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Status Reports

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
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2 June 1962

hand-del'd to Lt A  
6/2/62  
cc - Bundy (by hand)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Progress in the Counterinsurgency Program

I am not sure that you are entirely aware of the range of activities which your interest in counterinsurgency has generated throughout the government in Washington and in the field. On 22 March you received a progress report from the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) which tabulated some of the specific actions up to that time. Since then the program has gathered momentum at what I believe is a satisfactory rate. At some appropriate time it deserves to be called to public attention as a significant achievement of the Administration.

There follows a thumbnail tabulation of what is presently taking place in the principal functional fields.

a. Doctrine. In establishing the Special Group (CI) on January 13, 1962, you directed this new organization, among other things, to insure recognition of the importance of subversive insurgency in the organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the Armed Forces and other United States agencies and in all the foreign programs conducted by State, Defense, AID, USIA and CIA. To do these things, it became necessary at the outset to define the nature of the problem and to establish a doctrine for coping with it which would set objectives and assign tasks to the principal departments of the government. The Department of State has prepared a draft statement of national doctrine which is presently being considered by all the interested departments. State, Defense, AID, CIA and USIA are being required to express their individual concepts of their own capabilities to contribute to the program. Then, under State mentorship, these capabilities will be reconciled to avoid overlap and conflict. This process should result in a final doctrinal paper in two or three weeks.

The development of doctrine has required the establishment of definitions for the principal terms involved. This clarification of terms has itself been something of an achievement since the statement of a definition often carries with it an attitude or commitment to the subject defined.

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b. Training. It has been clear from the outset that throughout government there has been a lack of training directed specifically at counterinsurgency and the related problems of modernization. A complete review of the school systems of the departments has been conducted by the Special Group (CI) and a number of new courses initiated. A recent tabulation of training courses in being, or planned for the immediate future, indicates that over 50,000 officer grade personnel will receive training in counterinsurgency in the coming year. A five-week inter-agency course for senior personnel will begin on 11 June at the Foreign Service Institute. This is the course in which senior officials ordered to sensitive areas overseas will receive counterinsurgency instruction directed specifically at their future tasks. The National and Service War Colleges all have scheduled summer courses in counterinsurgency following the termination of the normal course. CIA is conducting a similar course.

The Secretary of State has proposed a reorganization of the Foreign Service Institute which, if approved, will include a center for international development studies designed to provide national level instruction on the problems of developing societies. When this center is in existence it will absorb the five-week inter-agency course mentioned above.

c. Review of Paramilitary Assets. Almost a year ago, at the termination of the Cuba Study Group, it was decided to make a review of the paramilitary assets of the United States and of the likely paramilitary requirements. This review has resulted in a series of studies covering United States forces and indigenous paramilitary forces world-wide. A final wrap-up report setting forth U.S. needs in this field has been completed by the Department of Defense and will be in your hands next week.

d. Foreign Police Training. One of the weak spots which was discovered early in the review of resources lies in the field of foreign police programs. An examination by the Special Group (CI) revealed that much work needs to be done both in strengthening the Washington end of the police training organization and in the scope and implementation of the police programs in sensitive countries abroad.

As a consequence, an interdepartmental committee has been established to determine the organizational responsibility and structure best suited to support an effective police support program. This committee is well advanced in its work of examining the program and has appointed two subcommittees to analyze police techniques for controlling riots without the use of excessive force, an action taken at your specific direction, and to determine the adequacy of program.

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level and content. Simultaneously, our Ambassadors in selected countries have been requested to submit their views on the police support programs to further facilitate the formulation of judgments in Washington on the means for making the program more effective.

Related to the foregoing activities is the plan for the establishment at Fort Davis, Panama Canal Zone, of a police academy for the training of Latin American students. The first class, beginning July 2, will consist of approximately 50 students drawn from 15 Latin American countries. Faculty members, together with several consultants, are now meeting at Fort Davis to complete the curriculum. - 62

a. Civic Action. All who have studied the problem of counter-insurgency have been impressed that there is an opportunity available to us to improve social and economic conditions by expanding civic action programs. It has been recognized that local military forces, following the pattern of the Armed Forces Aid to Korea Program in Korea, can contribute in a major way to civic action programs. AID has coordinated new guidance to our overseas missions and, together with State and Defense, has devised a new funding formula in support of an expanded program. Field surveys were conducted in a number of countries and specific recommendations developed as a basis for new programs.

For the balance of this fiscal year, an expanded program at the \$6 to \$8 million level is either approved and under implementation or will be approved in the next few days. For fiscal year 1963, an expanded program at the \$20 million level is contemplated. These efforts are of course in addition to ongoing programs of prior years and to numerous activities already under way in South Viet-Nam.

f. Use of South Viet-Nam as a Counterinsurgency Laboratory. The greatest possible use is being made of South Viet-Nam as a laboratory for techniques and equipment related to the counterinsurgency program. Also, an intense effort is being made to spread the experience acquired in South Viet-Nam, particularly in the Armed Forces. Thus far, 33 officers have been sent to South Viet-Nam as observers, and many more will be going out during the coming months.

g. Anticipatory Measures. The best way to defeat subversive insurgency is to prevent its eruption. There is need for a mechanism to anticipate and identify conditions which may lead to an outbreak of subversive insurgency. The following actions have been taken in this regard:

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(1) The United States Intelligence Board is reviewing the world-wide situation each week, and disseminates its findings as a Weekly Survey of Cold War Crisis Situations.

(2) The subject of subversive insurgency has been incorporated into the Priority National Intelligence Objectives, a United States Intelligence Board document which is used to guide the targeting of collection assets abroad. A specific list of intelligence requirements for counterinsurgency planning is currently under review by the Board.

(3) The attention of our representatives abroad is being focused on the problem through the counterinsurgency training programs referred to above.

(4) The Chiefs of Mission in Africa have been directed to prepare and forward internal defense survey reports to the Department of State. Ten countries in Latin America were visited earlier in the year by the South American Assessment Team for the purpose of reviewing their internal security situation. Similar reviews will be conducted in the Near Eastern countries in the coming months.

(5) A program is well under way to expand Army Special Forces assets and augment them with specialists in civil affairs, psychological warfare, engineering, and so on. This will afford a ready source of area-trained specialists to augment MAAGs or to use in other ways on short notice. State has already requested our Ambassadors in the less developed countries to specify their requirements for these specialized personnel.

The foregoing shows that the national counterinsurgency program is raising considerable dust. But there remains a lot to be done.

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