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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 19 SEP 2012 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 12-M-1987

JCSM-484-71

~~November 1971~~

OL XIV

(97)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: US Position for Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (U)

1. ~~1.1~~ The failure of the Soviets to accept the 27 July 1971 US SALT proposal and the continuing Soviet military buildup are viewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with great concern. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have carefully reviewed the 27 July proposal, the current strategic balance, discernible trends, and the SALT negotiation history. The following views are based on fundamental military considerations of US national security. They are not related to negotiating tactics or timing and are forwarded as a recommended US position for future negotiations.

2. ~~2.1~~ With respect to offensive arms, the continuing momentum of Soviet strategic missile growth, both deployed and projected, has carried Soviet strategic offensive force levels past the parity that once would have made a freeze militarily sound. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the 27 July freeze proposal, which would allow the USSR approximately 600 more offensive missiles than the United States, with the precise total depending on what date the agreement finally carries, is not adequate for US security interests. JCS SIOP/RISOP war games consistently show a disparity against the United States in the relative capabilities of the US/USSR to render damage if deterrence fails. This disparity is serious when considering only currently deployed forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly urge that this imbalance be corrected by modifying the current US proposal as follows:

a. An agreement based on an equal aggregate total ceiling on strategic missiles (ICBMs, MLBMs, and SLBMs) of 2375 (the current estimate of Soviet missile strength should all launchers currently under construction be completed). That number would include a subtotal authorizing each side no more than 313 MLBMs. Freedom to mix from one system to another within the limits would be permitted.


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SA 71-519
DOC 14-9
12-M-1587

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b. A close tie between the defensive and offensive agreements to preserve the leverage the US programmed ABM deployment gives in seeking to control Soviet offensive missile growth. The United States must not weaken this leverage by piecemeal concurrence in partial controls on Soviet offensive missile systems. The Soviets should be told that failure to include SLBMs in any offensive agreement will result in blocking an ABM agreement.

3. ~~23~~ With respect to the defensive agreement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note further concern. In its own security programs, the United States has, in a period of less than 2 years, fallen back from a 12-site SAFEGUARD deployment, once considered essential for US security, past the minimal militarily acceptable four-site SAFEGUARD, to the current two-site proposal advanced by the United States in SALT negotiations. Two sites limited to 200 missiles provide limited defense at a substantial cost. It would provide some operational know-how and limited coverage for approximately 660 missiles as well as a base for future expansion--should the need arise. The Soviets, with the Moscow ABM system, cover approximately 586 missiles and afford a measure of protection to their National Command Authority (NCA), as well as approximately 18 percent of their population, 48 percent of their industry, and 22 command and control centers. Four-site SAFEGUARD and, to a lesser extent, a three-site SAFEGUARD, gives some semblance of balance to that comparison--two sites do not. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The United States combine elements of the US/USSR ABM proposals and propose an agreement on one NCA site plus two sites for defense of ICBMs (west of the Mississippi for the United States and east of the Urals for the Soviets) for both sides with equal numbers of missiles/launchers. The military requirement for an NCA defense has increased significantly. The increasing number of Soviet SLBMs and their improving accuracy, coupled with the US short-time warning, seriously threaten US command and control survivability, particularly at the national level. This factor, along with the growing third-country nuclear threat, lends increasing importance to an NCA defense.

b. The United States stand fast on the requirement for the limitation of Modern ABM Radar Complexes (MARCAs). The number and types of MARCs would conform to the number and types of sites defended.

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c. The US position on other radar questions be:

(1) Other Large Phased Array Radars (OLPARs):
"Consultation" rather than "agreement" on the deployment of such radars. Agreement would be unwieldy and difficult to arrange between two sovereign powers.


(2) Early Warning: The United States should seek equal numbers to those existing and under construction in the USSR.

4. ~~(U)~~ The above recommendations take into account the current relative US/Soviet strategic postures. Although the US may or may not ultimately achieve the offensive authorizations permitted by these proposals, and technology may make it unnecessary, nevertheless, the United States must insure adequate flexibility to prevent being locked into a position of inferiority. Once the United States has accepted a position of military inferiority as a result of an interim "freeze" agreement, it will most likely be impossible to continue negotiations leading to military equality in offensive systems unless the interim agreement provides the flexibility inherent in an equal ceiling for both sides. The offensive and defensive recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide equality for both sides in numbers, missions, and capabilities. Since the Soviets have insisted on "equivalency" at every turn since the negotiations began, the proposals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be negotiable if the Soviets sincerely want an agreement.

5. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that this memorandum be passed to the Chairman of the Verification Panel and to the President as their recommended position for SALT VI.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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T. H. MOORER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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