

**PREVIOUSLY
RELEASED IN FULL**

~~SECRET SPECAT~~

JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER

COPY NUMBER
XVII.9a SA
GL

IMMEDIATE
O 071938Z OCT 91
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7609 USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0337

~~SECRET SPECAT~~ MOSCOW 2868Z
SPECAT

~~CROSS~~ **DECAPTIONED**

**RETURNED TO
ORIGINATING
AGENCY - DOD-
FOR DIRECT REPLY**

GENEVA FOR NST DELEGATION

~~P.O. 12350 DECLASS~~

TAGS: PARM, PREL, UP
SUBJECT: UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW'S DISCUSSIONS WITH
REPRESENTATIVES OF SOVIET REPUBLICS

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: ON OCTOBER 5 UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW ACCOMPANIED BY MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLICS OF RUSSIA, THE UKRAINE, BELORUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN ON PRESIDENT BUSH'S NUCLEAR INITIATIVE. UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW ALSO STRESSED US CONCERNS THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE USSR NOT LEAD TO THE CREATION OF NEW NUCLEAR POWERS AND OBSERVED THAT EFFORTS BY REPUBLICS TO EXPLOIT OR TAKE EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORY WOULD BE POLITICALLY COSTLY. RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KOLOSOVSKIY EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR THE US POSITION THAT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUT ADDED THAT UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS IN THE USSR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD REQUIRE SOME FORM OF REPUBLICAN PARTICIPATION. END SUMMARY.

3. ON OCTOBER 5 UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOUR SOVIET REPUBLICS THAT HAVE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORY. SOVIET PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREY KOLOSOVSKIY, VLADIMIR BELASHEV OF THE DISARMAMENT SECTION OF THE UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, ANDREY SANNIKOV OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF BELARUS, AND RUSTEM KURMANGULZHIN, OF THE KAZAKH PERMANENT REPRESENTATION IN MOSCOW. UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW WAS ACCOMPANIED BY BG JOHN GORDON (NSC), STEVE HADLEY (OSD), READ HAMMER (ACDA), LT GEN SHALIKASHVILI (JCS), ANDREW CARPENDALE (STATE), AND EMBASSY NOTETAKER.

4. BARTHOLOMEW OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY NOTING THAT THE US RECOGNIZED THE ROLE OF THE REPUBLICS IN THE CURRENT TRANSFORMATIONS UNDERWAY IN THE USSR. THE US WANTED TO EXPLAIN THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE TO THE REPUBLICS. THE USG LOOKS TO THE CENTRAL SOVIET AUTHORITIES AS ITS NEGOTIATING PARTNER ON THESE ISSUES. BARTHOLOMEW POINTED OUT THAT THE FAILED SOVIET COUP OF AUGUST 19 HAD BEEN AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE GENESIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S NUCLEAR INITIATIVE. THIS INITIATIVE AND HIS VISIT WERE A BREAK WITH THE PAST AND NOT INTENDED TO BE ARMS CONTROL BUSINESS AS USUAL. AT THE SAME TIME, THE START AND CFE TREATIES REMAIN THE FRAMEWORK FOR STABLE AND SECURE

***** FOR J5 *****
REVIEW FOR DISTRIBUTION TO CINCS
SUBMIT JCS-DSS FORM 30 IF REQUIRED

ACTION (R.M)
INFO CJCS(1) J8(3) J5(1) SECDEF-N(1)
USDP: SPECIAL HANDLING(13) USDA: P&L(1) USDA: AE(1)
USDA: STAFF SAC(1) ASD: PA(2) USDP: CH(1) USDP: PD(1)
DR(1) DD(1) DI-1(1) DB-AC(1) IMM(2) DA-SA(1)
OSC-CI(1) NWS(1) DA-PA(1) VP(1) DIO(1) DB(1) DIA(0)
+OCSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+NATS PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC
+NATS PENTAGN WASHINGTON DC
+USNMR SHAPE BE//SURVEY//

RELATIONS. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THESE TREATIES BE PROMPTLY RATIFIED AND BARTHOLOMEW URGED THAT ALL ON THE SOVIET SIDE WHO HAVE A ROLE IN THE RATIFICATION PROCESS -- WHETHER IN MOSCOW, KIEV, ALMA-ATA OR MINSK -- WORK TOWARD THAT END.

5. BARTHOLOMEW DISCUSSED THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED ON A MAJOR EFFORT TO SQUEEZE DOWN, REDUCE AND CHANGE THE NUCLEAR POSTURE OF BOTH SIDES IN A WAY THAT HAD NEVER BEEN ATTEMPTED BEFORE. THE US WANTED TO SHOW THE WAY AND TO GIVE REFORMIST ELEMENTS IN THE REPUBLICS AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN IN A MAJOR EFFORT TO REDUCE AND LIMIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SOME STEPS THE US WOULD TAKE UNILATERALLY, WITHOUT CONDITIONS. FOR EXAMPLE THE US IS UNILATERALLY REMOVING FROM THE US AND ABROAD ALL NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS AND ALL NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES. IN ADDITION, THE US IS WITHDRAWING ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM SHIPS AND SUBMARINES AND FROM LAND BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT. STRATEGIC BOMBERS HAD BEEN TAKEN OFF ALERT AS HAD ICBMS SLATED FOR DESTRUCTION UNDER START. ALL STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS HAD BEEN ELIMINATED EXCEPT FOR A NEW SINGLE RV ICBM. THE US HAD CONCEDED IN NAVAL ARMS CONTROL WHAT THE USSR HAD LONG SOUGHT AND THE CANCELLATION OF THE SRAM MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WAS OF REAL IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET AIR FORCE. THE US IS TAKING THESE STEPS ON ITS OWN, WITHOUT NEGOTIATIONS BUT BARTHOLOMEW SAID IT WOULD HAVE GREATER IMPACT IF THE USSR WOULD TAKE MATCHING AND SIMILAR STEPS. THESE COULD INCLUDE WITHDRAWAL AND DESTRUCTION OF WEAPONS THAT THE US NO LONGER HAS, SUCH AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ON AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS AND NUCLEAR LAND MINES. OTHER MEASURES COULD INCLUDE RETAINING MOBILE MISSILES IN THEIR GARRISONS AND MEASURES TO STOP THE FOUR OR FIVE EXPENSIVE STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS NOW UNDERWAY AND LIMIT MODERNIZATION TO A SINGLE RV ICBM AS WE HAVE. THESE STEPS SHOULD BE AIMED AT CREATING A NEW AND SMALLER STRATEGIC FORCE, WHICH WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO THE USSR OR TO ANY ENTITY THAT OCCUPIES THIS STRATEGIC SPACE.

6. IN ADDITION TO THESE UNILATERAL MEASURES THE US IS ALSO PROPOSING JOINT DIALOGUE ON THE SAFE AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ON THE PHYSICAL SAFETY AND SECURITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ON THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. TWO US PROPOSALS WOULD REQUIRE NEGOTIATION; A PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE ALL LAND BASED MIRVED ICBMS BECAUSE THEY ADD INSTABILITY TO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AND THE INTRODUCTION OF A LIMITED ABM DEFENSE AGAINST LIMITED ATTACKS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIAL THREAT OF MISSILE PROLIFERATION THAT IS DEVELOPING TODAY.

7. BARTHOLOMEW TURNED NEXT TO A DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES THAT ARE RAISED BY THE EMERGING ROLE THAT THE REPUBLICS ARE PLAYING IN SOVIET DEFENSE AND SECURITY POLICY. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE US WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE THE EMERGENCE OF SEVERAL NEW NUCLEAR POWERS IN THE AREA. THIS WOULD BE DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE POLICY OF NON-PROLIFERATION. IT WOULD ALSO SEVERELY COMPLICATE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ENTITIES THAT MIGHT EMERGE IN THE AREA AND WOULD NOT FOSTER THE KIND OF RELATIONSHIPS THAT WE HOPE TO BUILD WITH THE REPUBLICS. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE US DID NOT WANT TO GET IN THE MIDDLE OF THE EFFORTS UNDERWAY TO WORK OUT NEW RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE CENTER AND THE REPUBLICS. NOR DID THE US SAY THAT THE REPUBLICS SHOULD HAVE NO SAY ON MATTERS AFFECTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORY. BUT THE WAY THIS WAS WORKED OUT COULD AFFECT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE CENTER AND THE REPUBLICS: IT WAS NATURAL THAT WE WOULD HAVE AN OPINION ON THIS MATTER AND IT IS GOOD THAT THE REPUBLICS KNOW WHAT OUR OPINION IS. BARTHOLOMEW ADDED THAT OUR POSITION WAS NOT BASED ON A LACK OF TRUST OF THE REPUBLICS, RATHER IT STEMMED FROM OUR VIEWS ON PREVENTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: APR 22 2014

13-M-344/22
#42
CDSN-MAJ100
PAGE 1 OF 2
071938Z OCT 91

MCN=91281/01225 TOR=91281/04312 TAD=91281/04452

~~SECRET SPECAT~~

~~SECRET SPEGAT~~

JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER

COPY NUMBER-----

8. IT WAS NECESSARY, HOWEVER, TO BE CLEAR ON THIS MATTER. SOME MIGHT THINK THAT CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD CONFER POLITICAL INFLUENCE, BARGAINING LEVERAGE, OR A SEAT AT THE TABLE, BUT GIVEN THE GLOBAL INTEREST IN NON-PROLIFERATION THAT WAS SIMPLY NOT THE CASE. IN FACT, IT WOULD ACTUALLY HAVE THE REVERSE EFFECT. A MOVE TO TRY TO ASSERT CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE COSTLY IN TERMS OF POLITICAL ACCESS AND LEVERAGE.

9. SUMMING UP, BARTHOLOMEW REMINDED THOSE PRESENT THAT ON SEPTEMBER 4 SECRETARY BAKER HAD OUTLINED FIVE PRINCIPLES THAT GUIDE THE US RESPONSE TO THE CHANGES IN THE USSR. WE TAKE THESE PRINCIPLES SERIOUSLY. IN EFFECT, BARTHOLOMEW SAID HE HAD ADDED A SIXTH, THAT BEING RESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR BEHAVIOR. THIS MEANT AN EFFORT TO WORK OUT THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN SECURITY AND COMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGH SERIOUS DIALOGUE. THIS WAS NATURALLY A MATTER OF PASSIONATE INTEREST TO THE CENTER AND THE REPUBLICS; IT WAS ALSO OF INTEREST TO THE US AND WE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR OUR VIEWS IN A POSITIVE SPIRIT.

10. KOLOSOVSKIY THANKED BATHOLOMEW FOR THE EXPOSITION OF THE US POSITIO. KOLOSOVSKIY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE US DESIRE TO CONDUCT NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ONE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE DIFFICULTIES IN TRYING TO NEGOTIATE WITH MORE THAN ONE PARTNER. AT THE SAME TIME, KOLOSOVSKIY SAID THAT IN CURRENT CONDITIONS NEGOTIATIONS CAN ONLY SUCCEED IF THE REPUBLICS ARE INVOLVED. KOLOSOVSKIY DREW A DIRECT TIE BETWEEN INVOLVEMENT AND RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR. THIS KIND OF EXCHANGE WITH BARTHOLOMEW WAS HELPFUL, KOLOSOVSKIY SAID, IN ENCOURAGING THE CENTER AND THE REPUBLICS TO GO ALONG THE PATH OF MUTUAL INVOLVEMENT.

11. KOLOSOVSKIY SAID THAT RUSSIA HAD A STRONGLY POSITIVE VIEW OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S NUCLEAR INITIATIVE AND RUSSIA HAD INTRODUCED THAT POSITIVE VIEW INTO THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE

RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. KOLOSOVSKIY PARTICULARLY WELCOMED THE NEW PHILOSOPHY IN THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. PREVIOUS ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES HAD BEEN DEVELOPED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF CONFRONTATION BUT THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE HAD OPENED THE WAY TO SIMILAR MATCHING STEPS, THAT WOULD INCREASE POLITICAL CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. IT WOULD BE GOOD IF THAT POSITIVE TENDANCY DID NOT BECOME SMOTHERED BY THE INERTIA OF NEGOTIATIONS. KOLOSOVSKIY ADDED THAT RESTRICTIONS ON MODERNIZATION WERE VERY POSITIVE FROM BOTH THE STRATEGIC AND THE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW AND WERE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. STRAUSS BY

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: APR 22 2014

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22 APR 2014 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 3441

5USC552
+

EXDTS

MCN=91281/01225

TOR=91281/0431Z

TAD=91281/0445Z

CDSN=MAJ100

~~SECRET SPEGAT~~

PAGE 2 OF 2