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OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 21 2014

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*

SUBJECT: Persian Gulf Policy: State of Play and  
Next Steps

June 3 PRG thoroughly reviewed military and diplomatic actions and plans following on last Friday's NSPG. Following is a summary of where we stand and what needs to be done over the next ten days.

State of Play

Military Planning:

The first ship to be certified for reflagging will be ready on 14 June. The others will then be ready at the rate of two a week. None will be flagged until we are ready to protect and approval is given by NSC, DOD and State. No one should say the first ship will be flagged on 14 June. It is not flagged until we say flag it. Coast Guard and Kuwaits understand this.

The JCS concept is to have two transits a week -- one east and one west. Up to 4 ships per convoy. Two US ships will escort each convoy operating within a 10-mile radius. Other US ships will patrol the route to provide AWACS downlink, C2, etc. At present we have 5 combatants there (plus Lasalle) with 3 more to come by 1 July. All ships will be Phalanx-equipped by 3 July.

A guided missile cruiser has joined MIDEASTFOR and there will be a cruiser there permanently in addition to 7 destroyers and frigates (plus Lasalle). JCS plan to assign an AEGIS cruiser to the force "periodically", but details on dates and length of assignment are lacking. This is an important issue which needs to be clarified so all concerned have a common understanding of what is actually planned. The current JCS position appears somewhat less supportive of AEGIS assignment than the position reflected by Admiral Crowe at last week's NSPG.

JCS and CINCCENT want air cover for twelve-hour transit of Strait, to include protection against possible surface and air

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
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ADM Crowe. He  
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attack and capability to hit Silkworm sites. JCS would prefer that this be provided by land-based air, even when a carrier is present in the Arabian Sea; but the carrier can, of course, support the requirement, if necessary, during the seven months of the year, when one is scheduled to be in the Indian Ocean. During the remaining five months use of land-based air will be



orbit for USAF AWAC's, plan is to add a southern orbit, which will provide coverage of Gulf, Strait and potential Silkworm deployment sites in Iran, preferably by use of Saudi AWAC's augmented by US personnel. Use of two additional USAF AWAC's is fallback. Use of USAF tankers required for either alternative. The Secretary of Defense will make these requests to Saudi MOD Sultan today. When he gets an answer, JCS and CENTCOM will be able to proceed with planning. SIGINT, satellite and P-3 coverage of Strait and Gulf will also be increased.

Realistic allied military objective in Gulf would be variety of separate, visible operations, loosely linked by informal coordination of movements, joint or bilateral training and



Diplomatic and Public Strategy:

We agreed at the PRG that we need to do a better job of informing the public and Congress and other governments on our central objective of ending or at least containing the Iran-Iraq war. Continued expansion of the war increases the threat of Iranian hegemony over the Gulf Arabs; endangers free access to the energy resources upon which the West depends; and creates opportunities for expansion of Soviet influence. These are the points that President and George Shultz should emphasize at Venice -- seek firm support from the allies for strong UNSC action, public reaffirmation of their vital stake in the Gulf region (draft summit statement already circulated) and tangible contributions to overall effort.

We do not need allied military cooperation to protect a limited number of ex-Kuwaiti tankers under US flag and our own naval role is more modest than is generally understood. However, to achieve important common interests in preventing the war from spreading and Iran from intimidating nervous GCC states, as well as preventing serious Congressional (and international) concerns about

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allied cohesion and common determination, each government needs to do something more -- or more visible -- than it is presently doing. In some cases (Britain and France), this means simply highlighting and coordinating existing naval activities in and near the Gulf; for others, such as the Italians, Dutch and Canadians, it could mean an occasional naval deployment to the Gulf. For Japan and FRG it could mean some form of financial contribution. We don't need to ask for much; small steps by each of the allies tailored to their own needs and interests can add up to the effective overall political message which is needed.

Public and diplomatic activity in support of strong UNSC action to end the war, in reducing flow of arms to Iran, in bolstering morale of GCC and in urging Iran to cease terrorism/intimidation/attacks on neutral ships should be easier to get than military action and are also very important.

#### Next Steps

##### Military Planning:

Cap Weinberger meets with Prince Sultan in Nice today to press for Saudi F-15 quick reaction support and extended AWACS coverage (with the Saudis taking the lead in obtaining overflight clearances from the UAE and Oman). DOD and JCS have provided State with a list of specific requests to follow up on the President's messages to GCC heads of state last weekend. The requests are fairly modest at this stage with (with the exception of the issue of TACAIR basing in UAE); much will depend on how much support the Saudis are willing to provide.

We will ask the Omanis for search and rescue (SAR) assistance. Our pitch to the UAE will be for SAR aid, continued commercial refueling, and basing of TACAIR. We'll ask the Bahrainis for commercial refueling, SAR, and a communications facility for MIDEASTFOR. And we plan to request that Kuwait provide some limited support (fast patrol boats) for convoys near Kuwaiti waters; gratis fuel for MIDEASTFOR (which the GOK has already agreed to); and limited air support for convoys in the northern Gulf. As soon as Cap has reported the results of his discussion with Sultan, State will transmit follow-up messages to other GCC capitals (the GCC foreign ministers meet in Jeddah on June 6 to consider the general question of cooperating on the security of Gulf shipping).

Military and financial suggestions for allies will be included in Presidential letter to be sent you today for clearance and delivered tomorrow.

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At the PRG, JCS was tasked to provide a date by which an AEGIS cruiser would join MIDEASTFOR, and ~~SECRET~~ DOD will ensure that intelligence collection on Silkworm developments and tactical early warning receives the highest national priority. ~~SECRET~~ what appears to be radar calibration (for first time) and other work at Silkworm site at Kuhestak. NSC, State and DOD are working up recommendations on what more we should say to Iran about emplacement of missiles, as well as internal plans on specific action recommendations should missiles be emplaced, test-fired, or used vs. US or other ships.

Diplomatic and Public Strategy:

Presidential messages to allied capitals will go tomorrow to prepare the ground for the approaches that the President and George Shultz will make at Venice. Mike Armacost will call in the Soviet and Chinese Ambassadors tomorrow to lobby for cooperation at the UNSC and push Operation Staunch. DOD and State have begun work on the report to Congress which will be due within seven days of enactment of the Foley-Michel amendment or some variation thereof. This is hung up in Senate battle over more restrictive, conditional language but we want to be ready. (Colin tasked preparation of a detailed outline by COB Friday.) This will be the centerpiece of our Congressional and public diplomacy efforts over the next couple weeks -- we need to ensure that it is a comprehensive, timely, high-quality product.

State has also been tasked with preparation of a draft demarche to Iran, which we would transmit when we begin to implement the Kuwaiti protection regime. The message would spell out our determination to protect US flag shipping, spell out how we intend to proceed so there will be no misunderstanding or accidental incidents, and indicate what we would consider to be unacceptable, dangerous actions by Iranian armed forces or Revolutionary Guards (e.g. overly close approach to US ships, deployment/use of Silkworm, etc.).

*we.*  
Bill Cockell concurs.

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