

#83

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5450552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS and
Date: 01AUG2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1134

Oral History Interview

with

General Hamilton A. Twitchell

Conducted on

July 5, 1984

by

Dr. Maurice Matloff, Dr. Alfred Goldberg, and Dr. Robert Watson

OSD Historical Office
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: JUL 24 2013

13-M-1134

Matloff: This is an oral history interview held with General Hamilton A. Twitchell on July 5, 1984 at 10:00 a.m. in the Pentagon. Participating for the OSD Historical Office are Dr. Alfred Goldberg, Dr. Robert Watson, and Dr. Maurice Matloff. The interview is being recorded on tape and a copy of the transcript will be sent to General Twitchell for his review.

General, we will focus in this interview on your service in OSD during 1949 to 1950 and 1955 to 1958, and in your roles in military assistance and in NATO affairs. But I should first like to direct your attention toward certain factors in your earlier background and experience relevant to the history of OSD and national security policy in the post-World War II era. In connection with your assignment from 1945 to 1947 with the Army Plans and Operations Division and with respect to the movement for unification of the services after World War II, what role did you play during your service in that staff agency in preparing the Army's position? Did you have anything to do either with planning or implementation in connection with the National Security Act of 1947?

Twitchell: As a member of the Policy Section in the War Plans Division, which later became Plans and Operations, I was an action officer on many of the issues and subjects relating to the question of roles and missions and the whole question of the organization and role of the Joint Staff. I worked at that time primarily when General Norstad was DCSOPS, Plans and Operations. Some of the key issues that come to my mind were: the question of roles and missions, particularly with regard

to the relative size between the Army and the Marines; the functions of the two services; the question between the Army and the Air Force with respect to Army aviation and the support which the Air Force would be responsible for providing to the Army--the whole question of lift, and the responsibility for it. With respect to the Joint Chiefs, I think the fundamental issue was primarily the different concepts between the Navy on the one hand and the Army and the Air Force on the other regarding the nature and the responsibilities of the Joint Staff. Perhaps in a rather over-simplified version, the Navy favored basically a limited role for the Joint Staff and they looked upon the director to be essentially the same as the former Secretary of the JCS, whereas the Army and the Air Force had use for a stronger director. This question was finally resolved by a proposal which General Norstad had prepared, suggesting that the future director, once agreed upon, should take the various views and then submit his recommendations to the Joint Chiefs. That's what General Gruenther did, and basically that structure has not been changed too much. It certainly has evolved and has been refined and enlarged over the years, but that basic concept began under those circumstances.

Matloff: Did you have any dealings with any of your counterparts in other services, possibly even with Secretary Forrestal or any of his assistants, in connection with the National Security Act?

Twitchell: Basically only in the sense that from time to time when there would be meetings in the joint arena on a subject, with, for

example, Admiral Anderson, who was at that time Captain Anderson.

These were primarily on issues rather than specifically on the National Unification Act.

Matloff: How did you view the National Security Act as it affected military organization? Did you think it was effective?

Twitchell: I thought that as a first step it was a major improvement over the earlier system under which we had been operating among the three services, with the frequent meetings of the various committees of the Joint Chiefs in which, of course, each service was presenting its views, and then somehow they tried to arrive at some understanding and a compromise or an agreement on a particular issue. Because of my background, having been in SHAEF during the war, I had been brought up in an environment in which these things had to be looked at jointly.

Matloff: You came to this assignment from SHAEF?

Twitchell: Yes, at the end of the war.

Goldberg: With reference to the Marines, did the Army, during this period of 1945-47 leading up to the National Security Act, have serious thoughts about taking over the Marines, incorporating them?

Twitchell: I don't think that the Army officially had that thought, though there may have been views expressed by people in that regard. But, I think, the Army felt that there was definitely a role which centered on how far inland the Marines should go, and that whether you were talking primarily about an amphibious force as opposed to a force to fight a ground war, of course had an effect on the size.

Goldberg: Were you aware that there existed a great fear in the Marines that they might be done out of existence by the Army and the Air Force?

Twitchell: Yes.

Goldberg: That was a very serious one on their part--so serious that they felt that the Navy wasn't fighting hard enough against unification and were very critical of the Navy then.

Twitchell: There was also, certainly in the Army, strong feeling over the question of tactical air support--the feeling that the Navy system whereby the marines had their own aviation, aside from the question of the budget and resources--the fact that the people would be trained to be more acquainted with the problems of land warfare. I think that maybe some of these things still linger on in various ways.

Matloff: I'd like to touch on the next assignment that you had, your service on the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1947 and 1949. First of all, who appointed you to the Joint Staff?

Twitchell: Basically General Cort Schuyler, who was then the Chief of Plans and Policy. I think Norstad was Chief of Plans and Operations.

Matloff: What role did you play in that capacity?

Twitchell: I went down to the Joint Planning Committee, and I was primarily in a team called the Rainbow team. We dealt with a variety of subjects, including the budget, because this was the first time that the Chiefs had become involved in a budget problem. In addition to that, I did a lot of odds and ends jobs for General Gruenther, who was then the Director, and later for Admiral Davis. I was a backup to the OSD member,

who, I think, was Admiral Davis, on the planning for the U.S. views on NATO. With regard to military assistance, when WEU [Western European Union] got started and Montgomery was heading up a planning organization, General Kibler was sent to London to talk about U.S. coordination and possible assistance. It became evident during that period that there was going to be some need for strengthening and improving the U.S. machinery for developing a military assistance program. So I did a lot of work within the Joint Staff on the question of the reorganization and responsibilities of the Chiefs in the military services, and, of course, the question immediately came up, "Where is the most proper place for the effort to be headed up in the Pentagon?" After considerable thought, General Gruenther recommended to the Secretary of Defense that it rest in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Some felt that it should be within the Joint Chiefs--for example, the Army felt that it should be there. There was a question also within the services whether it should be more appropriately within the logistics side of the house or whether it should be in the operational side of the house. I think that Gen. Gruenther and Gen. Lemnitzer, when he became involved, felt that the basic rationale had to come from the operational side rather than the logistic side, and then the logistical aspects could be brought in properly.

Matloff: So you were getting involved with military assistance even in this assignment.

Twitchell: I had been involved in it before, because during World War II, of course, we rearmed the French army, and we also provided arms to the

liberated manpower units in Western Europe. One of my jobs in the Operations Division of SHAEF headquarters was to develop papers and recommendations regarding the equipment of these forces. So I had some background of some of the problems involved.

Goldberg: You were at Teddington, in England, the headquarters?

Twitchell: I understand that during the war President Roosevelt told Gen. Marshall that the Army staff was too old. They wanted to bring in some younger people, so they set up what they called a staff officers' task force pool. They sent out word that they wanted to bring twelve people into the newly built Pentagon across the river for duty. They had to be under 35 and had to have attended Leavenworth or some other school. Then they got some others at large. I was one of the twelve that came here. From there I went to Cairo, to the Middle East headquarters, and from there to London, and then after I got to the European theater headquarters, I was assigned to the Cossack planning staff. That was at Norfolk House. From there we moved out to Bushy Park, and from there to France.

Goldberg: I really asked because I was at Bushy Park also. I was with USSTAF Headquarters.

Matloff: What relations did you and your colleagues on the Joint Staff have with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its Chairman? Did you have any direct relations, or only through the Director? How did the Joint Staff work in those days?

Twitchell: Primarily our relations, for example in the Joint Strategic Planning Section, were handled under an admiral who worked for Gruenther.

We met primarily with the admiral and then with Gen. Gruenther on topics from time to time. Occasionally, when the Joint Chiefs would consider a paper that our team had drafted, we were present at the time.

Matloff: Did you get in on any of those crises that arose in this period, for example the Berlin airlift?

Twitchell: Not directly, except, of course, a lot of that, as I remember, was when I was still in the Plans Division of the Army staff. There was a question of how much lift would be required, and so on. I think at that time I did get involved in some of the questions involving the whole matter of our participation.

Matloff: From your experience on the Joint Staff from 1947 to 1949, did you come away with any impressions about the workings of the new national security organization?

Twitchell: I think that I felt, first of all, that the joint operations were improved, just because of the fact that you were there on a day to day basis, as opposed to being up in the Army staff, let's say, and then going down to meet with your counterpart to write a paper. Instead, you sat down and worked something out primarily with your counterpart. For example, in my case Gen. Schuyler said, "We will never tell you what position to take on a paper. You're going to the Joint Staff with the idea that you understand the Army's problems. You're to understand the other person's problems and then come up with the best solution."

Matloff: Did you have many dealings, for example, with members of OSD, in that capacity?

Twitchell: At that time not too many. Primarily with relation to military assistance.

Goldberg: Did you feel that the representatives of the other services on the joint staffs had the same attitude that Gen. Schuyler had recommended to you?

Twitchell: I guess I didn't, in some cases.

Goldberg: It varied, I suppose, with the issue.

Twitchell: Yes. Also, I think it varied possibly with the personality.

Goldberg: Could it have varied with the service? Given that the Navy had been negative toward the whole proposition of unification from the beginning, the Air Force was new and volatile and surging, etc. The Army really in a sense represented the anchorman of the organization during this time. Would you say that's an accurate way of looking at it?

Twitchell: I think so. There's something that is maybe even deeper. Let me explain this. One time I was talking with somebody about the question of command, as it was reflected in matters with which we were concerned. In the Army, a platoon leader stands in front of his platoon. Every individual soldier can see the action that that leader takes. So you have that relationship. In the Air Force, particularly with reference to the pilot of a plane in a very small crew, there is a relationship that is different in that category, because they are there as a team. How a ship is run in the Navy is a great mystery. The captain of a ship is up there; he eats alone; his cabin is removed. These things make a difference in the matter of how people develop their

attitudes, and it just seems to me that there is a different philosophy. I think that the Navy is still the most capable of saying this is a Navy view and sticking to it. I don't say that in any derogatory way. I think it has many advantages.

Matloff: Did you perhaps form any impressions in the Forrestal period of him as an administrator and as a national security policy advisor and maker?

Twitchell: After it was decided to place the military assistance effort under the Office of the Secretary, Jack Ohly was here at that time as the principal political adviser and he had two other key assistants. For a period I was on loan from the Joint Staff to Gen. Lemnitzer in OSD, so there was that inner linkage. In connection with the issues on military assistance, the relationships with the State Department, and so on, I came into contact not so much with him [Forrestal] personally, except from time to time, but more through the discussions with Gen. Lemnitzer and with Ohly, regarding this whole question of military assistance and foreign policy issues as they related to our period.

Matloff: Did you have any impressions as a result of these indirect contacts?

Twitchell: My impression was very favorable--that he was certainly dedicated to trying to pull together and make the National Security Act work; that he was up against tremendous organizational and structural problems, as well as such key issues as Israel and the other major foreign policy problems that we were facing. It's very important,

I think also, that the focus has been all within the Pentagon, whereas before the Unification Act the relationships between the Pentagon and the State Department were handled through the mechanism called SWNCC [State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee], which was a very awkward arrangement. It worked reasonably well, but it still did not provide for a good day-to-day operational basis. Once the military assistance program got adopted as a national policy, then they set up FACC [Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee]. That agency worked very well, just by virtue of the personalities of the people who were on it. They happened to be very top-flight, broadminded people.

Matloff: Let's come now to the first important assignment in OSD, as Executive Officer of the Office of Military Assistance from 1949-50. What was the background of that appointment? Who, for example, was responsible for putting you on that?

Twitchell: I think that Gen. Gruenther recommended me to Gen. Lemnitzer. Lemnitzer was at the National War College as the Deputy Commandant and he could not leave. I think it was agreed when he was selected that he would remain there until the following spring. So he could only come over here part of each day or each week. Having been involved with all of the issues regarding the establishment of the office, Gen. Gruenther told Gen. Lemnitzer that I could work with him. During that period I was working for Lemnitzer and in turn for Gruenther, once these issues were referred to the Joint Chiefs.

Matloff: Were you given any instructions, written or oral, when you took over as Executive Officer?

Twitchell: Just that Gen. Gruenther said, "I'm loaning you out to Gen. Lemnitzer and you will be still carried with the Joint Staff and do work here as well as whatever Gen. Lemnitzer wants."

Matloff: No briefing or guidance from the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

Twitchell: No.

Matloff: What was your conception of your role initially, when you took over? How did you see the position?

Twitchell: There were only three people when it was set up, so it was pretty clear. I was Lemnitzer's only assistant as the time. We were faced then with the problem of what sort of an office he should have, the question of setting up relations with the three services, with the Chiefs, and with the key elements in OSD, as well as how to start to develop the first military assistance program.

Matloff: Can you tell us a little about that program? What were the dominant policies and objectives of the program in those days?

Twitchell: Basically the primary concern was the provision of equipment to Western Europe. Korea was an issue; Taiwan was an issue. The other areas of the world presented lesser issues. Of course, there were the questions, particularly at that time, about the issues relating to the Belgians and the French, and the British, to a smaller extent; the matter of their problems with their colonies, and the desire on the part of the United States to further the colonies' independence on the one

hand, and how far you went in that respect in weakening your principal allies on the other. These were some of the issues that came up in terms of our overall security policy.

Goldberg: Did you deal with the political side of that issue, or was that State?

Twitchell: State. But there were discussions about the security aspects of it, which were appropriately in the Pentagon. One of the other key issues was the size of the advisory group. At that time Louis Johnson was the Secretary and he and the head of the political effort at the State Department agreed that there should be no strength over 25 members, including civilian assistants, typists, etc. The Joint Chiefs took strong objection to that.

Matloff: Who set the dominant policies for the program?

Twitchell: The way it worked was that in the Defense Department the Joint Chiefs set the basic military objectives and views as to what the program should do, of course drawing on the views of the services within their machinery. Similarly, State was doing some work on its side, and the economic considerations on the overall assistance program would also be incorporated. Then the FACC would meet to discuss the matter. Periodically the Secretary would meet with the service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs to discuss these issues. That's the way it was pulled together.

Matloff: Were there any differences either within Defense or between Defense and State on the rationale or objectives of the program?

Twitchell: I think that there were probably differences at the beginning, but they weren't unresolvable. I don't recall anything that really wasn't resolved primarily within the FACC.

Matloff: Can you tell us in brief how the office operated? what the procedures were on an issue that came up?

Twitchell: One of the key issues in terms of the programs themselves concerned the views of the services regarding the types of items that they wished to make available and the cost that they would charge. There were differences within the Pentagon on this issue, but they were resolved through the decision-making process. There was concern whether some service was trying to get rid of something and thereby get some funds that would assist it in its own procurement problem. So you had the issue of arriving at a proper balance between what we were trying to equip our allies with and what the services were inclined to provide to the program because of their own problems, and understandably so.

Goldberg: Didn't that really happen? the services really did take advantage when they could?

Twitchell: Yes. This was a matter on which we had meetings. As to how General Lemnitzer operated, he had a key representative from each service, primarily at the major general level. Of course, he dealt very closely with the Director of the Joint Staff. When an issue came up, his office would frame it and send it down to the Joint Chiefs and to the services. At the proper point it would then be cleared through the service mechanism up to the secretary level where necessary, and again to the Joint Chiefs and to the Secretary of Defense.

Goldberg: Is it correct that the services initially were not happy about this program because they felt that they were going to lose, but when they realized that this program could be made to work for their benefit by getting rid of the older equipment and replacing it with newer equipment from these funds that could be made available to them, they became more supportive of the program?

Twitchell: Probably that is right. But certainly it was a learning process.

Goldberg: General Lemnitzer told us that this is the way it was originally, that, for instance, General Collins, who was then the Chief of Staff, said, "Lem, what are you trying to do to us, take all our equipment away?" It was only shortly after when he found out that it might be possible to benefit from it that he decided it wasn't a bad program after all.

Matloff: Would you say, then, that the interservice competition did have an impact on the operations, policies, and programs of the Office of Military Assistance?

Twitchell: I would say interservice competition in the sense that there was probably a different view operationally as to what types of equipment, Army, Navy, or Air, could best further our objectives in Western Europe, and so forth, and what the priority of buildup should be; and then the question of how much of the so-called budget should go to each service.

Matloff: Since we've touched on the budget, who set the budgetary ceilings for the office and its program of military assistance?

Twitchell: I don't remember a budget being set in that sense. I think the general feeling of what the political climate would provide was that about a billion dollars was the maximum amount that the administration hoped would get through. So that, in a sense, set the guidelines for how the pie would then be divided between the economic programs and the military programs. Then from there it became a matter of making some estimates on what types of equipment were best needed, primarily based on the strategic guidance from the Chiefs.

Matloff: Any working out of some kind of formula between the budget for the military assistance program vis-a-vis the rest of the defense budget?

Twitchell: Yes, there was, definitely, and that was a question of whether or not the defense budget was going to be reduced because of this aspect. There was a good deal of discussion about that. I just hadn't thought about that particular fact, but that was a major consideration. It was concern, again for the point you've made, that this would reduce the services' aspect.

Matloff: Were you drawn in, as a result of your position of executive officer, in any of those discussions?

Twitchell: Primarily in the discussions of the interdepartmental working group and also with Ohly and McNeil, who was the Comptroller. Leva was the legal adviser.

Matloff: Were these the people that you were primarily dealing with in OSD other than in your own office?

Twitchell: Yes, and with General Bob Wood, who was the Army aide to the Secretary.

Matloff: Do you see, in looking back, any connection between the military assistance program and strategic planning, in which you had considerable background?

Twitchell: Yes, I think there was a great deal. Really the genesis of the program came from the strategic side. That meant that again you got, first, into the realities in types of equipment that could be provided and, secondly, to the priorities. But basically the program was so focussed on Western Europe that it was pretty clear as to what we hoped to see achieved by the Europeans and what the United States could provide in terms of its own forces, and then the strategy for the defense of Europe.

Matloff: Did you and your office play any role in connection with the planning and implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty?

Twitchell: When I was in the Joint Staff, Admiral Davis, if I remember correctly, was the OSD or the Pentagon representative to the US Planning Committee for NATO and I was his backup. So I went to meetings with him. Occasionally, if he wasn't able to go and it wasn't something important, I went over and I worked back and forth with people at State on the planning side.

Matloff: How effective did you think the office and its program of military assistance were?

Twitchell: I think that it was effective in that it was able to pull together the various views, some of which were conflicting, and some of which were congenial, in a very good manner, and it was primarily because

of General Lemnitzer's ability and personality. He worked well with people, and he had the respect of the Chairman of the JCS, General Bradley. And he was an old colleague of General Gruenther's. Also, he worked very well with the State Department people.

Matloff: From where you were sitting, did you have any feeling for the impact that the Louis Johnson regime was having on your office and on the program? Any impressions of Johnson as an administrator or national security policy adviser and maker?

Twitchell: I can perhaps illustrate on this question of a 25 limit on members of the MAAG. After getting the views of the Chiefs, General Lemnitzer forwarded a paper to Secretary Johnson, pointing out what the Chiefs' objections were. Nothing happened for a while. So he asked me to go to see the Secretary's assistant. She said, "Yes, Secretary Johnson has seen it." I asked, "Did he approve it or disapprove it?" She said, "He initialled it." I responded, "What does that mean?" She said, "That means he saw it." So I went back and told General Lemnitzer, who said, "On that basis, I'll assume he approved it." We never heard anything further. But he was very forceful; he had very strong views. I've never seen a Secretary or any other representative of the government speak back to Congress the way he did on his views about the budget and about the assistance program. I think the prevailing view I had was that in his effort to keep the budget down he underestimated the impact it was having on our readiness. You remember General Bradley even made a statement about what our national

budget could stand, or what our national prosperity could stand in relationship to the overall national budget. Probably that is the most significant factor of the Johnson administration. I don't think the relationships with the services were as harmonious as they were under Forrestal, who had a different personality. The other thing was that perhaps there were more political appointments stemming from political relationships than earlier.

Matloff: About your experience during 1951-53 in the office of the Special Assistant, Chief of Staff at SHAPE headquarters--what role did you play in that capacity? any relations with OSD in that connection?

Twitchell: First of all, that office was set up primarily to handle matters relating to the U.S. participation in the Allied Command, Europe, those things which could not be properly dealt with in the international staff--for example, some of the questions regarding atomic matters, the question of U.S. military assistance, the question of the relationship of SACEUR to the Joint Chiefs in the sense of the U.S. CINCEUR role. The latter matter was a very important factor which was handled primarily by General Eisenhower making it very clear to the Chiefs that the U.S. CINCEUR had to be responsible and responsive to SACEUR. As far as military assistance was concerned, they had what was referred to as J-MAAG, Joint Military Assistance Advisory Group, in General Handy's headquarters in Frankfurt. There was a very close relationship between General Schuyler's office and that office with respect to the program, because the real basis for the development of

the assistance program for Western Europe came from SACEUR'S planning. It then became important for CINCEUR's views to be tied to or related to the views of SACEUR, General Eisenhower, with his international responsibility. The heart of the program in dealing with the issues in Washington at that time really came from General Eisenhower's views. So that office dealt in many respects with that. It also dealt with the relationship between U.S. CINCEUR and SACEUR. I'd say there also were a number of other projects which General Gruenther or General Eisenhower would refer to that office--to General Schuyler--for special study where they felt this was more appropriate than sending it to the international staff.

Matloff: Did you have any dealings with General Eisenhower directly in that capacity?

Twitchell: From time to time, but more with Generals Ridgway and Gruenther--with Ridgway, when he became SACEUR.

Matloff: Could you get any sense, directly or indirectly, in dealing with Eisenhower or his chief subordinates there, whether he viewed the American commitment to NATO, particularly the ground troops, as a long-standing or permanent one?

Twitchell: My recollection is that he did not look upon it as a permanent one.

Matloff: That seems to be pretty much the impression that is emerging from a number of interviews with people who were privy to some of his thinking and and from discussing it with him. How about the major problems in NATO at that time--what were they?

Twitchell: Of course, the major problems I was drawn in on were related to the extent to which the so-called Lisbon goals could be met, how the various countries could be encouraged to live up to their commitments. During that time we moved from a purely requirements planning to a process which led, in effect, to the annual review, where you started from the goals which the countries had accepted and then among SHAPE, the countries, and the MODs [Ministers of Defense] developed the formula, rough as it was at that time, for getting their estimates of what they could and would carry out. And then this process, in turn, led to the recommendations of SACEUR to the Council, the discussion between the Council and the permanent representatives and again with the heads of state or the foreign ministers. Of course, SACEUR had a very important role of going around to all these different people and talking with them about their efforts.

Matloff: Now to one of the main points of interest from OSD's vantage point, your appointment to the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs [ISA], in which you served from 1955 to '58. What were the circumstances of that appointment? Who selected and briefed you?

Twitchell: I can't answer directly. I can tell you that I had been in a regiment in Massachusetts at Fort Devon, and at the end of that tour I was ordered to the personnel division in the Army staff. Then I was told that I had been ordered to ISA. The Chief of Personnel was Donald Booth and he told me that General Gruenther had requested that I

be assigned to ISA. This was just after the period when SHAPE had developed a further plan, with which Goodpaster was intimately involved, and which involved the use of atomic weapons and the whole question of modernization of the forces. I went into that assignment, which at that time involved three basic jobs: NATO, the principal one; second, SEATO, and third, METO, in the Middle East. For the first year that I was there, then, this duty was primarily dealing with those particular international alliances from the military point of view.

Matloff: Yours was particularly NATO?

Twitchell: No, I had all three of them. Of course, the basic effort was on NATO. Then about a year later there was a reorganization and I took the NATO Affairs Branch of the European Section. My efforts were primarily related to Europe, on military matters, the aid program, the whole politico-military relationship and dealing with the State Department, and so on.

Matloff: How was the staff selected and organized when you first came there? Who was doing the selecting?

Twitchell: I think the people were selected by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, with recommendations from the services. Of course, the way it worked generally, a formula was established allotting so many Army spaces, Navy spaces, and Air Force spaces to the different sections to make sure they was integrated, as well as civilian spaces.

Matloff: How about the relations between civilians and military on the staff? Was there any division?

Twitchell: There was no division. You would expect that with the different backgrounds there would be different views, but there weren't.

Matloff: Were the civilians political appointees?

Twitchell: Some of them. But there were very few supergrades at that time, so most of them came in and became civil servants.

Matloff: You've indicated there was some change in the organization. Were there any other changes during your period of tenure?

Twitchell: I think ISA has constantly undergone a revision almost biannually, or on an assistant secretary level basis, principally for refinements. Of course, there were the years when they set up the operating arm of military assistance as a separate organization, whereas before then it was primarily within ISA.

Matloff: About working relationships between ISA and other parts of the government--first of all in the department itself, the relationships with Secretary of Defense Wilson, and with McElroy, who followed. How often was there contact between the office or the director, the head of ISA, and the Secretary of Defense?

Twitchell: Between the Assistant Secretary of ISA or his principal assistants with the Secretary, I would say, quite regularly.

Matloff: How about with the Deputy Secretary, any dealings there? Frequent meetings or close relationships with Robert Anderson, Reuben Robertson, Donald Quarles?

Twitchell: I would say that this depended then to the extent to which the Secretary delegated certain responsibilities to his Deputy Secretary.

For example, Kyes had a role primarily in the administrative running of the place. I think a lot was delegated to the assistant secretaries in their respective fields.

Matloff: Could you see any changes in the impact on ISA in the shift from Wilson to McElroy?

Twitchell: There was certainly a very different manner of feeling. I'm not sure that there were any fundamental differences.

Matloff: How about with the changes from one ISA chief to the other, for example, from Hensel to Gray to Sprague, any differences there?

Twitchell: I really don't think that there were too many differences in their approach to the problems. They dealt with them somewhat differently.

Matloff: How about with the military services, particularly with the secretaries? Any impressions of what the dealings were like, what contacts there might have been, or what issues arose, in which the secretaries might have had an interest?

Twitchell: Let me deal with the question of modernization of NATO. That was probably one of the most difficult problems. Again, it goes back to how rapidly the services wanted to transfer their most modern arms. The Navy was particularly against it. It was concerned over the security implications of arms being sold. Admiral Radford was the Chairman of JCS, and this issue of providing the newer weapons, particularly those which were dual-capable and so on, really required an effort to bring together all elements of the Pentagon to get it worked out,

because of the concern. Of course, SACEUR was pressing for relaxation of some of the restrictions for the modernization, pointing out that the only way that the forces could meet the basic objectives of the strategic planning was to modernize because of the limitation on manpower; that you weren't going to get it all from strictly conventional means. It's the same issue that we're facing right now. This, I would say, was one of the key issues. Then there was also the question of the investment of forces, the reluctance of the services to make definite commitments to NATO. The Army was less concerned because of the fact that it had so many deployed in Europe, but there were concerns on the Navy and the Air side. And also there was the whole question of the U.S. commitment and extent to which we were prepared to meet our force goals. The other question was the whole matter of burden sharing, which was not so much an interservice problem but a problem that State and Defense had to work out.

Matloff: On the question of relations with State--how much coordination was there with State, and with whom did you and your colleagues in ISA deal?

Twitchell: I personally dealt primarily with the head of the NATO section in Western Europe. I would say that we also became frequently involved with the head of some other section, where it involved, let's say, the Belgians, who had something in the Congo.

Matloff: Was there any significant friction between the State Department and "the little State Department", as ISA was called?

Twitchell: Yes, I think there were times in which there were disagreements, but they were usually worked out. I think the feeling might be phrased this way: many people felt that ISA was becoming too political, and that State was becoming too military. Of course, the services at the working level very frequently would fuss about ISA and say, "They're trying to make too many military decisions." This came up one time when General Lemnitzer was Vice Chief. Having worked for him before, I saw him every now and then, particularly on matters relating to military assistance. I pointed out to him, when we were talking about the quality of service people on the ISA staff, that the colonel in ISA in many cases had more influence on the decision of the Secretary of Defense than some of the general officers in the Army, because he was writing papers that were two echelons below the Secretary and there were all of these layers on the service side. There was that feeling about whether ISA was trying to do too much on its own and was not bringing the services in. Procedural problems had created this feeling.

Matloff: Did ISA get into any conflicts of any kind behind the scenes, with the Secretary of Defense, possibly, taking a different position on issues, especially on questions that came up before congressional committees?

Twitchell: I don't remember anything specifically. I wouldn't have thought that it would have had too much leeway. I would have thought, for example, that in military assistance it would be more inclined to be more forthcoming than some of the secretaries.

Matloff: How about relations with the White House staff, and possibly with the National Security Council? Did ISA have any direct relations with the White House Staff? Could it coordinate directly or did it have to go through somebody else in Defense?

Twitchell: I would have said it would have been exceptional to have gone directly.

Matloff: How would it normally deal with that?

Twitchell: If the assistant secretary had a counterpart on some NSC committee or section, I think he could do that.

Matloff: Do you recall that ISA made much use of outside consultants in those days?

Twitchell: Not too much that I remember.

Matloff: About the threat, what did you find to be the dominant attitude toward the Soviet threat when you returned to Defense via ISA? Did you and your colleagues in OSD view communism as a monolithic threat? How did you see the threat to the United States in the '50s?

Twitchell: Let me go back. When I went to Europe in 1950, the Korean War had broken out. I had been ordered to Europe about a month before then, so you saw a situation in the Far East where the Soviet background was primarily military. The concern in Europe was it could easily be overrun by the Soviets. I think even at SHAPE, during the period that I was there, that they thought that the Soviets did have some basic objectives which they hoped to achieve; that they didn't have a blueprint, but that they had the military power again to

coerce the Western Europeans; and that their desire was to remove the American presence from Europe, certainly to reduce it.

Goldberg: How did you view the threat estimates from the individual services? They all had their own estimates which fed into the Joint Chiefs' planning and all the rest of it. Did you feel that they were perhaps too parochial in their views, in the estimates they were making of the Soviets, that they were mirror imaging, perhaps, in the sense of focusing naturally on the particular service that was the counterpart of theirs?

Twitchell: I think each service saw the effect of its role in slightly different terms and probably each one felt that that was more menacing than the others did. Again, for example, I was in the ^Shaffenburg [?] and there was great concern at that time, because of the efforts that we had to take in the Far East, that the Soviets might attack Western Europe. The threat was looked upon as something that was very real. It might not be imminent, but the people who were there really felt that way, so that while there was a battle for the budget back there, it was a different environment from what we're in now. For example, there was a real question about the extent to which the Soviets could depend upon their Eastern European allies to support them. Then, with the feeling that the U.S. still had the superiority in nuclear weapons, militarily this situation provided us with the ability to feel that we could exercise some control over the escalation of war, although there were those who said that they questioned that you could ever start

nuclear war without its getting out of hand. Of course, the more the Soviets made that point, whether they believed it or not is something else, at least it had value in that sense, and, of course, that issue has gone further.

Goldberg: Do you think that the Army exaggerated the threat in terms of its estimate of Soviet ground strength?

Twitchell: Perhaps a better way to say it would be, "Did they overestimate their capabilities in terms of the ability of the forces to move against Western Europe?" That's still a matter of great debate.

Goldberg: What I had in mind was the long-standing estimate of 175 divisions for the Soviets, which we know to have been greatly exaggerated, not necessarily deliberately. It could have been more out of ignorance, not having better information about it. What effect did this have on the Army itself, in its planning and its relationship to the strategic ideas and plans of the period? Did the Army, perhaps, underestimate its own capacity, because of this exaggerated estimate, to create more ground strength of its own, to really give in too much and too readily to the Air Force strategic concept of the way to deal with the Soviets, and therefore lose out in the budget battle because it didn't fight hard enough?

Twitchell: I wouldn't have said that the Army didn't fight hard enough. I think the real problem, and I've done some work on this issue since I've retired, is the ability of the Army to project itself overseas--to be able, particularly in the case of Europe now, to stop the Soviets.

When we had nuclear superiority, there was the feeling that if you were able to use the weapons, and this has become more in question, then the question comes up about not talking about a D+18 force, but what size force must you have to be able to project it promptly and timely. If you can't stop the battle in Europe during the first week or two, then as far as arguing for D-day divisions, you don't have much hope. So I would have said that the issue was more over the different views which have now evolved over the time that combat may exist, particularly before you go to nuclear weapons. And then the concern that you have today about the fact that the Europeans are becoming more reluctant, as are we, to say that we'll look to the use of nuclear weapons, and the unwillingness on the part of the Europeans to develop their conventional forces. That same issue has been in different shades and variations all the way through. But I don't think that people who were other than in the intelligence community were in any position to challenge the people who said, "This is the best estimate that we have as to the number of divisions." Whether there was agreement on their combat effectiveness was something else.

Goldberg: But even accepting the number of divisions and estimates of combat effectiveness, could and should the Army have led the fight for less of a nuclear strategy and more of a conventional strategy? Many people have alleged since then that the great tragedy was the over-emphasis on the nuclear, which cost us the conventional capability, and required a still further emphasis on nuclear capability.

Twitchell: Again, you are talking primarily about Europe.

Goldberg: Yes, about the Soviet threat in Europe primarily.

Twitchell: Earlier we weren't so much worried about the Soviet military threat elsewhere. I think a lot of this may go back to the decision at SHAPE, in view of the dim prospects of being able to develop the forces. We were talking about 90-100 divisions and it was very clear by 1953 and '54 that we weren't going to do it. The Army was probably among the last in trying to develop tactical nuclear weapons. There is also a real question of the extent to which the doctrine of dual capability has really been developed to ensure that it is workable in a timely fashion. There are lots of views on that. I can see within this the whole question of the budgetary procedure and how much of that has evolved into saying, "Here are some limits, don't come in with what is needed." That is the strategic objectives plan now. In there the services said what they thought they needed and the Chiefs said what they thought was needed. Within that framework, once you get down to the next phase and you're talking realistically about the budget, it seems to me that the constraints that are put on the military then are pretty clear.

Goldberg: It is interesting that at the end of the Korean War we had developed a very substantial conventional capability on the ground as well as in the air, that had we drawn from the Korean War the lesson that wars of the future were more likely to be limited and conventional than nuclear, we might have continued in that direction and this might

have served as enough inspiration to the Europeans to get them to do more than they were doing. But everything then turned in the opposite direction, and the Eisenhower administration drew from the Korean War the observation that we couldn't really afford to go in the conventional direction, that nuclear held out the bigger bang for the buck and was a cheaper way of achieving security for both us and the Europeans. It is rather ironic that it was that Army man, Eisenhower, who probably is as much responsible for us going in that direction as anybody else; probably more responsible. Does that square with your view of the situation?

Twitchell: I think that that is a fair expression of it.

Goldberg: And this, of course, in spite of Ridgway and Taylor doing their damndest to keep the Army up to snuff, to get a fair share and maintain a big conventional capability. Eisenhower just overrode them.

Matloff: Was there any impact on ISA's thinking, planning, or implementation, as a result of the philosophy of the President?

Twitchell: Yes. Again, particularly because it had this impact on the plans that were coming in from SACEUR on what was needed to defend Western Europe. That, again, was visualized as the principal Soviet military threat. The Europeans were less concerned about the military side than they were about the economic problems.

Matloff: Did ISA play any role in strategy-making during your tenure? Was it just implementing?

Twitchell: More in the policy role and commenting on the Chiefs' views on strategy, yes.

Matloff: Did it take a position on nuclear weapons, or conventional versus nuclear defense?

Twitchell: I would imagine so, in that certainly in connection with Europe it was supporting the need for nuclear weapons.

Matloff: This would tie this in with the other question about the threat. Did the coming of sputnik in '57 have any impact on ISA's thinking, planning, or policies?

Twitchell: I think it made people realize that the Soviets, once they decided to concentrate on any particular system and put their total effort behind it, were far more competent than had been visualized, just as we had underestimated their capability to move from air power to missile power. That was a great shock.

Matloff: In this period, the Ridgway-Taylor period, which Taylor called the "Babylonian captivity" of the Army, how did this affect your position in ISA? Did you feel uncomfortable at that time as an Army officer serving in ISA? Was the dominant philosophy affecting your own service?

Twitchell: I think that I wasn't so much concerned about it as it affected the Army itself. I was concerned about the whole question of the diminution of the service chiefs in their role as advisers to the secretaries of the services and to the Secretary of Defense. Taylor had on his desk a little holder for flags and he had all of the assistant secretaries and secretaries between himself and the Secretary of Defense. I think there were 19. I did feel that this layering and the concentration of responsibilities within the office of the Secretary of

Defense, whether it affected the service or the joint side, had some drawbacks to it.

Matloff: Were you drawn in on the formulation of the ISA budget in any way?

Twitchell: No, very little. Not in any meaningful way.

Matloff: This was the period when NATO was trying to integrate West Germany into the alliance, and in '55 it came in. Did you get drawn in on any of those problems sitting in ISA?

Twitchell: More in terms of the concerns about the role of the German military on the continent, the extent to which Germany, if left to itself and through lack of initiative of the others, would become the dominant power, and then the question of what would happen if the United States should pull out.

Matloff: Did you have any qualms about the rearmament of Germany in the light of its previous history?

Twitchell: I guess I felt that it would be very difficult for a nation to change its national character within a generation, but having dealt with some of the problems when I was in SHAPE, I felt that there was an opportunity there, particularly under Adenauer, to try to move forward on it. As a matter of practicality, if the Germans weren't brought into the act, then Western Europe's problems were going to be unmanageable, particularly because of our own reservations of the extent to which we should be involved on the continent on a day-to-day basis.

Matloff: About the other crises which came up during this time frame-- Indochina first--to what extent was ISA during your tenure involved with Indochina, and were you drawn in on any problem along that line? You had come in after the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the Communist takeover of northern Indochina as a result of the Geneva conference. Were you drawn in on the question of aid to Indochina, for example?

Twitchell: Very little, except as it related to the extent to which this in turn affected the aid to France.

Matloff: How about the domino principle? Did you and your colleagues in ISA accept this principle that was being expressed by Eisenhower, Dulles, and other officials?

Twitchell: I think in general people accepted that if something happened in Indochina it could have a ripple effect.

Matloff: Did you run into any skepticism in ISA or elsewhere in the administration concerning the validity of the principle?

Twitchell: Yes, there was some questioning, but nobody seriously questioned it. Just like Dulles saying that, if there was going to be a problem anywhere in the world, we would speak to the heart of the problem--I think that people thought that was an overstatement, but nobody really said that as a strategic concept it was highly questionable.

Matloff: Did you or your other colleagues in ISA get involved in the formation of SEATO, that came in in '55, probably right in the beginning?

Twitchell: By the time I got back, SEATO had been set up, and when they had meetings of their military committee I would go to them.

Matloff: Any repercussions of the Suez crisis of '56 on ISA?

Twitchell: Yes. At that time Gordon Gray was Assistant Secretary.

He went to the London conference, and I was his backup. The things that I remember in particular were related to the fact that the French and the British had closed their telephone lines to the United States and we didn't know what was going on. Then there was the question about the extent to which the French and the British could hold out. Gordon Gray had strong feelings that it was highly unlikely, and I remember that while he was in London, he expressed his personal views and said to the Chairman of the JCS, "I respect your views as a professional, but I differ with you on this point." So there were some political and military implications on that, particularly with Eisenhower's position, affecting the relations with the British.

Goldberg: What were the differences that Gray had with the Chairman?

Twitchell: This was a question about the extent to which the British and the French had the capability to carry off the operation. Gray was less optimistic than the Chairman.

Goldberg: At what point was this?

Twitchell: This was either just before or once the operation was undertaken. We were there in connection with the whole question of the Suez Canal, and what the political issues were going to be.

Matloff: How about the landings in Lebanon in 1958? Any relationships with ISA's work or dealings with them during that period?

Twitchell: At that time I was in the Army staff and I had very little involvement on that issue.

Matloff: How about the Quemoy-Matsu problem? Any involvement with that one?

Twitchell: Primarily with regard to aid and the role of the U.S. forces, particularly the Navy and the Air, in providing it.

Matloff: You were drawn in on that?

Twitchell: Because Lemnitzer had been Commander in Chief of the Far East and had very strong views about what we should do defensively out there. Again the principal thrust was from the Chief of Plans, so that I was just on the periphery.

Matloff: How do you view the effectiveness of ISA during the period that you served in it? Did it succeed? In what respect might it have failed?

Twitchell: First of all, I think that the Secretary of Defense does need an office which is able to assist him in his relationships with the State Department, and in turn which pulls together the views of the services and the Chiefs in their respective responsibilities. So, in that sense, I think it is a useful operation and a needed function. I think it was effective. Basically, there is the organizational problem of how you have all of these activities relating together, the extent to which the Armed Forces Policy Council is a useful instrument, and how the machinery works in terms of the proper balance between delegation of responsibility and being able to be sure you've got sufficient control over it to have adequate authority. I would be more charitable than many probably are about ISA.

Goldberg: In your remarks about the diminution of the role of the chiefs in relation to the OSD and the service secretaries, and the increasing centralization of power in OSD--did this disturb you a great deal? You were originally, of course, a supporter of the whole concept of unification and the National Security Act. OSD, which inevitably grew out of it, kept on growing. The big change, of course, really took place later under McNamara. You observed the beginning even before the McNamara period, and very much so in ISA, which grew increasingly powerful even before the McNamara period. What are your views on this centralization, increasing power in OSD and the Secretary of Defense, and what you perceive as the diminution of power in the services and the chiefs?

Twitchell: Let's take the services first. Undoubtedly, there is a need for overall control and coordination of the department, for centralized authority, and for a review process that digs into the service requests for money and so forth. But I think in some cases there has been a tendency for the systems analysts, if you will, and others to try and become too involved in the minutiae of the services. The service secretaries should be held responsible to the Secretary of Defense, to be sure that these things are worked out so that again the service secretary has a good understanding of the totality of the picture. There has got to be some harmony between the views of the service secretaries and the Secretary of Defense.

Goldberg: Is that more important than the harmony between the Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense?

Twitchell: I'll come to the Chiefs of Staff in a minute, because I think that's the bigger problem on the Joint Chiefs side, and this issue comes up again. I had two tours in the Joint Chiefs. The second time was more appropriate to this point. But I do think that part of the problem is the question of the difficulty the Chiefs face in certain issues with respect to agreeing when there are service differences, and that this is then permitted and encouraged, with, say, ISA or whatever other element, to step in and make a decision or recommendation, which the Chiefs should have done in the first place.

Goldberg: So the services in good part have brought it on themselves, this centralization of power in OSD, this enhancement of civilian control. A good part of that grows out of this interservice problem.

Twitchell: Yes.

Matloff: As chief of the Coordination Group of the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, '58-'60, after you left the ISA position, what were you involved in there and what were your relations with OSD in that capacity?

Twitchell: The direct relations were very limited. Earlier I referred to General Taylor's frustrations. He asked, just before he was ready to leave, to have what he referred to as a "horse blanket" during his tenure on the extent to which his administration had been able to bring about a rethinking of strategy. So we sat down and worked out a paper which showed the impact it had on the administration's basic decisions and allocations of the budget, the extent to which it had an impact on the public, and also on political scientists in the academic community.

Goldberg: You're referring to strategy?

Twitchell: Strategy and policy--basically the role of the Army, limited war, conventional war, flexible response, those things. Basically, we showed that there had been very little success. When I showed that to General Taylor, he said, "You make me feel as though I hadn't been here the last four years." That was exactly the case. There had been some impact on the thinking community, but little evidence of it in terms of resources--some impact in higher echelons of the government about the need to have a flexible response in limited war, but very little.

Goldberg: You're lucky he didn't ship you to Greenland.

Twitchell: I hadn't intended it to be that way. I think that the things that I dealt with, and the section dealt with, were primarily those of special interest or special issues such as the Chief of Staff's posture statement to Congress, the Secretary's statement to Congress. We drafted those.

Matloff: Then you didn't get involved in interservice squabbles.

Twitchell: I was going to say that the big one was the adequacy of airlift. There was a very unique operation in which practically the three service chiefs, or the first four service chiefs, were almost at the point where they were action officers, because they all went up and testified before Congress. They were personally involved in this.

Goldberg: You were having problems over taxpayer support, too, during that period, weren't you?

Twitchell: Yes, but the airlift was the big issue then. General Lemnitzer and General White worked out the Lemnitzer-White agreement.

Goldberg: There was a Decker-White agreement, wasn't there?

Twitchell: Yes, but that was later.

Matloff: Back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when you became Special Assistant to the Chairman in 1962, what role were you playing in this capacity? What sort of problems did you deal with? Did you get involved at all, for example, with the Cuban Missile crisis?

Twitchell: To the extent that I was the representative from the Chiefs with a special group on the question of Berlin. On the Berlin crisis, it seemed to me that it was a unique situation in that the principals were all so intimately involved in every little detail. The Joint Chiefs were in session practically around the clock. As an offshoot of Cuba they had a working group under Martin Hildebrand. I saw the Cuban crisis only in the sense that I was in on most of the sessions that the Chairman had in his office with regard to what was happening and what the decisions were, but primarily it was so tightly controlled that the Secretary and the Chiefs were working on this around the clock.

Matloff: Were you serving both under Lemnitzer and Taylor in this position?

Twitchell: Lemnitzer had pretty much left when it became a crisis, and it was basically under Taylor.

Matloff: Then I have to ask you the impact of the McNamara management reforms on the operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as you saw them from your position.

Twitchell: This was just beginning. Certainly, one of the things was this question of the role of the Joint Staff. One of the things that had impressed me in previous years was the inability of the Joint Staff to present a view of its own. During the early period, when General Taylor first came in, we worked on a paper which would provide a basis within the Joint Chiefs' procedures for the Joint Staff to provide a separate view, if the Chairman or the Director found it useful. I know that General Taylor was imbued with the idea that he was going to try to bring about a further strengthening of the role of the Chiefs and attempt to resolve some of the issues that the Chiefs were accused of not being able to solve themselves. One of the other things that I think is very interesting historically is the role of General Taylor when he was the Special Assistant to the President, and the working relationships that this created for the Joint Chiefs.

Matloff: Was that good or bad?

Goldberg: And for McNamara, too.

Twitchell: Yes. I think it's very complex and very complicated, when you've got a senior four-star man over there advising the President. This calls for forbearance on all sides. That's my own opinion.

Goldberg: It has been suggested that McNamara was responsible for getting Taylor appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs so he could get him out of the White House and into the Pentagon where he could keep an eye on him and Taylor would be responsible to him and not to the President. What do you think of this as a possibility?

Twitchell: I think that that might be the case. I hadn't thought about it in those terms, but this gets involved in the relationships of Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs and the whole question of the Bay of Pigs, and who was responsible for what. I think that that was a factor, and whether he felt he was more prepared to rely on General Taylor. I do feel from my own observation that this situation put some pressure and strains on the relationships.

Matloff: Your next few assignments were all related to NATO, from 1963 to 1966, in various capacities. Did you see any change in the problems NATO was facing in the '60s from what they had been in the 50s? You had been there in both decades. This was the period when France takes a walk.

Twitchell. Yes, within SHAPE, for example. SHAPE had become much larger. The initial sense of enthusiasm had somewhat diminished, although it still has a very strong feeling of integration for anybody that goes there even now. But the political climate, with DeGaulle in there, made it very clear that the ultimate political reactions were going to affect the military relationships. I worked for a French air force general and he in turn worked for a German lieutenant general. The three of us could sit down and work out any issue that we wanted, militarily.

Matloff: This was as the Chief of Plans Branch, Policy and Planning Division, SHAPE?

Twitchell: Yes. But we recognized that there were certain political differences that ultimately would negate what we agreed to militarily.

Also, there was the whole question about the attitude in the United States after Vietnam, the implications it had on our availability of forces, and so on. So I think that there was a vast difference.

Matloff: Were you feeling the impact of the war in Vietnam in your capacities from 1963-'66?

Twitchell: Certainly as Chief of Staff of Seventh Army I was, because of the readiness of the forces.

Matloff: Did the fact that American forces were being pulled away complicate relations with your allied counterparts?

Twitchell: Yes, I think it caused great concern to them, particularly when it was decided to do away with Seventh Army headquarters and to move U.S. CINCEUR to Stuttgart. This issue of the organization of the U.S. headquarters in Europe was something that came up all the time that I was in SHAPE. The Seventh Army was a very strong symbol to the Germans in particular. So when it was disbanded and moved into becoming a section or element of USAREUR headquarters, this image of the U.S. presence was changed. I remember a number of Germans saying, "We'd rather see Seventh Army headquarters stay." There was always the argument whether CINCEUR's Headquarters should have whatever joint structure it had, and then that there should be service sections. There were studies galore during the '50-'52 period about that relationship. Again, the problems relating to Vietnam--the budget and manpower problems--certainly had an impact on our role in Europe.

Matloff: Did you have any dealings at all with any people from OSD in any of your capacities in SHAPE and NATO in the period of '63-'66?

Twitchell: Primarily on the question of nuclear matters.

Matloff: With whom?

Twitchell: Primarily OSD. There were several burning issues. One was the mixed-man crews for the Polaris submarine, the multilateral force. I not only talked with General Lemnitzer about this but we had instructions that no American officer was to take any position contrary to the Secretary's. General Lemnitzer made it very clear that as SACEUR he had to state what he thought.

Goldberg: Did you have the same definition of multilateral force as some of the British did—an American crew with a French chef?

Twitchell: Again, this was something which we had to handle primarily within the U.S. element, and I spent a lot of my time as Chief of Plans on matters pertaining to the multilateral force. In that connection, that was developed by a consultant who came in to the Secretary of State. I was assigned to the Army Chief's office and I became the Pentagon contact with the State Department on this paper. My instructions were to provide every bit of information that was wanted but by no means to take a position and become embroiled in the substance of the paper, that this was something that would have to come back to the Chiefs. They really didn't favor it. The Navy favored it because it allegedly seemed to provide the basis for the building of more submarines. The whole question of a mixed-man crew, who has control over the keys, the compatibility of different nationalities living in submarine or on a ship, were all burning issues, and these were primarily between ISA and SHAPE. The Chiefs and Secretary McNamara came over and had sessions.

Matloff: Regarding your last assignment, in Iran, in connection with your service with the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, 1968-'71, whom were you accounting to in that position?

Twitchell: It was a mixed channel of communications; it was ISA and CINCSTRAC.

Matloff: Do you have any thoughts about policy toward Iran in the light of your experience?

Twitchell: Several. One, I was there when U.S. aid was phasing out. Two, the Iranians were purchasing at this stage, particularly when the procurement procedures were such that direct sales by commercial firms were being encouraged. This created all sorts of problems, because the motivations of the firms were different from those of the Pentagon. Finally, the only real constraints that the United States had on the Shah in that time period were when he was getting loans from the Exian (?) Bank. I think that one of the problems was that the Iranians were in no way to make a technical appraisal of what they were being sold in the way of sophisticated equipment. At that time the United States and Germany had an agreement whereby there would be purchases through foreign military sales and they would be through the Pentagon. We had a very serious issue over the sales of some aircraft, the F-4s from McDonnell Douglas, who were trying to pressure the Iranians to buy these. They wanted to sell them more than I thought they should. This was the problem with Bell Helicopter and several others. I constantly took issue on this point. Secondly and more importantly, the question

of the F-4s came down to the point of whether or not it should go through the Pentagon or go directly to McDonnell Douglas. The interesting thing was that, after the Iranians finally decided that they would go through the Pentagon, I later was told that it saved the Iranians \$60 million dollars. I think a more fundamental issue still exists, aside from the problems with Iran. I went out there in 1962, when I came back from Korea, to make a survey of the country. I was given six weeks to do it, but we took about two and one-half months. McNamara and the Shah did not agree on the size of the program and so he [McNamara] said, "We'll send a team out to tell you what you need." We tried to tell them what they needed to carry out the defense concept which the U.S. and Iran had, but that there was a limitation on how fast they could absorb the equipment, and that the equipment to be provided over a five-year program should be limited to what they could actually demonstrate they could use. It also called for a reduction in the Iranian forces. All the time I was there I kept saying, particularly on the Army side, "If you're going to have a modern force, you've got to have the ability to support it and you've also got to be able to command and control it. You need advisers who are more than just good battalion commanders who understand how to train somebody. You need people who know how to set up and run a modern military establishment." The more fundamental issue was: I don't think you can send people to third world countries without giving them a good indoctrination on the cultural and political problems and the way of life in

those countries. You don't just move them out there and try to indoctrinate or give them a shot of technology. I think that we're still making the same mistake.

Matloff: On the basis of your long experience, how effective do you think military aid was as a tool for political leverage in the Cold War?

Twitchell: I think that the provision of equipment was probably effective. If you're talking about political leverage in the longer term, it may not be too effective. The recipients' motives in many cases were not the same as ours. One of the things that interested me, particularly in the third world, is recognition of the extent to which we are providing aid primarily for political and strategic purposes, and then the problems which arise if later on we haven't recognized some of the implications. Saudi Arabia is a good case in point of the dilemma that we have now. The Saudis are relatively incapable of maintaining that force, and if we're going to decide that we want to have a force there, then we've got to decide how long we're prepared to support them, if something happens--whether we're going to be prepared to go in and be present. The Turkish program has never really gotten off the ground;; it's had its ups and downs. The question is, if you're not going to provide equipment during a wartime, are they going to be capable of maintaining it? I think that there are some fundamental issues that need to be looked at in the longer terms of political leverage and political relationships.

Matloff: In connection with OSD organization and management, earlier in response to Dr. Goldberg's question you offered some interesting observations about the structure, procedures, and working relations at the top levels in DoD. Do you have any other thoughts that you'd like to leave with us on such things as relations between JCS and the SecDef, between the Joint Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or between the services and the Joint Chiefs? Do you see any need for changes other than what you've already spoken about?

Twitchell: I guess I'd like to just address myself to this question of the Joint Staff, where you hear people say we should go to a purple suit outfit. I continue to favor having people sent there. Again, I think you have to decide whether somebody has the adaptability and the capacity for joint work as opposed to strictly military service work. But I think it is useful to have a system whereby people know what their service's problems are and have the capacity to understand them. So I frankly do not agree with those who say, "Let's go to a permanent Joint Staff." I think that the key thing is to make it attractive professionally. For example, when I went to ISA the second time, the Chief of Personnel said to me, "You know, most of your career has been out of the Army. Once every four years you've served with the Army. This is a dead end." This is incredible, because what ought to be the situation is that that service is very important, even from a rather parochial point of view, for the service staff to have to send people there. Finally, it got to the point where OSD put out a policy that

nobody could be promoted to a general officer or a flag officer unless he had done joint service. I think that went too far, but that measure was necessary to step up the quality of people going to the Joint Staff, because a lot of people did not want to go. The next issue is to be sure that those people who are there and do good work are in turn able to reflect a joint point of view and, if necessary, an independent one from their services, and not have this become something that is held against them. This is part of an outlook that has to be. I personally can see a need to have something like the former Joint Strategic Survey Committee or, as the proposal had been, to have people who have attained senior rank to provide advice, but the Chiefs should be cut into it.

Matloff: Do you see any need for changes in the national security educational system? You yourself had gone through the National War College.

Twitchell: I guess one thing I would say, but I'm not sure what the present policy is. At one stage, if somebody went to the Army War College, he couldn't go to the National War College because of spaces. I think that the two are different breeds of cats and that objectively we should be able to afford to send people to both schools.

Matloff: How would you characterize the personalities, styles, and effectiveness of the various officials in the top echelons of Defense with whom you came in contact during your long and varied career? Are there any other Secretaries of Defense, Deputy Secretaries of Defense, or members of the Joint Chiefs, who particularly impressed you one way or the other? Do you want to add anything about Forrestal?

Twitchell: No, because it was a relatively short time that I was associated with him.

Matloff: How about General Marshall as Secretary of Defense?

Twitchell: I didn't have any dealings with him at that time.

Matloff: Lovett?

Twitchell: My impressions of him were that he was a very broad-guaged, intelligent Secretary who understood working relationships very well.

Matloff: Wilson?

Twitchell: There is a story that will illustrate that. I did come into contact with him frequently on NATO meetings, preparing the briefing books for him, and so on. At one session it was the United States' turn to speak and it was decided at the end of the day to take up the meeting again the next day. This was to be the statement by the Secretary of Defense on what the U.S. position was going to be on U.S. support. When the people congregated for the early meeting in the morning to discuss the issues and what should be said and so on, nobody knew where the Secretary was. The only person that knew was his aide. The Secretary was down at the motor show looking at the cars, and that was the way he got an impression of how well Europe was getting along.

Goldberg: European competition?

Twitchell: I think it was deeper than that. I think he was out seeing just how much progress they were making, but he had a rather different view from most of the people who had been on the Washington scene, and, of course, Kaiser's relationships in dealing with the military were less than desirable.

Matloff: How about McElroy?

Twitchell: McElroy was more broad-gauged. He had a better feeling of how to handle a department.

Matloff: McNamara?

Twitchell: He was pretty clear in his disdain of the military, and generally the feeling was, "You give me the facts and I'll make the decision and the determination. He attempted to put all three services in the same pattern.

Matloff: Any Deputy Secretaries of Defense with whom you had dealings?

Twitchell: I didn't have too many with them.

Matloff: How about Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs--Bradley?

Twitchell: First of all, General Bradley was Commandant at Fort Benning when I was there as an officer. I knew him during the war as Army group commander and, of course, there was never a better person to deal with. He had a sound grasp of things. I think he did a very good job as the first Chairman.

Matloff: Admiral Radford?

Twitchell: He really was disdainful of NATO. These types of alliances and problems bothered him and got in his way. One time when we were having a problem with Syria I went in to see him and he said, "You and your damned alliance." So that illustrated this concern about the impediments that the political and the alliance relationships had with the operations of the more normal naval role.

Matloff: General Twining?

Twitchell: I didn't have too many contacts with General Twining, but I think he had a broader approach to many of these issues.

Matloff: Lemnitzer?

Twitchell: I had worked with General Lemnitzer, and I understood his ways very well. He had tremendous experience. I would say that he was probably respected by everybody as having a good touch with people and being able to work well with them.

Matloff: Taylor?

Twitchell: Taylor was more remote as Chairman, but intellectually nobody is above him. He may have a few peers, but he is in a class by himself intellectually.

Matloff: Any other officials in OSD?

Goldberg: Would you put Gruenther in Taylor's class intellectually and Admiral Sherman?

Twitchell: Yes; and Admiral Sherman; and in terms of wisdom and ability, General Lemnitzer. But they all exhibited this brilliance, if you will, in different ways.

Matloff: Did you have much contact with McNeil, the Comptroller, in any of your capacities?

Twitchell: Mostly in the early days of formulating the military assistance program.

Matloff: Any impressions of him or his style of work?

Twitchell: I thought, considering the fact that he was trying to bring together a defense budget, that he did a very good job and had a good understanding.

Goldberg: What were your impressions of Jack Ohly?

Twitchell: They were tops, both when he was an assistant to the Secretary, and then later on in ICA, or ECA, as it became. Probably one of the most competent people--self-effacing, but well-recognized by all of the people who dealt with him, I think, above, alongside, and below him. He was a very rare public servant.

Watson: I wonder if you could comment on Secretary of the Army Brucker. He must have been in a very difficult position. You said that the service secretaries had to agree with the Secretary of Defense, but they also had to have a rapport with their service, and he was sort of ground between two millstones there, wasn't he?

Twitchell: Yes, I think that that is probably right. He was certainly one of the most dedicated secretaries of the Army. But there were differences between him and the Secretary of Defense. For example, one of the critical issues at that time was the matter of whether the Army should give up its work on antiballistic missiles, the Nike Hercules, and such things. The feeling within the Army staff was that we should continue this if it was not going to be at the expense of the Army's primary mission. The Secretary felt otherwise, and this was a very sensitive point in this question.

Goldberg: In OSD the feeling was, "How the hell do we get rid of Brucker."

Twitchell: Yes, because he was trying to fight all of the problems. But there wasn't the same degree of relationship between the service secretary and the Chief of Staff, and, I guess, if you go right back to

it, probably the ideal relationship was that between Marshall and Stimson. Stimson had the confidence in himself, his knowledge, and his relationships, and he had utter confidence in the Chief of Staff and didn't interfere with the running of the staff. I think in terms of the preeminence of secretaries, and what's happened is part of unification, particularly in this sphere, the role of the service secretary has been downgraded to the point where he does not have the national character and stature that he used to have.

Goldberg: The service secretary's role has diminished more than has that of the Chief of Staff over the years?

Twitchell: That's right. But they are still tremendous organizations to run and they should not be to the point where you are not getting really top flight people who have political and executive ability.

Goldberg: Once in a while you still get a service secretary who can do this, such as Lehman in the Navy in these past few years, who has used political connections for the good of the Navy. He's been a real representative of the Navy, just as Brucker was in the Army. His reputation was really of being the Army's man, and not the man of the Secretary of Defense, which is why the Secretary of Defense would have been happy to get rid of him in the latter years.

Matloff: As you look back on your varied career in DoD, what do you regard as your major achievements?

Twitchell: In OSD, I would say working for Lemnitzer on the military assistance program, getting it set up and started, was an important

aspect. During the time I was in ISA there was the whole question of the modernization of the equipment program for Europe. In the case of the situation in Iran, I think what I was trying to do was completely lost in the '75 period when they just started selling too much equipment too fast, to the point where it became counterproductive. A lot of people overplay the role of the military forces of Iran in the downfall of the Shah, but the issues were far broader and far more complex. At least under Ambassadors Myer and MacArthur we tried to keep some restraints on it.

Matloff: Conversely, what experience disappointed you the most? Something perhaps that was left unfinished, that you couldn't complete?

Twitchell: I guess the thing that disappointed me the most was that I got hooked on so many staff jobs that I didn't get out to many command assignments.

Matloff: Thank you, General Twitchell, for your cooperation and for your willingness to share your recollections with us.

Twitchell: Thank you.