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U.S. Strategic Retaliatory Forces

ICBMs: By the end FY 1965 the U.S. will have deployed over 900 hard and dispersed ICBMs. For the mid range estimate of Soviet strength we have a 3 to 1 advantage. More importantly 2/3 of the Soviet ICBMs are soft and have a slow reaction time.

By end FY 1970 we will have over 1000 hard and dispersed ICBMs. Although the over-all growth may appear small, the ICBM force has almost 50 percent more capability than the force had in FY 1965. This is so because of the introduction of Minuteman II and its retro-fit to Minuteman I silos. The Soviet threat will probably be closer to 400 launchers and we will have a 2 1/2 to 1 advantage. Even at the upper end our advantage is more than 1 to 1.

SLBMs: Our Polaris force by far exceeds the capability of the Soviet SLBM force. The ranges of our missiles are 2 to 3 times greater. All of our boats are nuclear--most of the Soviet boats are conventional. Those that are nuclear are noisy and more easily detected. By 1970 most of our boats will have the 2500 n.mi. range missiles whereas at best the Soviets may have a 1000 n.mi. range missile.

MR/IRBMs: This is one category in which the Soviets have a greater force, and as will be seen this force poses a serious threat to NATO Europe.

Bombers: Our Heavy Bomber force throughout the period will exceed the Soviet force by a 3 to 1 margin. We have effective air-to-surface missiles--improved versions are under consideration. We have extensive ECM, and avoidance tactics. Our bombers are effectively able to penetrate at low altitude. We are phasing out medium bombers. Whether the Soviets do likewise remains to be seen.

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
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AIMS We thought that the Soviets had initiated a deployment of anti-missile defenses. This now appears not to be the case.



We do not expect these numbers to change radically through the planning period.

OSD
Section 6.2 (a)

IS 3.3(b)(5)

Soviet Forces Threatening U.S. and Europe

The greater portion of the Soviet threat faces Europe.

Ninety percent of the Soviet IR/IRBM face Europe--650-700 launchers. Some of these launchers have a reload capability. Currently about 300 ICBM's pose a threat to the U.S. (This threat may approach the magnitude of the IR/IRBM threat by the end of the decade.)


The role of the SSBNs is uncertain. Part would undoubtedly be assigned to the U.S. and part to Europe.

We expect the heavy bombers to be assigned against the U.S.--about 100 penetrating our warning barriers, and about 150 medium bombers penetrating our warning barriers. About 200-300 medium bombers could be assigned to NATO Europe.

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III. Description of Targeting Process at Omaha






JS 3.3(b)(5)

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IV. General Nuclear War Outcomes

1. Currently, even after a well planned Soviet first strike our surviving forces are able to destroy 


Over the next five or more years there is little that the Soviets could do to reduce the level of damage. 


There is no doubt as to the sufficiency of our deterrent capability now or in the foreseeable future.

JS 3.3(b)(5)


JS 3.3(b)(5), (g)