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# 18

INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF THE JOINT STAFF IN THE COLD WAR

THE PROBLEM

1. To develop procedures for increasing the effectiveness of the Joint Staff in prosecution of the cold war.

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
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MDR: 12-M-3097

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. By verbal directive, the Director of the Joint Staff indicated that the Subsidiary Activities Division should study ways and means of increasing the effectiveness of the Joint Staff in the prosecution of the cold war.

3. Cold war is defined in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan as "the complete scope of actions other than limited or general war that can be used in a power struggle between nations."

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DISCUSSION

4. The question is often asked as to why the U.S. does not develop one over-all comprehensive plan which, if carried out to the letter, would insure winning the cold war. It would be no more practical to do this for a cold war than it would be for a hot war. Wars are fought in accordance with a family of plans and by basic procedures which are the same whether the war is hot or cold. These plans and procedures are:

- a. A long-range statement of objectives and basic tasks. These are broad in nature and devoid of detail.

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They should, where feasible, include a statement of intermediate objectives.

b. Plans for the accomplishment of intermediate objectives. These should be in sufficient detail to initiate operations for the accomplishment of these intermediate objectives.

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c. Day to day operations. This is the daily integration of intelligence information with operational information and orders in order to adjust plans to the daily situation as it changes.

d. The planning cycle. This is a constant study of the situation in order to develop new short-range plans responsive to the changing situation and to adjust or revise intermediate and long-range objectives as required.

5. As a basis for determining means of increasing effectiveness, it is appropriate to analyze how the above procedures are applied now in the Joint Staff in fighting the cold war. The Joint Staff uses as their long-range objectives in the cold war NSC policies and OCB operations plans just as other governmental agencies do. SM 1201-59, "Military Activities During the Cold War," is designed to focus attention of the military establishment on intermediate objectives and short term goals. Admittedly not perfect and far from complete,

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it is a start in the right direction. The JSCP likewise contains a cold war section. With respect to the third aspect of conducting cold war, i.e., day to day operations, this is achieved in several ways. One principal tool is the daily J-2, J-3 briefing for the Director of the Joint Staff and his principal assistants. In addition, there are special briefings on particularly urgent situations and, of course, there is the normal staff coordination that constantly goes on in every staff. The fourth function, the planning cycle, is conducted on the Joint Staff level by the planning cells which exist in each directorate of the Joint Staff and which receive their chief impetus and guidance from their respective Directors who in turn are closely responsive to the guidance of the Director of the Joint Staff.

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6. In analyzing the above procedures, it would appear that the greatest area for increased emphasis exists in day to day operations and in the planning cycle. Although each directorate does consider cold war aspects of all problems, their view is necessarily circumscribed by the limitations of their directorate to specific areas of responsibilities. There is no one agency that is looking at the cold war problems across the board, sifting out the important ones and establishing priorities. The only individuals now on the Joint Staff who

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have an across the board look are the Director and the Assistant Director. With their multitude of activities, it is obviously not practical for them to perform this function. Likewise, in all directorates the majority of the personnel spend a great part of their time in activities concerned with their priority mission, which is operational readiness for general or limited war. So they too lack the time to evaluate and attempt to correlate the vast amount of information now available on the cold war.

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7. If a cold war organization is to be established, what form should it take? There are two basic types of agencies in any staff at the directorate level. One is an agency having direct authority over specific functions. The other is an agency having investigative and advisory authority such as is given to Inspector Generals, Judge Advocates and Comptrollers. Since by definition cold war operations may cover every activity except preparedness for a general or limited war, a separate cold war directorate with responsibility for all cold war actions would conflict with the basic responsibilities of all other directorates of the Joint Staff and is therefore obviously impractical. This leaves then only the second system as an alternative, which is to designate an agency of the Joint Staff to coordinate and monitor cold war activities rather than to be fully responsible for them.

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8. Since it has been determined earlier in this study that the greatest need lies in the coordination of day to day operations and in the planning cycle, this cold war agency will really be concerned with the execution of a continuously changing program rather than the execution of a comprehensive over-all cold war plan. The basic elements of any program are:

- a. A means of determining and presenting the status of the program -- in military terms, the situation.
- b. Recommendation of actions to be taken and responsibility therefor.
- c. Monitorship of progress in execution of actions previously directed.

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9. In relating the elements stated in paragraph 8 above to a program for monitoring the cold war, the one which presents the greatest difficulty is the first one which concerns the determination and presentation of the situation. This is true for many reasons, chief of which are:

- a. A cold war situation involves every independent country in the world. The total is now 157 and is constantly growing larger.
- b. At the national level, the cold war covers every activity or action by the U.S. or a foreign country which in any way affects the position of the U.S. as a world

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power. It also covers any action by the U.S. or a foreign country which affects the position of any other country.

g. Although the political, economic and sociological aspects of the cold war are not a basic responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is essential to understand these factors in order to properly estimate the world-wide cold war situation.

d. The great difficulty in determining and properly estimating the intent of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in its cold war activities.

The above factors are sufficient to illustrate the stupendous complexity of the problem. Due to this complexity, the immediate task is to find some means of narrowing the field of consideration so that the basic problems and issues can be brought clearly into focus. There are several procedures which can be used to accomplish this and which will be described in the next three paragraphs.

10. There is available in Washington from many sources, such as Central Intelligence Agency, Service Intelligence agencies, State, Treasury and Commerce, a vast amount of information on the nations of the world. It would be obviously impossible for the personnel assigned to this project to assimilate all of this data. Therefore, it is necessary

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to determine what specific items of information on each country are essential to an evaluation of that country's cold war situation. Through study and tests, a list of 25 items have been determined which appear to be generally applicable to all countries. See Enclosure 1.

11. Even when the requirement has been reduced by the device described in the preceding paragraph, the task of keeping abreast of the world-wide situation is still one of tremendous proportions. It is therefore essential to categorize countries in terms of criticality in order to further reduce the scope of the problem and better concentrate effort on the important areas. For this purpose, the countries of the world can be broken into three categories as follows:

- a. Critical
- b. Potentially critical
- c. Static

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The criteria for determining the category in which a country should be placed can be based on four principal factors. First, the problem or problems which render this country critical or potentially critical. Second, the element of time. In other words, is the crisis upon us now or do we have time to plan and prepare for it? Thirdly, the orientation of the country with respect to the ideological spectrum from Left

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to Right. For this purpose, countries can be classified  
as follows:

- (1) Sino-Soviet Bloc
- (2) Pro-Sino-Soviet Bloc
- (3) Uncommitted
- (4) Pro-West
- (5) U.S. Ally

The fourth factor can be called power influence. This means  
the capability of the country to influence the world power  
situation. It is apparent that this particular factor can  
be made up of many sub-factors. Of these, the following are  
considered the most important:

- (1) Strategic position
- (2) Political stability
- (3) Leadership
- (4) Economic viability
- (5) Armed Forces capability

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In other words, how much of an asset is this country to the  
U.S. in the cold war or in a hot war, and how much would its  
shift on the ideological spectrum affect us if the U.S. gained  
it or if the Soviets gained it? Although capable of modifi-  
cation or expansion to some extent, these four principal  
factors -- critical problems, time, orientation, and power

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influence do provide a fairly good basis of placing countries in the proper category with respect to priority.

12. An additional tool which can be used to further simplify the presentation of the situation is to determine the general types of cold war problem areas which are most applicable throughout the world. A detailed analysis of the present world-wide situation has revealed 20 such problem areas which occur most frequently and which have an impact on the cold war. See Enclosure 2. Of course, this list cannot be used exclusively since some countries have problem areas quite dissimilar to any other country. For example, the problem of the Panama Canal is unique to Panama and has no counterpart in any other country.

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13. This list of 20 type problem areas can then be used as a convenient checklist to determine what specific significant cold war problems exist in any one country. Once these problems are identified, they can then be analyzed in terms of the following elements:

- a. The basic requirement -- what needs to be done.
- b. Status -- actions currently under way or projected.
- c. Action -- what still needs to be done.

This analysis for each country can be summarized in brief terms on an analysis sheet. See Enclosure 3.

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14. Having developed the situation, the next step is to determine a means of presenting the situation. This presentation should be made periodically to the Director and his principal assistants. As a basis for the presentation, a situation report should be prepared which would be broken down into sections as follows:

Section I -- a list of countries by category together with a thumb-nail description of why the more critical countries are so categorized.

Section II -- a report of actions previously directed.

Section III -- recommended new actions together with agency responsible therefor.

It is visualized that this situation report would be circulated in the Joint Staff so that directors would be aware of actions affecting their directorates and could comment appropriately at the presentation. It is believed that if coordination was attempted in the normal way prior to the presentation, this would be of such a time-consuming nature as to be impractical of accomplishment and still have the presentations given in accordance with a periodically fixed schedule. If it is considered that such prior coordination is essential, then this should be accomplished by a working group made up of a representative of each directorate and chaired by the senior officer

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responsible for this cold war monitoring function. This presentation could also be used for a periodic report of statistical information on the cold war useful to the staff, such as listings of countries in accordance with the ideological spectrum, status of U.S. military aid, future significant events and dates, and status of Soviet aid program. In addition to serving as a means of directing action and monitoring progress, these periodic presentations would also serve a useful purpose of focusing the attention of all elements of the Joint Staff in the same direction in the cold war and provide the basis for unilateral initiation of appropriate cold war actions by individual directors.

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15. In the development of these procedures, the Subsidiary Activities Division, has, of necessity, done a considerable amount of exploratory work and testing of the program. It is considered appropriate at this point to describe some of this preliminary work, difficulties that arose, and results achieved.

16. As a basis for the assignment of countries to individual officers, the world was divided into three areas as follows:

- I -- Far East and Middle East, including Communist China.
- II -- Western Hemisphere and Africa South of the Sahara.
- III -- USSR and its Satellites, Western Europe and Northern Africa to include the Sahara.

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Each one of these three areas was assigned to a Branch of the Subsidiary Activities Division for study and action.

17. In determining the critical countries, it was found that there actually were not too many of these. The latest analysis shows a total of 13. However, it was found that even within this limited group, it was desirable to further break this category down as follows:

a. Critical. These are the countries on the critical list where action is now in progress, and since the entire staff would be actively following and planning with respect to these countries on a day to day basis, it is not visualized that short term requirements would normally be developed by the cold war monitoring agency. Requirements generated here would be for a long term period, usually extending into the immediate post-crisis period.

b. Critical Standby. These are countries where an extremely serious situation could develop at any moment, plans for which have been completed but which must be monitored closely. Generally, no requirements would be generated here and planning should be complete. Their inclusion in the critical category would serve as a constant reminder to the staff. Berlin is a good example.

See Enclosure 4 for a list of critical countries.

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18. The initial world-wide estimate developed a total of 59 countries in the B or potentially critical category. Since this list was so large, it was considered desirable to further sub-divide this group into a B1, B2 and B3 category. See Enclosure 5 for a list of the B countries. The category C countries, although the largest group in number, were not further sub-divided as less attention would normally be devoted to these countries and a relative priority within the category would not be necessary. See Enclosure 6.

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19. In developing the situation for his assigned area, each officer prepared a book which had a separate numbered tab for each country. Section I of the tab was the Basic Country Data Sheet of 25 items of cold war information on the country. These were developed for all countries. (See Enclosure 7 for an example.) Section II was the Analysis Sheet for the country showing the problem areas that were significant for that country, the requirements, current status and future action. (See Enclosure 3.) As discussed later, these analysis sheets were prepared for certain selected countries only. With respect to the economic and cultural problem areas, it is visualized that only the problems would be indicated, since generally speaking, it would not be within the capability of the cold war agency of the Joint Staff

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to analyze these problem areas completely. Likewise, even with the political and military problem areas, the requirements, current status and recommended actions would be in most cases stated in general terms, since only the designated action agency would be capable of arriving at detailed solutions.

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20. In order to further test the system, a trial analysis on a limited basis was made of the B1 and B2, potentially critical countries. This test run was only partially successful due to lack of experience with the system and also the relatively limited amount of data on each country which had been obtained at the time the test was made. However, this test run did reveal some specific problems relating to individual countries. Much more significant was the disclosure of many problems which were applicable to more than one country or that were peculiar to an area. These are really the basic programs which should form the foundation for Joint Staff participation in the cold war and should be given priority in the cold war effort. They are as follows:

a. Status of contingency plans for U.S. military action, if required.

b. A statement of courses of action in the event of possible future political or military developments.

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- c. A program of determining potential political leaders and orienting them in our direction.
- d. A program of determining potential military leaders and orienting them in our direction.

e. A determination of potential leaders Soviets are cultivating.

f. A constant review of military aid to determine adequacy and responsiveness to the current situation.

g. Monitorship of the adequacy, quality and compatibility of U.S. military representatives in the foreign country.

h. Adequacy of U.S. military foreign students program as to quality and responsiveness.

i. U.S. military activities with respect to alliances.

j. Psychological application of U.S. military power, i.e., trips, exercises, demonstrations, exhibits, local celebrations, etc.

k. Dissemination of basic cold war information.

l. Community relations.

21. In developing this program, it was found that in addition to our NSC policies and objectives, a doctrine for fighting the cold war needs to be developed. This need not be particularly long or complex, but should state the general principles which form guidance for all officers working in

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this field. Following are examples of some of the problem areas in the doctrinal field which should be included in this doctrine. It will be noted that some of these principles are stated as questions since a policy does not now exist with respect to them or should be reviewed.

a. In determining actions which should be taken, U.S. should consider actions which allies are taking and encourage to the maximum their participation.

b. What the country itself is doing to alleviate a problem area is also important in any estimate of the situation.

c. The U.S. position towards Sino-Soviet aid to other countries should be fully explored. Is it to our interests or is it even feasible to attempt to defeat or counter every Soviet offer of aid?

d. The U.S. position with respect to the use of propaganda should be fully explored. Our present information policies are generally not sufficient to defend ourselves against Sino-Soviet propaganda attacks nor to fully exploit Communist weaknesses.

e. U.S. attitude toward neutrality should be clarified.

f. U.S. programs that are in competition with Soviet programs must be given priority to insure that they compare favorably in quality and timeliness with Soviet programs.

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g. The necessity for detailed and elaborate restrictions on many aid programs which hamper flexibility must be fully explored.

22. The organization to accomplish this function presents some problems. At present, the Subsidiary Activities Division is organized into four branches as follows:

- a. Unconventional Warfare
- b. Psychological Operations
- c. Special Plans and Operations
- d. NSC-OCB Affairs

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The Subsidiary Activities Division has always had a functional requirement to "make recommendations regarding cold war activities of current situations where military interests are involved." In the past, this has been performed as an additional duty by superimposing it on the existing branches and by giving individual officers responsibility for specific countries. However, definite procedures for monitoring the cold war as outlined in this study were not set up, and the officers worked on this function as and when they could. As a result, they usually did not delve particularly into an individual country until a problem arose. They certainly were not able to get ahead of the current situation. Therefore, in a general sense this function of the Subsidiary Activities

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Division has not been adequately performed, and certainly not to the degree envisaged herein. If this program is undertaken, it cannot help but receive considerable notice from agencies outside the Joint Staff and may generate requests for support from other agencies in their prosecution of the cold war. Therefore, if done at all, it must be done well. To superimpose this function on the existing Division without augmentation would be tantamount to failure. At the present time there are 157 countries in the world and more being added each year. Since one of the functions of the program is to focus attention on critical areas, all of these countries would not be analyzed in detail, but at least the basic informational data would have to be developed and periodically reviewed in the event the country might shift to a different category. Therefore, there is no question that a separate Cold War Branch would need to be activated in order to perform this function.

23. As to personnel, it is not possible to determine the exact numbers required. The results produced will be in direct proportion to the personnel resources committed. However, some guidelines on personnel can be fairly accurately stated as follows:

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a. A Branch Chief, six action officers and two secretaries. This would be sufficient to initiate the program but would be sub-marginal as far as insuring that it could be carried out continuously on an effective basis. The area of responsibility per officer would be too great.

b. Branch Chief, nine officers, and three secretaries. This is the minimum to insure an adequate performance of basic tasks.

c. Branch Chief, 12 officers and four secretaries. This would definitely insure adequate performance of basic tasks and would provide for continued growth and capability to adequately perform other tasks which would probably develop as the program progressed.

24. From the standpoint of the Joint Staff, there would appear to be many benefits that would be derived from this program, some of which have been enumerated in preceding paragraphs. However, it is believed desirable to recapitulate these in order to better assess its over-all value. They are:

a. Focus the attention of the Joint Staff on critical cold war problem areas.

b. Establish for the Joint Staff some degree of priority with respect to the critical and potentially critical countries.

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c. Assist in defining cold war intelligence requirements, which would in turn be of assistance to intelligence agencies in concentrating a proportionate part of their effort on cold war intelligence.

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d. Establish the basic military cold war programs on which the Joint Staff should concentrate their major effort.

e. Identify specific projects in individual countries.

f. Assist operational elements of the Joint Staff in determining priority in the application of resources.

g. Assist planners in projecting their thinking towards possible future critical contingencies.

h. Assist the staff in developing recommendations for changes in NSC policies and OCB operations plans.

i. Assist in the determination of critical problems that should be discussed by the Joint Chiefs in State/JCS meetings, Defense/JCS meetings, etc.

j. Assist the Joint Staff in knowing what is being done in other agencies of the government in the cold war and in coordinating effort with these agencies.

k. Assist the Joint Staff in periodically assessing the cold war situation and checking the execution of previously approved projects.

25. Unquestionably, some difficulties would arise with respect to the implementation of this program. These are:

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a. Additional personnel would be required although some of this personnel might possibly be generated by readjustment within the Joint Staff.

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b. In general, recommendations of the Cold War Branch would be general in nature and would require detailed implementation by the directorate to which responsibility was assigned. It is visualized that the Cold War Branch would itself only implement those peculiar cold war problems that do not properly fit into the responsibilities of any one directorate. Therefore, it is possible that a certain amount of resentment and resistance of this Branch would develop in the staff as its basic job is to recommend work for other agencies to do. The Cold War Branch would have to overcome this difficulty by insuring that its recommendations are sound and realistic. Furthermore, the necessity for approval at the level of the Director of the Joint Staff prior to implementation would provide protection for the Directorates in this respect.

c. A possible charge of duplication of effort in that each directorate now gathers some of the information which would funnel into the Cold War Branch. However, this duplication is necessary since each directorate gathers the particular information necessary for its own field. The

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Cold War Branch, on the other hand, uses selected information from all agencies and synthesizes intelligence and operational information in order to determine over-all priorities and requirements. Also the directorates need their own detailed information to implement the cold war requirements assigned to them.

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d. The tendency may develop to expand the Cold War Agency to be fully responsible for all cold war actions. This would quickly overload its capacity, submerge its main purpose and cause conflict in the staff.

#### CONCLUSIONS

26. Both hot and cold war are fought by the same basic procedures, namely:

- a. A long range statement of objectives.
- b. Plans for the accomplishment of intermediate objectives.
- c. Day to day operations.
- d. The planning cycle.

27. In the cold war, the National Security Council policies and Operations Coordinating Board operations plans provide basically sound machinery for the establishment of long range objectives.

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28. SM 1201-59, "Military Activities During the Cold War," is a sound basis for the development of plans to accomplish intermediate objectives.

29. The procedures concerned with day to day operations and with the planning cycle are the areas where the need for greater emphasis exists.

30. This improvement in effectiveness cannot be achieved by the development of a specific cold war plan and its execution by the existing Joint Staff, but requires the creation of a special cold war agency.

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31. Since the cold war involves every directorate, the cold war agency established should not have directional authority since it would interfere with the responsibilities of all directorates. It should have coordinating and monitoring responsibilities only.

32. The basic tasks of this cold war agency would be:

- a. To develop and keep current the cold war situation.
- b. To periodically present the situation to the Director of the Joint Staff and his assistants, and thereat to make recommendations for appropriate action.
- c. To monitor the execution of previously directed actions.

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33. Although the cold war world-wide situation is extremely complex, it is possible to develop procedures which reduce the situation to understandable proportions and provide a firm basis for establishment of priorities and recommendations of action.

34. The fundamental advantages of the adoption of the program presented in this study would be the reduction of this massive problem to manageable proportions and the opportunity afforded the Joint Staff to periodically assess the progress being made in fighting the cold war, and to adjust existing plans or project new plans for future action.

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#### RECOMMENDATIONS

35. Approve the establishment of a Cold War Branch within the J-5 Directorate.

36. Approve the manning of this Branch with a Branch Chief, nine officers and three civilian secretaries as outlined in paragraph 23 b.

37. Approve in principle the procedures under which this Branch would operate as explained in this study.

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ENCLOSURE 1

BASIC COUNTRY DATA

1. Political

- a. Form of Government
- b. International Status (free, colony, mandate, etc.)
- c. Ideological Spectrum Position
- d. Communist Party Status
- e. UN Membership
- f. Present Leaders
- g. Future Leaders
- h. Alliances
- i. Involvements with U.S. or Third Countries
- j. Sino-Soviet Recognition

2. Sociological

- a. Populations
- b. Illiteracy
- c. Special Events and Dates
- d. Religion

3. Economic

- a. Natural Resources
- b. Exports
- c. Imports

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- d. U.S. Aid Less MDAP
- e. Soviet Non-Military Aid
- f. Viability of Economy
- 4. Military
  - a. Armed Forces
  - b. MDAP
  - c. Soviet Military Assistance
  - d. U.S. Military Bases or Facilities
- 5. Physiological
  - a. Geographic Significance

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ENCLOSURE 2

PROBLEM AREAS

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a. Political

1. Orientation - position on ideological spectrum
2. Stability - form of government, number of parties, factions, civil service
3. Leadership - strength of leaders
4. Succession - successors to present leaders
5. International Problems
6. Dissidence - discontent
7. Organized Internal Resistance - groups actively working for government overthrow

b. Economic

8. Under development - communications, agriculture, industry
9. Resources - natural and acquired
10. Technical Base - technicians
11. Communist Penetration - aid, technicians, equipment, teachers, construction
12. Financial - debt, balance of trade, sources of income

c. Cultural

13. Educational Weaknesses - teachers, schools, colleges, training programs
14. Communist Penetration - exchange students, Soviet training of teachers

d. Military

15. Adequacy of Forces - size, equipment, status of training, tasks
16. External Threat - from other countries
17. Aggressive Threat - aggressive plans of country

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18. Communist Military Aid - equipment, technicians, students
19. U.S. Bases and Forces - location, purpose, difficulties
20. U.S. Aid - amount, purpose, forcegoals, difficulties
- e. Miscellaneous

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## SECTION II

Country \_\_\_\_\_ Area \_\_\_\_\_ Cat. \_\_\_\_\_

| 1   | 2  | 3  | 4   |
|---|--|--|---|
| PROBLEM AREA  | REQUIREMENTS   | STATUS   | ACTION  |
| <p><u>NOTE:</u></p> <p>a. In this column only the problem areas which fundamentally influence the cold war situation in a country will be included. Rarely would all 20 problem areas appear here.</p> <p>b. Each problem area should be followed by a thumb nail description of the problem.</p> | <p><u>NOTE:</u></p> <p>a. In this column show the requirement needed to solve the problem in general terms. This should be the ultimate requirement needed to solve the problem regardless of how feasible immediate solution may be. When clearly discernible, intermediate requirements can be stated.</p> | <p><u>NOTE:</u></p> <p>a. Brief indication of actions taken or being taken to implement requirements. Stated in general terms.</p> <p>b. This column would not be complete as far as economic, political &amp; cultural activities are concerned, since with respect to these activities JCS responsibility is essentially one of coordination, recommendation &amp; advice.</p> | <p><u>NOTE:</u></p> <p>a. Brief indication of action that needs to be taken. In some cases this will be in specific terms, but more often in general terms since it will pose a problem for solution to the designated action agency. In some cases the requirement might be stated as an intermediate requirement such as "to study," "to develop a plan," "to obtain more information" or "to monitor."</p> <p>b. This column would not be complete as far as economic, political and cultural activities are concerned, since with respect to these activities JCS responsibility is essentially one of coordination, recommendation and advice.</p> |
| <p><u>EXAMPLE</u></p> <p>3. Leadership -</p> <p>a. There is no strong leader to replace present incumbent.</p>  | <p><u>EXAMPLE</u></p> <p>3a. Identify, influence and advise a successor.</p>   | <p><u>EXAMPLE</u></p> <p>3a. Several candidates known, but not particularly strong. No efforts underway to influence &amp; advise.</p>   | <p><u>EXAMPLE</u></p> <p>3a. Incorporate in general program of selecting future leaders.</p>  |

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ENCLOSURE 4

LIST OF COUNTRIES BY CATEGORY AND AREA

CATEGORY A

AREA I

Communist China (Stand by)

Laos

North Vietnam (Stand by)

South Vietnam

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AREA II

Cuba

Dominican Republic

Organization of American States (OAS) (Stand by)

Panama (Stand by)

Republic of the Congo

AREA III

Berlin (Stand by)

USSR (Stand by)

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ENCLOSURE 5

LIST OF COUNTRIES BY CATEGORY AND AREA

CATEGORY B1

AREA I

Burma  
Cambodia  
Jordan  
Syria  
Thailand

AREA II

Bolivia  
Cameroun  
El Salvador  
Ghana  
Guinea

AREA III

France  
Turkey

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CATEGORY B2

AREA I

Afghanistan  
Formosa  
Indonesia  
Iraq  
Iran  
Korea (South)  
Pakistan

AREA II

Guatemala  
Haiti  
Honduras  
Mali (Soudan-  
Republic)  
Venezuela

AREA III

Algeria  
Federal  
Republic of  
Germany  
Libya  
Morocco  
Portugal  
Spain

CATEGORY B3

AREA I

Bhutan  
Ethiopia  
Israel  
Japan  
Nepal  
Philippines

AREA II

Argentina  
Brazil  
Cameroons, British  
Columbia  
Federation of the  
West Indies  
Federation of the  
Rhodesia &  
Nyasaland  
Ecuador  
Iceland  
Mexico  
Nicaragua  
Paraguay  
Union of South Africa  
Zanzibar  
Uruguay

AREA III

Belgium  
Greece  
Italy  
Netherlands  
Poland  
Spanish  
Morocco  
Tunisia  
Yugoslavia

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ENCLOSURE 6

LIST OF COUNTRIES BY CATEGORY AND AREA

CATEGORY C

AREA I

Aden  
Australia  
Ceylon  
Hong Kong  
India  
Korea (North)  
Kuwait  
Lebanon  
Malaya  
Muscat  
New Guinea  
New Zealand  
Okinawa  
Oman  
Saudi Arabia  
Singapore  
Somaliland  
Sudan  
Yemen

AREA II

Angola (includes Cabinda)  
Annobon Island  
Antarctica  
Ascension Island  
Azores Island  
Bahama Islands  
Basutoland  
Bermuda Islands  
British Guiana  
British Honduras  
Bechuanaland  
Canada  
Cape Verde Islands  
Central African Republic  
Chad  
Chile  
Comoro Islands  
Congo Republic  
Costa Rica  
Dahomey  
Falksland Islands  
Fernando Pao Island  
French Antilles  
French Guiana  
Gabon  
Gambia  
Greenland  
Ivory Coast  
Kenya

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AREA II (CONT)

Liberia  
Malagasy Republic  
Mascarene Islands  
Mauritania  
Mozambique  
Netherlands Antilles  
Niger  
Nigeria  
Peru  
Portuguese Guinea  
Ruanda Urundi  
Sao Tome (and Principle) Islands  
Senegal  
Seychelles Islands  
Sierra Leone  
South-West Africa  
Spanish Guinea (Rio Muni)  
St. Helena Island  
Swaziland  
Tanganyika  
Togo  
Uganda  
Voltaic Republic  
Surinam

AREA III

Albania  
Austria  
Bulgaria  
Czechoslovakia  
Denmark  
Finland  
Great Britain  
Hungary  
Ireland  
Luxembourg  
Norway  
Rumania  
Spanish Sahara  
Sweden  
Switzerland

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ENCLOSURE 7

PART I

BASIC COUNTRY DATA SHEET

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INDONESIA

1. Political

a. Form of Government. Unitary republic with presidential cabinet and unicameral legislature under 1945 Constitution readopted 5 July 1959. Sukarno's executive powers virtually unlimited; exercised to limit number and scope of political parties, reorganize Parliament, and extend central control over regional governments. Political party dissatisfaction and widespread rumors springing from Government reorganization have had corrosive effect on public confidence, and resulted in increased maneuverings of power factions. Government, still plagued with internal security problems and regional rebellions necessitating heavy military expenditures, faces formidable economic instability and inflation.

b. International Status. Free republic.

c. Ideological Spectrum Position. The Government professes a neutral policy but Sukarno's actions to strengthen the PKI's representation in the key government positions seems to favor communism and the Soviet Bloc. The military are definitely anti-communistic and favor pro-western associations and influence. The populace are striving for nationalism and a true neutral position and do not like to be pressured by anyone.

d. Communist Party Status. The Communist Party (PKI) is a legal and recognized organization of about 1.7 million members. The PKI obtained nearly 20% of popular vote in 1955 parliamentary elections; emerged largest party in 1957 provincial elections in Java which contains 60% Indonesia's population. Strength centered in labor, farmers' groups, variety of front organizations.

e. United Nations Membership. Indonesia entered the UN in 1950.

f. Present Leaders. Political -- President and Prime Minister SUKARNO; Foreign Minister, SUBANDRIO; Minister of National Security, General ABDUL HARI NASUTION; Deputy Minister of National Security, Major General R. HIDAJAT Marta Atmadja. Army Chief of Staff, General ABDUL HARI NASUTION; Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence), Colonel MAGENDA; Navy -- Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Edi MARTADINATA; Air Force -- Chief of Staff, Air Marshall R. S. SURYADARMA.

g. Future Leaders. Political possibilities HATTA, DJUANDA, and SJAHRIR with NASUTION in supporting role. Military have adequate subordinates to take top positions.

h. Alliances. No known international alliances or treaties.

i. Involvements with U.S. or Third Countries. U.S. aid programs. Colombo Plan with Australia contributing the bulk of the support, although other commonwealth countries -- the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, India, and Ceylon -- have contributed.

j. Sino-Soviet Recognition. Indonesia recognizes both Communist China and Soviet Russia. Each are represented in Indonesia with an ambassador.

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## 2. Sociological

a. Population. 89,600,000 as of 1 January 1960. Males (ages 15-49), 23,753,000; physically fit, 11,680,000. Major ethnic groups, Javanese -- 48%, Sudanese -- 15%, Malay -- 8%, Madurese -- 8%, Chinese -- 3%, other (including non-Asiatics) -- 18%.

b. Illiteracy. (1960) 75%

c. Special Events and Dates. August 17 is celebrated as National Independence Day.

d. Religion. Over 80% of the people are Moslems. Other religions include: Christian, 4.3%; Hindu, 2.2%; Buddhist, 3.3%.

## 3. Economic

a. Natural Resources. Rice, tapioca, rubber, tea, coffee, pepper, copra, bauxite, manganese, phosphates, sugar.

b. Exports. \$969 million. Oil, tin, timber, rubber, tea, copra, sugar, coffee.

c. Imports. \$797 million. Rice, flour, machinery, electrical equipment, vehicles, petrol, iron, steel, textiles, cement.

d. U.S. Aid less MDAP. Economic \$1,350,000. IES exchange program; U.S. teachers, 4; foreign students, 29; foreign leaders, 31; specialists, 10; U.S. specialists, 2.

e. Soviet Non-Military Aid. Cultural \$6,500,000. Economic: \$101,000,000. Total academic students trained in bloc countries: 355. Technical students trained in bloc countries: 25. Economic technicians in Indonesia: 125.

f. Viability of Economy. The Indonesian economy is almost self-sufficient at a near-subsistence level. The minimum short-term needs of the population can probably be satisfied by domestic output, and the non-specialized nature of economic activity in most Indonesian communities permits the people to subsist despite civil unrest and disruptions in trade channels. There are at present no indications that Indonesia's basic economic problems of scarcity of capital; shortages of skilled labor, technicians, and managerial talent; and inadequate distribution and transport system; and unbalanced labor supply on the various islands -- all of which are compounded by political and sociological factors -- are any nearer solution than they were at the time of independence.

## 4. Military

a. Armed Forces. The Armed Forces combined strength is 350,000. The Army is one of the largest and most combat experienced of uncommitted countries in the Far East. The prestige and self-confidence have increased considerably as a result of the recent successful operations against the rebels. They are loyal to the central government, willing to fight, and capable of disciplined action. Material is obsolete or nearly so. At present, Armed Forces have no capacity to successfully wage an aggressive war and only limited capability of defending the nation. Defense would be mainly guerrilla-type resistance. The Army is the largest, best organized, and generally most anti-Communist force in Indonesia. The most influential member is General Nasution, as both Minister of National Security and Army Chief of Staff. He sets the line of political thinking in the Army.

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b. MDAP. \$18,200,000. Primarily for training, support equipment plus a token number of aircraft.

c. Soviet Military Assistance. \$416,000,000. \$200,000,000 of which is for ships and aircraft. The remainder for technical assistance, training and combat equipment.

d. U.S. Military Bases or Facilities. None.

5. Physiological

a. Geographic Significance. Indonesia lies along the equator, between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Its 3,000 islands stretch from Asia to Australia and command strategic water and air routes which traverse this region. If the archipelago were superimposed upon a map of the United States it would extend from coast to coast and from South Dakota to Texas. Volcanoes are the dominant feature and in spite of causing frequent earthquakes, the volcanic ash rejuvenates the soil. The climate is generally tropical.

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SECTION II

Country Indonesia

Area I

Category B2

| 1  | 2  | 3  | 4                                      |
|--|--|--|--|
| PROBLEM AREA   | REQUIREMENTS   | STATUS   | ACTION                                 |
| <u>Orientation:</u><br>Prevent Sukarno from surrounding himself with Communist people, aides and advisors or other influences.   | Influence Sukarno to be pro U.S.   | Ambassador pursuing  | Increase programs to influence Sukarno |
| <u>Dissidence:</u><br>Lack of Nationalism will encourage continuance of conflicting factions and disunity with a resultant possibility of a coup or an unfavorable dictatorship under communistic control. | Monitor  | Being monitored  |  |
| <u>International Problems:</u><br>Indonesia's desire to annex West Irian may result in Anti-Western influences, alliances or military action.  | Monitor  | JCS 1992/887 of 10 January 1961                              | Contingency Plans                      |
| <u>Orientation:</u><br>Continued neutrality will weaken the SEATO defenses in this area.   | Influence Sukarno to make Western mutual defense pact.   | Policy reviewed by NSC, 17 June 1960 by OCB, 25 January 1961 | Monitor                                |
| <u>Under development:</u><br>The under developed agriculture, industry, communications and transportation will prevent raising the standard of living and the stabilization of the economy.                | Develop industry, transportation, maritime and agriculture<br><br>Increase the number of skilled technicians | U.S. economic aid \$1,350,000                                |  |

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Enclosure 8

Country Indonesia (Cont)

| 1<br>PROBLEM AREA   | 2<br>REQUIREMENTS   | 3<br>STATUS  | 4<br>ACTION   |
|---|---|--|---|
| <u>Technical base:</u><br>Lack of skilled technicians<br>in all industrial fields<br>and lack of capital    | Neutralize effect and<br>capitalize on Bloc loans<br><br>Stabilize finances |  |   |
| <u>Communist Penetration:</u><br>Greatly increased Bloc<br>assistance money, tech-<br>nicians and equipment | Capitalize and influence<br>its use to U.S. benefit                         |  |   |
| <u>Financial:</u><br>Large foreign debts with<br>decreasing trade   |   | Foreign debts increased<br>from \$25 million in 1954<br>to \$102 million in 1959   |   |
| <u>Educational Weaknesses:</u><br>Lack of teachers and schools  | Improve   | IES exchange program:<br>U.S. 4 teachers, foreign<br>students 29; foreign<br>leaders 31; specialists<br>10; U.S. specialists 2 | Increase students to U.S.<br>or third countries; in-<br>crease U.S. teachers and<br>instructors                   |
| <u>Communist Penetration:</u><br>Exploitation of teacher<br>shortage by providing<br>teachers               | Eliminate   |  | Expose communist teachers<br>influence to military as<br>internal security threat                                 |
| <u>Aggressive Threat:</u><br>Possible offensive to<br>capture West Irian                                    | Monitor   | JCS Message 988460<br>of 10 January 1961   | Influence military leaders<br>against such actions  |
| <u>U.S. aid:</u><br>Inadequate and time lag   | Increase scope of military<br>aid and expedite congress-<br>ional approval  | U.S. military aid<br>\$18,200,000  | Legislative action to<br>permit release of ships,<br>planes, munitions and other<br>surplus supplies to Indonesia |

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