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FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUEDADA/AFIS AMHS BOLLING AFB DC

RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE

RUETIAQ/MPCFTGEORGEGMEADEMD

RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//

RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP

RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL

RUWSMXI/MAC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//

RHEPAAB/TAC IDHS LANGLEY AFB VA//IDHS//

RUEDBIA/CDR513THMIGP FT MONMOUTH NJ//IAM-IC-D//

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RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC//092/022/092H//

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RHIPAAA/USCINCCENT//CC-J2/J-2//

RUHQHQ A/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//JJJ//

RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//JJJ//

RUHQIPA/COMIPAC HONOLULU HI//JJJ//

RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N2//

RUCBSAA/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA//N00/N2/8SW//

RHDL CNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N2//

RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//G93//

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RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT//N2//
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RUEBLEA/USCENTAF ELF ONE COORD TEAM RIYADH SA//JJJ//
RUDMNIC/COMNAVINTCOM WASHINGTON DC//NIC-03/32/33//
RUDMCAC/NAVINTCOM CAC WASHINGTON DC//CAC//
RUDMNOP/NAVOPINTCEN SUITLAND MD//OO/OOB/OOC/71/08/82/83/08W//
RHHMBRA/FICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI//1/2/44W//
RUCBSAA/FICEURLANT NORFOLK VA//N21/OPS/01//
RUAJMAB/FOSIF WESTPAC KAMI SEYA JA//JJJ//
RUHHWIA/FOSIF WESTPACDET CUBI PT RP//JJJ//
RUDMCTF/CTF ONE SIX EIGHT//CTF-H/HT/H4//
RUCIBBA/USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//IN//
RUFLMMA/CTG ONE SIX EIGHT PT FOUR//00/OPS//
RULSND/CTG ONE SIX EIGHT PT ZERO//OPS//
RUDMNSC/NAVTECHINTCEN WASHINGTON DC//DA00/DA33/DE22//
RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC//JJJ//
RUETIAA/NSACSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//JJJ//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHMA/AMEMBASSY MANAMA
RUFHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA
TG ONE FIVE ZERO PT ONE
TG ONE FIVE ZERO PT TWO
ZEN/CTG ONE FIVE ZERO PT THREE

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RUHGOAA/COMUSNAVCENT//N2//
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RUDHAAA/CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA//JJJ//
RUKGNBA/HQ AFSAC FT BELVOIR VA//INO//
RUDCAAA/ARCENT FWD//G2//
RHIPAAA/NAVCENT RIYADH SA//N2//
RHIUFAA/USCENTAF FWD HQ ELEMENT//IN//
RHIPAAA/COMUSMARCENT FWD//G2//
RHIHDAA/SOCCENT DEPLOYED//G2//
RHILHAH/CDRXVIIIABNCORPS INTEL//G2//
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OIN//
RUCJACC/USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2-CH/JIC//
RHIVHAA/CMO 18 ABC FWD
RUCLFBA/CTOCSE 18 ABC FT BRAGG NC
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SECTION 01 OF 02

SERIAL: (U) IIR 5 316 4051 91.

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ), KUWAIT (KU).

SUBJ: IIR 5 316 4051 91/MILITARY OPTIONS TO RESOLVE PERSIAN GULF
CRISIS - DESERT SHIELD (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET NOFORN, NOINTEL~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: 901000.

REQS: T-8C2-2650-01-90.

SOURCE: ~~(S/NF/WW)~~ #3015301019//INDIVIDUAL WITH ACCESS TO
INFORMATION WHO HAS REPORTED RELIABLY IN THE PAST.

JS 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);

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JS 1.4 (c)

SUMMARY: ~~(S/NF/WW)~~ THIS IIR IS THE FIRST IN A SERIES WHICH
HIGHLIGHT VARIOUS ARTICLES, PUBLICATIONS AND BRIEFS PREPARED BY

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ DISCUSSING VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT PERSIAN
GULF CRISIS.

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TEXT: 1. ~~(S/NF/WW)~~ BACKGROUND ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ HAVE CONDUCTED EXTENSIVE RESEARCH
AND ANALYSIS ON THE ECONOMICS, INDUSTRY, CULTURE, RECENT HISTORY,
GEO-POLITICS, SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND MILITARY POSTURE AS PERTINENT TO
THE MIDDLE EAST/ARAB STATES AND THE CURRENT PERSIAN GULF CRISIS. THE
FOLLOWING IS AN ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ BRIEF TITLED "UNITED STATES:

MILITARY OPTIONS" DATED 20 SEP 90:

A. (U) EVENT: PRESIDENT BUSH HINTED STRONGLY THAT THE U.S. MAY
RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION TO FORCE IRAQ OUT OF KUWAIT.

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B. (~~SNF/WH~~) SIGNIFICANCE: A MILITARY OFFENSIVE TO LIBERATE KUWAIT IS PROBABLE. U.S. FORCES WILL BE READY TO ADVANCE BY EARLY NOVEMBER.

C. (~~SNF/WH~~) ANALYSIS: MILITARY OPTIONS FOR THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES IN GULF CRISIS ARE INSEPARABLE FROM THEIR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. U.S. POLITICAL GOALS SINCE AUGUST 2 HAVE COVERED A SPECTRUM, FROM A MINIMUM OF DETERRING IRAQI ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA TO A MAXIMUM OF TOPPLING SADDAM HUSSEIN. IN BETWEEN LIE RESTORATION OF KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY UNDER A "LEGITIMATE" GOVERNMENT AND A RANGE OF LESSER AIMS IN REGARD TO SADDAM HUSSEIN, FROM CONTAINMENT TO PUNISHMENT AND HUMILIATION. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THE MINIMUM APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. THE PRESENT QUESTION IS WHAT MILITARY OPTIONS EXIST FOR WRESTING KUWAIT FROM IRAQI CONTROL AND/OR MOVING AGAINST THE IRAQI LEADER AT HOME. TAKEN TOGETHER, U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES ALREADY OR SOON TO BE DEPLOYED ARE SUPERIOR TO IRAQ'S IN THE AIR AND AT SEA, QUALITATIVELY MORE THAN QUANTITATIVELY, AND IN THE IMPORTANT AREAS OF RECONNAISSANCE (INCLUDING SATELLITE SURVEILLANCE) AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE.

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JS 5654-55262(1)

MILITARY PATCHWORK OF NATIONALITIES AND ARSENALS.

JS 1.4 (g)

AGAINST THAT, IRAQ'S MILITARY STRENGTHS LIE PREDOMINANTLY IN THE SIZE OF ITS GROUND FORCE, IN EQUIPMENT TERMS AS WELL AS PERSONNEL, AND IN THEIR SHORT AND MAINLY CLOSED LINES OF COMMUNICATION (ALTHOUGH THE LOGISTIC LINK FROM IRAQ TO KUWAIT STILL SEEMS FRAGILE), WITH A PREPONDERANCE OF OLDER AND LESS CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND A NOTABLY UNCOMBATIVE RECORD IN WAR AGAINST IRAN, THE IRAQI AIR FORCE IN CONTRAST IS RELATIVELY WEAK. PARTLY FOR THAT REASON, WEAKNESS EXTENDS TO THE VULNERABILITY OF SO MANY CIVILIAN AND INDUSTRIAL AS WELL AS MILITARY TARGETS INSIDE IRAQ, WHEREAS ITS OWN REGULAR FORCES CAN POSE NO COMPARABLE THREAT TO NON-REGIONAL ADVERSARIES.

MILITARY MORALE, AS EVER, IS HARDER TO PREDICT. THE IRAQI WILL TO FIGHT MIGHT NORMALLY BE EXPECTED TO RISE AS CONFLICT MOVED CLOSER TO THE NATIONAL HEARTLAND. BUT THAT COULD BE OFFSET BY THE INTENSITY OF AN ATTACK BY HIGH TECHNOLOGY MUNITIONS, PARTICULARLY FROM THE AIR, FOR WHICH NEITHER TRAINING NOR WAR AGAINST IRAN CAN HAVE PREPARED IRAQI UNITS. AS TO THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES, ONE CONSIDERATION MUST ALWAYS BE

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EVEN MORE IMPORTANT MAY BE THE DIVERGENT EFFECTS ON DIFFERENT ANTI-IRAQ CONTINGENTS OF THE WAY IN WHICH ANY WAR IS LIKELY TO DEVELOP. THE MORALE OF U.S. FORCES COULD BE EXPECTED TO RISE AS SUCCESSIVE

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MILITARY TARGETS AND POLITICAL GOALS WERE ATTAINED UP TO AND INCLUDING THE FORCIBLE DIPOSITION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. EUROPEAN FORCES' REACTIONS TO MOVING ALONG THE SPECTRUM INTO IRAQI TERRITORY ARE MORE QUESTIONABLE, JUST BECAUSE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS REMAIN AT LEAST AMBIVALENT ABOUT GOALS LYING BEYOND THE RECOVERY OF KUWAIT. AND ARAB FORCES MAY WELL PROVE OPENLY RELUCTANT TO FIGHT FOR ANY OBJECTIVE BEYOND THAT -- EVEN IF THEY ARE PRIVATELY READY TO APPLAUD THOSE WHO DO. THAT PROBLEM OF HOW VARIOUSLY INITIAL SUCCESS MAY AFFECT THE MILITARY LEAGUE AGAINST IRAQ IS LINKED TO LARGER POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON FUTURE MILITARY ACTION. HAVING INDICATED POLITICAL OBJECTIVES BEYOND THE RECONQUEST OF KUWAIT, THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WILL BE UNDER DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO DEMONSTRATE MILITARY SUCCESS BEYOND THAT THRESHOLD. FAILURE COULD BE COSTLY AT HOME. BUT PRESSING AHEAD SUCCESSFULLY BEYOND KUWAIT'S RECOVERY MUST MAKE IT HARDER TO AVOID CONVERTING SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS SUPPORTERS IN DEFEAT INTO HERO-MARTYRS IN THE EYES OF ARAB NATIONALISTS EVERYWHERE. MOREOVER, IT IS BOUND TO BECOME PROGRESSIVELY HARDER BEYOND THAT POINT TO MAINTAIN THE THREE CRUCIAL ANTI-SADDAM COALITIONS -- WITH ARAB AND MOSLEM STATES, WITH WEST EUROPEANS AND JAPAN, AND WITH THE SOVIET UNION -- WHICH U.S. DIPLOMACY HAS BEEN AT SUCH PAINS TO CONSTRUCT. ALL THOSE CONSTRAINTS COME TOGETHER TO BEAR ON THE CHOICE OF MILITARY OPTIONS. FOR INSTANCE, CONSIDERATIONS OF MILITARY MORALE AND COALITION POLITICS COMBINE TO ARGUE FOR THE LEAST POSSIBLE DELAY BEFORE THE U.S. AND ITS MAJOR ALLIES DECIDE ON THE NEXT STAGE OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION. AT THE SAME TIME RELATIVE MILITARY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES CONVERGE WITH BOTH POLITICS AND ECONOMICS TO ARGUE AGAINST ANY OPTION WHICH NECESSITATES SEIZING AND CONTINUING TO HOLD LARGE AREAS OF HOSTILE TERRITORY. THE NET RESULT IS SOME RANKING OF MILITARY OPTIONS AVAILABLE IN THEORY TO THE UNITED STATES. UNRANKED, THOSE OPTIONS CAN BE SUMMARISED UNDER SIX HEADINGS.

(1) WITHDRAW. COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND POLITICALLY INCONCEIVABLE AT PRESENT. WHATEVER OPTIONS ARE EXPLORED IN THE INTERIM, HOWEVER, WITHDRAWAL OF AT LEAST THE BULK OF U.S. FORCES IS LIKELY TO BE THE ONLY OPTION IN THE LONG TERM. INTERIM STRATEGY MUST THEREFORE CREATE CONDITIONS FOR ULTIMATE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL ON POLITICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TERMS.

(2) STAND PAT, I.E., COMPLETE CURRENTLY PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES, MAINTAIN OR TIGHTEN THE BLOCKADE AND "DIG IN" FOR THE LONGER TERM, BUT INITIATE NO OTHER MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQI-HELD TERRITORY. MILITARILY FEASIBLE, AND SERVES THE MINIMUM PURPOSE OF SAFEGUARDING SAUDI SECURITY, ALBEIT AT RISING ECONOMIC COST. BUT NO LONGER SATISFIES EITHER POLITICAL EXPECTATIONS OR THE REQUIREMENTS OF

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MILITARY MORALE.

(3) PROVOKE IRAQI ATTACKS ACROSS THE SAUDI BORDER, IN ORDER TO INFLICT MAXIMUM MILITARY LOSSES ON IRAQ, BY A PREPARED GROUND AND AIR RESPONSE, AT MINIMUM POLITICAL COST. APPEALING IN THEORY, NOT LEAST AS A FURTHER DEMONSTRATION OF IRAQI AGGRESSION, BUT IMPLAUSIBLE IN PRACTICE AGAINST AN OPPONENT AS CALCULATING AND FUNDAMENTALLY CAUTIOUS AS SADDAM HUSSEIN.

(4) ATTACK KUWAIT TO EXPEL IRAQI FORCES. ARGUABLY THE MINIMUM NOW CALCULATED TO SATISFY CONSTITUENCIES AT HOME AND AMONG ARAB GOVERNMENTS SUPPORTING THE U.S. MILITARILY FEASIBLE ONCE CURRENT DEPLOYMENT COMPLETED DURING OCTOBER, GIVEN WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT U.S. CASUALTIES POSSIBLY MEASURED IN THOUSANDS, AND GIVEN ALSO PRIOR ESTABLISHMENT OF DECISIVE AIR SUPERIORITY. BUT OSTENSIBLY LEAVES SADDAM HUSSEIN IN POWER, WITH HIS IMAGE ENHANCED IN MANY QUARTERS AS A VICTIM OF IMPERIALISM.

(5) ATTACK BUT NOT INVADE IRAQ. COVERING ESCALATION FROM HARASSING RAIDS ACROSS IRAQ'S BORDERS TO DEEPER STRIKES INTENDED TO PUNISH, DISARM AND/OR HUMILIATE SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS REGIME. MILITARILY FEASIBLE, ESPECIALLY BY USE OF AIR POWER AGAINST SELECTED MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL TARGETS (BUT PROBABLY NOT AGAINST URBAN POPULATION CENTRES SUCH AS BAGHDAD, GIVEN INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS).

ONLY IF IT PROMPTS A SWIFT AND SUCCESSFUL ANTI-SADDAM COUP OR UPRISING - WHICH SEEMS UNLIKELY - OR PREPARES THE GROUND FOR MORE DECISIVE MILITARY ACTION.

JS 505-157601

JS 1.4 (a)

(6) INVADE IRAQ. TO OVERTHROW SADDAM HUSSEIN, WITH OR WITHOUT A PRELUDE OF OPTIONS 4 AND/OR 5. MAXIMISES THE REWARD FOR SUCCESS, AND MAY REPRESENT THE ONLY MILITARY MEANS OF TOPPLING SADDAM BUT ALSO MAXIMISES THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY RISKS. PUTS MAXIMUM STRAIN ON U.S. DIPLOMATIC COALITIONS, LEAVING U.S. FORCES LIKELY TO BEAR THE MILITARY GRUNT OF INVASION, WITH ONLY QUALIFIED SUPPORT FROM EUROPEAN ALLIES AND LITTLE OR ANY FROM OTHER COLLABORATORS. (AN IMPORTANT EXCEPTION WOULD BE IF TURKISH FORCES WERE TO INVADE SIMULTANEOUSLY IN THE NORTH). GIVEN UNRESTRICTED USE OF AIR POWER AGAINST MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL TARGETS, PUTS GREATEST PRESSURE ON IRAQI MORALE. BUT NEVERTHELESS GIVES GREATEST VALUE TO NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF IRAQI GROUND FORCES, AND ALSO LICENSES WIDEST IRAQI RESPONSE, INCLUDING INDISCRIMINATE USE OF MISSILES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS WITHIN THE REGION AND OF TERRORISM FURTHER AFIELD. AFTERMATH LIABLE TO INCLUDE UNPREDICTABLY RADICAL AND DIVISIVE CHANGES IN RELATIONSHIPS AND POWER BALANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST (E.G., IF TURKEY EMERGED IN CONTROL OF MOSUL AND THE KIRKUK OIL FIELDS) AND A MORE SCEPTICAL ATTITUDE TO

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U.S. REGIONAL POLICY ON THE PART OF GOVERNMENTS ELSEWHERE, INCLUDING THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

ALTHOUGH NOT RANKED, THOSE OPTIONS ARE PROBABLY IN ORDER OF INCREASING UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE MILITARY OUTCOME. IN PARTICULAR, WHEREAS A WELL-PREPARED ATTACK ON KUWAIT HAS EVERY CHANCE OF SUCCESS, THE ODDS ON A QUICK AND COMPREHENSIVE VICTORY INSIDE IRAQ ARE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO CALCULATE. SEVERAL AXES OF ADVANCE ARE AVAILABLE TO U.S. FORCES, ACROSS THE DESERT HIGHLANDS ON THE SAUDI-IRAQI BORDER AS WELL AS THROUGH KUWAIT AND ALONG BOTH THE TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES VALLEYS, BUT NONE IS EASY AGAINST OPPOSITION. IN THE END, THE RESULT WOULD BE LIKELY TO DEPEND ON THE EFFECT OF A DETERMINED ALL-ARMS ASSAULT ON THE MORALE OF IRAQI TROOPS AND COMMANDERS AND ON SADDAM HUSSEIN HIMSELF. IF MORALE CRUMBLLED, U.S. POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY OBJECTIVES COULD QUICKLY COME WITHIN REACH. IF IT DID NOT, IT COULD BECOME EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PRESS HOME THE ATTACK TO A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION, ESPECIALLY AGAINST OBSTINATE DEFENDERS IN BAGHDAD AND OTHER CITIES, WITHOUT CAUSING VERY HIGH AND POLITICALLY COSTLY CASUALTIES AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.

THE RESULT OF USING EXISTING POLITICAL PRIORITIES AND CONSTRAINTS TO WEIGH THE SIX MILITARY OPTIONS LISTED SEEMS TO BE AS FOLLOWS. JS 505-0.52(4)(1),
- OPTIONS 2 AND 3 CAN BE DISREGARDED, AS POLITICALLY AND/OR JS 1.4 (a)
MILITARILY INSUFFICIENT, AS FOR THE MOMENT CAN OPTION 1.
- ALTHOUGH MILITARY HARASSMENT UNDER OPTION 5 MIGHT FIRST BE USED TO TEST OR UNSETTLE IRAQI FORCES

TO ACHIEVE THAT, HOWEVER, AIR POWER MUST BE USED ON A LARGE SCALE TO DESTROY IRAQI AIR BASES AND MAJOR RETALIATORY FORCES, SUCH AS CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MISSILE BATTERIES, TO WHICH EXTENT OPTIONS 4 AND 5 TEND TO MERGE.

AJOR INVASION OF IRAQ (OPTION 6) IS THE ONLY MILITARY COURSE ABLE - BUT NOT CERTAIN - TO REMOVE SADDAM HUSSEIN. BUT IT IS LIABLE ALSO TO DAMAGE, IF NOT DEMOLISH, THE TRIPLE COALITION THE U.S. HAS BUILT IN SUPPORT OF ITS GULF POLICY HITHERTO. MOREOVER, THE LONGER-TERM IMPACT OF AN INVASION, WHATEVER ITS OUTCOME, ON THE ATTITUDES, ALIGNMENTS AND RELATIONSHIPS OF STATES IN AND AROUND THE MIDDLE EAST IS BOUND TO INVOLVE CHANGES MANY OF WHICH COULD BE INIMICAL TO THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES.

ALL IN ALL, THE PLAUSIBLE CONCLUSION MUST BE THAT THE U.S. WILL MOVE WHEN READY - PROBABLY NOT BEFORE LATE OCTOBER AND POSSIBLY LATER - TO DRIVE IRAQ FROM KUWAIT, ACTING IN CONCERT WITH ALLIED ARAB AND EUROPEAN UNITS, BUT THAT MILITARY SUCCESS IN THAT REGARD WILL HAVE TO COME BEFORE TAKING (OR RECONSIDERING) ANY DECISION ABOUT INVADING

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COMMENTS: ~~(S/NFAM)~~ THIS INFORMATION IS RELEASABLE TO COALITION FORCE AS NECESSARY. NO ATTRIBUTION TO SOURCE OF DATA OR ORIGINATOR SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO INFORMATION RECIPIENTS.

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ACQ: (U) MANAMA, BAHRAIN (901000).

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CSD 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

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