance support requirements to servicing finance personnel. For example, lack of detailed coordination and reliable estimation concerning cash support requirements resulted in a finance office improperly positioning 2.8 million dollars which results in an unnecessary expense to the U. S. Government.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: In future exercises, strongly recommend that commanders give more detailed/accurate and timely attention to unit finance service support needs and ensure that unit requirements are made known to Division Finance Support Officer or supporting finance personnel.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 7th MEDCOM

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
POC: HQ 7th MEDCOM (ACSOPS)
NUMBER: A-PMA-36

(U) TITLE: Reserve Component Augmentee

(U) PROBLEM: Participation of Reserve Component Augmentees

(U) DISCUSSION: Contacts with Reserve Component clinical personnel revealed an inadequate orientation of REFORGER operations and lack of proper integration into exercise planning. RC personnel were not well briefed on what the exercise requirements were or how they fit into the overall scheme of things. Upon arrival in country, transportation was a problem between point of arrival and assignment destination. Late notice to HQ 7th MEDCOM resulted in late notification of gaining units and created a difficult process of integration into medical staff schedules at those medical treatment facilities.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Reserve Component Augmentee positions be designated early, personnel briefed sufficiently and included in the Time Phased Force Deployment List for the scheduled REFORGER.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: ODCSPER (SAFETY)

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
HQ USAREUR (ODCSOPS, ODCSPER - SAFETY)
NUMBER: A-POG-37

(U) TITLE: Vehicle Warning Lights

(U) PROBLEM: Inadequate Lighting of Army Vehicles

(U) DISCUSSION: Several accidents occurred because Army Vehicles were not adequately lit during limited visibility.

A. (U) Several accidents occurred when oversize/overweight vehicles on public roads did not utilize a rotating amber warning light, per regulation, and were struck by privately owned vehicles.

B. (U) Several accidents occurred when privately owned vehicles struck Army vehicles that were not fitted with intermediate turn signal lights, side clearance lights, or side marker lamps.

(U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. (U) Insure oversize/overweight vehicles driven on public roads are equipped with a rotating amber warning light. This requires coordination with the TANK-Automotive Command in developing a mounting kit for the light.

B. (U) Insure Army vehicles are fitted with side clearance lamps, intermediate turn signal lamps, and side marker lamps where required. These lamps are presently available for retrofit on most wheeled vehicles only.

C. (U) Insure installed vehicle lighting is operational at all times.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: SGS, HQ USAREUR

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: SGS, HQ USAREUR
NUMBER: A-POM-38

(U) TITLE: Visitor Operations

(U) PROBLEM: Communications.

(U) DISCUSSION: Communications links between the USAREUR OSGS and the USAREUR JVCC were sparse, and were virtually nonexistent between the USAREUR OSGS and the MSC JVB. The only secure means of communication for the USAREUR OSGS was via a leased TELEX and ELKROTEL. Means had to be developed to discuss itineraries over nonsecure military telephone lines, which were often busy anyway.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

A. (U) TASS secure voice system be installed in USAREUR OSGS as part of the standard REFORGER exercise requirement.

B. (U) A Deutsche Bundespost telephone, with control key, be installed in USAREUR OSGS during REFORGER primary planning and execution phases for visitor operations.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: AFCENT Reserve Corps
(FWD)

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSPER
NUMBER: A-PPP-39

(U) TITLE: Inconsistent Policies

(U) PROBLEM: Inconsistency in unit policies regarding off limits restrictions and the "non-drinking" rule for exercises.

(U) DISCUSSION:

A. (U) Netherlands and US authorities were confused as to what rules were in effect for various units.

B. (U) The personnel assigned to the Press Center and the AFCENT SUPACT/300th ASG had no restriction on going out of the training areas/kazernes and drinking alcohol as long as it was done after 1700 hrs in civilian clothes. The 2AD (FWD) had a No Drinking rule and restricted troops to the training areas/kazernes except to mission essential trips. The 1st AD had a No Drinking rule but allowed soldiers to go off the training areas/kazernes in BDU's. The 1st CAV Div had a No Drinking rule and initially allowed troops to go off the training areas (this was changed to a restriction to the training areas).

C. (U) The Netherlands authorities were informed during the planning stages that US soldiers would not be allowed to drink alcoholic beverages and that they would be restricted to training areas/kazernes.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That future exercises require all soldiers to follow the same set of rules.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-39

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: ODCSPER (SAFETY)

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
HQ USAREUR (ODCSOPS, ODCSPER - SAFETY)
NUMBER: A-PPP-40

(U) TITLE: Life Preservers for Water Operations

(U) PROBLEM: Inadequate Supply of Personal Flotation Devices

(U) DISCUSSION: During river-crossing operations there was an inadequate US military supply of personal flotation devices (PFD).

A. (U) During REFORGER 83 river crossings were accomplished utilizing commercial ferries which provided PFD for US military personnel.

B. (U) Regulations require PFD be worn by all personnel while crossing in bodies of water in US military vehicles.

C. (U) There was not a sufficient number PFD available if vehicle swimming operations had been planned for REFOREGER 83.

(U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. (U) Insure adequate supply of PFD are available for future planned vehicle swimming operations.

B. (U) Update USAREUR Reg 385-2, Amphibious Operations, to include rules governing use of PFD while on commercial ferries.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-40

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: ODCSPER

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
POC: HQ USAEUR (ODCSPER)
NUMBER: A-PPS-41

(U) TITLE: Red Cross Vehicles and Drivers

(U) PROBLEM: The USAEUR REFORGER EXOPORD provided for vehicles for stateside Red Cross representatives but not drivers in the planning for FTX Confident Enterprise.

(U) DISCUSSION: In the planning for FTX Confident Enterprise, CONUS based Red Cross personnel discovered that there had been no provisions made for drivers of the vehicles to be provided. Last minute coordination had to be accomplished to obtain drivers.

(U) RECOMMENDATIONS: That CONUS based Red Cross personnel be required to obtain USAEUR drivers licenses prior to deployment allowing them to drive their own vehicles during the exercise.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-41

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 1st PERSCOM

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
POC: HQ USAREUR (ODCSPER, 1st PERSCOM)
NUMBER: A-PPS-42

- (U) TITLE: REFORGER Tours
- (U) PROBLEM: Late tour cancellations
- (U) DISCUSSION:

A. (U) Tour programs should not be set up in advance, except at the request of a unit commander. In Hanau, thirteen buses had to be cancelled for a total cost to the government of DM 6200. Because of the spontaneous nature of exercise requirements, soldiers are not always able to participate in tours whose departure times have been predetermined without staff knowledge of the exercise schedule. Soldiers sign up for tours in advance, but then do not show up at departure time, for whatever reason.

B. (U) Since JCS funds by regulation cannot be used to reimburse local tour guides or to pay admission fees (to castles, museums, etc) tour participants must bring DMs and pay these expenses themselves. This was not fully explained to unit commanders, some of whom interpreted "Free REFORGER Tours" to mean just that and who were upset when they learned that there were costs for the participants.

C. (U) The funds used to pay for the tours are transferred to the installation transportation office whose staff then orders buses. In some communities, there was little or no coordination between the ITT staff and the ITO staff. The ITO did not have enough vendors under contract that operated buses equipped with WC's nor were local city tour guides arranged for.

(U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. (U) Tour programs should be set up on a request basis rather than a predetermined schedule which allows no flexibility. Bus vendors should be contracted on an open-ended basis; unit commanders of CONUS deployed units and their host unit commanders should be provided with a list of destinations (and a description of what constitutes a tour, to include patron out-of-pocket expenses) in the months prior to the exercise. With 48 hours notice, a unit commander can request a tour to the destination of his choice for the precise number of passengers desired. This is the system used by the Baumholder staff with success and without any tour cancellations.

B. (U) Unit commanders and passengers must be informed that the tour transportation is "free," but tour guides, admission fees to points of interest, and overnight accommodations at AFRC are out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the tour participants.

C. (U) In each location providing tours, the ITO and ITT staff must work closely together on the specifications of the tours, transportation, local guides and other relevant matters. If the ITO-contracted vendors cannot provide the quality or quantity of buses required, then the possibility of rolling funds over the "S" account for use by the ITT directors should be explored so that local vendors can be contracted who can fulfill the requirements.

III-42

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: SGS, HQ USAREUR

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: SGS, HQ USAREUR
NUMBER: A-PXD-43

(U) TITLE: Visitor Operations

(U) PROBLEM: Late acceptances by CINCUSAREUR invitees.

(U) DISCUSSION: RSVP from several distinguished visitors were received only a few days before the visitor's scheduled arrival, although the invitations were mailed in May with a response requested by 1 July. Execution of a visitor support plan was made needlessly hectic.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

A. (U) Insure that invitations were received. The last reminder should state politely the assumption that the invitee will not visit REFORGER, and that his file will be so annotated.

B. (U) Send periodic reminders to those visitors who have not responded to CINCUSAREUR invitations.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-43

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: SGS, HQ USAREUR

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: SGS, HQ USAREUR
NUMBER: A-PXD-44

(U) TITLE: Visitor Operations

(U) PROBLEM: Last-minute uncoordinated itinerary changes.

(U) DISCUSSION: Both visitors and commanders changed itineraries, often without telling each other. Several visitors were taken to units or activities they neither wanted nor planned to visit, and several visitors visited units or activities where they were neither expected nor particularly welcome. Transportation schedules were disrupted, escorts were left behind, and unit training was needlessly disrupted.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Limit available visitor options to pre-selected itinerary "events" (NOT Demonstrations). Essentially, offer each visitor a limited choice of units and activities to visit each day, then do not deviate from the choices. USAREUR Joint Visitors Coordination Center (JVCC) must be the sole point of contact for all visitors prior to their arrival for a REFORGER visit.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-44

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: SGS, HQ USAREUR

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: SGS, HQ USAREUR
NUMBER: A-PXD-45

(U) TITLE: Visitor Operations

(U) PROBLEM: Excessive length of visit.

(U) DISCUSSION: Several visitors came to REFORGER 83 in early September and remained until early October, placing excessive demands upon the visitor support system. The average length of visits follows:

- A. (U) CINCSAREUR invited visitor: 2.2 days
- B. (U) CONUS MACOM quota visitors: 8.7 days
- C. (U) USAREUR MSC quota visitors: 1.45 days
- D. (U) Other (self-invited) visitors: 9.46 days

E. (U) Many of these long-term visitors simply "got-in-the-way" of units trying to train. Key areas of interest can be seen by most visitors in two days.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

A. (U) Limit all visit lengths to two full days. Day of arrival and day of departure would be "zero" days, with no impact on the exercise.

B. (U) Reclassify those who are not true visitors (e.g., CEWI Evaluation Team) as "participant advisors" and allow them to place no demands on either the training units or the visitor support system. They would be advisors or observers on a strictly non-interference basis.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:

MAR 27 2013

III-45

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: SGS, HQ USAREUR

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: SGS, HQ USAREUR
NUMBER: A-PXD-46

(U) TITLE: Visitor Operations

(U) PROBLEM: Visitor support operations--personnel expertise

(U) DISCUSSION: Proper expertise and knowledge of elementary protocol need improvement across the board. Personnel at both the USAREUR JVCC and at the MSC JVB were guilty of simple faux pas which should never have occurred. Both the JVCC and JVB lacked a full complement of personnel knowledgeable in the treatment of distinguished visitors.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

A. (U) USAREUR SGS exercise staff supervision over both USAREUR JVCC and MSC JVB.

B. (U) MSC SGS exercise direct control over MSC JVB.

C. (U) Establish a more stringent selection process for augmentees to USAREUR JVCC.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-46

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: SGS, HQ USAREUR

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: SGS, HQ USAREUR
NUMBER: A-PXD-47

(U) TITLE: Visitor Operations

(U) PROBLEM: Contingency visitor plan for scaled-down FTX.

(U) DISCUSSION: Because of adverse weather conditions and maneuver damage possibilities, scaling down FTX CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE to a CFX was considered only one day prior to scheduled STARTEX. Had this happened, USAREUR and V Corps would have had literally hundreds of REFORGER visitors in the exercise area with very few places to take them and very few things to show them.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Following contingency plans be developed:

A. (U) What to do with visitors during exercise.

B. (U) HQ USAREUR OSGS and USAREUR JVCC develop a method to notify rapidly all visitors who have not yet arrived of the exercise change and to determine rapidly whether they still plan to attend.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-47

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: SGS, HQ USAREUR

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: SGS, HQ USAREUR
NUMBER: A-PXD-48

(U) TITLE: Visitor Operations

(U) PROBLEM: Aviation support.

(U) DISCUSSION: A major drawback occurred in the reliance by the USAREUR JVCC (Frankfurt Flughafen) on the 56th Aviation Company at Coleman Barracks in Mannheim for air transportation support. Many aircraft missions wasted almost an hour of "empty" helicopter blade time transiting between Mannheim and Frankfurt. The 56th also has a policy of not "hopping over the horizon" from Mannheim to Heidelberg, requiring either many visitors to drive from HQ USAREUR to Mannheim and back to Heidelberg, requiring either many visitors to drive from HQ USAREUR to Mannheim to catch a flight, or to fly to Frankfurt in a 207th aircraft in order to meet a 56th aircraft which flew to Frankfurt empty.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Dedicate air assets to USAREUR JVCC and station these assets, with their supporting maintenance, at Rhein-Main AB during the 3-week primary execution phase of the REFORGER Visitors Program.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-48

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 1st PERSCOM

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
POC: HQ USAREUR (ODCSPER, 1st PERSCOM)
NUMBER: A-PXD-49

(U) TITLE: MWR Support

(U) PROBLEM: Acquisition of Real Property for use in support of REFORGER MWR Requirements.

(U) DISCUSSION: By regulation, Joint Chiefs of Staffs (JCS) monies designated for MWR support may not be used to purchase items that are not "consumable," however, requirements exist to purchase some items of equipment such as table tennis tables, video playback units and television sets in order to properly provide services for large numbers of patrons located at redeployment assembly areas. The current practice is to pull the required equipment from existing facilities within the host community at the expense of local ongoing programs. The equipment is subjected to long hours of use in dusty, often inadequately heated facilities (tents). When the equipment is worn out or damaged beyond repair, it is the local community program that suffers. In some cases, the host community MSA may not own the equipment required. Such was the case at Schweinfurt, where two video playback units had to be commissioned for use at Hammelburg RAA at a cost of \$900. There is now a question as to how this money will be reimbursed.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That policies relating to use of JCS funds be reviewed taking into consideration the necessity to purchase "state of the art" non-consumable recreational equipment (16mm projectors, video playback units, electronic games to use with TV sets etc) required to provide MWR programs at redeployment assembly areas.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-49

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER 1st PERSOON

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
POC: HQ USAREUR (ODCSPE, 1st PERSCOM)
NUMBER: A-PXD-50

(U) TITLE: Book Kits

(U) PROBLEM: Insufficient quantities of library book kits.

(U) DISCUSSION: The paperback books distributed during the exercise and redeployment are extremely popular. A total of 487 kits each containing 25 books were distributed to Hanau, Baumholder, Frankfurt, 68th Medical Group (Giessen) and Schweinfurt. According to HQDA policy, the kits are to be distributed at a rate of one per 200 soldiers and therefore the quantity received would appear to be more than sufficient according to that formula. However 25 books for 200 individuals is an unrealistic ration and means only 1 out of 8 soldiers will receive reading matter. In reality, every other soldier takes a book or two and even if MWR staff "rations" the books, there are never enough to go around. The Library Service Center at Roedelheim only had 25 more book kits to supply Hammelburg RAA (Schweinfurt) after the initial issue of 150 kits ran out during one week of operations.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That the regulation governing the book kit distribution formula be changed to allow for one book kit per 50 soldiers, and the Library service Center order and restock its inventory so that in the future, sufficient quantities of book kits are available and meet REFORGER demands.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-50

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 1st PERSCOM

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
POC: HQ USAREUR (ODCSPER, 1st PERSCOM)
NUMBER: A-PXD-51

- (U) TITLE: Budgeting MSA requirements
- (U) PROBLEM: Budget planning and MSA Requirements
- (U) DISCUSSION:

A. (U) Responsibility for budgeting tours and game kits was transferred from 1st PERSCOM, Morale Support Directorate (MSD) to MILCOM. This was an improvement as MILCOM budgeted their needs. Difficulties during budget planning were due to inexperience of MILCOMs including MSA requirements in its REFORGER budgets. Difficulties included dividing funds between two fiscal years and obtaining requirements from MILCOMS POC not cleared for early Phase 4 data.

B. (U) 1st PERSCOM, MSD was responsible for budgeting and contracting Commercial Entertainment based on input from MILCOM thru MSC. MILCOM MSA POC not cleared for Phase 4 data, could not identify requirement.

C. (U) USAREUR Library Division budgeted for and provided book kits based on distribution breakout from MSC. Kit distribution was decided at 21st SUPCOM REFORGER IPR.

(U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. (U) That MILCOM continue to include MSA requirement into annual REFORGER budgets, but method to obtain MSA requirements at community level be improved. The following suggestions are provided:

B. (U) That MILCOM MSA POCs obtain security clearances needed to obtain data from SPO early enough in planning stage to establish requirements.

C. (U) That no change be made in Commercial Entertainment budgeting procedure, but method to obtain MILCOM MSA request be improved based on above suggestions.

D. (U) That no change be made in book kit budgeting procedure.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-51

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 7th MEDCOM

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
POC: HQ 7th MEDCOM (ACSOPS)
NUMBER: A-IMD-52

(U) TITLE: Intelligence Information

(U) PROBLEM: Lack of Real-World and Simulated Intelligence Information

(U) DISCUSSION: The absence of real-world and exercise-generated (simulated) intelligence information reduced the responsiveness of air ambulance assets to actual MEDEVAC requests and restricted the training opportunities for aeromedical evacuation crews and units. Actual locations of supported units of the Blue and Orange forces were either not made available to the respective MEDEVAC unit operations or the Dustoff Control Center, or were so outdated they were of no value. Frequently, the most accurate information was gathered by aircrews in the course of an evacuation mission. This absence of information increased the response time, contributed to confusion in the determination of unit location and led to numerous COMSEC problems. The lack of aviation-related "simulated" intelligence information (e.g., location of AA sites, suspected aggressor troop concentrations) limited the potential combat training value of such a scenario for aeromedical evacuation aircrews.

(U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. (U) Until a secure means of communications can be implemented between a combat unit and its aeromedical evacuation support, a concerted effort to procure current tactical data concerning friendly as well as enemy positions by medical operations must be ongoing.

B. (U) That a realistic anti-air threat scenario be injected into problem play for use by all aviation units to aid in training aircrews and flight operations personnel.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-52

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND
Forces Application

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
NUMBER: A-OEW-53

(U) TITLE: FTX Participation

(U) PROBLEM: Limited Electronic Warfare (EW), Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), or Enemy Command Control and Communications (C3) targeting was done by the corps.

(U) DISCUSSION:

A. (U) The EW element in the FSE at the CTOC only monitored targeting done by the division. The divisions exercised the EW planning and tasking system as required. This created an exercise artificiality that left the Corps FSE out of planning and tasking training. An EW element was created within the CTOC for coordination purposes but EW matters appeared to be handled as routine G-2 information.

B. (U) There did not seem to be a clear understanding for the lines of authority and communication for the EW element of the FSE. All EW, SEAD and C3CM targeting should be done in the FSE with full coordination and understanding of the G-3, G-2, ALO and EW element. (EW, SEAD and C3CM must be planned and exercised to be effective.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Future exercises should include the actual play of the Corps Fire Support Element (FSE) to include EW planning to delineate lines of authority and coordination procedures that must be followed within the FSE to conduct successful operations.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-53

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 3D SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-00G-54

(U) TITLE: Provisioning of a Forward Area Support Team (FAST) for 3D ACR

(U) PROBLEM: To facilitate support of 3D ACR, a provisional FAST (- Maint Co) was fabricated from 3D SUPCOM assets.

(U) DISCUSSION: Overall, the action was successfully accomplished, however, the adverse impact on 3D SUPCOM units was significant. Non-divisional DSU/SSAs are not adequately staffed/equipped to support provisioning of a division-type FAST. When mandated to do so, the end result is a degradation to the parent unit's assets; both personnel and equipment, and a degradation to the parent unit's ability to support its normal customers. The organic assets of 3D SUPCOM do not readily lend themselves to the provisioning of a FAST at, or near, the same level, or with the same capabilities, of a divisional FAST.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That all CONUS based major sized (brigade or larger) units, coming to USAREUR for participation in REFORGER, be required to bring with them the necessary elements to field an adequate FAST element to preclude provisioning from SUPCOM assets.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-54

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 21st SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR, ODCSRM
NUMBER: A-OOG-55

(U) TITLE: Exercise Planning & Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: Unauthorized direct coordination with allied officials resulted in improper agreements being made.

(U) DISCUSSION:

a. (U) It was reported by British Army Officials in the Muenster area and Berman Army personnel from Lutzow Kaserne that personnel from the 1st CD were requesting support and attempting to make deals without going through proper channels. During the initial coordination with BAOR and the German Territorial forces, the channels for coordinating support were clearly defined. In many cases personnel from the 1 CD ignored established procedures and operated independently and at the expense of the installation coordinator.

b. (U) In several instances the British and German forces complied with the unauthorized request in the spirit of partnership. However, several of the unauthorized request resulted in contract modification.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

a. (U) That USAREUR and ARRED emphasize lines of coordination between supported and supporting units to be strictly adhered to during redeployment operations. The person(s) designated as installation coordinator(s) should be the sole spokesman for dealing with the supporting host or Allied nation.

b. (U) The allied and Host Nation personnel be briefed on the importance of complying with prearranged procedures.

c. (U) That changes to or request for additional support requirements only be made by the individual identified by the responsible headquarters charged with operating and supporting redeployment site.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-55

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, 21ST SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
NUMBER: A-OOS-56

(U) TITLE: Tactical Realism

(U) PROBLEM: Local Security While in the Marshalling Area in the RCZ/COMMZ.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: Although there were instances of detecting infiltration teams, the vast majority of the infiltration teams were able to penetrate transient units perimeters, operate extensively against equipment, and exfiltrate without detection. Common problems noted throughout the Marshalling Area were:

- A. ~~(C)~~ Likely avenues of approach were not covered by listening/observation posts or patrols.
 - B. ~~(C)~~ Proper challenge and password procedures were not used.
 - C. ~~(C)~~ Reaction forces were not available to seal off areas when infiltrators were detected.
 - D. ~~(C)~~ Units did not tie-in with the units next to them.
 - E. ~~(C)~~ Guards often patrolled with flashlight which allowed easier infiltration past them and had the rules of engagement been such, they would have been easy targets.
 - F. ~~(C)~~ Little if any use of night vision devices by defending forces.
 - G. ~~(C)~~ Helicopter security was extremely neglected.
 - H. ~~(C)~~ Support units guarded vehicles in approximately the same manner they guard a motor pool in peace-time.
- (U) RECOMMENDATION: MAGG and deploying unit commanders emphasize training and play a more active role to insure local security by transient units is established, coordinated, and maintained in the Marshalling Areas.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-56

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: USAREUR

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR, ODCSI
NUMBER: A-00S-57

(U) TITLE: REAR Area Play

~~(C)~~ PROBLEM: REAR area play needs to be stressed more during REFORGER. REFORGER units presently do not get an adequate appreciation of the REAR area threat because of the peacetime type routineness of LOC operations.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: REFORGER FTX's provide a good environment to practice the forward area battle, but more REAR area activity needs to be stressed throughout the REFORGER time frame if an overall appreciation of a European wartime environment is to be obtained. Greater REAR area play would give CONUS REFORGER units a greater appreciation of potential obstacles to successful deployment, and provide a more challenging arena to test unit OPSEC procedures.

~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION: That continued REAR area play be emphasized and expanded during REFORGER. The use of SF elements, in addition to practicing their mission, could as well test REFORGER units OPSEC postures, and duplicate the Soviet SPF threat.

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-57

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: OCPA

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, OCPA
NUMBER: A-OPA-58

(U) TITLE: Public Affairs

(U) PROBLEM: Need for Close Coordination and or Liaison with Operations Center.

(U) DISCUSSION: Extreme problems were experienced by the U. S. Army liaison cell (located at the Dutch National Territorial Command Press Center) in trying to get unit locations of 1st Cavalry Division units. The unit held all unit locations as "CLOSE HOLD - NO DISSEMINATION." Press escorts had to "roam" the countryside to try to find maneuver units on the ground. One of the main objectives of the REFORGER exercise is to provide US and European exposure to the abilities, capabilities and determination of the US and NATO forces. This "hiding" from the media is contrary to the DoD, DA and USAREUR stated reasons for the exercise.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Close cooperation and coordination be established and maintained between public affairs officers and operations centers to insure that: (a) the need for media exposure is stressed; and (b) commanders are reassured that all unit locations will be safeguarded and that there will be no unnecessary disclosure of such information. Use of public affairs liaison personnel in operations centers is suggested, especially during periods of heavy maneuver traffic.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-58

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: OCPA

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, OCPA
NUMBER: A-OPA-59

(U) TITLE: Public Affairs

(U) PROBLEM: Still Photography.

(U) DISCUSSION:

A. (U) It became apparent upon commencement of exercises ATLANTIC LION and CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE that the assured still photo processing and printing support to U.S. Army photo teams was not adequate for releasing up-to-date photos to the civilian and military media in the U.S. and Europe.

B. (U) The Dutch military photo lab utilized a local commercial photo lab for processing and printing with a two day turn around; not acceptable for press release photos. Our photo teams were submitting around 40-50 rolls of film daily, and this was probably something they had not anticipated.

C. (U) 5th Corps photo platoon was not able to process and print in a timely manner as their G-3 had a higher priority and Public Affairs photo release requirements were three days in being completed. Accountability was not satisfactory, resulting in lost work orders and negatives.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

A. (U) The immediate solution to the Dutch situation was to have couriers bring the unprocessed film to Heidelberg Photo Lab for processing and printing. The Heidelberg Photo Lab transferred their work load to the Mannheim Photo Lab due to renovation. The immediate alternative to the 5th Corps photo platoon was the establishing of a photo lab with borrowed chemicals dedicated to Public Affairs located at Pioneer Kaserne in Hanau.

B. (U) The captioning of photos was a burden of extreme difficulty before releases could be effected. The solution to future exercises is to establish dedicated photo lab facilities and administrative personnel to provide adequate support in the timely release of photos to the media.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-59

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X) SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
Forces Application NUMBER: A-OPL-60

(U) TITLE: Airspace Restrictions

~~(S)~~ PROBLEM: Airspace restrictions associated with the ADIZ and Frankfurt control zone were not clearly understood by all ground commanders.

~~(S)~~ DISCUSSION: Air support could not be provided in some cases because of ADIZ proximity. This artificiality caused frustration among ground commanders who did not fully understand the restriction.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Units commanders at all levels be fully briefed on the air restrictions imposed by exercise constraints.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-60

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ USAREUR, ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: USAREUR, ODCSOPS
NUMBER: A-OPP-61

(U) TITLE: Communications and Missile Maintenance Equipment of CONUS Deploying Units.

~~(S)~~ PROBLEM: Units arriving in theater without required communication and maintenance systems.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: Units deploying from CONUS must bring all tactical communications and maintenance required items of equipment which are not in POMCUS. Deployment from CONUS to USAREUR should be done under same criteria as deployment to hostile zones where units must perform missions with organic assets. When USAREUR units are tasked to provide assets to deploying units for internal operations, USAREUR unit capabilities are degraded. Also, unrealistic perceptions of available support are developed.

~~(S)~~ RECOMMENDATION:

A. ~~(C)~~ POMCUS units deploy with POMCUS shortfalls at REDCON C2 for equipment readiness Code A items and REDCON C1 for pacing items, as required to accomplish unit missions.

B. (U) Non-POMCUS units deploy with all assets required by TOE to accomplish assigned missions.

C. (U) DA task appropriate commands to develop interface procedures during transition to new family of secure radios.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-61

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 21ST SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR ODCSOPS
NUMBER: A-OPS-62

(U) TITLE: Redeployment

(U) PROBLEM: Unauthorized Departure from Redeployment Scheduling.

(U) DISCUSSION: Members of CONUS (four officers and two enlisted) were assigned to 21st Support Command for Reserve Active Duty Training from 7-25 September 1983. Transportation to and from CONUS was by way of REFORGER designated aircraft. Two officers and one enlisted member of the group decided to remain in Europe after their active duty training was over and to return home at their own expense. These three individuals gave no notice of their intention not to return on airflow and did not report for the return airflow flight.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: The ARRED (Army Readiness) briefing of all units and unit cells that are chosen to participate in Reserve Component Overseas Deployment Training programs should include instruction on service member responsibility for compliance with AR 350-9, 1 October 1983, and especially para 3-2(c) of that regulation.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:

MAR 27 2013

III-62

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGEN 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS/ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-OTA-63

(U) TITLE: Exercise Realism

(U) PROBLEM: Tactical realism in the COMMZ.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: Tactical realism has been stressed in LOC activities only to a limited extent.

~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION: That all concerned continue to develop and implement appropriate scenarios to improve tactical realism in LOC activities. Consistent with intelligence scenario and peacetime constraints this should include UW OFFOR/terrorists attacks on LOC facilities, units moving through the LOC and supporting units in the LOC.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-63

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X) SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
Forces Application NUMBER: A-OTN-64

(U) TITLE: Joint Air Attack Tactics (JAAT)

~~(S)~~ PROBLEM: Preplanned JAAT Missions were limited by the simultaneous availability of Army and Air Force aircraft.

~~(S)~~ DISCUSSION: Although preplanned JAAT was unsuccessful the week of 19 Sep 83, impromptu JAAT missions were flown in support of the 8ID frequently. Since 81TFW aircrews habitually work closely with Army attack helicopters, and the procedures are well known to both aircrews, the necessary coordination was quickly accomplished once the helicopter frequency was obtained. Aircrews reported these impromptu missions were highly effective and realistic.

~~(S)~~ RECOMMENDATION: Commanders ensure that JAAT opportunities for training are utilized, whether preplanned or not.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-64

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND
Forces Application

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
NUMBER: A-OXD-65

(U) TITLE: Airspace Management

~~(S)~~ PROBLEM: The exercise did not provide an arena in which to fully exercise airspace control measures.

~~(S)~~ DISCUSSION: The Corps Airspace Management Element (CAME) was not acting in its normal capacity of planning and implementing airspace control measures throughout the corps area. Instead, they monitored division operations and airspace control measures. Although Weapons Free Zones (WFZ) Restricted Operations Zones (ROZ) and on occasional High Density Airspace Control Zone (HIDACZ) were implemented, the airspace constraints and rigidity of the entry and exit points preclude the use of other airspace control measures.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: None.

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-65

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X) SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
Forces Application NUMBER: A-OXD-66

(U) TITLE: Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (JSEAD)

(U) PROBLEM: JSEAD planning was not evident at the Corps and division level in the exercise.

(U) DISCUSSION: Although good intelligence was available at both the corps and division levels, no one was checking target requests for JSEAD requirements. While there were isolated exceptions, there was not a comprehensive effort. Planning at the brigade level was excellent; however, it was not executed in all cases because of aircraft diversions.

~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION: More emphasis should be placed on JSEAD planning and tasking at corps and division levels in future exercises.

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-66

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: ARRED LNO

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: EXERCISING CORPS
NUMBER: A-OXD-67

(U) TITLE: ARRED LNO

(U) PROBLEM: Liaison Officer (LNO) duties were not clearly delineated.

(U) DISCUSSION: The duties of LNO for FTX CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE were administrative since III Corps HQs did not participate with an operational cell. There were no requirements at the tactical level to receive or pass information. The LNO performed as an action officer for the REFORGER 83 Planning Group of the V Corps G3 to assist in the deployment and redeployment of over 5,000 CONUS based participants. Major emphasis was placed on coordination with CONUS unit advance parties, V Corps host units, the V Corps staff and the USAREUR staff. The purpose was to insure unit personnel and equipment arrived and departed the V Corps area according to plan. Daily communications were maintained with the mentioned agencies to identify problems and initiate required actions and make necessary adjustments to established plans. Major emphasis was placed on Reserve Component units because of the large number of small units and their decentralized control. Redeployment Assembly Areas (RAA) were closely monitored through on-site visits to insure equipment maintenance and administrative requirements were met for POMCUS turn-in, unit agencies equipment shipments and redeployment of personnel.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: LNO become thoroughly familiar with appropriate REFORGER FTX Planning directives prior to assumption of duties. LNO should report to assigned Corps at least one week prior to the FTX to establish lines of communication and initial coordination with the mentioned agencies prior to the arrival of unit main bodies. LNO should become familiar with participating RC units' organization and equipment to be deployed. LNO will require a non tactical vehicle for visits and coordination.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-67

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: OJA

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
POC: HQ USAREUR (USA CLAIMS SER)
NUMBER: A-OXD-68

(U) TITLE: G3 Participation at Post Maneuver Claims Conference

(U) PROBLEM: Post Maneuver Claims Conference requires the participation of personnel from G3 staffs.

(U) DISCUSSION: USA Claims Service, Europe (USACSEUR) personnel participated in Post Maneuver Conferences with Defense Cost Offices in those areas where REFORGER 83 was conducted. At these conferences, geographical areas and exercise timeframes were agreed upon for purposes of maneuver damage claims responsibility. These areas of responsibility were determined based upon size of the respective force, where they maneuvered, and the number of tracked vehicles used. USACSEUR field teams monitored the flow of REFORGER 83 exercises to gather information in preparation of these Post Maneuver Conferences. To augment USACSEUR field team information, G3 personnel, involved in planning these exercises, were informally asked to attend this year's Post Maneuver Conferences. Their knowledge of maneuver personnel and operations proved very helpful in arriving at an equitable distribution of claims responsibility. G3 participation should be formalized and continued at future Post Maneuver Conferences.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That G3 participation in REFORGER Post Maneuver Conferences be formalized in future annual REFORGER operation orders.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:

MAR 27 2013

III-68

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 21ST SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR, ODCSOPS
NUMBER: A-OXD-69

(U) TITLE: Coordinating Authority

(U) PROBLEM: Direct coordination between USAREUR MSC's and CONUS units was received too late in the planning process.

(U) DISCUSSION: CONUS and USAREUR units were authorized coordinating authority on 1 Apr 83. Given proper guidance and procedures, early coordinating authority would be beneficial for coordinating time sensitive details.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: USAREUR grant coordinating authority IAW published guidance NLT eight months prior to STARTEX.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-69

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 21ST SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODGSOFS
NUMBER: A-OXD-70

(U) TITLE: Reserve Component (RC) Two-Week Cycle

(U) PROBLEM: Many RC units participating in RF 83 had been programmed for only a two week Active Duty (AD) period.

(U) DISCUSSION: In cases of successive units this does not support continuity of operations and thereby degrades quality of support. In cases where the RC units passed POMCUS equipment to a succeeding unit, the two week AD did not allow adequate inventory time.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Schedule RC units, which will pass POMCUS equipment, for a four day overlap; schedule other RC units for at least a 48-hour overlap, and schedule all RC units for a 21 day Over-sea Deployment Training (ODT) for exercises or regular ODT starting FY 85.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-70

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
NUMBER: A-OXD-71

(U) TITLE: Planning & Execution Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: Milestone Compliance.

(U) DISCUSSION: Numerous milestones associated with LOC support requirements and Host Nation Support (HNS) were missed. Proper documentation cannot be prepared without accurate and timely submissions.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: All commands must insure actions are taken to insure milestone compliance.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-71

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: MOD NL

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-OXD-72

(U) TITLE: Exercise Planning & Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: Marshalling and Staging Area Activities.

~~(c)~~ DISCUSSION: US and NL Liaison teams at the exercise locations in Brandy Station did not function at a desired level due to the fact that they arrived at the same time as the exercising troops.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: US and NL Liaison teams should arrive at the exercise locations 48 hours early.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-72

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: MOD NL

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG/ODCSC-E
NUMBER: A-OXD-73

(U) TITLE: Exercise Planning & Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: Host Nations Support Coordination.

(U) DISCUSSION: Without prior notification US Signal Detachment arrived at their exercise location one week early and caused problems with regard to billeting and meals.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Early arriving detachments should not go to exercise locations in the NL without prior notification of HQ 300 ASG (FWD).

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-73

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: USACAE

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LBD-74

(U) TITLE: Preparation of Contract Requirements

(U) PROBLEM: Contract requirements were identified late and improperly documented.

~~(S)~~ DISCUSSION: Many REFORGER 83 contracting requirements were late, poorly identified and editing was insufficient. Errors include the following;

A. (U) POC names, phone numbers and addresses were either incorrect, missing, unavailable, or POC's knew nothing about the requirement.

B. (U) The basic requirement itself was not validated prior to submission, usually late, poorly described and considered (either grossly over or underestimated), and in a few cases totally unrealistic.

C. (U) Requirements submission was highly fragmented (more so than during previous exercises) making in very difficult to coordinate track and control.

D. (U) This year, many requirements were very late.

E. (U) The use of bulk fund documents for commodities was not used. Units had to furnish an entire procurement package for each new requirement for the same commodity.

F. (U) Prior advice by USACAE contracting personnel was generally ignored.

G. (U) Failure to use imprest fund for requirements that cost \$3000.00 or less.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

A. (U) Units should insure that PR&C's/requirements are properly prepared and that personnel designated as POC's are the appropriate persons with the authority and knowledge to make decisions with regard to their requirements.

B. (U) Units at corps level should consolidate requirements and insure timely submission. USACAE highly recommends the use of bulk fund documents wherever possible.

C. (U) Units should thoroughly coordinate their requirements with the exercise support planning staff and, in turn, USACAE, in advance of formal submission to avoid unnecessary mistakes and to avail themselves of the special logistic/procurement expertise at USACAE.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: USACAE

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
NUMBER: A-LER-75

- (U) TITLE: Contracting Officers Representative (COR)
- (U) PROBLEM: Failure of CORs to conduct themselves properly.
- (U) DISCUSSION: During planning and execution of contracts for REFORGER 83 numerous problems with COR's occurred and they are characterized as follows:
- A. (U) Lack of coordination between COR's and the Contractors. One of the primary reasons was that many of the major headquarters did not provide for interpreters to be available and on hand. This may have hampered operation in this vital area.
 - B. (U) COR's made unauthorized changes in existing contracts.
 - C. (U) In more than several incidents COR's failed to or refused to properly certify invoices and made no attempt to reconcile the differences.
 - D. (U) Many COR's could not be contacted during the exercise and there were in many cases no responsible persons available to make necessary decisions or coordinate changing requirements.
- (U) RECOMMENDATION:
- A. (U) COR's be thoroughly familiar with their duties and the contents of USAREUR PAM 715-3 Manual for Contracting Officer's Representatives.
 - B. (U) COR's be available to perform their duties and that commands insure that the services of an interpreter are readily available to assist if and as required.
 - C. (U) All units must insure that the Standards of Conduct and AR600-50 are reviewed and adhered to at each level of all commands.
 - D. (U) Units must also insure that COR's are of sufficient rank and experience to preclude undue influence and intimidation by other ranking officials.
 - E. (U) USACAE provide COR training assistance for exercises upon request.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-75

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 7th MEDCOM

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
POC: HQ 7th MEDCOM (ACSOPS)
NUMBER: A-LMD-76

(U) TITLE: Patient Returnees - BENELUX

(U) PROBLEM: BENELUX Patient Returnees During Deployment and Onward Movement

(U) DISCUSSION: There were several problems concerning transportation for patients who had been discharged within the BENELUX. It was understood that host nation support would be available for the transport of patients to the next higher level of medical care. This did not occur, therefore, SHAPE MEDDAC assets (ambulance support) had to be used upon numerous occasions.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: The subject of rear area evacuation support must be coordinated and additional assets made available to supplement the SHAPE MEDDAC ambulance service. This should be covered in the Host Nation Support Agreement.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:

MAR 27 2013

III-76

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 21st SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR, ODCSRM
NUMBER: A-LOG-77

(U) TITLE: Contracting

(U) PROBLEM: Contractors were not able to comply with contract specifications.

(U) DISCUSSION: Contract for laundry, latrines, tents and heaters, and trash removal were let in NORTHAG with contractors who were in some cases unable to perform up to contract specifications. This caused discomfort for the soldiers being supported and required additional contractors to be found on a crisis basis.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: USACAE must carefully research contractor capability before final awarding of a contract. This is particularly important in contracts dealing with life support for soldiers.

III-77

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LOG-78

(U) TITLE: Logistics Interoperability

(U) PROBLEM: Implementation of the NATO Mutual Support Act (NMSA).

(U) DISCUSSION:

A. (U) During REFORGER 83 USAREUR expanded implementation of NMSA to include not only acquisition of logistic support in the LOC, but also replacement-in-kind arrangements with Germany and the Netherlands. As in REFORGER exercises of two previous years, NMSA authority was used by USACAE, to delete all statutory clauses from contractual documents used to acquire support for forces in the LOC. USACAE thus used an agreement format instead of a formal contract to acquire required support. Use of agreements as the vehicle for acquiring REFORGER LOC support is necessary, because many NATO governments view contracts containing standard, commercially oriented clauses as offensive. Three implementing arrangements for replacement-in-kind of logistic support were ACS negotiated by ODCSHNA at the request of USAREUR units participating in post REFORGER exercises. The following descriptions summarize these implementing arrangements.

B. (U) Exchange of POL support between units belonging to V (US) Corps and the 15th PANZER Brigade (GE) during Exercise BRAVE LION and CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE. Issues were made by each side to customers from the other country. Each country documented issues using their standard service issue documentation. Replacement-in-kind was used to maximum extent as means of reimbursement.

C. (U) An implementing arrangement between HQ Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA) and HQ USAREUR authorized provision of division level tactical electronic warfare (EW) training by the 103d MI Bn to a RNLA task force in exchange for provision of all logistic support required by US Army contingent. Exchange occurred during ATLANTIC LION. RNLA provided all field support, to include rations, POL, billeting, and barrier material. Additionally rail transportation to and from exercise site was provided. While at the exercise site, the US provided EW training to Netherlands task force.

D. (U) A separate implementing arrangement between RNLA and HQ USAREUR covered the exchange of logistic support between elements of the 1st (NL) Corps and 1st (US) Cav Div. During ATLANTIC LION brigade sized elements were attached to the other countries divisions and supported with rations and POL. Replacement-in-kind was used to the maximum extent as the means for reimbursement.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That use of NATO Mutual Support be expanded in REFORGER 84 to include more logistic exchanges. Publication of USAREUR implementing instructions in early CY 84 will result in increased future usage of NATO Mutual Support Act.

III-78

UNCLASSIFIED

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Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 200TH TAMMC

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LPO-79

(U) TITLE: Class III (Bulk) Supply & Distribution

(U) PROBLEM: Resupply of Fixed Facilities.

(U) DISCUSSION: Units deployed to field locations without complete POL unit basic loads (UBL's). This caused Corps fixed facilities to be drawn down at STARTEX creating problems in the resupply of both field and fixed facilities.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That units deploy to field locations with complete basic loads.

III-79

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: ODCSOPS

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR ODCSOPS
NUMBER: A-LPP-80

(U) TITLE: Non-Tactical Vehicles (NTV)

(U) PROBLEM: NTV requirements for both CONUS and USAREUR units were not accurately identified or justified.

(U) DISCUSSION: Better control of NTV requirements was accomplished for REFORGER 83. These requirements were to be submitted for screening to HQ, USAREUR ODCSOPS with submissions subsequently being tasked to hosting MSC at the time support was required. MSCs were to obtain support from supporting TMPs and lease only when TMP assets were not available. In the screening process justifications for vehicles were absent or unclear. With few exceptions much time was spent determining accurate uses of NTV assets by both CONUS and USAREUR units. Once identified and tasked to hosting MSCs, no points of contact or accurate pick-up locations were provided.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

A. (U) CONUS and USAREUR units be limited to use of tactical vehicles during deployment and the FTXs.

B. (U) Authorization for all NTV requirements be standardized by phase and type unit.

C. (U) All NTV requirements be identified in accordance with AR 58-1 and include name, address and phone number of unit POC who will actually be involved in picking up requested vehicles.

D. (U) Approved NTV requirements continue to be provided through supporting TMPs first and leased second. Priority of leased assets is with the CONUS units. CONUS units will receive TMP assets only after all USAREUR requirements on a particular TMP have been met and additional assets remain.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-80

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 21ST SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR ODCSOPS
NUMBER: A-LPP-81

(U) TITLE: Redeployment

(U) PROBLEM: CONUS-Deployed Equipment Left Behind

(U) DISCUSSION: 16th Sig Bn deployed from CONUS with two shelters (maintenance and communications) which were not functioning. The equipment was turned in at Pirmasens Communications Maintenance Center (PCMC). The unit subsequently redeployed to CONUS, leaving the two shelters in Germany. The shelters were left without their prime movers. This raises problems concerning control and transportation of the equipment back to CONUS.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: CONUS units should not deploy from CONUS with equipment which is not operational. If equipment does become non-operational, units must provide the maintenance activity with a required repair date on equipment that is prior to redeployment. If the maintenance activity cannot fix the item prior to redeployment, the unit should redeploy with the item and have it repaired at home station.

III-81

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ USAREUR ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LPP-82

(U) TITLE: Deployment

(U) PROBLEM: Delinking Concept.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: The 758th Maintenance Company was deployed delinked (the delinking concept is employed where people are deployed separate from equipment). They fell in with the 588th Company of the 19th Battalion in the 3d SUPCOM to form an ENHANCED CAPABILITY UNIT (designated TPFDL units that deploy without unit equipment). These units fall in on forward deployed units and equipment. This allows 24 hour utilization (2d and/or 3d shift) of equipment. Units maintain unit integrity. Organizational equipment is shipped by sea in normal unit Deployment Priority Sequence. The two problems noted with this concept as exercised were:

a. ~~(C)~~ When the requirement to displace this "ENHANCED CAPABILITY UNIT" became a reality the transportation/mobility of the unit was inadequate, with organic capabilities, to displace. Significant augmentation was required to effectively displace.

b. ~~(C)~~ Significant command and control problems were encountered, especially in production control as the delinked unit assumed operation of the second and third shifts.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Unity of command and enhanced mobility be considered by the parent organization when exercising ENHANCED CAPABILITY UNITS resulting from the delinking process.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, 21st SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LPS-83

(U) TITLE: POMCUS Operations

(U) PROBLEM: Equipment Deletions From Hand Receipts

(U) DISCUSSION:

A. (U) Liaison personnel made decisions on equipment to be drawn or deleted which were reversed when the advance party arrived. Some units were unaware of what equipment was available for issue, as illustrated by one unit bringing water and fuel cans with them.

B. (U) Arrangement of temporary loans within CECE was a wasted effort since most units deleted this equipment upon arrival, for example a M728 (CEV), moved from the 5th CEC to 6th CEC, was not taken and a 20 ton crane, moved from the 6th CEC to the 8th CEC, was not drawn.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Deploying units need to be more accurate when determining hand receipt quantities and submitting lists of equipment not to be drawn IAW published milestones.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-83

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 21ST SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LPS-84

(U) TITLE: COMMZ Operations

(U) PROBLEM: Coordination of Life Support.

(U) DISCUSSION: The Director, Host Nation Activities, AFCEM SUPACT (US) is the U. S. Army Point of Contact in the Netherlands for all U. S. Army interface with Host Nation agencies for support less movement. The 7th Signal Brigade (Maj Malloy) made separate life support arrangements with LTC Fontein, Cde, PIROC (Princess Irene Kamp) for early deploying Signal units (76th Signal Company). The unit was scheduled to arrive 22 August 1983 in order to allow for RATT/TRIPO test shots. Class I and billeting, however, were not coordinated thoroughly due to lack of coordination, since ASA was unaware of any life support requirements, as was ARC. The normal Dutch ration cycle required amendment, meal hours in HN mess required extension and overtime payment for cooks, meal accountability and payment of charges were included in the US-NL Host Nation Support Contract and billeting was not arranged to accommodate male and female personnel until arrival of the 2d AD (FWD) Installation Coordinator, 6 September 1983. Many conflicting requirements were provided and no single point of contact was available who was aware of the total requirements.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That all units requiring Host Nation support coordinate with the appropriate single US POC.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-84

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ USAREUR, ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LSM-85

(U) TITLE: Non-demand supported stockages of Class IX and Class VII (repair parts and assemblies)

~~(C)~~ PROBLEM: To eliminate exercise stocking (non-demand supported) of supplies in theater (IRON MOUNTAINS) and standardize resupply packages for strategic resupply.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: Development of "IRON MOUNTAINS" demonstrates lack of confidence in a peacetime supply system to support an FTX of this scale while still purposely functioning under peacetime constraints. CONUS logistical community must be exercised. Air Line Of Communications (ALOC) and extended ALOC operations provide movement medium for flow of supplies and should allow logisticians to manage this flow rather than stockpiles. need is to emphasize flow of supplies rather than build up of stocks.

~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION: That listed capabilities be refined and improved to facilitate strategic resupply and elimination of stockpiles:

- A. (U) ALOC and extended ALOC (USEUCOM AND MAC).
- B. (U) Configuration of associated supplies in CONUS by unit loads (DA).

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-85

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LSM-86

(U) TITLE: Deployment of Missile and ADA Systems Maintenance Capability

~~(C)~~ PROBLEM: Units did not deploy from CONUS with LCSS (not authorized POMCUS) system.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: Continual mobility and remoteness of reinforcing tactical units prohibits effective access to non-organic missile and ADA gun support organizations. Some organic, mobile capability (contact teams) should be attached to each appropriate maneuver element. Theater level missile maintenance assets will not be readily available for direct support, which will render any out of sector support infeasible and impractical in most cases. Contact teams should obtain backup support from their parent unit (where possible). Availability of DS or backup support to the reinforcing elements will experience lean periods while intransit between parent and reinforced units. Therefore, for the reinforcing elements to maximize the self sustaining capability, the attached contact teams and/or organic support assets must carry as much repair capability and essential Class IX (and limited Class VII, DX) as possible.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That units deploy for REFORGER those assets required for sustainment of their wartime missions, to include LCSS.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-86

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UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, USAREUR ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LSU-87

(U) TITLE: Class I and Food Service

(U) PROBLEM: Reefer Support During REFORGER

(U) DISCUSSION: Excessive dedicated reefer van support to REFORGER 83 operations during the deployment, reception, onward movement and exercise phases seriously impacted on the accomplishment of normal theater level commitments and exercise realism. B-Ration menu instituted for REFORGER 83 requires no fresh produce supplements nor ice to simulate wartime austerity. Additionally, reefer vans were utilized by exercising combat support hospitals for the storage of ice, as well as the storage of restricted diet items for patients.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That reefer van usage be eliminated during the tactical phases of REFORGER to follow thru with original intent of the B-Ration menu and to create a more realistic exercise, as these assets will not be available in an actual situation.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-87

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: DSRE

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LSU-89

(U) TITLE: Class I and Food Service

(U) PROBLEM: Support From CONUS-Based Veterinary Food Inspectors.

(U) DISCUSSION: Veterinary support during the exercise was overall satisfactory. However, two factors did adversely impact this support. First, the supporting veterinarians from CONUS were not familiar with the standards and procedures used in Europe. This caused unnecessary delays in inspections and decision making. Second, many of the field sites had little or no means by which the field veterinarian could talk with the DSRE veterinary staff. This condition caused confusion and additional delays.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Representatives of any visiting veterinary support unit be sent to DSRE prior to the exercise to allow for an "in-briefing" and proper exchange of information. Additionally, field sites should have adequate communications systems to allow for conversation between the field veterinarian and DSRE whenever necessary.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-89

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 21ST SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LSU-90

(U) TITLE: Exercise Planning and Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: AAFES-Eur representation on the USAREUR Central Planning Team.

(U) DISCUSSION: AAFES - Europe attendance and participation in planning conferences would afford them the opportunity to receive timely information as to location, troop strength, and exercise participants. The attendance of AAFES POC at REFORGER planning conference would provide them the opportunity to meet personally with command project officers, and address specific AAFES requirements for planning actions.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That commands hosting REFORGER conferences invite representative from AAFES. Exercise support is more effective when project officers participate in the planning of that support.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-90

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LTM-91

(U) TITLE: Movement Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: Changes to the Rail Schedule.

(U) DISCUSSION: IAW milestones established by USAREUR REFORGER 83 EXOPORD (4019X) the final rail scheduling conference was conducted the week of 22-26 Aug. This conference was designed to finalize the deployment/redeployment rail schedules and to process last minute changes before the schedules were published. Both in-country and CONUS units were to finalize their rail requirements prior to the start of the conference. However, many units failed to finalize their requirements and requested numerous changes involving both train composition and railhead locations. The requested changes were of such a magnitude that only deployment requirements could be addressed at the conference. After the conference adjourned on 26 August units continued to make numerous changes, of various complexity, until the day of deployment. These changes had the overall effect of delaying the publication of the deployment rail schedule for exercise ATLANTIC LION until 2 Sep 83. Redeployment rail planning suffered the same fate. Units submitted numerous changes to the redeployment schedule and thus delayed the publication until 22 Sep 83 for the first redeployment edition, 29 Sep 83 for the 2d edition, and 7 Oct 83 for the final edition. Due to the volume of changes and the lateness of submission, the rail schedules contained many errors that should have been corrected prior to publication. This created confusion and caused serious disruption to rail operations.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that both in-country and CONUS units place special emphasis on insuring that their rail requirements are accurately defined and finalized prior to the DB final rail scheduling conferences.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-91

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LTM-92

(U) TITLE: Movement Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: Late Identification of Convoy Routes by BENELUX HN.

(U) DISCUSSION: During REFORGER 83 the BENELUX movement authorities did not finalize and confirm convoy routes until late August. This allowed little time for effective planning and adequate coordination. Early identification of deployment convoy routes is critical if thorough planning of convoy movements is to be accomplished. Exact identification of routes allows for detailed planning of rest/tech halt sites, critical point analysis, convoy route marking, and border crossing point procedures. In addition, early identification allows for adequate coordination with other USAREUR MSC's to provide convoy movement reporting and identify specific convoy support center logistic requirements.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That coordination with Host Nation authorities be conducted to insure that confirmed convoy routes are identified prior to REFORGER deployment.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-92

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X) SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
SUBMITTER: 4th TRANSOOM, 3D MOV RGN POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LTM-93

(U) TITLE: Redeployment

(U) PROBLEM: Redeployment Aircraft Cargo Planning.

(U) DISCUSSION: Reports from the Rhein Main APOE disclosed that some redeployment aircraft were "cubing out" before they "weighed out". This appears to be a repeat problem from previous REFORGERs. Units are arriving at the redeployment center with both excessive TAT and items packaged in footlockers and boxes. Some of the TAT items are not mission essential, i.e., C-Rations, personal clothing in boxes, gift items, etc. This caused processing delays as well as load problems. Excessive use of footlockers and boxes results in the available aircraft loading space being filled (cubed out) before meeting the allowable cabin load (ACL). This resulted in some cargo being left behind and having to be rescheduled on remaining flights.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that units be reminded that they should ship only essential equipment. Footlockers and boxes should only be used to provide special protection and security for mission essential equipment.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-93

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ USAEUR ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAEUR ODCSLOG/ODCSOPS
NUMBER: A-LTN-94

(U) TITLE: Aerial Resupply

(U) PROBLEM: Requesting Procedures and Training

(U) DISCUSSION: USAEUR's Airdrop Requesting Procedures outlined in LOI were successful, however, USAEUR units lack established external procedures and training required to fully exercise the capability of Aerial Resupply.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

A. (U) Procedures outlined in LOI for requesting aerial resupply should remain unchanged to be incorporated into update of USAEUR Reg 700-700.

B. (U) All USAEUR units become totally familiar with airdrop requesting procedures outlined in LOI dtd 14 Jun 83.

C. (U) That unit training on recovery procedures of air items and equipment be conducted by all units with such training being done by qualified rigger personnel.

D. (U) That a separate training stock of air items other than those of OP 18 stockage be funded and maintained by 5th QM DET for such training.

E. (U) That exercising units be required during REFORGER 84 to conduct a minimum 2 airdrops per day and that during other exercises, such as ARTEPs and USAEUR exercises mandatory aerial resupply be incorporated to insure units are training for such operations.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-94

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 21st SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LTR-95

(U) TITLE: Exercise Planning and Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: Fuel Coupons Expiration/Renewal.

(U) DISCUSSION: There were insufficient quantities of official FY 84 fuel coupons on-hand at TMPs when NTV's were dispatched by the TMPs to support REFORGER 83. Nontactical vehicles for REFORGER 83 were dispatched with fuel coupons which expired 30 Sep 83. A limited quantity (10,000 ltrs) of new coupons were available 23 Sep 83 for distribution and another 10,000 liters were available 29 Sep 83.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: PBO's request fuel coupons far enough in advance to be issued prior to the expiration of the old coupons. This would allow the TMP managers to issue both old and new coupons prior to any vehicle's departure on the extended exercise.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-95

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LTR-96

(U) TITLE: Reception & Onward Movement

(U) PROBLEM: Sea-Air (SAI) and Air-Air Interface (AAI) Operations.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: Planned Sea-Air, Air-Air Interface operations during reception and onward movement phases of REFORGER exercise are designed to simulate strategic air diversions (AAI) and expedite onward movement (SAI). Units chosen to participate are required to produce detailed aircraft load plans Schedules and locations are then produced and announced, detracting from the realism.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Ad LOC sea-air and air-air interface operations be exercised for future REFORGERs to realistically test strategic air diversion concepts. Schedules/locations and units chosen should be known by "trusted agents" including Host Nation, 4th TRANSCOM, 21st SUPCOM, USAFE, and USAREUR exercise planners to preclude contracting problems.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-96

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 7th MEDCOM

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
POC: HQ 7th MEDCOM (ACSOPS)
NUMBER: A-LXD-97

(U) TITLE: Rough Terrain Equipment

(U) PROBLEM: Rough Terrain Equipment Deletion

(U) DISCUSSION: A 6000 pound rough terrain forklift was not a very useful piece of equipment in the field. The 37th MEDSOM deployed with one 4000 pound and one 6000 pound rough terrain forklift. The 4000 pound was invaluable to the MEDSOM operation, especially in setting pallets inside tents. The 6000 pound was too large to be effective, especially in working around small areas. It was only useful in unloading extremely heavy material which wasn't necessary during the exercise. The 37th MEDSOM really had no use for the forklift during the exercise; however, in an actual mobilization situation it would be required for handling CONEXES, Air Force pallets, etc.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: For field training exercises similar to REFORGER 83, deploy with at least two 4000 pound rough terrain forklifts rather than a 6000 pound or 10,000 pound lift.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-97

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 21ST SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LXD-98

(U) TITLE: Exercise Realism

(U) PROBLEM: Out-of-Sector Support of a US Brigade.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: For a short period (3.5 days), a US Bde was attached to the Netherlands Division. Instead of relying on Host Nation support from the division as required by war plans, unit had stockpiled needed supplies, consequently a training opportunity was lost.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: USAREUR and deploying units make maximum use of interoperability during exercises.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-98

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: EUCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS/ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LXD-99

(U) TITLE: Exercise Realism

(U) PROBLEM: As a general observation it seems that throughout the LOC (SPOD, APOD, holding areas, convoy routes, etc.) there was light activity on the one hand and on the other excess supervision and operators (particularly maintenance). Everyone was working at making the system function, including units and individuals who either will not be available or will be spread far thinner than they are during REFORGER.

(U) DISCUSSION: This concentration of supervision, use of units that won't be available, and the relatively small flow of personnel and equipment through the LOC creates far too optimistic picture of the realities.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Using some isolated and limited events attempt to flood one or two sites (APOD or holding areas) with requirements while at the same time being ruthless in causing the people who have to operate the facility to do so with only their realistic assets.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:

MAR 27 2013

III-99

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, 21ST SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LXD-100

(U) TITLE: EOD Exercise

(U) PROBLEM: The maneuver umpires and the Umpire Control Centers (UCC) were unfamiliar with EOD play.

(U) DISCUSSION: The umpires did not understand how EOD play should be integrated into the combat and logistical MILPLAY. The Umpire Control Center and Area Control Centers did not appreciate the impact unexploded ordnance will have on operations or the EOD umpire's need for timely information on air strikes, ground combat, etc. EOD umpires need this info so they can lay bombs, mines, projectiles, etc. in a realistic manner.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That a senior EOD Umpire be posted to the UCC. Further, an EOD cell should be added to the Umpire School conducted prior to REFORGER.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-100

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 21st SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-LXD-101

(U) TITLE: Class V Basic Load Upload

(U) PROBLEM: Increased Participation in Ammunition Upload.

(U) DISCUSSION: More units should be involved in the Class V Unit Basic Load Upload portion of the Marshalling Area activity.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: More units of various types should be required to upload Class V Unit Basic Load. This would provide a more realistic type marshalling area exercise and reinforce the planners with the fact that Class V is an integral requirement for not only handling but also providing a visual display of the transportation requirements for the ammo UBL. The units can also establish procedures that will enable them to redistribute the ammunition assets as required or to upload combat vehicles in an expeditious manner.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-101

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: EUCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USEUCOM
NUMBER: A-APN-102

(U) TITLE: Inconsistency in the Use of Terms

(U) PROBLEM: Within the LOC there was inconsistency between the term Staging and Marshalling Areas (STAMA) and holding areas. In Belgium the term was STAMA while in the Netherlands it was holding area.

(U) DISCUSSION: While this is not necessarily crucial it could conceivably cause confusion at the level of command awaiting units out of both countries. It could, for example, cause a higher level of command to plan to commit a unit prematurely as they are reported having cleared the marshalling area.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Research be conducted to determine the correct term(s) and the JSPs and OPLANs be standardized.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-102

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: AFCEM Reserve Corps
(FWD)

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR, ODCSOPS
NUMBER: A-APX-103

(U) TITLE: Visits to Allies

(U) PROBLEM: Uncoordinated meeting with allied representative by deploying forces established requirements and agreement without the knowledge of the hosting MSC.

(U) DISCUSSION: During the pre-exercise planning phase, CONUS participants made several visits to Europe for coordination and reconnaissance purposes. During some of these visits were made to Allied/NATO headquarters and installations without prior coordination with the US host headquarters. This resulted in confusion.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Future USAREUR directives include specific guidance to CONUS units that no visits will be made to Allied units or headquarters, without prior coordination with the US host headquarters.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-103

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-ATM-104

(U) TITLE: Movement Coordination (Reporting)

(U) PROBLEM: Convoy Movement Reporting.

(U) DISCUSSION: For a majority of the convoys conducted during deployment and redeployment, the UMCC did not receive the required movement reports from the responsible US commands. Lack of this data degraded the UMCC's capability to perform its force tracking mission and to exercise real time movements control. Current and accurate reporting of convoy departure/arrivals by US elements, combined with convoy reports received from German Feldjaeger forces, will enable the UMCC to monitor deploying units and provide status reporting of follow-on forces to gaining commands. In addition, accurate convoy reporting enhances the UMCC's ability to exercise movement control by insuring that convoys can be located and diverted/delayed in response to a changing tactical situation.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Although the responsibility for convoy reporting was specifically outlined in USAREUR EXOPORD REFORGER 83 (4019X), USAREUR must reemphasize to all commands the necessity for making accurate convoy reports.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-104

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: III Corps

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
NUMBER: A-AXD-105

(U) TITLE: Tactical Operations

(U) PROBLEM: Tactical planning was done without consideration for national maneuver doctrine.

(U) DISCUSSION: The I (NL) Corps and III (US) Corps conduct military operations in accordance with their national doctrines. The lack of understanding in basic fundamentals of how US forces deploy and maneuver led to unrealistic operations being planned and executed. The flexibility of the US doctrine regarding maneuver could not be used due to the strict adherence to a set scenario. Close and continuous working relationships should assist in overcoming the problem of understanding differences in concepts and doctrine between US forces and US allies. Joint operations such as ATLANTIC LION and the III (US) Corps CPX GOLDEN SABER are key elements in improving interoperability.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That a concerted effort be made on all joint exercises to identify and reduce differences in concepts and doctrine between US forces and NATO allies.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-105

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: AFCEM Reserve Corps
(FWD)

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAHEUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-COG-106

(U) TITLE: Mobile Radio Telephone

(U) PROBLEM: Contracting costs need to be reduced for installing MRTs in leased vehicles.

(U) DISCUSSION: Contracting and Installation of MRTs is both a cumbersome and costly procedure. Once approval has been received for use of MRTs the unit must submit two Purchase Requests (PR&C) for the MRT and, if it will be installed in a rental vehicle, a third purchase request is required. One PR&C for the MRT is submitted to USACAE for rental and installation of the instrument while the other MRT PR&C is processed thru 5th SIG CMD for the use of telephone circuits (mainline). The latter PR&C requires a description of the vehicle (type, license number) and instrument (make, model, serial number, wattage, antenna configuration, etc) prior to any action by 5th SIG CMD. To acquire this information requires both the instrument and vehicle (if rented) be contracted early, expending both manpower and funds.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: USACAE and 5th Signal Command review procedures for procurement of Mobile Radio Telephones with the idea of reducing overall cost not just minimizing cost in their specific area.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-106

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: V CORPS

SUSPENSE: None
POC: V CORPS C-E
NUMBER: A-COM-107

(U) TITLE: Communications Equipment of CONUS-Deploying Units

(U) PROBLEM: Units deploying from CONUS must obtain and bring all tactical communications/equipment means they require. One major unit came to REFORGER 83 without a Communications Center (teletype rig), switchboards for their Main CP and RSSA (trains). Another major unit came without any FM retrans equipment, or other equipment to provide a command and control link between their battalion headquarters and their companies. Numerous smaller units indicated a requirement for FM secure radios, yet came without them.

(U) DISCUSSION: Most European based units have barely enough communications assets to perform their assigned missions. Deployment to the European theater from CONUS should be done under the same criteria as a deployment to a hostile zone where units are required to perform their missions with its organic assets. When European units are tasked to provide communications assets to deploying units for the internal communications of the that deploying unit, this further degrades the European based unit's ability.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: CONUS deploying units upgrade their MTOE's to include the internal communications assets they require, or if on hand, they bring that equipment with them. If the assets are required, but not on hand, FORSCOM should reallocate assets to insure their deploying units have what they require.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-107

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X) SUSPENSE: None
SUBMITTER: USAREUR POC: USAREUR C-E
NUMBER: A-COM-108

~~(C)~~ TITLE: Belgium Military Communications Network

~~(C)~~ PROBLEM: Lack of usage of the Belgium Military Communications Network

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: The U.S./Belgium Joint LOC Plan, dated 23 November 1982, states the Belgium Military Communications Network (BEMILCOM) is available for U.S. Forces use during war. In a meeting in June 1983 with the C-E Officer, Commander, Forces Interior (CFI), Belgium, the use of the existing Belgium courier and local/long distance telephone network by U.S. Forces for REFORGER was offered. USAREUR ODCSC-E outlined to 21st SUPCOM in June 1983 their objective to accept the CFI offer to use the existing BEMILCOM system. 21st SUPCOM was requested to outline and submit telephone requirements to USAREUR. Minimum use of the Belgium network was planned because of reluctance on U.S. planners to reply on BEMILCOM. A trunkline between the Kaiserslautern DCO and the Turvern tandem switchboard was planned to provide automatic access for calls inbound to the BEMILCOM telephone system. However, the circuit was connected unexplainably by CFI to a manual switchboard. Difficulty was experienced with call completion on this circuit because Belgium operators occasionally only spoke Flemish.

~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION: All USAREUR MACOM's operating in the Belgium LOC plan maximum use of the existing BEMILCOM for future REFORGER exercise and that USAREUR ODCSC-E initiate contact with CFI and outline requested U.S. use of BEMILCOM to include English speaking operators at planned manual interface points.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-108

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 5TH SIG CMD

SUSPENSE: None
POC: DCSOPS, 5TH SIG CMD
NUMBER: A-COM-109

(U) TITLE: DBP Telephone/TELEX Instruments

(U) PROBLEM: Over commitment of DBP for telephone/TELEX instruments.

(U) DISCUSSION: Over 650 Purchase Request & Contracts were submitted for commercial telephone/TELEX service in support of REFORGER. Due to the extensive use of DBP instruments, shortage of telephones/TELEXs occurred. During the exercise some circuits were not terminated by the DBP due to the lack of instruments.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Use of DBP service be reviewed by users and that the user contact the local DBP office in the area of operation to confirm that DBP can support their instrument.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-109

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: ODCSOPS-Plans

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR (ODCSOPS-Plans)
NUMBER: A-COM-110

(U) TITLE: Radio Frequency Management

~~(G)~~ PROBLEM: The number of usable frequencies available in the 220-450 MHz range is seriously limited. Civil applications compete with the military and further exacerbate a difficult frequency management situation.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: Because the multi-channel radios of both US and NL forces operate in the same frequency range, the probability of interface is great. The potential for frequency interface between multi-channel radio systems of US and NL forces was identified during the planning phase for exercise ATLANTIC LION. During the conduct of ATLANTIC LION, three parties were competing for the use of available UHF frequencies - the 1 (NL) Corps, the 1st Cav Division and the 1st Armored Division. The 1 (NL) Corps and the 1st Cav Division needed the frequencies as player units and the 1st Armored Division in a controller/umpire role. There were ninety (90) UHF frequencies available in NORTHAG for use during the exercise. Considering the frequencies are used in pairs (transmit/receive), these frequencies were rapidly used up with the 1st Cav Div potentially installing twenty-two (22) divisional UHF systems at any one time. The US and the Dutch continually were in competition for the use of the frequencies and consequently there was considerable "bootlegging" (unauthorized frequencies and usage) going on. During wartime, this practice only hurts friendly units. The seriousness of this problem is the act that there were basically only two divisions and will be compounded immensely if there were four or five Corps competing for frequencies. The NL signal group computer was used to manage the frequency assignments of both US and NL multi-channel systems. A four-person frequency management liaison team was provided to the US to assist in interfacing the automated NL system and the manual US system. Dysfunctional frequency interface did occur early in the exercise. Intense and continuous coordination efforts at the time kept the problem from becoming critical proportions again. It did however, remain a significant interoperability problem throughout the exercise.

~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION: The post exercise comments from the frequency management team and from the US and NL participants be presented to NORTHAG along with recommendations for a workable solution to the multi-channel frequency problem that occurs when III (US) Corps operates in the NORTHAG area.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-110

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: ODCSSA

SUSPENSE: Ongoing Action
POC: HQ USAREUR, ODCSSA
NUMBER: A-CSN-111

(U) TITLE: Systems Automation

~~(C)~~ PROBLEM: The 1ST Cavalry Division did not deploy with the Division Data Center (DDC) nor did the division bring data tapes from which participation on USAREUR equipment would be possible.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: During an actual emergency 1st CD would be deployed with DDC automatic data processing support in NORTHAG is yet untried. The lack of participation of the 1CD DDC left the question of NORTHAG ADP support as an unresolved issue. While NORTHAG intergration is the principal issue, forces earmarked for CENTAG must be able to accomplish much of the same interface transition.

~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION: Close coordination between FORSCOM and USAREUR be maintained to insure CONUS DDC's be exercised in REFORGER 85. This can be accomplished by either the deployment of a DDC or having the CONUS DDC personnel bring their tapes for use on USAREUR ADPE.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-111

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: OCPA

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, OCPA
NUMBER: A-NPA-112

(U) TITLE: Public Affairs

(U) PROBLEM: Necessity for Media Pre-brief.

(U) DISCUSSION: One of the most dynamic military processes is that of REFORGER. It appeared to this command that many of the DoD invited media expected to view that traditional opposing force exercise, and did not understand the REFORGER process, i.e., arrival, POMCUS, marshalling, and forward movement. The ability to accomplish REFORGER is in reality more important than the follow on exercises, e.g., ATLANTIC LION and CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE. Perhaps CONUS media could be solicited to cover the REFORGER exercise by a thorough briefing of the whole process.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That USEUCOM and the USREDCOM for the DoD tour develop a comprehensive briefing/handout on REFORGER and the AUTUMN FORGE series to be used in soliciting invitees; additionally, that a similar briefing/handout, but with greater information, be given to the participants prior to their arrival in theater. This should include the planned activity list with explanations.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-112

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: OCPA

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, OCPA
NUMBER: A-NPA-113

(U) TITLE: Public Affairs

(U) PROBLEM: Lack of Influential CONUS Civilian Media Participation in DoD Media Tour.

(U) DISCUSSION: Each year, numerous invitations are extended to CONUS commercial media outlets to attend REFORGER aboard REFORGER aircraft. These invitees are extended special handling and provided ground and air transportation, hotel reservations, and inordinate support upon reaching Europe to facilitate their coverage of REFORGER and its related exercises. The effectiveness of the project is dependent on the attendees coming from influential stateside media outlets such as regional stations/newspapers. This year, as in the previous REFORGER, the importance of attendees has not been satisfactory. This is indicated by photographers here to get "file" shots and photographers from small magazines (circulation of 12,000) being on the tour. The personnel receiving an invitation should be carefully selected to justify the resources and manhours required to support this project. Additionally, last minute cancellations by CONUS media preclude attendees from other willing media and/or result in empty aircraft seats. This reflects poorly on the public affairs community.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That USEUCOM and DoD review the whole program for its benefit and cost effectiveness. If it appears that participation does not justify the expenditure of USAREUR time and money, then cancel the program.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-113

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
NUMBER: A-EJR-114

(U) TITLE: Movements Coordination (Reporting)

(U) PROBLEM: FORSCOM WWMCCS Teleconference (TLCF) Not Operational 24 Hours a Day - 7 Days a Week.

(U) DISCUSSION: During redeployment, the JDS was not utilized for airflow reporting. Aircraft departures were reported by the UMCC via the FORSCOM "REFORGER" teleconference. One of the problems experienced by the UMCC during this redeployment reporting, was the inability to log-on to the FORSCOM teleconference, either because FORSCOM was not active, or the "REFORGER" TLCF was not in session. This problem occurred on several weekends, and in particular during the Holiday weekend of the 15th and 16th of October. The reporting of 5 aircraft departures could not be done on the 15th and 16th of October, due to FORSCOM WIN not being active.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: If a decision is made to utilize a specific system for REFORGER reporting, the system must be active on a 24 hour, 7 day-a-week basis.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-114

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSJOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-EJR-115

(U) TITLE: Movement Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: Air Flow Data.

(U) DISCUSSION: Both deployment and redeployment airflow were provided by FLOGEN in USAF "lump forecast". Although the "lump data format" is ideal for Air Force use, it does not satisfy Army movement management requirements. Specifically, the lump format does not identify the FRN (unit) that is carried aboard a particular flight. Many flights have loads consisting of several units and many of these units will move to different locations upon arrival at the APOD. Consequently, exact identification of units carried on each flight is critical in planning and executing onward movement from the APODs. During REFORGER 83, the computerized airflow had to be manually processed in order to identify specific units on each flight. This was a time consuming, cumbersome process wasting man hours that could have been more effectively expended on other REFORGER planning tasks. The FLOGEN is a computerized system and it should be able to produce the airflow data in a variety of formats that will accommodate the needs of all movement managers.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That future airflow planning data be provided to Army users in FRN or unit format.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-115

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: V CORPS PAO

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, OCPA
NUMBER: A-EPA-116

(U) TITLE: APIC Site

(U) PROBLEM: The physical siting of the Allied Press Information Center was shifted from Bldg 1307, Fliegerhorst Kaserne to the Erlensee Hotel (about five minutes away), Erlensee, FRG.

(U) DISCUSSION: Several key factors appear to support the propriety of this move, among them

A. (U) Physical plant requires little to no "fix-up" funds expenditure; i.e., the hotel is already maintained in a visually appealing posture.

B. (U) Many hotels have existing communications capabilities such that the addition of instruments (phone, TELEX, wire service machines) as well as office machines (typewriters, word processors, and copiers) present minimal intrusion.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That future APICs be sited in civilian hotel facilities.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-116

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-EPP-117

(U) TITLE: Exercise Realism

(U) PROBLEM: Realism in LOC facilities.

~~(S)~~ DISCUSSION: USAREUR and the Host Nations have attempted to conduct LOC operations realistically. This realism should be consistent with wartime realities. If established facilities are to be used in wartime (as is the case in Belgium) then these facilities should be practiced during REFORGER.

~~(S)~~ RECOMMENDATION: That Host Nations identify facilities to be used in war and expand use of them during REFORGER as a matter of course.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-117

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 200TH TAMMC

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-EPP-118

(U) TITLE: Exercise Planning & Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: Submission of Temporary Loan Requests.

(U) DISCUSSION: USAREUR established 29 April 1983 as a cutoff date for submission of temporary loan requests. This cutoff date was slipped 3 times, therefore delaying 200th TAMMC receipt of requests from the field. Because of these date changes, the 1 August 1983 MRO release date was not met. By the time 200th TAMMC received final approval from USAREUR to initiate temporary loan releases the "urgency-of-need" had risen to the critical level thus causing the Temporary Loan Section and item managers at 200th TAMMC and 21st SUPCOM personnel to have to react in a short time frame in order to make the temporary loan releases in time for the equipment to be used by the requesting units.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That USAREUR reestablish the 1 June cutoff date as used in previous REFORGER exercises. This will insure sufficient time for USAREUR staff elements to receive/review all requests and allow 200th TAMMC and the 21st SUPCOM enough time to accomplish necessary processing actions; i.e., research availability, initiate correspondence, coordination and subsequent MRO release to Reserve Storage Activities, pulling, preparing issue and actual issue to units.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-118

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
NUMBER: A-EPP-119

(U) TITLE: Planning and Execution Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: Delay in granting WIN permission.

(U) DISCUSSION: Obtaining WIN permissions is a lengthy and difficult process. Main REFORGER MSC participants require WIN access early in the exercise planning process to facilitate coordination amongst USARUER and CONUS participants alike.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That WIN permissions be closely monitored in the pre-exercise phase, and that direct coordination be accomplished with USAREUR prior to the exercise to verify receipt of WIN permissions.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-119

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-ETM-120

(U) TITLE: Movement Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: Inaccurate Redeployment Rail Schedules.

(U) DISCUSSION: Inaccurate, late and incomplete redeployment rail schedules were a constant problem for redeployment rail movements. This reflected very unfavorably upon US and Host Nation transportation agencies in the eyes of customers expecting professional rail services. Nearly every train from NORTHAG had to be reworked with the customer unit to match on-hand equipment with rail cars previously scheduled. Many movements transporting oversize equipment failed to have "LUE" (over/outsized clearance) numbers and/or processed clearances. The DB gave a perception of inflexibility in its capability to respond to and correct rail requirements of customers. The DB operations elements were essentially closed during the night and over the weekends during redeployment and no major changes to a rail schedule could be processed during these periods. This seriously hampered UMCC's ability to make timely adjustments to rail movements.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: DB/GTSC place special emphasis on insuring that a complete and accurate redeployment schedule is published at least one (1) week prior to execution of the first rail redeployment movement. If a final redeployment rail schedule cannot be published in advance then "type trains" should be scheduled that are capable of transporting unit TO&E/TDA equipment. LUEs should be processed in advance for "type trains". A DB and VerKK Liaison Cell should be positioned at RAA railheads on a 24 hour basis throughout the entire redeployment phase to facilitate changes (deletions, additions, etc.) to "type trains" scheduled.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-120

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 21st SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR, ODCSRM
NUMBER: A-ETN-121

(U) TITLE: Interoperability Training

(U) PROBLEM: Interoperability Training Points of contact were not accessible to deploying units.

(U) DISCUSSION: HQs NORTHAG identified Points of Contact (POC) for hosting organizations down to Battalion/Company level. Several problem areas were identified in regards to the level at which the POC's were located. The hosted units found it impossible to communicate with their allied counterparts via telephone from Ft. Hood. Generally the disparity in language was the cause of the difficulty, but international telephone communications were equally as difficult. This HQs had the same difficulty in trying to communicate via telephone. Often individual POCs were unavailable due to unit schedules or leaves. In addition to the communications difficulty, confusion existed until late in the planning process as to direct coordination authority. HQs NORTHAG clarified this after inquiry from USAREUR in mid August. HQs NORTHAG identified POCs for contracts at the applicable Corps and the GINC during the same time frame. The late identification of these POCs resulted in logistics contracts being submitted late.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That a single POC/office at each Allied Corps be identified for the coordination of logistics and training support. Identification of the POC early in the planning sequence is imperative. The hosting units would be more responsive to their Corps HQs; difficult telephone traffic would be greatly reduced; and logistics coordination which is a Corps level responsibility could be effected by the same individual.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-121

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: A-ETR-122

(U) TITLE: SPOD Operations

(U) PROBLEM: Deployed Port Transportation Detachment Duty Performance.

(U) DISCUSSION: The deployed Cargo Documentation (CD) Contract Supervision (CS) elements performed assigned duties in an outstanding manner. The 491st Cargo Documentation (ADP) element executed all assigned support tasks and provided all documentation required to execute TOE Port Clearance mission. Other assigned transportation teams accomplished assigned supervisory tasks within allocated times and with excellent results.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That Port Augmentation Teams from CONUS continue to be deployed in support of related/assigned wartime mission statements.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-122

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X) SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSI
Forces Application NUMBER: B-IOM-124

(U) TITLE: Tactical Reconnaissance Results Reporting System (TARRRS)

~~(C)~~ PROBLEM: Communications equipment associated with the dissemination of data thru the TARRRS Network is too slow to effectively meet time sensitive intelligence requirements.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: The U.S. unit which operates the Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance Results Reporting System (TARRRS) must rely on slow, Korean War vintage communications. This causes a substantial delay in the dissemination of RECCE/EXREPS to CENTAG and subordinate Corps. Initially reports from the TARRRS NCS averaged 4 1/2 hours from DTG of message to receipt by the Corps G2. Although later in the exercise this was improved to 90 minutes, it still was interoperability training with other allied personnel who work at the TARRRS NCS so that this combined type operation can run more smoothly.

~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION: That better communications assets be procured for dissemination of data thru the TARRRS Net, and that troops manning the TARRRS have more opportunities for interoperability training with other allied members. The first step in the better allocation of communications may be the utilization of the EMIDS Communications system for CRESTED EAGLE. If this test is successful, a permanent allocation of the EMIDS may be the solution to present TARRRS communications problems.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div. WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-124

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ V Corps

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: 4ATAF/SOC-III
NUMBER: B-OCC-125

(U) TITLE: Forward Air Control Post (FACP) Employment

~~(c)~~ PROBLEM: Current plans do not necessarily locate an FACP within V Corps/GDP area during wartime.

~~(c)~~ DISCUSSION: Although the FACP's are normally used in a defensive role under SOC-III control, both Blue/Orange FACP's functioned primarily in an offensive role during FTX CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE/COLD FIRE 83. This mode of operation proved extremely beneficial to V Corps and enhanced the in-flight BDA reporting to 100% success by ENDEX. This technique also increased FACP awareness of the offensive air order of battle, thus enhancing detection of hostile air operations in Corps area.

~~(c)~~ RECOMMENDATION: 4ATAF/SOC-II should consider locating a FACP with each Corps, to be used in both a defensive and offensive role, closely working with each Corps ASOC. With the introduction of NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) into the defensive system, several FACP's may be available for realignment with ASOCs at Corps level.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-125

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X) SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
Forces Application NUMBER: B-OCC-126

(U) TITLE: Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) Targeting

(U) PROBLEM: BAI targeting process worked well.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: Because CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE was a Corp's level exercise, divisions nominated BAI targets against assets allocated. While this is a deviation from the norm, Corps monitored the allocated BAI assets and performed the formal target selection with the ASOC.

~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION: Divisions continue to nominate BAI targets.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-126

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X) SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODOSOPS
Forces Application NUMBER: B-00M-127

(U) TITLE: Airspace Control Order (ACO)

~~(C)~~ PROBLEM: Dissemination of the ACO was outstanding.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: By establishing a set time for transmission (i.e., every eight hours) all units were aware of the ACO publication time and looked for it. When it was not received by the designated time corrective steps were taken. This was a quantum improvement over previous exercises.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Formalize ACO transmission times and requirements for change.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-127

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: PZ BDE 15
III (GE) KORPS

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: CENTAG
NUMBER: B-OPP-128

(U) TITLE: Interoperability with PZ BDE 15

(U) PROBLEM: Liaison detachment at the boundary of allied formation.

(U) DISCUSSION: Neighboring bns at both sides of an allied boundary are to maintain close contact at the boundary. During the FTX this requirement was not realized at all echelons and led to late detection of gaps.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Liaison detachments at the boundary of allied formations should make a compulsory agreement. Each side should provide at least one platoon of combat forces; one language proficient officer; and one artillery FO.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-128

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X) SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
Forces Application NUMBER: B-OPP-129

(U) TITLE: Dissemination of Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Status to Field Units

(U) PROBLEM: There was no established procedure for passing current ADA weapon status for Air Raid Warnings from the CAME to the DAME or to the Division's Brigades.

(U) DISCUSSION:

A. (U) It is the responsibility of the Corps Air Defence Commanders to disseminate the ADA weapons control status informations Air Raid Warning and other tactical ADA related data to ADA forces working in the Corps Area of Responsibility (AOR) via ADA Brigade tactical channels. As the ADOLT, he is also required to keep the Air Defense Operation Liaison Team (ADOLT) elements at the CAME informed. Further dissemination from the CAME to DAME is not formally covered under the ADOLT concept.

B. (U) The DAME at one unit stated that it had not received a change to SHORAD Weapons Control Orders or Air Raid Warning in three days. The SAM Operations Officer, Allied Sector Three, indicated that the Air Raid Warnings changed numerous times daily, dependent on the air threat reflected on radar.

C. (U) If the DAME or Brigade AD officers are not aware of current ADA weapons status or threat status, the field commanders will not have all essential information on which to base tactical decisions.

D. (U) In addition, should the ADA Brigade communications net fail, there would not be a trained or knowledgeable back-up system.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Establish procedures requiring the expeditious transmission of ADFA weapon status and threat data from CAME to DAME to the maneuver brigades.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-129

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: GTNC

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSHNA
NUMBER: B-OPP-130

(U) TITLE: Exercise Planning & Coordination

~~(S)~~ PROBLEM: The US had changed their command and control structure by employing an Area Support Group (ASG) in the GTNC area for the first time.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: The WBK III liaison team earmarked for the Marshalling Area Control Group (MACG) had to stay with the ASG.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: GTNC should be informed of changes of the command and control structure so that they can adapt their liaison organization accordingly.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-130

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X) SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
SUBMITTER: PZ BDE 15 POC: CENTAG
 III (GE) KORPS NUMBER: B-OPS-131

(U) TITLE: Interoperability with PZ BDE 15

(U) PROBLEM: PZ BDE 15 Assembly Area Organization.

(U) DISCUSSION: Assembly areas allocated to the 15 (GE) PZ BDE were much too small during both exercise phases. During week 1 phase the assembly area reached as near as 1.6 km to the IGB. In some cases the US CPs were located less than 2 km from the IGB.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Larger area requirements of a German Brigade in comparison with a US Brigade should be taken into consideration. National restrictions for the presence of GE forces near the border should be observed.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-131

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X) SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
Forces Application NUMBER: B-OPS-132

(U) TITLE: ASOC G-3 Air Representation

(U) PROBLEM: There are Corps variances in the positioning and use G3 air representative.

(U) DISCUSSION: Corps G3 affiliation with the ASOCs varies from full time representation to no representation. The association which seems to work best is one in which a G3 representative is available to the ASOC full time. In a fluid situation, he is needed to adjudicate immediate CAS problems for the divisions and advise on other tactical air support problems which arise.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: A Corps G-3 air representative be in the ASOC to make required air support decisions and adjustments.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-132

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: B-OTH-133

(U) TITLE: Exercise Realism (OPSEC)

(U) PROBLEM: OPSEC and Convoy Route Marking.

(U) DISCUSSION: Deployment convoy routes for CONUS Forces were required to be marked by CINCSAREUR REFORGER 83 EXOPORD (4019X). GTSC Liaison elements and German feldjaeger patrols reported that the convoy routes to exercise ATLANTIC LION were not marked and the routes to CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE were not marked adequately along certain segments. Limited convoy route markings created delays and confusion to CONUS deploying units unfamiliar with the European road network. Limited use of convoy route markings provides general route assistance to the deploying forces but on the other hand it assists intelligence gathering and identification of possible points of disruption by potentially hostile elements. Intentional movement of convoy route marking signs occurred this year, as in past REFORGER exercises, continued use of these markings will increase this possibility and is not a good OPSEC practice.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: CONUS deploying units conduct convoy movements in the European theater without the false security provided by easily identifiable route marking by utilizing maps and accurate replies to road movement bids (STANAG 2155) only.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-133

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 7th MEDCOM

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
POC: HQ 7th MEDCOM (ACSOPS)
NUMBER: B-LMD-134

(U) TITLE: Host Nation Support

(U) PROBLEM: Host Nation Support Agreements

(U) DISCUSSION: US Forces within the BENELUX were trying to impose US standards concerning preventive medicine support on host nations. As we depend on the host nations to do all necessary medical support, we can not try to impose US standards and US regulations on host nations. Much of the REFORGER 83 support was contracted from the host nations. When the REFORGER control elements arrived, it was found that the support being provided was in accordance with host nation standards and not US Army standards. For example, the contract only specified that the host nation would provide potable water. The contract did not specify that the water be potable with US Army standards or that it be rechlorinated to a five parts per million of chlorine residue.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: The support required should be specified in the support agreement. If there is a difference between US Army standards and host nation standards, then the host nation agreement standards will apply.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-134

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 200th TAMMC

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: B-LPP-135

- (U) TITLE: Logistics Interoperability
- (U) PROBLEM: Use of NATO Weigh Ticket.
- (U) DISCUSSION: The FBG 143 NATO Weigh Ticket was used without problems by both III and V Corps.
- (U) RECOMMENDATION: Use of the FBG 143 NATO Weigh Ticket be standardized throughout NATO to uplift bulk fuel from NATO depots.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-135

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: B-LTM-136

(U) TITLE: Automated Port Computer Documentation

(U) PROBLEM: Fielding the system and NATO interoperability.

(U) DISCUSSION: A Cargo Documentation Team utilizing and automated port computer documentation system (DASPS) successfully recorded CONUS unit equipment arriving aboard one of the scheduled REFORGER 83 vessels. This limited test successfully highlighted the importance of capturing cargo visibility quickly to facilitate reception and onward movement planning and forecasting. Full BENELUX LOC activation during crisis or war will require the speed and accuracy an automated port computer documentations system will provide to process the volumes of supplies and equipment required to sustain NATO. The US alone cannot deploy or preposition enough automated computer documentation systems to obtain the capabilities a fully activated European LOC will require.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: US and Host Nation study measures to standardize cargo documentation systems to enhance interoperability. This automated system should start in CONUS.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-136

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: EUCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: B-LTN-137

(U) TITLE: COMMZ Operations

(U) PROBLEM: LOC NATO Procedures.

(U) DISCUSSION: During LOC Operations problems developed because LOC procedures were not fully known at executing level. For example:

A. (U) With regard to medical care orders and procedures described in Annex K of the US/NL Joint LOC Plan and regulations agreed with a representative agreed with a representative of SHAPE Medical Center were not known to US local authorities at the exercise locations.

B. (U) The procedures with regard to POL requirements for Central European Pipeline System (CEPS) were not completely executed. The daily fuel request was not submitted although it was asked for in a message to 7th SUPCOM.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Participants who are responsible for specific aspects of the LOC operations should be aware of all agreements and procedures e.g. as outlined in the US/NL Joint LOC Plan or outlined in other agreed documents concerned.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-137

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: EUCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: B-LXD-138

(U) TITLE: Staging and Marshalling Area (STAMA) Operations-- Provision of Host Nation Support

(U) PROBLEM: Host Nation had a tendency to overservice the US particularly in the provision of goods and services.

(U) DISCUSSION:

A. (U) In that the exercise is a micro reflection of the total wartime flow requirement, the HNS provided is relatively easy for the Host Nation to acquire. Therefore, the Host Nation has a tendency for over-accommodating US units in their needs. This does facilitate the exercise execution, however, it presents a false picture as to the method of support which would be provided in wartime. Therefore, the US is not realistically exercising in the austere environment which would be present during wartime mobilization.

B. (U) An example which emphasizes this point is the provision of POL. In the Herentals MA as well as other areas, the HN provided a POL tanker to top off vehicles prior to their departure. The HN tankers would probably not be available in wartime. HN plans call for establishing POL distribution points at specified location. Vehicles would be required to go to the POL point rather than POL being delivered to their location. This would require much more planning and coordination by the MACG personnel and more realistically complicate the tasks of the MACG.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: During the planning stages of REFORGER US agencies operating in the LOC should examine closely the HNS means being offered and question HN staff personnel as to the wartime realism of the method by which HNS is being provided.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013


III-138

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND
Forces Application

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
NUMBER: B-AEW-139



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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

OSD 3.3(b)(1),(3),(5)

III-139

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: III Corps

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS - NUC/CHEM-
NUMBER: B-ANB-140

(U) TITLE: NBC Operations (Interoperability)

(U) PROBLEM: Mission oriented protective posture

(U) DISCUSSION: The NATO nations use the same or very similar chemical protective equipment. The equipment worn for various levels of protection is similar in many cases; however, the levels of protection are described in different terms.

~~(S)~~ RECOMMENDATION: That a standard NATO document be prepared showing what is meant by the various levels of protection used by the individual nations. This would aid in ensuring that attached allied units are in the proper level of chemical protection. This document should be prepared at the NATO level and should include a MOPP Zero level which requires that individuals carry but not wear their chemical protective clothing and protective mask.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-140

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X) SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
Forces Application NUMBER: B-APS-141

(U) TITLE: COMAAFCE SUPLAN 35001M

~~(S)~~ PROBLEM: There is still a general uneasiness about COMAAFCE SUPLAN 35001M.

~~(S)~~ DISCUSSION: There are some concerns about the establishment of low level transit routes (LLTR) and the ability to change these routes in a timely manner, High Density Airspace Control Zones (HIDACZ) restrictions and aircraft transiting procedures.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Reinforce the dialogue now occurring with command emphasis. AAFCE is chairing an on-going study group to assist in resolving these and other airspace problems with the 35001M plan. These efforts must be pressed continuously.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-141

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: B-ATM-142

(U) TITLE: Movement Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: BENELUX Road Movement Clearance.

(U) DISCUSSION: Host Nation movement control did not function well beyond national boundaries. Road clearance requests were not passed across national boundaries in a timely manner. The nations concerned themselves only with their particular portion of the movement and did not actively pursue it to completion, for example, many Belgium initiated road movement clearances were only cleared to Belgian border and not to destination.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That Host Nation movement agencies process road march credit clearances properly as required by NATO STANAG agreements.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-142

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: III Corps

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSC-E
NUMBER: B-CCS-143

(U) TITLE: ASOC and TACP COMSEC Materials

(S) PROBLEM:

(S) DISCUSSION:

(S) RECOMMENDATION:

OSD 3.3(b)(7)(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div. WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-143

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UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSCom

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: B-CTM-144

(U) TITLE: Movement Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: HEROS-5 Computerized Highway Movements System.

(U) DISCUSSION: The use of the HEROS-5 system contributed immeasurably to the success of the UMCC to control highway movements. The system provides detailed movement data that enhances movement control and convoy monitoring. The statistical data provided by the HEROS system provides all the data necessary to obtain visibility over convoys moving in the theater. It provides cumulative movement times, detailed CP times, size of convoy, dimensions of largest vehicle, load classification, column lengths, pass time, etc. It provides a detailed routing by both road reference and map grid coordinate reference. Essentially, it eliminates a need to provide detailed strip maps in addition to the clearance. Another advantage to the system is that it can be used to communicate between movement headquarters (one terminal to the other). From a UMCC standpoint, the system permitted the UMCC to obtain current march credits quickly and make new credits or modify existing credits in order to meet unforeseen contingencies, e.g. certain march credits had to be modified as a result of different routing necessitated by the Belgian rail strike. Most of the problems encountered with the HEROS-5 march credit by deploying units resulted from a lack of understanding of the system, its capabilities, and the format of the printout.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That USAREUR ICW GTSC insure that the UMCC is provided a HEROS-5 terminal for all future REFORGER exercises and operations conducted in support of USAREUR OPLAN 4360.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-144

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: B-ETM-145

(U) TITLE: Movement Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: Collocation of German and US Movement Control Elements in the USAREUR Movement Control Center (UMCC).

(U) DISCUSSION: During REFORGER 83 GTSC and GTNC collocated movement control team elements on site with the UMCC. These elements received convoy reports from Feldjaeger Forces and had constant interface with participating territorial command movement headquarters (VerKK). In addition, these elements provided a means for direct communication with the DB and other civilian host nation agencies. This collocation enabled the UMCC to obtain total visibility over the surface movements in the theater and to provide detailed coordination of movement requests. However, the greatest benefit comes from the increased capability afforded the UMCC to respond to unprogrammed requirements. Collocations permitted US and GTSC elements to closely plan and coordinate ad-hoc procedures to contingency situations, e.g., the Belgian rail strike. Aside from the language benefits, the additional communication assets provided by the GTSC element, i.e., the HEROS-5 and their internal TELEX system, enabled the UMCC to develop a response to a situation and notify all affected field agencies of changes to be implemented. This shortened reaction time, eliminated confusion, and permitted certain deployment movements to be modified with minimal disruption.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That USAREUR ICW GTSC/GTNC insure that the UMCC is augmented with German Territorial Command movement control team liaison elements for future REFORGER exercises. A critical component of the movement team is their communications package. USAREUR must strive to insure that all future liaison elements come equipped with HEROS-5 and TELEX capability.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-145

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: USAREUR

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR, ODCSI
NUMBER: C-ION-146

(U) TITLE: Army/Air Force Communications



OSD 3.3(b)(1)/(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-146

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND
Forces Application


SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSI
NUMBER: C-IOM-147

(U) TITLE: Targeting Process

(U) PROBLEM: The capability of US Forces to acquire intelligence on follow-on forces and attack these targets continues to improve. Passing of intelligence information down to division level greatly improved over previous exercises.

~~(c)~~ DISCUSSION:

OSD 3.3(b)(1)



~~(c)~~ RECOMMENDATION: Formalize direct intelligence links to the corps which were tested in this exercise. Continue to improve the links which provide near-real-time intelligence.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-147

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: ODCSOPS-Plans

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAFEUR (ODCSOPS-Plans)
NUMBER: C-IPP-148

~~(C)~~ TITLE: Intelligence Dissemination

~~(C)~~ PROBLEM: Lack of standard reporting formats and timely coordination is hindering critical decision making.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: Timely intelligence and information are critical to decision making. Problems occurred in sharing of intelligence and information



~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION: That these problems be addressed to the US Army Member, Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) - Army Board, in order that the Army can direct action be taken by applicable NATO working parties.

OSD 3.3(b)(1),(5)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-148

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: USAREUR

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR, ODCSI
NUMBER: C-IPP-149

(U) TITLE: Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Requirements

(U) PROBLEM: V Corps has no organic LRRP capability. NATO LRRP participation validated again the need for an organic Corps LRRP unit.

(U) DISCUSSION: The requirements for a human intelligence (HUMINT) asset have been validated during REFORGER exercises since the mid-1970's. NATO LRRP participation in FTX CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE (REFORGER 83) was a significant contributor to the total intelligence collection process. Information provided by LRRP teams was timely and reliable. Exercise participants praised the availability of LRRP teams and expressed extreme satisfaction with the information provided.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Continue to pursue current LRRP initiatives and notify DA of another successful REFORGER of LRRP operations that validates again the requirement for an organic Corps LRRP capability.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-149

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: USAREUR

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR, ODCSI
NUMBER: C-ITR-150

(U) TITLE: Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Requirements

(U) PROBLEM: Requirements that must be completed for successful LRRP operations necessitate intense planning and precise execution. The availability of training for this mission every other year does not provide training that will insure a successful mission.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION:

A. (U) V Corps G2 hosted NATO LRRP Units that were divided into twenty teams. During the exercise, several insertions and extraction operations were conducted using airborne, air mobile and foot techniques. G2 coordinated all activities. Several challenges confront planners and operators that are common to LRRP operations, not just NATO interoperability techniques.

B. (U) Coordination of airborne operations requires precise and lengthy exchanges between Army, Air Force and German officials. Air space coordination, drop zone clearance, drop zone operations and mission peculiar equipment availability are only four of many issues that must be completely understood by all parties.

C. (U) Pilots of airplanes and helicopters are not normally experienced for airborne/air mobile operations and require intense preflight briefings, especially for night operations.

~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION: LRRP participation in REFORGER exercises continue. There is a requirement to establish a training base to overcome successfully the many operational requirements associated with LRRP activities.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-150

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X) SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
Forces Application NUMBER: C-OCC-151

(U) TITLE: Weapons Control Orders (WCO)

~~(C)~~ PROBLEM: The division airspace management element demonstrated the ability to implement and control multiple weapons control orders effectively and without confusion.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: Weapons control orders with varying parameters were used within the division. For example, some weapon free zones were declared only for aircraft below 2000 feet, others only for fixed wing aircraft, and other against groups of four or more helicopters. In the last case, one division was able to overcome an enemy helicopter infiltration by a group of six helicopters. Despite the Corps monitor status, the CAME retained control of weapons control order request for division. Weapons control order changes had been regularly received from 4ATAF but were stereotyped and routine in nature, based primarily upon the time of day and without regard to air activity.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Corps and division airspace management elements regularly practice and use multiple weapons control orders.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-151

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ V CORPS/MACLO

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
NUMBER: C-OEN-152

(U) TITLE: C-130 Airfield

(U) PROBLEM: Too few usable C-130 landing zones.

(U) DISCUSSION: Extensive resupply can be conducted via airdrop or airland. Aerial resupply, like road and rail, requires suitable facilities for transfer of material. C-130 airland resupply can be completed on any surface from grass strip to international airport. The more sophisticated the landing zone (hard surface runway, large parking ramp, navigation aids, etc.) the greater the reliability of on-time resupply. Airland missions provide better aircraft utilization because of the back haul capability for air-evac patients or repair parts. V Corps has one C-130 capable airfield. The one airfield does not provide the desired redundancy or flexibility to support projected V Corps requirements. Due to a lack of C-130 airfields the desired joint Army/AirForce training activities are greatly reduced.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: A number of C-130 capable landing zones need to be identified with at least one available in each division rear area.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-152

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
NUMBER: C-OJR-153

(U) TITLE: Force Tracking

(U) PROBLEM: Lack of Updating Deployment Airflow in the JDS/FROM.

(U) DISCUSSION: During the deployment of REFORGER, aircraft delays, diversions and manifest data were not updated in the JDS/FROM. Several delays and diversions were received telephonically from different sources but were never annotated in the JDS/FROM on WWMCCS. Scheduled PAX data, cargo data, and FRN deletions/additions were never updated in the JDS/FROM. There were numerous instances where passengers and cargo data differed considerably from what the JDS/FROM showed as manifested on aircraft. These changes caused significant problems for TRANSCOM elements responsible for onward movement for the PAX and cargo from the APODs.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That the CONUS element responsible for updating the JDS (i.e. MAC and FORSCOM) insure that updates are made in a timely manner. Updates should reflect exactly who and what is on the aircraft when it departs the APOE in accordance with the decided "exception parameters" of JDA.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-153

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: ODCSOPS

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC:
NUMBER: C-OJR-154

(U) TITLE: Joint Deployment System (JDS)

~~(C)~~ PROBLEM: Lack of confidence in JDS by the transportation operating agencies and force trackers impaired realistic evaluation of JDS.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: Planning guidance agreed to by all participating HQ at JDS transportation conference in May 83 required exception reporting through JDS and that no positive reporting would be conducted. FORSCOM initiated teleconference (TLCF) in which positive reporting was conducted. FORSCOM position was that reports were intended for internal FORSCOM use, however, HQ MAC, 21st AF, HQ USAREUR, 4th TRANSCOM and 21st SUPCOM all had access to TLCF data. Additionally, identical info was passed through direct telephone communications between ARRED Cell at Ft Hood, TX and ARRED Cell at 21st SUPCOM in Kaiserslauter. JDS was not exercised properly and agreed upon exception reporting was either not timely or not done at all. Full 4102 deployment mandates establishment of integrated and credible system which is responsive to change. To develop a cohesive system, problems must be identified and corrected by exercising JDS.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

A. (U) JCS enforce well defined requirements for service integration into JDS.

B. (U) JCS establish completion date for integration to take place.

C. (U) JCS establish attainable and well defined criteria for system use during exercises.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-154

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: EUCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS/ODCSC-E/
ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-00M-155

(U) TITLE: Information Flow and Impact on Communications Requirements

~~(S)~~ PROBLEM: Reports and information requirements transmitted by various agencies, ALCE, NSSG, ASG and 2nd Movement Region, are unrealistic given the austere communication means available in the LOC. Additionally similar information requirements being reported to different command levels of various agencies are of questionable value for effecting decision making.

(U) DISCUSSION:

A. ~~(S)~~ The BE LOC in wartime will have to depend mostly on HN civilian telephone networks. There will be very limited secure communication available. However, units operating in the LOC have generated numerous reporting requirements based mainly on peacetime communication means or on the assumption that US communication assets would be available.

B. ~~(S)~~ With limited or austere communication constraints, information requirements could be reported on a management by exception approach. Data elements such as ACFT mission number, type, unit equipment nomenclature, ACFT arrival and departure times etc, being reported from the SAI Airport to NSSG headquarters to 322 ALD could be greatly diminished by designing reports which refer to preplanned data and/or reporting only exceptions to preplanned moves.

~~(S)~~ RECOMMENDATION: All units supporting LOC operations should analyze their reporting/information requirements given the wartime communication constraints. Additionally, higher level commands should analyze each subordinate to eliminate duplication of reporting and require only those elements of information necessary in decision making. Peacetime exercise briefing requirements should not be the determining factor for reporting information.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-155

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND
Forces Application

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
NUMBER: C-OSM-156

(U) TITLE: Maintenance Support

(U) PROBLEM: Vehicle maintenance support for ALO operated vehicles was inadequate.

(U) DISCUSSION:

A. (U) In one unit, only one of two M-113s assigned to the regimental ALO was capable of being fielded. The second vehicle was inoperative by the second day of the exercise and left behind in lieu of a MRC-108 jeep. Although an understandable solution during exercises, the survivability and ability of this vehicle to keep pace with track vehicles would be short lived.

B. (U) Manpower constraints at Army units cause difficulty in supporting ALO M-113s driver requirements. This could be alleviated by training the Air Force enlisted specialist (AFCE 275 X0) to drive and perform operators maintenance on the vehicle, and thereby provide a more efficient use of available manpower.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

A (U) Reemphasize the importance of M-113 vehicles to the air support mission and the required maintenance support.

B. (U) Train 275X0s to operate and maintain ALO assigned tracked vehicles.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-156

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LNB-157

(U) TITLE: POMCUS Operations

(U) PROBLEM: NBC Overgarment Issue

(U) DISCUSSION: Since the current shelf life of protective overgarments is seven years, one sixth of on hand stocks are issued during REFORGER exercises in order to rotate and replenish POMCUS stocks. Once issued to a unit, overgarments are retained by the unit as training suits. CECE then replenishes these issued stocks with newer ones. Rotation of one sixth of the on hand quantity effectively rotates each POMCUS Package every six years.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: NBC protective overgarment shelf life should be extended by 3-5 years in order to lower replacement costs and lessen the overburdening requirements of physically issuing these suits in such large quantities.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-157

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 200TH TAMMC

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LPO-158

(U) TITLE: Class III, (Bulk) Supply & Distribution

(U) PROBLEM: Procedures for establishing Rail Heads and Fuel System Supply Points (FSSP).

(U) DISCUSSION: Confusion concerning standard procedures and authority required to establish rail heads and FSSP(s) was observed during the exercise. Specific procedures and staff responsibilities need clarification.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: The 200th TAMMC will formalize procedures, clarify responsibilities, and disseminate the same to field units. More specific guidance will be incorporated into future exercise operation plans.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-158

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 200TH TAMMC

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LPO-159

(U) TITLE: Class III (Bulk) Supply & Distribution

(U) PROBLEM: Petroleum Tank Truck Inspection Criteria.

(U) DISCUSSION: Significant variations exist between units concerning a standard petroleum tank truck inspection criteria required prior to loading from fixed and field facilities.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: The 200th TAMMC will establish a theater-wide pre-load inspection criteria for petroleum tank trucks. The criteria and inspection procedures will be disseminated and incorporated into future field training exercises.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-159

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 200TH TAMMC

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LPO-160

(U) TITLE: Bulk Fuel Aerial Resupply Operations

(U) PROBLEM: Lack of familiarity with Aerial Resupply Procedures.

(U) DISCUSSION: Exercise objectives included bulk aerial resupply operations using C-130 aircraft. Bureaucratic attitudes were experienced with Air Force personnel involved in coordinating support. Problems were experienced in load capacities of aircraft, frequent changes in delivery/receipt times, and airfield clearances. The C-130 should be capable of lifting between 5,000 and 6,000 gallons of fuel. Prior to execution of the first mission the lift was reduced to between 2,500 to 3,000 gallons. As a result of frequent changes in mission times, one aircraft discharge was not completed as required. There were no bulk fuel aerial deliveries into III Corps due to airfield clearance problems.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Aircraft load capacity should be confirmed during pre-exercise coordination. Minimize changes in aircraft load and discharge times. Airfield clearances should be approved prior to requesting mission support. The Theater should utilize aerial resupply periodically during the year to improve coordination and enhance training.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27. 2013

III-160

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 200TH TAMMC

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LPO-161

(U) TITLE: Class III (Bulk) Supply & Distribution

~~(C)~~ PROBLEM: Requirements Forecasting.

(U) DISCUSSION: Field units experienced difficulty in accurately forecasting petroleum requirements. Forecasted requirements were often inaccurate and did not reflect a three day forecast as required..

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Forecasting procedures and techniques be reviewed and additional training be conducted in this area.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-161

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 200TH TAMMC

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LPO-162

(U) TITLE: Class III (Bulk) Supply & Distribution

(U) PROBLEM: Requirements Reporting.

(U) DISCUSSION: The Bulk Petroleum Status Reports/Requirements Requisition was not submitted in a timely manner. Reports were often received the day of the required delivery or not at all. Late submissions during wartime would result in degradation of overall support.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: MACOM's should establish a requirements report, based upon previous consumption and demand factors, to be submitted in the event of communication problems with subordinate units or non-receipt of bulk fuel requirements. An alternate means of communication (telephonic/courier) should be established as a back-up to the electronic message system.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-162

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 32D AADCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LPF-163

(U) TITLE: Out-of-sector Support

(U) PROBLEM: Effective logistics support for U.S. formations deployed outside of a U.S. Corps sector.

~~(c)~~ DISCUSSION: It was found in late May 1983 that the 3rd SUPCOM had rewritten their GDP and had not included out of sector support of 3-59 ADA in the new one. There was no alternate means planned for providing out of sector support of 3-59 ADA and thus creating problems in planning for the Brigade and Battalion.

~~(c)~~ RECOMMENDATION: Planning and coordination should be made to reestablish out of sector support IAW CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4102. Alternate means of all support requirements should also be addressed in unit plans. Also all memorandums of understanding dealing with pertinent logistical support between U.S. and Germany should be studied.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-163

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, USAREUR ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ USAREUR ODCSOPS
NUMBER: C-LPS-164

(U) TITLE: Self-sufficiency of Deploying Formations

~~(S)~~ PROBLEM: Diversion of forward stationed units to support deploying forces during reception and onward movement seriously degrades support programmed for forward stationed combat forces.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: US forward stationed maintenance capability was diverted from principal mission, back-up to US forward stationed formations, to provide COMMZ support. Host Nation support (HNS) was requested to preclude this necessity. 1st (NL) Corps FTX ATLANTIC LION limited HNS that could be activated in the Netherlands and precluded exercise of desired levels of HNS. US assets used to fill this void would not be available in a full 4360 implementation. CONUS unit equipment must be deployed fully mission capable. Personnel accompanying Sea-deployed equipment must maintain operational status aboard ship. Driver and advanced parties must be configured and equipped to support POD clearance and onward movement. This includes security, maintenance, recovery and evacuation, refueling, subsistence and medical support.

~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION: That JCS and DA direct REDCOM and TRADOC to insure deploying unit self-sufficiency plans, SOPs and training are adequate.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-164

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LPS-165

(U) TITLE: Reception & Onward Movement

(U) PROBLEM: Accurate Vessel Equipment Lists.

(U) DISCUSSION: The vessel equipment list (VEL) is a key document in planning port reception operations and forecasting onward movement from the port to TAA's. Data from the VEL is used to identify critical MHE requirements and provide baseline data for the STANAG 2165 forecast. Up until the actual arrival of the ships, 4th TRANSCOM did not have an accurate VEL that could be used to finalize planning. This command received a total of three (3) VEL's and each one contained significant differences in type and quantity of equipment. In addition, the final VEL did not contain an accurate forecast of what was contained on each ship.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that all responsible agencies undertake appropriate action to insure that the VEL is as accurate as possible and, if there are changes, to notify all commands in the transportation planning process to insure updates to the VEL.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-165

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: V CORPS

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LSU-166

(U) TITLE: Tray-Pack Foods (T-Rations)

(U) PROBLEM: Department of the Army has developed the T-Rations as an alternative to B or C-Rations which can be served hot with minimum personnel and equipment. The T-Ration is part of the Combat Field Funding System. This concept was untested in a field environment in Europe. Extended feeding of T-Rations during CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE was selected as a means to satisfy this test.

(U) DISCUSSION: Special Troop Battalion, 3D SUPCOM, was designated the test unit. Natick Laboratory personnel were present to assist and observe the testing. T-Rations are designed to be heated in an element especially designed for feeding a battalion size unit, usually utilizing only three food service personnel per battalion. T-Rations were generally well received by the troops except for some dissent citing lack of taste in some components.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That Department of the Army re-evaluate the ingredients used in seasoning T-Rations and that further testing be conducted by Natick Laboratory aimed at improving taste.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-166

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: USAREUR, ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LSU-167

(U) TITLE: Class I and Food Services

(U) PROBLEM: Maintaining Accountability, Sanitation and Cleanliness of Field Dining Facility Operation.

(U) DISCUSSION: Early in the exercise several field kitchen operations experienced problems in accountability, sanitation and cleanliness of the kitchen area. The problem of accountability was noted as a result of some food service sergeants lack of administrative knowledge. Several field sites visited had problems with mess kit laundry lines. This was found to be a result of food service sergeants not requiring KPs to clean cans and heaters after each meal. Several trash collection points had large accumulation of trash on ground due to boxes not broken down before placing into dumpsters and dumpsters not being closed after use. Several field kitchen sites had a shortage of cook personnel.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That units publish SOP's for operating field kitchens; that food service sergeants familiarize themselves with all AR's and TM's pertaining to field kitchen operations. That ration accountability be maintained IAW AR 30-1.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-167

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LTM-168

(U) TITLE: SPOD Operations

(U) PROBLEM: Maintenance of deployed equipment.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION: The mechanical services performed by supercargoes enroute and during discharge have a direct effect on discharge events. The ship discharge at Antwerp and Vlissingen was directly assisted by supercargo teams working under the supervision of the MTMC Port OICs. The equipment was in excellent condition and had been attended to by the supercargo teams enroute. At Rotterdam, the supercargo team was not available to the Port OIC and the equipment on the main RO/RO deck required considerable start-up assistance. Once started, the equipment operated well. A few problems were beyond the capability of the drivers teams, e.g. vehicles blocked access to the vessel stern ramp, which required external assistance to begin discharge, however a properly configured supercargo team under the supervision of the Port OIC would have precluded this.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That supercargo teams continue to start/check equipment status on-board the vessel enroute, and upon arrival of vessel at SPOD, that the supercargo detachment remain under the operational command and control of the Port Commander until released in concert with the completion of vessel discharge.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-168

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: DSRE

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LTM-169

~~(C)~~ TITLE: Class I Resupply & Movement Control

~~(C)~~ PROBLEM: Negative Impact of Support Using the Trailer Transfer Point (TTP) Relay System.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION:

(a) ~~(C)~~ The TTP Relay System created unnecessary delays of shipments on several occasions during the exercise. The delays caused a loss of man hours as soldiers waited for, or returned to pick-up shipments that had not arrived on the required delivery date (RDD). Examples of the impact of the TTP Relay System include:

1 ~~(C)~~ An emergency shipment needed for issue on 17 Sep 83 at Hunfeld arrived on 18 Sep 83..

2 ~~(C)~~ A regular shipment programmed to arrive at Hunfeld on 17 Sep 83 actually arrived on 19 Sep 83.

3 ~~(C)~~ Several (in excess of 10) S&P's were scheduled to arrive at Borken on 21 Sep 83. Two vehicles arrived on time the remaining vehicles arrived a day late.

(b) (U) In almost every case mentioned above and in other cases not shown, the problems can be associated with one or more of three factors related to the TTP System. The three factors are:

1 ~~(C)~~ Trailer Transfer Point personnel were often not aware of incoming shipments.

2 ~~(C)~~ Limited or no tractor power to pull trailers to the final destination.

3 ~~(C)~~ Personnel responsible for monitoring incoming shipments lacked training and in some cases did not notify the NCOIC when 999 (emergency) shipments had arrived.

~~(C)~~ RECOMMENDATION: Shipments be pulled directly from depot to destination whenever possible. When TTP System must be used, personnel on duty should be trained to monitor incoming vehicles and manage assets to assure prompt pulling forward of shipments to the destination.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-169

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS-TNG
NUMBER: C-LTM-170

(U) TITLE: Movement Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: Convoy Discipline.

(U) DISCUSSION: Reports received by the UMCC through both German Feldjaeger and US channels disclose problems with overall convoy discipline. Reports indicate that in many instances units failed to adhere to their convoy march credit clearance and conducted poor march discipline. Deviations ranged from missing start time, unauthorized delays enroute, units moving on the wrong day, units failing to stop at scheduled rest stops, vehicles not marked properly with march credit numbers and/or convoy flags. In addition to being a potential safety hazard, poor convoy discipline hinders the capability to deploy forces in an organized, controlled manner. Movement of forces under march credit provides visibility over what units are being convoyed and their current location in the theater. Disregard for the march credit/movement order by deploying forces takes away this visibility and restricts the UMCC's capability to force track and provide positive movement control. Although violations may seem insignificant at the individual convoy commander level, lack of convoy discipline and failure to adhere to movement times by several convoys can have a reverberating effect that can totally disrupt theater highway deployment operations. Convoy maintenance/life support activities and security arrangements are all coordinated according to movement times and expected closure times. Failure to adhere to the movement credit can result in some convoys not receiving their required essential support. In peacetime this can be corrected with only minor inconvenience, however, in wartime the results could be disastrous.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That USAREUR and FORSCOM undertake an aggressive program to emphasize the importance of convoy discipline to deployment operations. Convoy discipline and the exact execution of movement orders should be a part of the total evaluation of a units capability to deploy and fight.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-170

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LTM-171

(U) TITLE: Movement Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: Identification of POMCUS Rail Requirements.

(U) DISCUSSION: CONUS units submitted STANAG 2156 "Surface Transportation Request" identifying rail requirements to move equipment from POMCUS locations. Units were to carefully review what they were programmed to draw from POMCUS and develop rail requirements based upon this review. Actual conduct of rail operations from POMCUS sites revealed that many of the STANAG 2156 submissions did not match what was actually drawn from the POMCUS site. This caused delays in the deployment of some units since trains had to be reconfigured and new rail clearances obtained.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Units must carefully review their rail requirements and insure that their POMCUS draw can be supported by their STANAG 2156 submissions. Additional emphasis must be placed on insuring that units are only issued those POMCUS items that have been programmed and listed on the approved POMCUS draw list. It is also recommended that unit movement officers deploy early and review STANAG 2156 submissions with final POMCUS issue listing prior to arrival of advance party in units authorized a liaison party or with the advance party, if not authorized a liaison party.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-171

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LTM-172

(U) TITLE: Reception & Onward Movement

(U) PROBLEM: MHE at Railheads.

(U) DISCUSSION: Many items scheduled to be moved by rail required material handling equipment (MHE) to assist in loading and off-loading operations. These items consisted of pieces of equipment such as MILVANS w/o chassis, CONEXs, 20 ton cranes, commo shelters, etc. In some cases supporting units failed to adequately forecast MHE requirements at railheads in time to contract for required services. This necessitated implementing changes to the deployment concept and switching mode of shipment.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That receiving/gaining units conduct a careful review of type equipment scheduled to be transported by rail in support of their operation and insure sufficient MHE is available prior to the departure/arrival of rail assets at both origin and destination.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-172

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 200TH TAMMC

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LTM-173

(U) TITLE: Class III (Bulk) Supply & Distribution

(U) PROBLEM: Saturation of Rail Head Facilities.

(U) DISCUSSION: During the conduct of REFORGER rail resupply was used primarily for JP-4. Four rail heads (three JP-4 and one DF-2) were used in III Corps and three rail heads (JP-4) were used in V Corps. A total of 57 rail car loads were shipped. Problems were experienced in shortages of rail tank cars, meeting required delivery dates and rail head operations.

(a) (U) Rail Car Shortage: Due to unprogrammed rail support to CFE BASE-LAHR in support of a USAFE Collocated Operating Base (COB), JP-4 rail cars were in great demand. Eighty-six rail cars were in JP-4 service which proved to be inadequate to meet the demand.

(b) (U) Required Delivery Dates: Pre-exercise coordination identified delivery quantities and dates. Due to a shortfall in rail car availability delivery dates were frequently slipped.

(c) (U) Railhead Operations: Confusion existed concerning procedures for rail head clearance, shipping locations, arrival of rail cars and discharge procedures. Pressure from local residents temporarily closed the Wehrheim rail head causing slippage in deliveries. Frequent changes of shipment locations created confusion and delays in deliveries. A general lack of communication support at rail heads resulted in difficulty in coordinating arrival of rail cars. Installation Transportation Officers (ITO) were not actively involved in petroleum rail movements during the exercise. Improper discharge procedures delayed the timely return of empty rail cars.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Better coordination with USAFE concerning JP-4 support impacting on USAREUR resources should be conducted prior to the exercise. Rail car availability should be increased accordingly. Future rail head training should include improved communication support, more involvement by ITO's and closer coordination with local Deutsch Bundesbahn personnel. Rail cars should be discharged so as to enhance the accessibility to and expedite the return of empty rail cars.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-173

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X) SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS
Forces Application NUMBER: C-AER-175

~~(C)~~ TITLE: Liaison Personnel and Communication

~~(C)~~ PROBLEM: A covering force was provided an Air Defence Chaparral/Vulcan (C/V) battery in direct support of its covering force mission, but was not provided the ADA Liaison Officer (LNO) personnel or communications. The LNO section was retained by the normally supported brigade.

~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION:

A. (U) When an air defence C/V battery is in direct support of a maneuver unit, the C/V battalion provides a liaison section with communications to the supported unit.

B. ~~(C)~~ If a C/V battery is provided to a unit during a covering force mission, the LNO section should also be provided to them. The absence of the LNO section deprives the maneuver unit commander the ability to coordinate his air defence coverage and to know the weapon status of his air defense forces.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Establish a policy directing air defense forces in direct support be employed with a liaison section.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-175

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: III Corps

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS - FMD
NUMBER: C-AEN-174

(U) TITLE: Engineer Equipment Requirements in NORTHAG

~~(c)~~ PROBLEM: Insufficient Bridging Assets are available for NORTHAG operations.

~~(c)~~ DISCUSSION: FTX ATLANTIC LION highlighted requirements for specific engineer equipment and units. Those identified were similar to requirements expected in combat operations in other NORTHAG sectors. The entire NORTHAG sector requires an increased water and gap crossing capability. ATLANTIC LION demonstrated that the required amount of AVLB's, medium girder bridges, ribbon bridges, and assault boats in NORTHAG can easily exceed our current capability.

~~(c)~~ RECOMMENDATION: That an analysis of the current bridging capability assigned to NORTHAG be made in order to determine their adequacy. Additionally, US Army MTOE's for units scheduled to deploy to NORTHAG should reflect additional water and gap spanning capabilities.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-174

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: V CORPS

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: TRADOC
NUMBER: C-APS-176

(U) TITLE: Update RAOC MTOE

(U) PROBLEM: V Corps RAOC MTOE is obsolete.

(U) DISCUSSION: The current RAOC MTOE (29-408G) is obsolete in its ability to support the needs of V Corps Rear Area Protection. The proposed doctrine outlined in TRADOC PAM 525-30 documents this problem. V Corps RAOC's are required to administratively operate under one MOTE, and train under another.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Approval of new MTOE as soon as possible to support V Corps rear area protection requirements.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-176

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: MTMC, TTCE

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-ATM-177

(U) TITLE: SPOD Operations

(U) PROBLEM: Mission of Advance Party Port Driver Team.

(U) DISCUSSION: Deploying units were not aware of the requirements associated with the advance party driver pool. Most advance party elements were confused about the purpose, use and composition of the driver detachment provided to the Port Commander for use in the discharge of the ship. In one case, the OIC of the 1st Cav Div element would only authorize his personnel to operate 1st Cav Div equipment. In another case, the selection of the driver team was made only after MTMC TTCE personnel made contact with the advance elements and explained the concept of operations. Also a training deficiency was disclosed in that some personnel selected could not back semi-trailers in close quarters.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That the advance driver element be configured and constituted in advance of deployment so that the team can be trained, briefed, and prepared to assist in vessel discharge operations and maintenance.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-177

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, USAREUR ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS-TNG
NUMBER: C-ATN-178

(U) TITLE: Training

(U) PROBLEM: CONUS Unit Knowledge of USAREUR War Plans and Host Nation Transportation Support Procedures.

(U) DISCUSSION: Several incidents occurred during the deployment and FTX phases of REFORGER 83 that highlighted the need for a better knowledge and understanding of USAREUR war plans and HN transportation support procedures by deploying forces. Most of the confusion and problems experienced by CONUS forces in obtaining transportation support can be directly attributed to a lack of knowledge of one or more of the following factors:

- (1) (U) The role of 4th TRANSCOM in supporting onward movement - Many units are not familiar with the onward movement concept addressed in USAREUR OPLAN 4360-82. Units were confused over which agency plans, provides and controls movements of forces from APOD and SPOD to Marshalling Areas and onward to Staging Areas.
- (2) (U) Which Theater agency provides the required support, i.e., Host Nation or US Command.
- (3) (U) The Theater Army support concept - several CONUS units were neither familiar with the functions/responsibilities of the Area Support Group present, nor their respective responsibilities for obtaining support under this concept. This was a significant problem in the NORTHAG area.
- (4) (U) The proper channel for submitting the transportation request, i.e., through the TMO or the Corps MCC, ITO, DTO, etc.
- (5) (U) The proper form for the request, i.e., STANAG format.
- (6) (U) The required response times to process the request and perform the mission, e.g., many units expected instantaneous approval of highway clearance requests.
- (7) (U) The "by mission" versus "dedicated" transportation support provided by TRANSCOM assets. The TRANSCOM's mission is theater General Support line-haul and back-up Direct Support to the Corps elements. These missions are highway assets for continued GS mission services.

All of these factors are addressed in existing USAREUR war plans and Host Nation LOC agreements. Although some senior planners and commanders did understand the basic concept, many of the lower level personnel responsible for obtaining the support did not and this resulted on several transportation related problems.

RECOMMENDATION: (U) That movement personnel of CONUS based deploying forces review all applicable USAREUR war plans and Host Nation LOC agreements in preparation for REFORGER participation.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-178

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: III Corps

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS - FMD
NUMBER: C-CEW-179

(U) TITLE: Centralized Tasking of EW Assets



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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-179

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, WWMCCS
NUMBER: C-CJR-180

(U) TITLE: Communications

(U) PROBLEM: Excessive WWMCCS Down-Time.

(U) DISCUSSION: During the 8 week exercise period (2 Sep - 27 Oct 83), the WWMCCS was non-operational 253 hours, or 19% of the time. Reasons for the non-operational status included "System Saves", preventive maintenance, software problems, hardware problems, and maintenance problems. When analyzing WWMCCS reliability during aircraft arrival and departure, a critical time for UMCC reporting, the WWMCCS was inoperable during 38% of the aircraft arrivals during deployment. The WWMCCS inoperability during this critical timeframe caused significant delays in reporting aircraft arrivals to USAREUR elements, necessitating telephonic deployment reporting from the UMCC to appropriate USAREUR agencies. The WWMCCS was inoperable during 15% of the redeployment flights, resulting in a significant delay in reporting aircraft departures to CONUS elements preparing to receive those affected missions. An issue which should be highlighted is the routine shutting down of the WWMCCS by USAREUR for "System Saves" (every Sunday 0001-0600) and for preventative maintenance (H6000 computer Sundays 0800-1200; Level 6 computer Thursday 1400-1600). If the WWMCCS communication system is expected to function in a wartime environment, then action must be taken to reduce these 12 hours of weekly down-time. During REFORGER 83, this down-time affected the UMCC WWMCCS operations significantly.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: That the system saves, and preventative maintenance schedule be coordinated with USAREUR operations for times having the least impact on REFORGER reporting.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-180

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: EUCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSC-E/ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-COM-181

(U) TITLE: Vulnerability/Insufficiency of Communications System



(U) RECOMMENDATION: A complete study needs to be made of actual needs and the appropriate systems to fulfill that need. It may be possible to move forward in the schedule of arrivals signal units that could support the LOC. It may also be possible to establish some back up support on a rotational basis from the units rotating through the LOC.

OSD 3.3(b)(1),(3),(5)

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-181

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: V CORPS

SUSPENSE: None
POC: V CORPS C-E
NUMBER: C-COM-182

(U) TITLE: Communications for RAOC Liaison Teams

(U) PROBLEM: RAOC liaison teams need to be equipped with organic communications capability.

(U) DISCUSSION: RAOC liaison teams are critical to the passage of pertinent rear area information. Reliance on organic capabilities of the unit they are assigned is a problem. The addition of RATT assets to the MTOE would go a long way in solving this situation. Current MTOE allows for 1 RATT (GRC-142), 1 VSC-2 (AM Radio), and 7 VRC-46 Radio sets (FM). The RAOC liaison teams need to be as self-sustaining as possible.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Provide additional RATT assets to RAOC MTOE.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-182

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: V CORPS

SUSPENSE: None
POC: V CORPS C-E
NUMBER: C-COM-183

(U) TITLE: Communications for Marshalling Areas

(U) PROBLEM: Lack of functional Integrated Marshalling Area Communications Coordination

(U) DISCUSSION: Command and control of subordinate units is severely degraded due to the absence of a viable communications link among the combat equipment draw sites and their respective marshalling areas with the forward Command Post. The lack of communications impacts all areas, specifically: changes in aircraft arrival convoy and rail schedule changes (RP and SPs) equipment draw problems, ammunition upload problems, current operational availability of equipment drawn, the dissemination of vital operational/tactical changes and status of Super Cargo Equipment (NAP) arrival, handling and movement to the Tactical Assemble Area from the BENELUX.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: 21st SUPCOM establish an integrated communications net that will provide timely data to the Forward Command Post. This would allow the Commander to more effectively control his units during the critical in country arrival, equipment/ammunition draw would additionally allow the Command group to effectively communicate with the Corps/Division to which it will be attached/assigned for status reports and mission changes.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-183

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: USACAE

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSCE
NUMBER: C-COM-184

(U) TITLE: Tactical Weather Communications Deficiencies

(U) PROBLEM: Deployed division and ACR weather teams (WETMs) received little usable weather data from either the Army Command and Area Communications System (ACACS) multichannel or the high frequency radio teletype (HF RATT). Weather support was seriously degraded.

(U) DISCUSSION:

A. (U) Weather communications were barely adequate when combined radio intercept of civilian broadcasts and the USAREUR Weather Net (UWN) and multichannel. Each of these have serious shortcomings: Radio intercept would be unavailable in war when civilian broadcasts could not be depended on. The UWN is often difficult to receive and ACACS multichannel is slow to come up after jumps, which particularly affects lower echelon units. Weather communication also suffers from vintage teletype equipment. For these and safety of flight reasons, WETMs depended heavily, in some cases exclusively, on radio intercept of civilian weather broadcasts.

B. (U) Multichannel weather data is consistently unavailable to ARC staff weather officers (SWOs) because of large number of communications switches and patches which must be established and units' short stay at any location between jumps. Division SWOs fared better with multichannel FAX in commission almost 50% of the time. The multichannel teletype in commission rate was 70%, with frequent garbling, for the 8ID SWO; however, only 2% for the 3AD SWO.

C. (U) Radio teletype (RATT) rigs effectiveness varied. The 8ID SWO's RATT rig was pulled for the admin/log net by the division's commanding general. The 3AD SWO's rig was effective during daytime only. 11th ACR SWO's rig served "no useful purpose." The 3ACR SWO's rig "had numerous mechanical out-ages, was diverted to higher priority users" for 4 days and never had the right CEOI keylist. 1CD SWO's rig had no success copying indigenous broadcasts or UWN. However, 7WS/OL-G, providing staffing area support with 2d AD(F), and 7WS/Det 5, supporting 1CD Avn, each had excellent RATT rig reception.

D. (U) USAREUR C&E support at the UTFU and to V Corps was very good.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Equip corps, division, and ACR SWOs with portable micro computer and modem. An inexpensive word processing software package could be used to format data. Data would be entered into system when it becomes available, then transferred at 300 baud whenever a call can get through over TASS. Portable micro computer disk drive packages are available for \$2,000, word processing packages are available for \$100, DOT matrix printers for under \$500, and modems under \$300. For less than \$3,000 per unit, a reliable, fast, and secure weather communications system could be obtained. Two of these systems should be purchased to test the feasibility.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-184

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X) SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
SUBMITTER: Directorate of AIR-LAND POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSCE
Forces Application NUMBER: C-CPS-185

(U) TITLE: Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) Equipment Capabilities and Limitations

(U) PROBLEM: There were restrictions placed on the ALO's use of the high frequency (HF) radio by some units.

(U) DISCUSSION:

A. (U) There seems to be a disparity in radio use within the Air Force Tactical Air Request Net (TARN). USAFE Pamphlet (USAFEP) 55-1, 10 Mar 83, states that the HF is the primary radio, but either the HF or VHF/FM may be used to pass immediate air request to the ASOC via the most direct routing.

B. ~~(C)~~ Because of the high power output (approximately 1000 watts) and long range transmissions, the HF radio can be quickly (5-10 sec) located and targeted by enemy artillery. However, if properly deployed with the directional antenna option, the HF radio may be more survivable.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

A. (U) The ALO's should assure unit commanders fully understand the capabilities and limitations of the TACP equipment.

B. (U) USAFEP 55-1 should reflect the limitations of the current equipment and consideration given to making the VHF/FM the primary radio for the TARN.

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-185

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, 21ST SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSC-E
NUMBER: C-CSN-186

(U) TITLE: Secure Communications Equipment



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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-186

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-CTM-187

(U) TITLE: Movement Coordination (Reporting)

(U) PROBLEM: Rail Reports.

(U) DISCUSSION: During both deployment and redeployment the UMCC did not receive rail reports from the ARC, Corps or SUPCOMs. USAREUR EXOPORD REFORGER 83 (4019X) specifically defined rail reporting requirements of all participating commands. Due to the lack of reporting information, effective, positive rail control was never totally established. The UMCC could not implement effective movements control or provide force tracking information to USAREUR. Lack of information severely hampers the UMCC's ability to control movements. Rail reporting provides visibility over that portion of the deployment of forces. Without the information the UMCC cannot provide current force tracking information nor control movements to respond to a changing tactical situation.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the ARC, SUPCOMs and Corps establish a railhead support/reporting element to report and assist in controlling rail operations.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-187

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-CTM-188

(U) TITLE: Movement Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: Movement Information Reporting.

(U) DISCUSSION: Movements information reporting procedures for REFORGER 83 were in consonance with existing war plans and with responsibilities specified for each command in the USAREUR EXOPORD. Briefly stated, two systems of movements reporting exist: WWMCCS and a telephonic report system. The problem, as noted in the final REFORGER 83 briefing, was the failure of commands to comply with their stated responsibilities of movements reporting throughout any sector of the theater (21st SUPCOM, ARC or V Corps) to the UMCC. The WWMCCS force and supply tracking system (21st SUPCOM and subordinate commands) was not updated throughout deployment. Telephonic support due the UMCC on movement departures or arrivals, etc., were seldom received for any mode.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: USAREUR emphasis through command channels is needed in order for MSCs to properly plan and execute this vital information system. While 4th TRANSCOM will continue to evaluate the possibilities of more efficient automated systems of reporting, we believe the two existing systems are viable and must be responded to for successful wartime reinforcing movements.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-188

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 4TH TRANSCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSOPS-TNG
NUMBER: C-ETM-189

(U) TITLE: Movement Coordination

(U) PROBLEM: STANAG Submission.

(U) DISCUSSION: The exercise required units to submit all movement requests in STANAG format (2155/2156). Many units did not know how to prepare STANAGs. Those STANAGs that were submitted were sloppy and inaccurate, and many STANAG replies were late. In addition, some in-country supporting agencies (ITO, etc) were not familiar with procedures for processing STANAGs.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: USEUCOM/USAREUR continue efforts to educate all European Theater forces on STANAG report procedures, all future exercises continue to use only STANAG reporting procedures, and that peacetime movement procedures be brought in line with STANAG report requirements.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-189

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 7th MEDCOM

SUSPENSE: (ONGOING ACTION)
POC: HQ 7th MEDCOM (ACSOPS)
NUMBER: C-LSM-190

(U) TITLE: Test Kit Equipment

(U) PROBLEM: Lack of Laboratory Test Kit Equipment

(U) DISCUSSION: The clinical laboratory personnel within the two Combat Support Hospitals participating in the exercise experienced frustration in obtaining test kits and reagents needed to operate their laboratories. Most of the test kits, reagents, and components required to operate laboratory equipment in a Combat Support Hospital are not components of the Medical Resupply Set #2 and are not routinely maintained by the unit. Consequently, during field exercises and certainly in mobilization, significant shortfalls will occur in the availability of these items. During REFORGER 83, the 37th Medical Supply, Optical and Maintenance unit personnel received good input from laboratory personnel as to what is required in the laboratories.

(U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. (U) USAMMCE personnel work with the appropriate 7th MEDCOM consultants to establish essential requirements for test kits, reagents, and equipment components needed to support functional laboratories.

B. (U) USAMMCE establish a program to procure and maintain these items in the inventory.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-190

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LSM-191

(U) TITLE: Exercise Logistics Realism

(U) PROBLEM: An apparent divergence exists between deploying force expectations and theater capabilities.

~~(S)~~ DISCUSSION: Exercises represent our best opportunity to test OPLANS, Agreements, and Standard Operating Procedures. Deploying forces should be prepared to experience austerity in logistical support and services. It would be improper to train soldiers practicing a deployment to war in unrealistic practices which result in unrealistic expectations. The forward stationed and deploying CSS force structure will not permit, in time of war, the provision of non-essential services except when they can be obtained from indigenous sources. To develop these sources REFORGER is the best medium we have available. As an exercise of the lines of communications, REFORGER is our only annual opportunity to realistically test the provisions of our Joint Support Plans (JSP). It also excellent interoperability training. Deploying forces however, continue to expect peacetime levels and types support. This is not consistent with the intent to train in peace as we will have to execute in times of tension or war.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Insure that exercise realism continues to be developed and all participants reconcile themselves to the idea that services and support will be austere.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-191

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LSM-192

(U) TITLE: Logistics Standardization

(U) PROBLEM: Lack of standardized packages and procedures for provisions of Class I, II, (SSSC) and Class III (package) items to deploying forces.

(U) DISCUSSION: Prior to publication of CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4360-82 in Dec 83 deploying units were required to bring an initial supply of self service items. As a lesson learned from REFORGER 82 this requirement was eliminated to free a significant strategic lift capability. The intent was to locally procure the necessary common Class II supplies for deploying units. Our mistake was in not standardizing and configuring supplies in unit loads. This resulted for REFORGER 83 in deploying units submitting want list prior to deployment for USAREUR to obtain and store for the unit. This was definitely not an economical enhancement and was a management nightmare.

(U) RECOMMENDATION:

A. (U) All deploying units, POMCUS and follow-on, should be provided a standard supply of Class II (SSSC) items upon arrival in their marshalling areas or TAAs. In order to achieve this the following will be implemented:

(1) (U) USAREUR will provide the newly developed USAREUR standard SSSC listing to ARRED.

(2) (U) ARRED should develop a standard unit package for each SRC to be supplied to theater by USAREUR.

(3) (U) USAREUR will screen each SRC listing and publish a standard SSSC listing by SRC code and forward to FORSCOM/ARRED for information to each unit and to 21st SUPCOM/Hosting MSC for implementation.

B. (U) Standardize Class I, and III (package) basic loads and resupplys for participating units (unit configured loads) for REFORGER 84 and 85. The standardization of basic loads and resupply of Classes I and III (package) by configuring these commodities in unit loads will streamline the issue procedure, facilitate the programming of work loads at issue facilities, expedite inventory and accounting procedures and facilitate the use of alternative modes of transport for resupply operations. This was done to some degree with Class III (package) for POMCUS units for REFORGER 83 and Class I is an appropriate additional application. In Class I this was exercise in 83 at the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin and again during the CENTCOM Exercise BRIGHT STAR.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-192

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 21ST SUPCOM

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: HQ, USAREUR, ODCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LSM-193

(U) TITLE: Airdrop Requests

(U) PROBLEM: Lack of Familiarity with aerial resupply procedures.

(U) DISCUSSION: Requested missions for airdrop rigging by the 5th QM Det were often sent directly to the 5th QM Det, bypassing USAREUR and HQ, 21st SUPCOM. Further, some requests were for items other than Class I, III or V which is all that is presently authorized by USAREUR. As a result, 3AD was unable to successfully arrange for any airdrops of supplies.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: Better publicize airdrop requesting procedures and update USAREUR Reg 700-700.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-193

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXERCISE: REFORGER 83 (4019X)
SUBMITTER: 200th TAMMC

SUSPENSE: ONGOING ACTION
POC: DCSLOG
NUMBER: C-LSM-194

(U) TITLE: Logistical Realism

(U) PROBLEM: To determine a more effective release procedure for OPLAN 39.

(U) DISCUSSION: a. (U) The procedures outlined in OPLAN 4102 and 4360 are guidelines to support wartime contingencies where OP 39 would fulfill the requirement to establish marshalling areas in support of the reception process for augmentation forces deploying to Europe and drawing POMCUS. During peacetime, i.e., REFORGER, accountability necessitates the return of all released operational project stocks. War plans must be followed to the extent possible, however, accountability must establish responsibility to insure the items are returned to the depot, or proper measures taken to account for lost, damaged or destroyed property. The war plans exempt accountability. Those involved in the release of operational project stocks must not confuse terminology, i.e., release, issue, temporary loan. This year's release included all three words, each having a different meaning, thus creating the difficulty in releasing the operational project. Also, the proponent did not specify the equipment desired for the release.

b. (U) The OPLAN procedures are paraphrased below:

- (1) (U) User or proponent may request release.
- (2) (U) The proponent must approve of the release.
- (3) (U) Request is submitted to DCSOPS, who coordinates with DCSLOG.
- (4) (U) The 200th TAMMC is notified to release stocks.
- (5) (U) The requestor should identify which stocks are desired to be released. (If not specified, it is assumed the entire operational project is to be released).
- (6) (U) D72/Materiel Release Orders are cut.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-194

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) RECOMMENDATION: a. (U) The proponent submit a revision to the intended purpose of OP 39 to include the peacetime use of equipment to support REFORGER, i.e., equipment is required to establish marshalling areas in support of the reception process for forces deploying to Europe and drawing POMCUS.

b. (U) Establish full accountability for OP 39 stocks released. In addition to the procedures paraphrased in the discussion, 1-5 above, the following should be incorporated for accountability purposes:

- (1) (U) Prepare code sheet for DIC D7N (Issues to recipient of consigned inventory).
- (2) (U) D7N will generate MRO.
- (3) (U) User/proponent will submit 1348-1 with document numbers.
- (4) (U) Fund cite code for users be placed in supplementary address block.
- (5) (U) User pick up equipment.
- (6) (U) Turn-in of items: Prepare D6N (from consignee of consigned inventory).
- (7) (U) Turn-in document number will be the same as original document number. Turn-in annotated for lost, damaged or destroyed property. Charges for repair. The MMC will follow through to bill the customer.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

III-195

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Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 27 2013

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