

In Reply Refer to
J-15019/8

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. QUARLES

SUBJECT: Foreign Manpower for Military Purposes:
Status Report on preliminary discussions of State-Defense-
CIA Working Group

Pursuant to the discussion of the above subject by the Secretaries of State and Defense on June 17, 1958, and the letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense dated July 2, 1958, an inter-agency Working Group has held preliminary discussions to consider the need and feasibility of using foreign manpower for military purposes; possible situations in which their use might be considered by the United States; possible forms of organization, and the political implications which their use might involve.

Before proceeding further with the study, the Working Group considered it desirable to indicate, by means of the attached status report and annexes, the general directions of its tentative conclusions and course of actions, in order to assure that further work by the Group will best serve the purposes underlying the initiation of the study.

Encl:
Status Report
Annexes A thru D

ALANEO F. FLY
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Assistant Secretary

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 USC 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS and
Date: 28 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1343

Group A
13M-1343



~~SECRET~~ *Unclassified* *Haiti*
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

8 May 1963

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY GILPATRIC

From: Maj. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Military Resources

For your information, yesterday CIA (J. C. King) asked us for help in obtaining the names of Haitian military personnel who had received training in the United States. Shortly afterwards, Colonel Jolly and Captain Warren of my staff had contacted the Army, Navy, and Air Force, obtained lists from the Services, and delivered to CIA a list of 101 Haitian military men who had received training here.

In anticipation of the contingency planning on Brazil, which I am monitoring for you (I have spoken to Gen. O'Meara, Adm. Riley, and CIA about this), I am asking for a similar listing of Brazilian military who received training in the U.S.

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DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS
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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.


MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense (Special Operations)

SUBJECT: List of Military Personnel who have
had Assignments with CIA

REFERENCE: Memo to DD/S fr O/SOD dated 30 Oct
59, same subject as above

1. Your memorandum of 30 October 1959, has
been referred to this office for action.

2. We expect to complete the list requested
by you by 10 December 1959. It is regretted that
the list cannot be completed any sooner, but a con-
siderable amount of research is required in the
preparation of such a list.


EUGENE S. FIELD
Colonel, Armor
Chief, Mobilization and
Military Personnel Division

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 21 2013

30 October 1959

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, SUPPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

C-1533

ATTENTION: Chief, Military Personnel Division**SUBJECT: Request for List of Military Personnel who have
had Assignments with CIA**

With reference to recent conversations between a representative of this office and the Chief, Military Personnel Division, CIA, it is requested that you furnish us with a list of Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel who have completed tours with your Agency in either a PP, PM or Staff capacity, showing the years in which they were so assigned. Since it is understood that a similar list of Army personnel was recently compiled at the request of ACSI, it is assumed that the inclusion of Naval and Air Force personnel in the list furnished to this office will not place a greatly increased burden upon your staff.

This list is desired in order that we may insure that the most qualified personnel available to the Defense Department will be utilized as appropriate and practicable in furtherance of Defense programs in support of US national security objectives. You may rest assured that the above information will receive the same security protection as similar information furnished to this office by your Agency.

SIGNED

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Date: FEB 21 2013

EDWARD G. LAKE DALE
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

JTFrench/wb/72969/30 Oct 59

6 November 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL LANSDALE

SUBJECT: Allied Officer Students in U. S. Military Service Schools
and Colleges

1. I will not waste your time belaboring the point on the value of maintaining a folder in this office on outstanding Allied Officer Students who have visited or are currently visiting this country.

2. Specifically, a means should be devised for pulling together at this level brief items on officers from foreign areas who could represent valuable assets to us in time of crises. I am sure that ACSI maintains biographic intelligence on an across-the-board basis on all Allied Officer Students. However, without benefit of personal investigation, I am also sure that this intelligence is developed on a catch-as-catch-can approach and that there is little or no effort devoted to pinpointing individuals of great potential value to us.

3. I would suggest that you have someone run a brief check in ACSI on presently existing procedures in this field. Based on the findings of this brief analysis, I would recommend that a procedure be devised which would bring to the attention of this office presently available biographic data on all student officers from such key regions as the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and parts of South America. Individuals who stand out in the course of this brief screening should be earmarked for special attention and appropriate follow-up. I am in no sense suggesting the recruiting of agents, rather I am stressing the strengthening of the bonds of friendship and mutual respect with officers of such caliber that they may eventually rise to positions of importance within their own countries and thus find themselves so situated that they can exercise a key influence in the relations between our respective countries.

4. Obviously, the steps which I have indicated above will not complete the picture. It is essential that someone from this general level analyze the present system of handling Allied Student Officers in this country. (I have noted from my own personal experiences and observations that the treatment of Allied Officers does vary from place to place.) An over-all program which gets down to concrete specifics in this area must be established and promulgated through command channels with such emphasis that little room is left for the local school commandant for deviation from stated objectives. Some such program is in existence. However I do not believe it is working as effectively as it might be.

5. I intend to get further into the specifics of this matter and will write you from down below some additional ideas.



S. V. Wilson

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Doc 107

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

CINCPAC FILE
FFI (J43)
L11-3
Ser 00145
4 March 1959

SECRET

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~~SPEEDLETTER - AIR MAIL~~

~~SECRET NO FORN (Unclassified upon removal enclosures)~~

From: Commander in Chief Pacific
To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

- Encl: (1) Meeting with General Nasution, 17 Feb 59
(2) Talk with Young Colonels, Burma, 14 Feb 59
(3) Conversation with Governor Esteban Bernido, 31 Jan 59
(4) Conversation with Indonesian Engineers, 16 Feb 59

Enclosures (1) through (4) are forwarded for your information.

AUTHENTICATED:

J. D. McLeod
J. D. McLEOD
Ass't to Joint Secretary

H. R. WHITTAKER
Ass't Chief of Staff
for Joint Logistics

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USARMA MANILA (W/1 Cy Encl (3))
USARMA RANGOON (W/1 Cy Encl (2))
DRAPER COM(ANDERSON SUB-COM)(ATTN: COL E. G. LAMSDALE) (W/5 Cys Encls (1) thru (4))
CINCUSARPAC (W/1 Cy Encls (1) thru (4))
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1 cy - New. Sec. 10 Mar 59
1 cy - Hq. Sec. 11 Mar 59
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

By - Colonel E. G. LANSDALE, (Anderson Subcommittee)

Subj: Meeting with General Nasution, 17 February 1959

Present: General Nasution, Chief of Staff, Indonesian Army
Colonel Jani, Deputy Chief of Staff
Colonel Sukendro, Personal Staff of General Nasution
(Security Affairs)
Colonel Imam Sukarto, Chief, Army Intelligence
Major Sunario, Deputy Chief, Army Intelligence
Mr. Dillon Anderson (for first part of discussion)
J. Lawton Collins, General, USA (Ret)
Colonel E. G. Lansdale
Colonel Ray Cole, USARMA, Djakarta
Major George Benson, Ass't USARMA, Djakarta (for
last part of discussion)

1. Mr. Anderson explained the general purpose of the Committee's visit, in making a study for our President. General Nasution thanked him and said he welcomed any questions the Americans wished to ask. The following is General Nasution's response to questions and comments:

2. Internal Security:

The Indonesian Army is coping with three types of rebels:

a. The DI, who seek to institute a Moslem state in Indonesia. In Central and West Java, where they are fighting under the leadership of a former Deputy Minister of Defense, they are estimated to have 9,000 weapons. (Nasution related a story of how he hid out in this same area, as a division commander fighting against the Dutch, taking scattered cover during daylight and reassembling his troops at night, just as the DI do now.) They are protected by the people, their fathers and brothers, who also are fanatic Moslems. The DI usually avoid Army posts and patrols, but kill village head-men who have helped the Army and attack isolated, weak police posts.

In the southern part of Sulawesi, the DI have 4-5,000 weapons, mostly taken from the former Dutch police forces. The DI leader in Sulawesi has asked a number of times for a meeting with Nasution, but other operations have had priority and such a meeting has not taken place yet.

In Atjeh, northern Sumatra, there is a form of cease-fire, with DI officials meeting with Nasution and negotiating terms. Nasution is offering unconditional surrender, without reprisals against those who surrender. He tells them that "if we keep fighting, we will all lose our freedom and our territory."

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ENCLOSURE ()

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There are no known radio communications between the various groups of DI in Java, Sulawesi and Atjeh. Representatives and couriers travel between the groups by ordinary air and sea commercial means. The Army makes a security check of passengers at airports and piers, to arrest the DI.

b. The PRRI rebels in central Sumatra and Tapanuli (Sumatra) are actually of two different types, one anti-government and the other Moslem like the DI, who have joined together against the government. Their nucleus is from 3 battalions of a regiment that rebelled. 75% of these former Army men have surrendered by now, but the rebels have filled the ranks by recruiting from the local people. In clashes with the Army, the ratio of killed is 80 to 150 rebels to 1 Army man. At Tapanuli, the rebels have been split up, with one group almost entirely surrendered now to Nasution. The rebels are not being given the chance to build up their strength. The "old soldiers" among the rebels in Sumatra are being rehabilitated by the Army, when they surrender. Officers and students are sent to Java, for schooling. Enlisted men are sent to Sibolga, where they are retrained and then sent home to their villages with a little money; if their home villages are in rebel areas, they are kept in Sibolga.

The Pemesta in Sulawesi are somewhat like the PRRI. They are Christians and now hold one regency. The Army has been operating against them.

c. The RMS are a third group of rebels, located in the Moluccas. They are "close to the Dutch." Their number is not big. It is estimated they have about 1,000 weapons. The terrain, however, is very difficult for Army operations.

3. Anti-Rebel Methods:

Nasution explained that anti-rebel operations are carried out in four phases:

- (1) Split the rebels up into smaller groups.
- (2) Break up the pockets of resistance, mopping up. "This is the most difficult." During this phase, the rebels usually have a "shadow government" of their own in the area, replacing open control.
- (3) Patrol activity to keep the broken up groups on the move.
- (4) Then, when the rebels are dispersed as individuals, catch the leaders and cadre. If this fourth phase is successful, then area security is turned over to the police.

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4. Progress in Anti-Guerilla Campaign:

General Nasution said that, if the political situation doesn't change, he estimates it will take from 3 to 5 years to clear up the rebel situation. The Army has enough troops for the job.

He commented on the current situation, as follows:

In West Java, near the big cities, the Army is already in the 4th phase.

In West Java, in more remote areas, the Army is entering the 3rd phase.

In South Java, the Army is in the 2nd phase.

In DI areas of Sulawesi, the Army is in the 2nd phase.

Kalimantan (S. Borneo) is clear.

5. Assistance:

General Nasution said that the Army tries to help the people in operational areas, but can only do so in a very limited way. Priority need has been for weapons, which is why he asked the U. S. for rifles instead of road-building equipment. Medical supply is very short. If they could get medical supplies, they would prefer to mobilize their own "student doctors," many of whom have volunteered already, rather than ask for help from foreigners such as the Filipino "Operation Brotherhood" teams, (mentioned as operating in Vietnam and Laos; the Indonesians know little about this.)

Nasution said, "What we need is to send more of our top officers to the United States for training. We also need U. S. training aids and methods. Colonel Jani, my Deputy, is always asking your Military Attache for help on this." (Comment: USARMA, Djakarta, got U. S. Army permission two years ago to furnish training manuals to the Indonesians). Nasution said that Indonesian instructors, including Leavenworth graduates, do the translating.

6. Political Future:

Nasution said that Indonesia doesn't have a stable government. Politicians just follow the party leaders, and sometimes put the interests of the party ahead of the best interests of the country. Thus, President Sukarno started "guided democracy", which is a middle road between U. S. democracy on the one hand, and dictatorial methods on the other, to achieve national goals. "Guided" really means "restricted." So, trouble began when we tried to find just ways of reaching national objectives. The political parties have their own way of reaching these. The President has his. And, Nasution his.

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Nasution's idea is that, in the technical field, the government should be organized much the same as an Army headquarters. (He said he couldn't use this analogy openly, because it would scare the politicians). The Cabinet Ministers would act as "sort of a general staff" for the Prime Minister, as well as being like the Chief Quartermaster, for instance, and run his own Ministry. Then there should be Deputy Prime Ministers, to act much the same as an Army G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4. He discussed this idea with the President, but when the Cabinet met, Nasution was in the hospital for an operation, so the idea was not adopted.

Nasution said that civil service personnel must not belong to any political party. Members of the Army are needed in Parliament and the Cabinet, but the soldiers must not have the right to vote while on active duty.

Indonesia needs a government that will remain in power for a period of 4 or 5 years, like in the United States. The 1945 Constitution provides the means for this. In the present Constituent Assembly, the adherents of the 1945 Constitution and the Moslem group are "fighting." However, the "Islam Group is not too far from this," (The 1945 Constitution) and could agree, particularly with the "Five Principles" (of Belief in God, Nationalism, Humanism, Democracy, and Social Justice). For Nasution, as a Moslem, belief in God is enough. He points out to other Moslems that "it is against our religion to force Christians, Catholics and Hindus."

Nasution said that the President is always thinking in the political field. So, he discussed with him having functional representation (as one House of the Parliament), to replace the parties, and this to be higher than the parties (as an Upper House). The President agreed, but would put only 50% of representation for functional groups (such as labor, farmers, youth, Army, etc.). The political parties want functional representation to be only one-third of the Parliament, and even those should be party members. The President states that he will appoint the functional representatives through the National Front (which is under Nasution's control).

Nasution then commented that the 1945 Constitution provides for the President to be elected by Parliament for a 5-year term. Parliament has 50% of its representatives elected by the people, and 50% "by functional groups." Parliament can change the Constitution. Nasution added that the "1945 Constitution ideology is holy" to the Army. It is the big psychological means "to keep Army morale high."

He then said that both the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister agree with the idea of the 1945 Constitution. The Army is helping foster the idea, "But behind the screens." If the Constitution is forced by the Army, there will be a bad popular reaction. The idea for its adoption must come from the people.

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The PKI (Communist Party) doesn't agree. But, if they find that it will be useless for them to oppose, they will join in fact (to adopt the 1945 Constitution, and functional representation) and then try to gain control. Right now, the PKI is fighting for nationalist goals, but Nasution said he was sure that the Communists will change to their own goals later, as they have in other countries.

7. Service Rivalries:

Nasution admitted that there was some rivalry between the Army, Navy and Air Force. He said that Indonesia, is a young country, so there is some technical competition. In 1953, the Defense Minister made three separate services, where before there had been one Chief of the Armed Forces. This has become "liberal" competition, not "guided" competition. However, the Army is "the exponent of the Revolution, the fighter for it." It is "a great pity," but the men in the other services did not fight in the Revolution. Members of the Army "have to be clean from the Revolution on." Nasution added that he is doing more flying than the Chief of the Air Force.

8. Equipment:

Nasution acknowledged that the Indonesian Army should only request U. S. weapons which can be "best used for local conditions." He added that "Colonel Jani, my Deputy, knows both armies."

9. Visit to Vietnam:

Nasution said that he had never visited Vietnam. The two countries have something in common, since the French were probably much like the Dutch.

10. Comment:

General Nasution made a most favorable impression. He talked readily and apparently openly, in the manner of one friend to another. He gave every appearance of a troop commander who has the loyalty of his soldiers, who has thought out his own plans, and who knows the art of leadership. He displayed evident liking for and closeness to his "American" deputy, Colonel Jani. His expressions of patriotism seemed to be natural and unforced.

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MEMO FOR THE RECORD

Doc 107

By: Colonel E. G. Lansdale (Anderson subcommittee)

Subject: Talk with Young Colonels, Burma, 14 February 1959

1. Comment: Colonel Maung Maung invited me to Dagon House, Rangoon, for a discussion on the afternoon of 14 February 1959 about Burmese Army actions against the insurgents, knowing of my interest in counter-guerrilla operations and psychological warfare. At Dagon House, we went into what is evidently General Ne Win's War Room, where we were joined by Colonels Aung Gyi, Bo Lwin (Intelligence), and Ba Than (Psychological Warfare), and by Captain Kyi (of Psychological Warfare). At first, there was a formal briefing by Colonel Bo Lwin, but the conversation soon became general and free in a most friendly manner. I purposely abstained from taking notes at the time. The following is the gist of what these "young colonels" had to say at this conference, based upon notes I wrote much later:
2. Colonel Bo Lwin gave his briefing from an "enemy order of battle map", indicating location and size of insurgent units. Most of the Communist units were in the area west of the Rangoon-Prome road (with headquarters marked at about mid-point between the two cities) and in the Irrawaddy River delta area. Kachin insurgents were also marked, in the mountains and foothills east of Rangoon. Smaller units were marked, scattered over much of Burma. Communist forces are estimated at between 3,500 and 4,000. They are armed with World War II weapons, of many makes. There is no evidence of Chinese Communist help in weapons, equipment, or personnel. It is likely that the Chinese Communists give them funds from time to time. The Communist insurgents are on the defensive, only capable of small harrassing raids now. They used to blow up the rail lines at will; the Army hopes that they would try such a raid now, because they are ready and waiting, and "there would be dead Communists".
3. In reply to a question about radios, Col Maung Maung said that the Communists formerly operated a radio station for broadcasts to the public, but do so no longer. They operate a radio transmitter now, from their headquarters, for communicating with insurgent units, including the Kachins. The Kachins themselves have 4 or 5 transmitters for communicating with units.
4. Col Maung Maung then remarked that the Army was quite worried about the Communists working among the Kachins. Thakin Than Tun, Communist leader, has visited the Kachin area. The Kachins are "very stubborn" people and, if they become sold on Communism, it is going to be exceptionally difficult to stamp out Communism among the Kachins.
5. The talk turned to the subject of propaganda. Col Aung Gyi said that the Army makes a point of capturing the enemy's mimeograph machines. He stressed the importance of this, saying the Army was well aware of the value of propaganda and wanted to deny this capability to the enemy. He laughingly admitted that the Army's Brigade Commanders made good use of captured enemy mimeograph machines, in the Army's psychological warfare campaign.
6. Col Ba Than remarked that the Army had produced and used 35 1/2 million leaflets, booklets, newspapers, etc. in its psychological warfare campaign, to date. A strong troop information and education program is being pushed, including a troop magazine and radio broadcasts to the Army, with time allotted to the Army on civilian stations.

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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7. Maung Maung, Aung Gyi, and Ba Than all started explaining the anti-Communist campaign. Most Army leaders were formerly Communists, so they (Brigade Commanders particularly) are very adept at countering all the Communist arguments. They laughingly recalled that the Army published accounts of the Stalin denigration campaign and air-dropped these on Communist areas, to the chagrin of Communist insurgent leaders who were still praising Stalin, not knowing that he was no longer a Communist hero. During the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit at the end of 1955, and the Mikoyan visit early in 1956, they spread pictures and accounts of the visits, saying that the Russians were friendly to the Army, which confused the insurgents further and helped induce surrenders. (Comment: Aung Gyi seemed to have the liveliest interest in psychological warfare among the three, being particularly amused at the "practical joke" aspects of it, which is the mark of an able practitioner. From other remarks, it is likely that he is responsible for the Army's "gray" publications, which were commented about briefly.)

8. All of the Burmese then started telling anecdotes about 1953, when just a few cities were held by the government, and most of the outskirts were held by insurgent bands, as was much of Burma. They pointed out on the map where the main insurgent concentrations were in 1953, and where the few Army battalions were located at that time. Bo Lwin commented that there were 35,000 Communist insurgents then. Maung Maung described the fight for Rangoon's airport. Aung Gyi described how the insurgents would hold one half a city, the Army the other half.

9. In answer to a question, Col Maung Maung described how the Burmese Army became close to the people and won them over to start helping the Army against the insurgents. The Army formed a District Council in each district, as it started expanding its areas of control. The District Council included the Brigade Commander, the District Commissioner, representatives of the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Agriculture, and other government organizations in the area. (These District Councils still govern the districts today; the "Brigade Commander really runs the country", as one American in Rangoon put it). After Army patrols secure an area, small teams are sent into the area by the District Council. They distribute seeds, give agricultural advice, publish information, and help organize village self-defense units. Formerly, the insurgents would attack a village shortly after the initial security and civic action operation, singling out head-men, self-defense members, and other villagers who had been friendly to Army and government personnel, and kill them. Now, the Army continues the protection until several villages have self-defense units organized with a runner system between them, so they can come to each others help in the event of an attack. The villagers are now quick to notify the nearest Army unit of any strangers in the neighborhood.

10. Maung Maung explained that the Army had learned a great deal in visits to the Philippines, where Burmese officers spent time with the Philippine Army Civil Affairs Officers in the military areas and with BCTs. They also visited EDCOR centers to study the Army's rehabilitation work with former Huks. He recalled that he had talked at some length, during his last visit in Washington, about the "civic action" the Army is carrying out along the Chinese border, starting schools, distributing medical supplies and blankets, and undertaking public works, as a result of ideas the Burmese officers had picked up in the Philippines. He said that they hadn't learned as much in Vietnam, (probably due to language difficulties); Ba Than remarked that he had spent some time in Vietnam personally, observing similar

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operations by the Vietnamese Army. They admitted that, if the Vietnamese invited them, they would like to see the operations of the Vietnamese Army in establishing posts and communities in border regions.


11. Maung Maung and Aung Gyi explained the Army's rehabilitation work. Captured and surrendered insurgents are given brief re-indoctrination courses at several centers in Burma; the main one near Rangoon was recently closed. Included in the courses is some instruction in fishing, farming, or handicrafts. Personnel are then sent to several colonies, (a number of locations were pointed out on the map, including one north of Prome and one in the Irrawaddy delta), where the former insurgents can earn their own farms, fishing boats, or small businesses. Maung Maung said that most of this rehabilitation "has flopped", since the insurgents had a "pretty lazy life" camping out and robbing people as insurgents, and they are still too lazy to work hard, even to gain things for themselves as peaceful civilians. One notable exception to this is in the Arakan region, where former insurgents have become very industrious citizens. One group now runs a shipping line, with LSTs, out of Akyab. Another runs a bus line.

12. The Army has great hopes for a large new rehabilitation area it is planning to open up in the Southern Shan States, west of Inle Lake. This is excellent farming land. (All of the colonels expressed admiration for the beauty of this area).

13. The colonels said that the Army is fighting hard against the Communist insurgents. Friends of theirs are getting killed, and they expressed determination to finish off the Communist insurgents, who are getting harder to find and pin down for a fight.

14. Comment: The colonels were present at a buffet dinner that same night, given by General Ne Win in honor of Dillon Anderson and his staff. The colonels were unusually friendly and each asked for more time to continue our talk, but there was no further opportunity. Maung Maung added: "tell General Erskine to invite the new Burma desk man at State to come out and visit Burma".

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V. W. ALDEN, COLONEL, USAF

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MEMO FOR THE RECORD

By: Colonel E. G. Lansdale (with Anderson subcommittee)

Subject: Conversation with Governor Esteban Bernido,
31 January 1959

Doc
106

1. Comment: Having heard rumors that Esteban Bernido, Governor of Bohol Province in the Philippines (President Garcia's home province), was one of several being named as possible successors to Jesus Vargas for the post of Secretary of National Defense, I was interested in meeting him. We had not met before, and I knew little about him except that he had paid for a trip to Japan for himself and his wife out of his own pocket, at the time Garcia visited Japan in 1958, that he was reportedly an honest man quite opposed to graft in government, and that he lived in simple style. On 31 January 1959, I heard that Governor Bernido and his wife were in Manila, and arranged to meet them. I visited them at a small Ermita hotel, where they were staying in an inexpensive room. The highlights of what he told me follow:

2. Bernido makes rather frequent trips to Manila, to discuss Bohol affairs with President Garcia (usually at breakfast at the President's "hide-out") and with Presidential Secretary Pajo, ex-Governor of Bohol.

3. He said that Communism was on the increase in the provinces, at the barrio level. He did not blame this on Opposition parties or Chinese, but explained that this was subversive work by Filipinos who were either card-carrying Communists, or close to it. Subversion is even being carried on in Bohol. (Comment: Much the same was told me by other Filipinos, affiliated with the NP, LP, and PFP, and who spend much of their time in the provinces, about subversion in the barrios on Luzon and in the Visayas; I didn't discuss this problem with anyone who knows Mindanao well. This subversion reportedly has a definite anti-American theme.)

4. In fighting against subversion, Bernido said that he is concentrating on trying to inform the people of Bohol, because a "government that isn't based on popular support is simply nothing". He said that he is the first governor to hold seminars for barrio lieutenants and members of barrio councils, which he follows up with a provincial publication, "The Rural Gazette", which he founded. Seminars and the publication include such topics as the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, the role of citizens in a democracy, and agriculture.

5. He commented that the battle against Communism is not on "the land or sea or air" but is in "the human heart". "We should get there first, to the heart of every freedom-loving man". He added, with some colorful cuss-words, that the graft and corruption of "big shots" only helped the Communists and that he had urged President Garcia to prosecute some of these "big shots" (not named) and make real examples of them.

6. He said that one of the things that plagues him now, with a Boholano as President, is that so many of the people in his province want government jobs. He said that he is trying to initiate self-help among the people. He then gave a brief sample of what he tells the people of Bohol. "Don't look up to the government for jobs. The government must look up to you for support. Your taxes and help are what make the government run. If you all go to work for the government, then who is going to be left to support you?"

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7. Bernido was born in Guindalman, Bohol, on 12 February 1916. He mentioned that his mother, an elementary school teacher, had a "hard time making both ends meet" and that he enlisted in the Army after finishing "the secondary grade". (He left the Mapua Institute of Technology in June 1936 for six months Army training, then completed the six months course at the School for Reserve Commission at Camp Kitchley, Lanao, and was commissioned a probationary Third Lieutenant). He was then assigned to the ROTC unit of the Philippine School of Arts and Trade as an assistant instructor. In August 1941, he was assigned as commanding officer of G Company, 61st Infantry Division, which was inducted into USAFFE on 1 September. At the outbreak of World War II, his company was assigned to the defense of the Malabang airstrip in Mindanao, which was attacked by the Japanese. In the mountains of Zamboanga province, he became a battalion commander. When U.S. Major Childress left for Australia, Bernido disbanded his battalion and made his way back to Bohol. There, he organized the East Bohol Battalion of guerrillas, and later became chief of staff of the Bohol Command, when the Bohol guerrillas became unified.

8. After the war, Bernido enrolled again in the Mapua Institute of Technology, which he had left to join the Army in 1936, after his sophomore year. He graduated, as an electrical engineer. He married Consuelo Casenas in 1945; (comment: a very attractive Filipina). She was the only daughter of the late Filomeno Casenas, representative of the 3rd district of Bohol for three terms and governor of Bohol for two terms. After graduation, Bernido worked in the Bureau of Public Works, then in 1947-48 in the National Power Company.

9. In 1949, he was elected representative of the 3rd district of Bohol. (Comment: He remarked that he was the only Nacionalista congressional candidate to win in Bohol in 1949; Cabangbang and Castillo, the other two candidates, lost). In Congress, he was a member of the Defense, Public Works, Transportation and Communication, and Irrigation Committees. He was re-elected in 1953, and became chairman of the Committee on War Veterans, Vice-chairman of the Committee on National Defense, and a ranking member in the Committees on Public Works and Communication and Transportation.

10. In 1957, President Garcia appointed Bernido as Governor of Bohol, to replace Governor Juan C. Pajo, who became Executive Secretary (to President Garcia). In the last convention of the Governor's League, Bernido was voted one of the ten outstanding governors.

11. Comment: Bernido appears youthful and energetic. He is a bit reminiscent of Magsaysay, with his anger against "big shot crooks", obvious feeling of closeness to the people in the barrios, farm and guerrilla background, and friendship for the U. S.

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V. W. ALDEN, COLONEL, USAF

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MEMO FOR THE RECORD

By: Colonel E. G. Lansdale (Anderson subcommittee)

Subject: Conversation with Indonesian Engineers, 16 Feb 1959

1. USARMA-Djakarta arranged an informal meeting with Indonesian Army Engineers which was held the afternoon of 16 February 1959, at Colonel Sudarto's quarters. Those present were:

Colonel Sudarto, Chief of Engineers.
Major Hartuwan, Assistant to Col Sudarto.
Colonel Ray Cole, USARMA-Djakarta.
Colonel E. G. Lansdale, with the Dillon Anderson unit of the Draper Committee.

2. It was explained to Col Sudarto that the Americans were seeking information about the ways in which the Indonesian Army was helping the Indonesian economy and people, and were not in position to discuss specific U.S. aid programs with him. He smiled and said that he understood that no promises of help could be given, that General Nasution had made the decision to substitute a request for small arms in place of the engineering equipment initially on the request list submitted to the U.S., and that the Indonesian Engineers had some equipment "from outside" now, but didn't have enough rupiahs for adequate maintenance.

3. Pioneer Battalions. Col Sudarto said that the Engineers are now organized in Pioneer Battalions, with a total strength of 5,000. They have had to undertake a number of civil engineering tasks, "due to snipers" (making some public works hazardous in rebel-infested areas) and the availability of skills in the Army Engineers. Col Sudarto mentioned the following current projects:

a. A small harbor in North Sumatra, to accommodate ships of 3,000 tons, and the construction of some roads in Atjeh to permit products to be brought to this harbor.

b. Some road construction in the Balikpapan area.

c. Bridging in Central Sumatra, to assist military operations.

d. Flood control in the Brantas River area, East Java. Col Sudarto said that this was being done by the Pioneer Battalion from Malang, who replaced a Russian engineering team, now departed, so "the Army will handle all explosives". The Army Engineers are tunneling through a mountain, to drain flood waters into the sea, having adopted a plan originally proposed by Japanese engineers, instead of attempting to construct a canal.

e. As Post Engineers for the Army, barracks are to be constructed on 34 selected sites. While a start has been made on this, the Engineers are running into financial difficulties. Col Sudarto said that of the 200 million rupiahs programmed from Surplus Agricultural Commodities funds for this barrack construction, the Engineers only received 50 million rupiahs. He commented that the barracks program is a pressing matter, since the Army is now largely housed in public buildings, mostly in schools and some in banks. He pointed out that Army headquarters in Djakarta was actually a bank building. He added that these buildings should be turned back to the civilians as soon as possible.

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4. About skills, Col Sudarto remarked that the Army Engineers were far ahead of civil engineers. He said that on a recent bridge construction project, civil engineers had estimated it would take 3 years at a cost of 300 million rupiahs, so the Army Engineers moved in and did the construction in 3 months at a cost of 300 thousand rupiahs.

5. Training. Engineer officers are trained at the Engineer Academy in Bandung. There are 300 students in the academy, for a four year course. 64 have already graduated. The Army is increasing this training and plans to graduate 100 Engineer officers a year, starting in 1960.

6. Nasution's Orders. Col Sudarto said that General Nasution had recently given him orders to:

- a. Complete barracks for 8 battalions this year.
- b. Start the Construction Battalions as soon as possible.

7. Construction Battalions. The Army plan is to organize 5 Construction Battalions, of 980 men each, to undertake civilian public works. Since there is a shortage of trained technicians in Indonesia, these Construction Battalions will be manned with some retired Army Engineer personnel, some civilian engineer volunteers, and with semi-skilled Infantry personnel released from the Army. The latter will be given training in surveying, maintenance of electrical and mechanical equipment, and operation of equipment. The battalions will be organized by territories needing development, Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi.

Col Sudarto estimates that the equipment for each battalion will cost about \$5 million (US), not including LSTs which they hope to obtain, to permit minimal ports to be developed through beach-landing areas instead of constructing conventional port facilities, including piers. He estimates further that it will take 3 years to organize, train, and initiate the Construction Battalions. The Army Engineers believe they can train all the soldiers in the semi-skills required, at the rate of 2,000 per year. However, they are hopeful of having 72 engineer officers trained in the United States over the 3 year period.

Col Sudarto said that planning for these Construction Battalions is being done in close collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, as well as with the Ministries of Mining and of Industries.

The plan of operation envisages these Construction Battalions opening up now inaccessible areas of resources, for settlement and exploitation. Specific examples mentioned by Col Sudarto were the nickel deposits in Sulawesi, now in DI-controlled jungle areas, and the idle lands of Eastern Sumatra which need roads to permit settlers to take up lands and start growing rice and rubber. A beach-landing area would be developed, minimal roads bulldozed and scraped from the beach to the area, and the jungles cleared. Eventually, the Construction Battalions might be used in helping build agricultural processing plants, such as paper and sugar factories.

8. Assistance to Navy and Air Force. Col Sudarto stated that the Army Engineers are helping both the Navy and the Air Force at their request. The Air Force has only an embryo engineer organization at present. Actually, the Navy has the largest

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requirement at the moment. Navy headquarters are at Surabaya and the Navy requested that air facilities at Surabaya be greatly improved. The Army Engineers commenced construction 3 months ago. The plan is to construct a civil-military air base at Surabaya capable of handling jet transports by 1962. The Indonesians hope that such airlines as PAA and TWA will make use of these facilities then.

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V. W. Alden

V. W. ALDEN, COLONEL, USAF

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

9 March

MEMO FOR

Zander *[initials]*

Barkey *[initials]*

Kelleher *[initials]*

Smith *[initials]*

French *[initials]*

Curtis *[initials]*

Evans *[initials]*

Return Col. *[initials]*

Attached are copies of reports

I wrote at CINCPAC on the way
back from SEA. CINCPAC has
distributed to ISA + the Defense
Intell. Community.

Please return to me when you
have finished with them.

SL

Mr. *[initials]*, *[initials]* returned
may 59

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MEMO ROUTING SLIP		NEVER USE FOR APPROVAL/ALL CONCURRENCE IN UNUSUAL ACTIONS	
1 NAME OR TITLE Col Patterson (Rosen)	INITIALS	CIRCULATE	
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION AFCIN-X	DATE	COORDINATION	
2 Hq CIN-2 JMT		FILE	
3 ✓ Col CHASE CIN-X1		INFORMATION	
4 Walsh Has seen and OK'd JMT		NECESSARY ACTION	
		NOTE AND RETURN	
		SEE ME	
		SIGNATURE	
<p>REMARKS</p> <p>These papers are summaries of various meetings the Anderson Subcommittee had with various representatives of Indonesia, Philippines and Burma recently. They were loaned to me by Mr. Barkey (OSO, OSD) for information in the belief that they probably had not been as yet made available to General Walsh and with the thought that he might be interested in getting the information in advance of normal distribution.</p> <p>I must return them to Mr. Barkey by about 10 April and would like to be able to advise Mr. Barkey whether or not General Walsh would like to continue receiving such advance information in this form. If so, Barkey can loan this type data to us as he receives it.</p> <p>On these particular reports we are authorized to thermofax them for AFCIN-2 providing such thermofax copies are controlled in AFCIN and the Security classification is maintained.</p>			
FROM NAME OR TITLE George E. Grogan		DATE 27 Mar 59	
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION AFCIN-X1		TELEPHONE 53228	

DD FORM 95

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MEMO ROUTING SLIP		NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS	
1 NAME OR TITLE <i>Mr. Barclay</i>	INITIALS		CIRCULATE
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION <i>080-056</i>	DATE		COORDINATION
2			FILE
			INFORMATION
3			NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN
4			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE
<p>REMARKS</p> <p><i>Thank you very much. Paul Walsh was most interested. Would appreciate any more info this you might have.</i></p>			
FROM NAME OR TITLE <i>Samuel Earl</i>	DATE <i>17 Apr.</i>		
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION <i>Agcin X1</i>	TELEPHONE		

DD FORM 1 FEB 54 95 Replaces DA AGO Form 888, 1 Apr 48, and AFHQ Form 10, 10 Nov 47, which may be used.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

By - Colonel E. G. LANSDALE, (Anderson Subcommittee)

Subj: Meeting with General Nasution, 17 February 1959

Present: General Nasution, Chief of Staff, Indonesian Army
Colonel Yani, Deputy Chief of Staff
Colonel Sukendro, Personal Staff of General Nasution
(Security Affairs)
Colonel Imam Sukarto, Chief, Army Intelligence
Major Sumarto, Deputy Chief, Army Intelligence
Mr. Dillon Anderson (for first part of discussion)
J. Lawton Collins, General, USA (Ret)
Colonel E. G. Lansdale
Colonel Ray Cole, USARMA, Djakarta
Major George Benson, Asst USARMA, Djakarta (for
last part of discussion)

1. Mr. Anderson explained the general purpose of the Committee's visit, in making a study for our President. General Nasution thanked him and said he welcomed any questions the Americans wished to ask. The following is General Nasution's response to questions and comments:

2. Internal Security

The Indonesian Army is coping with three types of rebels:

a. The DI, who seek to institute a Moslem state in Indonesia. In Central and West Java, where they are fighting under the leadership of a former Deputy Minister of Defense, they are estimated to have 2,000 weapons. (Nasution related a story of how he hid out in this same area, as a division commander fighting against the Dutch, taking scattered cover during daylight and reassembling his troops at night, just as the DI do now.) They are protected by the people, their fathers and brothers, who also are fanatic Moslems. The DI usually avoid Army posts and patrols, but kill village head-men who have helped the Army and attack isolated, weak police posts.

In the southern part of Sulawesi, the DI have 4-5,000 weapons, mostly taken from the former Dutch police forces. The DI leader in Sulawesi has asked a number of times for a meeting with Nasution, but other operations have had priority and such a meeting has not taken place yet.

In Atjeh, northern Sumatra, there is a form of cease-fire, with DI officials meeting with Nasution and negotiating terms. Nasution is offering unconditional surrender, without reprisals against those who surrender. He tells them that "if we keep fighting, we will all lose our freedom and our territory."

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There are no known radio communications between the various groups of DI in Java, Sulawesi and Atjeh. Representatives and couriers travel between the groups by ordinary air and sea commercial means. The Army makes a security check of passengers at airports and piers, to arrest the DI.

b. The PRRI rebels in central Sumatra and Tapanuli (Sumatra) are actually of two different types, one anti-government and the other Moslem like the DI, who have joined together against the government. Their nucleus is from 3 battalions of a regiment that rebelled. 75% of these former Army men have surrendered by now, but the rebels have filled the ranks by recruiting from the local people. In clashes with the Army, the ratio of killed is 80 to 150 rebels to 1 Army man. At Tapanuli, the rebels have been split up, with one group almost entirely surrendered now to Nasution. The rebels are not being given the chance to build up their strength. The "old soldiers" among the rebels in Sumatra are being rehabilitated by the Army, when they surrender. Officers and students are sent to Java, for schooling. Enlisted men are sent to Sibolga, where they are retrained and then sent home to their villages with a little money; if their home villages are in rebel areas, they are kept in Sibolga.

The Pemesta in Sulawesi are somewhat like the PRRI. They are Christians and now hold one regency. The Army has been operating against them.

c. The RMS are a third group of rebels, located in the Moluccas. They are "close to the Dutch." Their number is not big. It is estimated they have about 1,000 weapons. The terrain, however, is very difficult for Army operations.

3. Anti-Rebel Methods:

Nasution explained that anti-rebel operations are carried out in four phases:

- (1) Split the rebels up into smaller groups.
- (2) Break up the pockets of resistance, mopping up. "This is the most difficult." During this phase, the rebels usually have a "shadow government" of their own in the area, replacing open control.
- (3) Patrol activity to keep the broken up groups on the move.
- (4) Then, when the rebels are dispersed as individuals, catch the leaders and cadre. If this fourth phase is successful, then area security is turned over to the police.

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4. Progress in Anti-Guerilla Campaign:

General Nasution said that, if the political situation doesn't change, he estimates it will take from 3 to 5 years to clear up the rebel situation. The Army has enough troops for the job.

He commented on the current situation, as follows:

In West Java, near the big cities, the Army is already in the 4th phase.

In West Java, in more remote areas, the Army is entering the 3rd phase.

In South Java, the Army is in the 2nd phase.

In DI areas of Sulawesi, the Army is in the 2nd phase.

Kalimantan (S. Borneo) is clear.

5. Assistance:

General Nasution said that the Army tries to help the people in operational areas, but can only do so in a very limited way. Priority need has been for weapons, which is why he asked the U. S. for rifles instead of road-building equipment. Medical supply is very short. If they could get medical supplies, they would prefer to mobilize their own "student doctors," many of whom have volunteered already, rather than ask for help from foreigners such as the Filipino "Operation Brotherhood" teams, (mentioned as operating in Vietnam and Laos; the Indonesians know little about this.)

Nasution said, "What we need is to send more of our top officers to the United States for training. We also need U. S. training aids and methods. Colonel Jari, my Deputy, is always asking your Military Attache for help on this." (Comment: UNARMIA, Djakarta, got U. S. Army permission two years ago to furnish training manuals to the Indonesians). Nasution said that Indonesian instructors, including Leavenworth graduates, do the translating.

6. Political Future:

Nasution said that Indonesia doesn't have a stable government. Politicians just follow the party leaders, and sometimes put the interests of the party ahead of the best interests of the country. Thus, President Sukarno started "guided democracy", which is a middle road between U. S. democracy on the one hand, and dictatorial methods on the other, to achieve national goals. "Guided" really means "restricted." So, trouble began when we tried to find just ways of reaching national objectives. The political parties have their own way of reaching these. The President has his. And, Nasution his.

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Nasution's idea is that, in the technical field, the government should be organized much the same as an Army headquarters. (He said he couldn't use this analogy openly, because it would scare the politicians). The Cabinet Ministers would act as "sort of a general staff" for the Prime Minister, as well as being like the Chief Quartermaster, for instance, and run his own Ministry. Then there should be Deputy Prime Ministers, to act much the same as an Army G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4. He discussed this idea with the President, but when the Cabinet met, Nasution was in the hospital for an operation, so the idea was not adopted.

Nasution said that civil service personnel must not belong to any political party. Members of the Army are needed in Parliament and the Cabinet, but the soldiers must not have the right to vote while on active duty.

Indonesia needs a government that will remain in power for a period of 4 or 5 years, like in the United States. The 1945 Constitution provides the means for this. In the present Constituent Assembly, the adherents of the 1945 Constitution and the Moslem group are "fighting." However, the "Islam Group" is not too far from this, " (The 1945 Constitution) and could agree, particularly with the "Five Principles" (of Belief in God, Nationalism, Humanism, Democracy, and Social Justice). For Nasution, as a Moslem, belief in God is enough. He points out to other Moslems that "it is against our religion to force Christians, Catholics and Hindus."

Nasution said that the President is always thinking in the political field. So, he discussed with him having functional representation (as one House of the Parliament), to replace the parties, and this to be higher than the parties (as an Upper House). The President agreed, but would put only 50% of representation for functional groups (such as labor, farmers, youth, Army, etc.). The political parties want functional representation to be only one-third of the Parliament, and even those should be party members. The President states that he will appoint the functional representatives through the National Front (which is under Nasution's control).

Nasution then commented that the 1945 Constitution provides for the President to be elected by Parliament for a 5-year term. Parliament has 50% of its representatives elected by the people, and 50% "by functional groups." Parliament can change the Constitution. Nasution added that the "1945 Constitution ideology is holy" to the Army. It is the big psychological means "to keep Army morale high."

He then said that both the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister agree with the idea of the 1945 Constitution. The Army is helping foster the idea, "But behind the screens." If the Constitution is forced by the Army, there will be a bad popular reaction. The idea for its adoption must come from the people.

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The PKI (Communist Party) doesn't agree. But, if they find that it will be useless for them to oppose, they will join in fact (to adopt the 1945 Constitution, and functional representation) and then try to gain control. Right now, the PKI is fighting for nationalist goals, but Nasution said he was sure that the Communists will change to their own goals later, as they have in other countries.

7. Service Rivalries:

Nasution admitted that there was some rivalry between the Army, Navy and Air Force. He said that Indonesia, is a young country, so there is some technical competition. In 1953, the Defense Minister made three separate services, where before there had been one Chief of the Armed Forces. This has become "liberal" competition, not "guided" competition. However, the Army is "the exponent of the Revolution, the fighter for it." It is "a great pity," but the men in the other services did not fight in the Revolution. Members of the Army "have to be clean from the Revolution on." Nasution added that he is doing more flying than the Chief of the Air Force.

8. Equipment:

Nasution acknowledged that the Indonesian Army should only request U. S. weapons which can be "best used for local conditions." He added that "Colonel Jani, my Deputy, knows both armies."

9. Visit to Vietnam:

Nasution said that he had never visited Vietnam. The two countries have something in common, since the French were probably much like the Dutch.

10. Comment:

General Nasution made a most favorable impression. He talked readily and apparently openly, in the manner of one friend to another. He gave every appearance of a troop commander who has the loyalty of his soldiers, who has thought out his own plans, and who knows the art of leadership. He displayed evident liking for and closeness to his "American" deputy, Colonel Jani. His expressions of patriotism seemed to be natural and unforced.

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MEMO FOR THE RECORD

By: Colonel E. G. Lansdale (Anderson subcommittee)

Subject: Talk with Young Colonels, Burma, 14 February 1959

1. Comment: Colonel Maung Maung invited me to Dagon House, Rangoon, for a discussion on the afternoon of 14 February 1959 about Burmese Army actions against the insurgents, knowing of my interest in counter-guerrilla operations and psychological warfare. At Dagon House, we went into what is evidently General Ne Win's War Room, where we were joined by Colonels Aung Gyi, Bo Lwin (Intelligence), and Ba Than (Psychological Warfare), and by Captain Kyi (of Psychological Warfare). At first, there was a formal briefing by Colonel Bo Lwin, but the conversation soon became general and free in a most friendly manner. I purposely abstained from taking notes at the time. The following is the gist of what these "young colonels" had to say at this conference, based upon notes I wrote much later:
2. Colonel Bo Lwin gave his briefing from an "enemy order of battle map", indicating location and size of insurgent units. Most of the Communist units were in the area west of the Rangoon-Prome road (with headquarters marked at about mid-point between the two cities) and in the Irrawaddy River Delta area. Kachin insurgents were also marked, in the mountains and foothills east of Rangoon. Smaller units were marked, scattered over much of Burma. Communist forces are estimated at between 3,500 and 4,000. They are armed with World War II weapons, of many makes. There is no evidence of Chinese Communist help in weapons, equipment, or personnel. It is likely that the Chinese Communists give them funds from time to time. The Communist insurgents are on the defensive, only capable of small harassing raids now. They used to blow up the rail lines at will; the Army hopes that they would try such a raid now, because they are ready and waiting, and "there would be dead Communists".
3. In reply to a question about radios, Col Maung Maung said that the Communists formerly operated a radio station for broadcasts to the public, but do so no longer. They operate a radio transmitter now, from their headquarters, for communicating with insurgent units, including the Kachins. The Kachins themselves have 4 or 5 transmitters for communicating with units.
4. Col Maung Maung then remarked that the Army was quite worried about the Communists working among the Kachins. Thakin Than Tuan, Communist leader, has visited the Kachin area. The Kachins are "very stubborn" people and, if they become sold on Communism, it is going to be exceptionally difficult to stamp out Communism among the Kachins.
5. The talk turned to the subject of propaganda. Col Aung Gyi said that the Army makes a point of capturing the enemy's mimeograph machines. He stressed the importance of this, saying the Army was well aware of the value of propaganda and wanted to deny this capability to the enemy. He laughingly admitted that the Army's Brigade Commanders made good use of captured enemy mimeograph machines, in the Army's psychological warfare campaign.
6. Col Ba Than remarked that the Army had produced and used 35 1/2 million leaflets, booklets, newspapers, etc. in its psychological warfare campaign, to date. A strong troop information and education program is being pushed, including a troop magazine and radio broadcasts to the Army, with time allotted to the Army on civilian stations.

ENCLOSURE (2)

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7. Maung Maung, Aung Gyi, and Ba Than all started explaining the anti-Communist campaign. Most Army leaders were formerly Communists, so they (Brigade Commanders particularly) are very adept at countering all the Communist arguments. They laughingly recalled that the Army published accounts of the Stalin denigration campaign and air-dropped these on Communist areas, to the chagrin of Communist insurgent leaders who were still praising Stalin, not knowing that he was no longer a Communist hero. During the Bulganin-Krushchev visit at the end of 1955, and the Mikoyan visit early in 1956, they spread pictures and accounts of the visits, saying that the Russians were friendly to the Army, which confused the insurgents further and helped induce surrenders. (Comment: Aung Gyi seemed to have the liveliest interest in psychological warfare among the three, being particularly amused at the "practical joke" aspects of it, which is the mark of an able practitioner. From other remarks, it is likely that he is responsible for the Army's "gray" publications, which were commented about briefly.)

8. All of the Burmese then started telling anecdotes about 1953, when just a few cities were held by the government, and most of the outskirts were held by insurgent bands, as was much of Burma. They pointed out on the map where the main insurgent concentrations were in 1953, and where the few Army battalions were located at that time. Bo Lwin commented that there were 35,000 Communist insurgents then. Maung Maung described the fight for Rangoon's airport. Aung Gyi described how the insurgents would hold one half a city, the Army the other half.

9. In answer to a question, Col Maung Maung described how the Burmese Army became close to the people and won them over to start helping the Army against the insurgents. The Army formed a District Council in each district, as it started expanding its areas of control. The District Council included the Brigade Commander, the District Commissioner, representatives of the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Agriculture, and other government organizations in the area. (These District Councils still govern the districts today; the "Brigade Commander really runs the country", as one American in Rangoon put it). After Army patrols secure an area, small teams are sent into the area by the District Council. They distribute seeds, give agricultural advice, publish information, and help organize village self-defense units. Formerly, the insurgents would attack a village shortly after the initial security and civic action operation, singling out head-men, self-defense members, and other villagers who had been friendly to Army and government personnel, and kill them. Now, the Army continues the protection until several villages have self-defense units organized with a runner system between them, so they can come to each others help in the event of an attack. The villagers are now quick to notify the nearest Army unit of any strangers in the neighborhood.

10. Maung Maung explained that the Army had learned a great deal in visits to the Philippines, where Burmese officers spent time with the Philippine Army Civil Affairs Officers in the military areas and with BCTs. They also visited EDCOR centers to study the Army's rehabilitation work with former Huk. He recalled that he had talked at some length, during his last visit to the Philippines, about the "civic action" the Army is carrying out

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operations by the Vietnamese Army. They admitted that, if the Vietnamese invited them, they would like to see the operations of the Vietnamese Army in establishing posts and communities in border regions.

11. Maung Maung and Aung Gyi explained the Army's rehabilitation work. Captured and surrendered insurgents are given brief re-indoctrination courses at several centers in Burma; the main one near Rangoon was recently closed. Included in the courses is some instruction in fishing, farming, or handicrafts. Personnel are then sent to several colonies, (a number of locations were pointed out on the map, including one north of Prome and one in the Irrawaddy delta), where the former insurgents can earn their own farms, fishing boats, or small businesses. Maung Maung said that most of this rehabilitation "has flopped", since the insurgents had a "pretty lazy life" camping out and robbing people as insurgents, and they are still too lazy to work hard, even to gain things for themselves as peaceful civilians. One notable exception to this is in the Arakan region, where former insurgents have become very industrious citizens. One group now runs a shipping line, with LSTs, out of Akyab. Another runs a bus line.

12. The Army has great hopes for a large new rehabilitation area it is planning to open up in the Southern Shan States, west of Inle Lake. This is excellent farming land. (All of the colonels expressed admiration for the beauty of this area).

13. The colonels said that the Army is fighting hard against the Communist insurgents. Friends of theirs are getting killed, and they expressed determination to finish off the Communist insurgents, who are getting harder to find and pin down for a fight.

14. Comment: The colonels were present at a buffet dinner that same night, given by General Ne Win in honor of Dillon Anderson and his staff. The colonels were unusually friendly and each asked for more time to continue our talk, but there was no further opportunity. Maung Maung added: "tell General Erskine to invite the new Burma desk man at State to come out and visit Burma".

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V. V. Alden

V. V. ALDEN, COLONEL, USAF

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MEMO FOR THE RECORD

By: Colonel E. G. Lansdale (with Anderson subcommittee)

Subject: Conversation with Governor Esteban Bernido,
31 January 1959

1. Comment: Having heard rumors that Esteban Bernido, Governor of Bohol Province in the Philippines (President Garcia's home province), was one of several being named as possible successors to Jesus Vargas for the post of Secretary of National Defense, I was interested in meeting him. We had not met before, and I knew little about him except that he had paid for a trip to Japan for himself and his wife out of his own pocket, at the time Garcia visited Japan in 1958, that he was reportedly an honest man quite opposed to graft in government, and that he lived in simple style. On 31 January 1959, I heard that Governor Bernido and his wife were in Manila, and arranged to meet them. I visited them at a small Ermita hotel, where they were staying in an inexpensive room. The highlights of what he told me follow:

2. Bernido makes rather frequent trips to Manila, to discuss Bohol affairs with President Garcia (usually at breakfast at the President's "hide-out") and with Presidential Secretary Pajo, ex-Governor of Bohol.

3. He said that Communism was on the increase in the provinces, at the barrio level. He did not blame this on Opposition parties or Chinese, but explained that this was subversive work by Filipinos who were either card-carrying Communists, or close to it. Subversion is even being carried on in Bohol. (Comment: Much the same was told me by other Filipinos, affiliated with the NP, LP, and PPP, and who spend much of their time in the provinces, about subversion in the barrios on Luzon and in the Visayas; I didn't discuss this problem with anyone who knows Mindanao well. This subversion reportedly has a definite anti-American theme.)

4. In fighting against subversion, Bernido said that he is concentrating on trying to inform the people of Bohol, because a "government that isn't based on popular support is simply nothing". He said that he is the first governor to hold seminars for barrio lieutenants and members of barrio councils, which he follows up with a provincial publication, "The Rural Gazette", which he founded. Seminars and the publication include such topics as the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, the role of citizens in a democracy, and agriculture.

5. He commented that the battle against Communism is not on "the land or sea or air" but is in "the human heart". "We should get there first, to the heart of every freedom-loving man". He added, with some colorful cuss-words, that the graft and corruption of "big shots" only helped the Communists and that he had urged President Garcia to prosecute some of these "big shots" (not named) and make real examples of them.

6. He said that one of the things that plagues him now, with a Boholano as President, is that so many of the people in his province want government jobs. He said that he is trying to initiate self-help among the people. He then gave a brief sample of what he tells the people of Bohol. "Don't look up to the government for jobs. The government must look up to you for support. Your taxes and help are what make the government run. If you all go to work for the government, then who is going to be left to support you?"

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7. Bernido was born in Guindalman, Bohol, on 12 February 1916. He mentioned that his mother, an elementary school teacher, had a "hard time making both ends meet" and that he enlisted in the Army after finishing "the secondary grade". (He left the Mapua Institute of Technology in June 1936 for six months Army training, then completed the six months course at the School for Reserve Commission at Camp Kiethley, Lanao, and was commissioned a probationary Third Lieutenant). He was then assigned to the ROTC unit of the Philippine School of Arts and Trade as an assistant instructor. In August 1941, he was assigned as commanding officer of G Company, 61st Infantry Division, which was inducted into USAFFE on 1 September. At the outbreak of World War II, his company was assigned to the defense of the Malabang airstrip in Mindanao, which was attacked by the Japanese. In the mountains of Zamboanga province, he became a battalion commander. When U.S. Major Childress left for Australia, Bernido disbanded his battalion and made his way back to Bohol. There, he organized the East Bohol Battalion of guerrillas, and later became chief of staff of the Bohol Command, when the Bohol guerrillas became unified.

8. After the war, Bernido enrolled again in the Mapua Institute of Technology, which he had left to join the Army in 1936, after his sophomore year. He graduated, as an electrical engineer. He married Consuelo Casenas in 1945; (comment: a very attractive Filipina). She was the only daughter of the late Filomeno Casenas, representative of the 3rd district of Bohol for three terms and governor of Bohol for two terms. After graduation, Bernido worked in the Bureau of Public Works, then in 1947-48 in the National Power Company.

9. In 1949, he was elected representative of the 3rd district of Bohol. (Comment: He remarked that he was the only Nacionalista congressional candidate to win in Bohol in 1949; Cabangbang and Castillo, the other two candidates, lost). In Congress, he was a member of the Defense, Public Works, Transportation and Communication, and Irrigation Committees. He was re-elected in 1953, and became chairman of the Committee on War Veterans, Vice-chairman of the Committee on National Defense, and a ranking member in the Committees on Public Works and Communication and Transportation.

10. In 1957, President Garcia appointed Bernido as Governor of Bohol, to replace Governor Juan C. Pajo, who became Executive Secretary (to President Garcia). In the last convention of the Governor's League, Bernido was voted one of the ten outstanding governors.

11. Comment: Bernido appears youthful and energetic. He is a bit reminiscent of Magsaysay, with his anger against "big shot crooks", obvious feeling of closeness to the people in the barrios, farm and guerrilla background, and friendship for the U. S.

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