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XVII. 9c
XVII. 9e
#26

ROUTINE
R 111814Z OCT 91
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5115
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//POLAD//
USMNR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XP//
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD//
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAF//
ZEN//USDELMC BRUSSELS BE//POUCH

ZYUW RUFHMAA4659 2841614
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
USLOSACLANT NORFOLK VA//
USCINCEUR WAIHINGEN GE//POLAD//
CINCUSMAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD//

EXERCISES (WEAPONS USED).

- HOW ARE GROUND-LAUNCHED AND AIR-DELIVERED WEAPONS CONTROLLED?
- LINES OF COMMUNICATION.
- USE CONTROL EQUIPMENT.
- RELEASE AUTHORITY.
- SAFETY AND SECURITY PROCEDURES.
- HOW ARE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MISSILES CONTROLLED?
- LINES OF COMMUNICATION.
- USE CONTROL EQUIPMENT.
- RELEASE AUTHORITY.
- SAFETY AND SECURITY PROCEDURES.

SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 04659

VIENNA FOR USDEL CSBM; USVIENNA FOR USDEL CFE; BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

TAGS: NATO, MAC, PREL, PARM, UR
SUBJECT: LIST OF QUESTIONS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR CONTROL

REF: USNATO 4383

1. (S) BELOW FOLLOWS A LIST OF QUESTION ON SOVIET NUCLEAR CONTROL PREPARED BY THE I.S. IN RESPONSE TO DISCUSSION AT THE SEPTEMBER 26 MAC (SEE REFTEL). THE ORIGINAL BELGIAN SUGGESTION WAS FOR A COMMON ALLIED LIST OF QUESTIONS TO PUT TO THE SOVIETS AT ANY FOUR-POWER MEETING, BUT THE BRIEF TRANSMITTAL LETTER FROM SYG WOERNER SAYS ONLY THAT THE LIST HAS BEEN PREPARED "FOR USE BY ALLIES AT THEIR DISCRETION."

2. (U) BEGIN TEXT.

- POINT PAPER ON SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- COMMAND, CONTROL AND SECURITY
- HOW DOES THE SOVIET COMMAND AUTHORITY FUNCTION REGARDING NUCLEAR FORCES?
 - RESPONSIBILITY FOR ULTIMATE DECISION ON USE OF WEAPONS (CHARTER).
 - ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN.
 - CONSULTATION PROCESS, IF ANY.
 - ROLE OF SUBORDINATE AUTHORITIES.
 - NATIONAL INVOLVEMENT OF SEPARATE REPUBLICS, IF ANY.
 - EMERGENCY OR FALL-BACK CONTROL PROCEDURES (BREAK IN COMMAND CHAIN).
- HOW ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT SEA CONTROLLED?
 - LINES OF COMMUNICATION.
 - USE CONTROL EQUIPMENT.
 - RELEASE AUTHORITY.
 - SAFETY AND SECURITY PROCEDURES.
 - PROCEDURES USED DURING SIMULATED NUCLEAR TRAINING

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div., WHS
Date: AUG 27 2013

ACTION (U,6,7,8,F)
INFO CJCS(1) J3(4) J5(2) QUAL CONTROL(1)
USRMCLO(1) SECDEF-W(1) DARPA(1) SDIO(8) USDP:FILE(1)
ASD:RA(2) USDA:PBL(1) USDA:ADMIN(1) USDA:AE(1)
USDA:TWP(1) USDA:IP(2) USDA:STNF(1) ASD:PA(1) GC(1)
ASD:PA&E/EPF(1) ASD:PA&E/LF(1) ASD:PA&E/FS(1)
ASD:PA&E/DWIS(1) ASD:PA&E/DCL(1) OASD:C3I-INT(1)
USDP:DASDEUR(2) USDP:DSAA(1) USDP:NSP(1)
USDP:FMRA(1) USDP:TSPD(1) USDP:SD&S(1) USDP:ESH(1)
USDP:START(1) USDP:VP(1) USDP:SFP(1) USDP:LOS(1)
USDP:IGA(1) USDP:TNF(1) USDP:NPP(1) USDP:MN(1)
USDP:CF&ACP(2) USDP:EW ECON(1) USDP:EUR POL(1)
USDP:SEE(1) USDP:NATOPOL(1) USDP:DS&S&VP(1)
DIO-WE(1)
+OSTIA WASHINGTON DC
+DNA WASHINGTON DC//OPAC/OPNA//
+SAFE

WHAT PRECAUTIONS ARE TAKEN TO ENSURE AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED OR INADVERTENT RELEASE/LAUNCH?

- MECHANICAL/ELECTRICAL DEVICES (KEYS, PERMISSIVE ACTION LINKS).
- SECURE AND DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS.
- COMMAND CODES AT APPROPRIATE DECISION LEVEL.
- HUMAN RELIABILITY PERSONNEL SELECTION CRITERIA.
- ACCESS CONTROL (SECURITY, 2-MAN RULE, PROCEDURES).
- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CONTROL EQUIPMENT.
- METHODS USED FOR EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION OF WARHEADS.
- WHAT ORGANIZATIONS ARE CHARGED WITH PHYSICAL

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SECTION 02 OF 02 USNATO 04659

VIENNA FOR USDEL CSBM; USVIENNA FOR USDEL CFE; BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

TAGS: NATO, MAC, PREL, PARM, UR
SUBJECT: LIST OF QUESTIONS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR CONTROL

PROTECTION AND HOW DO THEY PERFORM THIS FUNCTION?

- COMMAND STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT.
- CUSTODY CONTROL IN PEACETIME.
- ON-SITE SECURITY FORCES AND TRAINING.
- HUMAN RELIABILITY PERSONNEL SELECTION CRITERIA.
- SECURITY PROCEDURES DURING TRANSPORT, METHOD OF TRANSPORT.
- UPLOAD/OUTLOAD PROCEDURES AND PRECAUTIONS.
- WEAPON PROTECTION PLANS, REGULATIONS, RECOVERY PROCEDURES, ETC.

WHAT SAFETY FEATURES ARE EMPLOYED IN THE WEAPON DESIGN?

- ELECTRICAL/SRAY VOLTAGE ISOLATION.
- SINGLE-POINT SAFETY DESIGN.
- SEPARATION OF CORE AND DETONATOR.
- FIRE RESISTANCE OR USE OF INSENSITIVE EXPLOSIVES.
- SHOCK RESISTANCE.
- WEAPONS WITH PAL DEVICES (MISSILES, AFAP, BOMBS).

WHAT EQUIPMENT IS USED FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF STORAGE SITES?

- STAND-OFF AND VERTICAL THREAT.
- TERRORIST ATTACK.
- PROTECTION AGAINST TAKE-OVER BY TERRITORIAL FORCES.
- CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE AND TRANSPORT.
- BERMS, PROTECTED FIGHTING POSITIONS.
- UNDERGROUND STORAGE.
- ACCESS DELAY SYSTEMS.

WHAT PROVISIONS ARE MADE FOR NUCLEAR ACCIDENT/INCIDENT RESPONSE?

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MCN=91284/05762 TOR=91284/1621Z TAD=91284/1629Z CDSN=MAU596

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- ON-SCENE COMMAND AUTHORITY/LEVEL.
- PUBLIC NOTIFICATION POLICY/PROCEDURES.
- RESPONSE UNITS (MEDICAL, CONTAMINATION CONTROL, SECURITY, ETC.).

- WHAT METHODS/PROCEDURES WILL BE USED FOR DESTRUCTION OF WEAPONS AS DRAW DOWN CONTINUES?

 - SAFETY PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS (NUCLEAR WASTE).
 - CAPACITY AND ECONOMIC IMPACT ON CAPABILITIES FOR MASS DESTRUCTION OF WARHEADS.

- WHAT CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED OR ARE ANTICIPATED IN NUCLEAR COMMAND CONTROL AS A RESULT OF RECENT EVENTS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION?

Office of the Secretary of Defense ⁵⁴⁹⁰⁵⁵²
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS ^{qud}
Date: 29 AUG 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: 7 Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-3425

- RESPONSIBILITY FOR WEAPONS WITHIN NON-RUSSIAN REPUBLICS.
- REMOVAL OR RETROGRADE OF WEAPONS TO RUSSIAN REPUBLIC.
- CENTRAL AUTHORITY CONTROLS.

END TEXT. VERSHBOW
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