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#19

STRUCTURES FOR COLD WAR ACTION

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

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1. Objective. To design a mechanism whereby the President can better plan and conduct an integrated effective US cold war strategy.

2. Important Factors.

a. The problem of an over-all US strategy toward the Communist challenges, including the exploitation of Communist vulnerabilities, is perhaps the most basic one confronting the Government. The problem's principal two points are:

(1) The absolute necessity of a fundamental agreement being reached on the highest level of the Government as to the nature of the Communist challenge in the cold war and finding not only responses to the challenge but also finding ways and means of seizing the initiative in order to keep the Soviet Government off balance.

(2) Establishing an effective coordinating and directing mechanism within the United States Government in order to enable the Executive Branch of the US Government to operate more effectively in that broad area of political-military-economic action called the Cold War.

3. Recognition of the Conflict. Despite many examples of devoted and effective actions by United States officials and organizations in fighting the cold war, there is evidence of a lack of the necessary conviction on the part of many policy makers within the Executive Branch that the cold war is actually a serious conflict and that it is essential to national security that the US Government win this struggle. The reluctance of the US policy makers to accept this bare fact might well result in the loss of the US's most cherished precepts.

The Communist threat should be recognized as persistent, complex, multi-dimensional, deliberate, systematic, ruthless and dynamic. It must be understood in terms of recent history and the proclaimed objectives

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of Sino-Soviet leaders, which should no longer be dismissed by any responsible American as "just propaganda." It must acknowledge inroads already made, new penetrations in our own neighborhood, and evolving dangers to entire continents.

If the US is to fight the Cold War successfully a basic change must be effected in:

- a. The US conception and evaluation of the Communist threat; and
- b. Both the underlying doctrine and the scale of the measures adopted for countering this threat.

Indecisiveness and half-heartedness in accomplishing this change -- whether motivated by escapism, wishful thinking, political or budgetary convenience, or the reluctance of allies -- could eventually prove fatal to our national existence. A continuing failure to recognize the real nature of the threat and to accept the costs of meeting it successfully would assure Sino-Soviet leaders of retention of their present initiative. Resignation to the present state of affairs, moreover, will not even assure persistence of this situation, undesirable as it may already be. Indeed, our fortunes could deteriorate in a continuing pattern of retreat and of attrition through subversion, civil conflict, and limited aggression. Any permanent concession of the initiative to the Communist leadership could set in motion disintegrating forces that not only destroy the confidence of allies and the hopes of uncommitted nations but even finally destroy the will and capacity for defense of our own borders.

4. Existing Inadequacies.

Because of its global nature and the complexity of its strategy, tactics, and weapons, the cold war creates ever changing pressures upon Washington. This has meant that high strategy councils, and particularly those officials in a position of decision, have had their concentrated attention shifted from one area to another as the Communist enemy has initiated actions into new areas or re-opened dormant trouble spots.

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Consequently, areas which are still critical have to vie for attention in Washington at important moments when the exigencies of a new situation (i.e., Alabama) attract thought and energies of Washington's higher councils elsewhere.

Policies and high level speeches or communiques are meaningless unless they are backed up by visible evidence of US willingness to use power. Vacillating, uncertain programs of semi-action indicate indecision as well as basic weakness of will. Steady, reliable programs with continuity of purpose, maintaining flexibility in tactics, are the indispensable alternative. The crux of the problem is the coordination and implementation of such programs. The difficulties encountered within the US Government are magnified many times by the problems of coalition action.

If the existing mechanisms of the government were adequate to cope with the extent of the present crisis, the world problem in its present magnified form would not exist. There are two chief reasons why the government approach for the development of a positive national concept has not succeeded. First, there is the inescapable fact that the highest-level officials are bogged down with the operations of their respective departments and agencies and, since they are held personally accountable for these operations, they necessarily give them their personal priority. Secondly, the various interdepartmental policy planning and operating agencies are bureaucratically representational in nature and consequently narrow in outlook. Their policy proposals and action programs consequently represent a summation of compromise of various departmental points of view, and at times result in the government working at cross-purposes or not at all. Since a truly national strategy is far more than the sum total of the various components that go into it, policy achieved either through such addition or compromise is inadequate.

While recognising the inadequacy of the current governmental approach, it is equally true that no valid national concept can be developed without full cognizance of the complex problems confronting the government

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This paper does not concern itself with means employed by members of the United States Government at the highest level to project a positive, constructive image of the United States by thoroughly cooperative measures. This area should continue to be handled under present foreign policy arrangements.

5. Proposed Mechanism. In order to deal more effectively with the Communist cold war wherever a new mechanism is proposed:

a. There will be established directly under the President a Security Actions Directorate.

(1) The Director of the group will be responsible to the President and will report directly to the President. This is a most important administrative arrangement in order to avoid the pitfalls of the past in connection with attempts to solve cold war problems. He will be a regular member of the National Security Council and will participate, as do other members of that Council, in the broad determination of national policy. His primary function, however, will be the planning and monitoring of specific plans developed to attain specific cold war objectives established by the President.

(2) He will be assisted by a Deputy Director designated by the Secretary of State.

(3) The Director will have the advice, counsel and cooperation of an Advisory Board. This board will be small and comprised of men having responsibility for the execution and recommendations they may make -- essentially, the key No. 2 men of the government -- such as the Undersecretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of CIA, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From time to time, because of the unique nature of certain problems confronting the government, other key officials will attend board meetings, such as the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Office of the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General (JHE).

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b. The Security Actions Directorate will be supported by a small highly qualified staff headed by a staff executive and assistant both responsible to the Director.

c. The staff will consist of the following sections: Plans, Coordination, Review, and Indications.

d. The plans, review and indications elements of the staff, placed on executive office payroll, will be comprised of men selected from both within and outside the Government who have demonstrated an unusual capacity for imaginative thinking in the various facets of the cold war. The Coordination Section will be composed of interdepartmental representatives of the key participating agencies, primarily State, Defense, and CIA, and with representation as appropriate from NSA, ICA, Treasury, etc.

e. Plans. This section will plan political, psychological, economic and military support actions to restore cold war initiative to the United States. It will also recommend to the President how US military posture and resources can best support a vigorous and imaginative cold war strategy.

f. Coordination. This section will be organized on a geographical basis, paralleling for coordination purposes the area responsibilities of the overseas unified commands or comparable regional arrangements. Its members, drawn from agencies in the Government concerned with cold war problems will provide a continuing link between the White House and the operating agencies. Actual operations will be conducted by the departments and agencies which have the primary responsibility in each instance. The Assistant in charge of the Coordination Section will have the responsibility, direct or delegated to a member of the Coordination Section, of insuring that the responsible departments and agencies issue the necessary instructions to their representatives in the field to carry out the approved plans. In addition, the Assistant in charge of Coordination will participate with the Plans Section in the

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case, recommendations for solution will be collected from the field.

Furthermore, the Coordination Section will facilitate the performance of the Indications Section by keeping it informed of all plans underway and all information received from the field in relation to the carrying out of those plans. This information will supplement that received by Government-wide communications.

g. Review. The task of this section will be to evaluate the results of any plan actually put into operation in terms of both Soviet reaction, general effectiveness and degree of Free World support. It will recommend corrective actions in the light of Communist counter measures or when operations miscarry or are ineffective.

h. Indications. The task of this section will be to present a continuous net evaluation of the world situation, to maintain a current projection of operations underway. It will, in effect, provide a service to the President, to the Director and his Deputy and to the Plans, Coordination and Review elements of this staff.

The Indications Section would provide:

- (1) Up-to-minute intelligence from all government agencies on the progress of world events and the interaction of Free World and Communist Bloc programs. As such it would be a war room for the cold war.
- (2) Facilities for rapid, secure communications directly from the White House to all parts of the Executive Branch, to Ambassadors and other personal representatives of the President abroad, to the unified and specified commanders in the US and overseas.
- (3) Current status of major projects or programs which have been approved by the President and are being implemented by the Executive Branch.
- (4) Repository of facts and information on all activities of the Executive Branch for quick, ready reference by the President and the White House staff.
- (5) Facilities for presenting this information in succinct

form utilizing the most advanced techniques available to include TV.

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In order that the Security Actions Directorate may perform efficiently within the existing framework of Government, it will be given no publicity. Meetings of the Advisory Panel will take place normally in conjunction with their relationship to the National Security Council.

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