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FROM AIR DEFENSE FORCES, WILL BE LOCATED AWAY FROM
OPERATIONAL UNITS.

-- THE SOVIETS INTEND TO REMOVE THEIR SLCMs FROM
SUBMARINES TO A CENTRAL STORAGE LOCATION AND TO ELIMINATE
SOME OF THEM. THEY PRESSED TO LEARN WHETHER THE U.S.
INTENDS TO CONTINUE PRODUCTION OF SLCMs.

~~SECRET~~ SPECAT SECTION 01 OF 16 MOSCOW 28781

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TAGS: PARM, PREL, UR

SUBJECT: UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW'S MEETINGS WITH
SOVIET DEPUTY FM OBUKHOV, OCTOBER 8, 1991

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA-~~
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THE SOVIETS RAISED BUT DID NOT PRESS VERY HARD FOR
U.S. AGREEMENT TO REMOVAL OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
FROM AVIATION UNITS TO CENTRAL STORAGE AREAS. THE
SOVIETS' PROPOSAL IMPLICITLY INDICATED THAT THEY NOW
ACCEPT THE PRESENCE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE.

THE PROCESS OF TRANSFERRING SOVIET WEAPONS TO
CENTRAL STORAGE AREAS WILL TAKE TIME, DUE TO LIMITED
STORAGE SPACE AVAILABLE. AS MORE SPACE IS FREED UP BY
WEAPON ELIMINATIONS, MORE WEAPONS WILL BE MOVED TO
CENTRAL STORAGE.

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT

SUMMARY
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**NO OBJECTION TO FULL
RELEASE**

2. A NEW ARMS CONTROL ERA BEGAN IN MOSCOW ON OCTOBER 6,
AS U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS ENCOURAGED EACH OTHER TO
MATCH UNILATERAL ARMS REDUCTION STEPS EACH SIDE'S
PRESIDENT HAD ALREADY ANNOUNCED. TRANSPARENCY WAS THE
RULE; WITHOUT POLEMICS OR HAGGLING, THE SIDES USED THE
SIX HOURS OF MEETINGS TO AMPLIFY ON THE DETAILS OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES. THE SOVIET SIDE
SEEMED WORRIED THAT THEY WOULD BE PERCEIVED AS BEHIND THE
CURVE IF THEY COULDN'T DISMANTLE WEAPON SYSTEMS AS
RAPIDLY AS THE UNITED STATES. IN CONTRAST TO THEIR
PREVIOUS FOOTDRAGGING IN PROVIDING INFORMATION, SOVIET
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES ORDERED STATISTICS TO BE
GENERATED ON THE SPOT IN RESPONSE TO UNDERSECRETARY
BARTHOLOMEW'S REQUESTS. IN ANOTHER FIRST, THE SOVIET
DELEGATION INCLUDED THE REPRESENTATIVES OF FOUR REPUBLICS
ON WHOSE TERRITORY NUCLEAR ARMS ARE LOCATED: RUSSIA,
UKRAINE, KAZAKHSTAN AND BELORUSSIA.

3. IN ADDITION TO INFORMATION ALREADY CONTAINED IN
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS, THE FOLLOWING
POINTS OF INTEREST EMERGED DURING THE DISCUSSIONS:
-- AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE,
NO NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES BELOW
A RANGE OF 5600 KM WILL REMAIN IN THE SOVIET ARSENAL, NOR
WILL ANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS OTHER THAN SLBMs BE ABOARD
SOVIET SHIPS.

-- IT WILL TAKE THE SOVIET SIDE ROUGHLY EIGHT OR NINE
MONTHS TO REMOVE ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES FROM ITS
SURFACE SHIPS AND SUBMARINES.

-- THE SOVIET SIDE RAISED NO OBJECTIONS TO THE U.S.
APPROACH OF RELYING ON VOLUNTARY IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULES
AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE, RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING TO
NEGOTIATE FORMAL VERIFICATION PROCEDURES OR TIMETABLES.

-- CENTRAL STORAGE AREAS FOR SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR
WEAPONS WITHDRAWN FROM SHIPS AND SUBMARINES, AS WELL AS

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+NATS PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC
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-- SOVIET INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY FOR WEAPONS ELIMINATION
IS UNCERTAIN, BUT CLEARLY LESS THAN THE 1600-2000
WARHEADS PER YEAR THE U.S. SIDE IS ABLE TO ELIMINATE.
THEREFORE, THE SOVIETS EXPECT THEIR ELIMINATION PROCESS
TO PROCEED MORE SLOWLY THAN OURS.

-- THE SOVIETS DECLINED TO SAY WHAT, IF ANY, STRATEGIC
MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS WOULD CONTINUE OPERATING IN THE
WAKE OF THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE.

-- THE SOVIETS CONFIRMED THAT THE "PERMANENT BASING
BT

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AREAS" REFERRED TO IN GORBACHEV'S SPEECH ARE IDENTICAL TO
"RAIL GARRISONS."

-- THE SOVIETS DO NOT NOW INTEND TO CONFINE
ROAD-MOBILE ICBMs TO BASES; THEY CITE SURVIVABILITY AS A
REASON. RESPONDING TO U.S. ARGUMENTS REGARDING
VULNERABILITY TO TERRORISM AND OTHER DANGERS, THE SOVIETS
THANKED US FOR AGREEING TO CFE TERMS THAT FACILITATED
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THESE WEAPONS.

-- IN REMOVING MISSILES FROM ALERT STATUS, THE SOVIETS
HAVE RENDERED LAUNCH MECHANICALLY IMPOSSIBLE AND HAVE
ALSO RENDERED IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR LAUNCH SIGNALS TO BE SENT
TO THE MISSILES IN QUESTION.

-- THE TEMPO OF REMOVING SOVIET MISSILES FROM SILOS
WILL BE SLOWED BY THE NECESSITY OF DRAINING THE LIQUID
FUEL AND TAKING EXTRA SECURITY PRECAUTIONS DURING THE
PROCEDURES.

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY RENDERED INOPERATIVE THREE
NUCLEAR SUBMARINES WITH 44 LAUNCHERS, AND ARE IN THE
PROCESS OF DOING THE SAME WITH THREE MORE, CARRYING 48
LAUNCHERS.

-- THE 503 MISSILES GORBACHEV ANNOUNCED AS GOING OFF
ALERT STATUS CONSIST OF 326 SS-LLS, 40 SS-135, 47 SS-175,
AND 90 SS-195. (FYI, THESE FIGURES WERE ADJUSTED IN A
MEETING THE NEXT DAY, TO 37 SS-175 AND AN ADDITIONAL 10
SS-185.) REMOVAL OF 126 SS-LLS AND THREE SS-175 FROM
ALERT STATUS IS ALREADY COMPLETE, AND ELIMINATION OF
THEIR SILO LAUNCHERS HAS BEGUN.

-- THE SOVIETS DISAGREED WITH A U.S. ANALYSIS OF HOW
FORCE STRUCTURES WOULD LOOK AFTER THE ELIMINATION OF
GROUND-BASED MIRVED ICBMs, CLAIMING THE RESULTING WARHEAD
RATIO WOULD BE TWO-TO-ONE IN THE U.S. FAVOR.

END SUMMARY
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SUBJECT SUMMARY
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NEW CONTEXT, NEW GROUND RULES;
ALL WARHEADS FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE
MISSILES TO BE ELIMINATED;
U.K. PARTICIPATION;
U.S. WITHDRAWAL AND DESTRUCTION TIMETABLES;
U.S. DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES;
NO TRADITIONAL VERIFICATION;
NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS BELOW SLBM RANGE TO REMAIN ON
SUBMARINES;
WARHEADS TO BE STORED FAR FROM OPERATIONAL UNITS;
CLARIFYING A MISTRANSLATION;
RATIONALE FOR TIMETABLES; NEGOTIATION NOT APPROPRIATE;
STABILITY BETTER SERVED BY RETAINING SOME SEA-BASED
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CENTRAL STORAGE AREAS;
NOT ALL SOVIET AIR DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BE
DESTROYED;
DIFFERING VIEWS ON AIR-BASED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS;
TREATMENT OF SLCMs;
STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION;
WHY NOT ALSO CONFINE ROAD-MOBILE ICBMS TO BASES?
REMOVING MISSILES FROM ALERT: PROCEDURES;
WHAT TYPES OF SOVIET MISSILES ARE GOING OFF ALERT?
START RATIFICATION;
FURTHER STRATEGIC FORCE REDUCTIONS: QUALITY VERSUS
QUANTITY;
ELIMINATING MIRVED ICBMS;
COMPARING POST-START FORCE STRUCTURES.

END SUBJECT SUMMARY.

PARTICIPANTS
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PRINCIPAL SOVIET PARTICIPANTS: DEPUTY FM OBUKHOV, GEN.
OMELICHEV, GEN. LADYGIN, RSFSR DEPUTY FM KOLOSOVSKIY,
AMB. NAZARKIN, AMB. GOLOVKO, MR. YEVSTAF'YEV, MR.
NAMEDOV, DR. ROGOV, UKRAINIAN REPRESENTATIVE BELASHEV,
BELORUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE VYCHEZHANIN, KAZAKH
BT
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REPRESENTATIVE KURMANGUZHIN, RSFSR REPRESENTATIVE AGAYEV,
INTERPRETER PROKOV'YEV. ALSO PRESENT: COL. KOLTUNOV, MR.
IVANOV, MR. BERDENNIKOV, INTERPRETER BYKOV.
PRINCIPAL U.S. PARTICIPANTS: UNDER SECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HADLEY, LT. GEN. SHALIKASHVILI, AMB.
HAMMER, BG GORDON, DR. ALESSI, MR. MACEACHIN, MR. TIMBIE,
INTERPRETER D. ARENSBURGER. ALSO PRESENT: BG CURTIN, MS.
KOCH, MR. D. GRAHAM, CAPT. BOYER, MR. WALPOLE, MR.
MILLER, MR. T. GRAHAM, MS. SUTTER, INTERPRETER SAUL.

FIRST SESSION: 10:00 A.M. - 12:45 P.M.
MFA OSOBNYAK
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NEW CONTEXT, NEW GROUND RULES
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4. IN HIS WELCOMING REMARKS, DEPUTY FM OBUKHOV QUOTED
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE BUSH
NUCLEAR ARMS INITIATIVE, AND CALLED THE RECIPROCAL SOVIET
STEPS A GOOD FOUNDATION FOR MEANINGFUL BREAKTHROUGHS
TOWARD REAL DISARMAMENT AND ENHANCED SECURITY FOR BOTH
COUNTRIES. ACTING IN UNISON, HE SAID, THE TWO GREAT
POWERS HAD ABANDONED OBSOLETE POLITICAL STEREOTYPES AND
WERE MOVING TOWARD A NEW STAGE OF COOPERATION.

5. OBUKHOV SAID THIS NEW STAGE IN RELATIONS HAD BEEN
FACILITATED BY THE PROFOUND TRANSFORMATIONS UNDERWAY IN
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE VICTORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES
OVER THE COUP PLOTTERS; HE EXPRESSED SOVIET GRATITUDE

TOWARD THE UNITED STATES FOR ITS SUPPORT DURING THE DAYS
OF THE ABORTIVE COUP AND FOR ITS ASSISTANCE IN
ESTABLISHING A NEW DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND THE BASIS FOR A
MARKET ECONOMY.

6. CALLING THE U.S. AND SOVIET INITIATIVES AN IMPORTANT
AND CONSTRUCTIVE SET OF PROPOSALS, OBUKHOV SUGGESTED THAT
EXPERTS TURN TO ANY SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THEY MIGHT HAVE.

7. UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW, AFTER ACKNOWLEDGING
OBUKHOV'S EXPRESSIONS OF GRATITUDE FOR U.S. SUPPORT, SAID
THAT FOR ALL ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AND FOR THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE, IT WAS A PROFOUND AND IMPORTANT FACT
THAT AFTER ALL THE YEARS OF CONFRONTATION, TODAY THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE WISHED THE SOVIET PEOPLE SUCCESS, AND
NOTHING BUT SUCCESS; WE WANTED TO DO WHAT WE COULD TO
HELP THE SOVIET PEOPLE TOWARD THAT SUCCESS. BARTHOLOMEW
SAID THIS WAS THE FRAMEWORK AND PHILOSOPHY THAT HAD LED
PRESIDENT BUSH, AFTER THE AUGUST EVENTS, TO TAKE HIS
INITIATIVE, IN WHICH WE WERE SEEKING TO ACT, WITH RESPECT
TO THESE WEAPONS, IN A WAY THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD FIND
HELPFUL.

8. BARTHOLOMEW QUOTED PRESIDENT BUSH'S VERY POSITIVE
PUBLIC ASSESSMENT OF THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE, BUT NOTED
THE PRESIDENT'S REMARK THAT SOME AREAS REMAINED TO BE
IRONED OUT. BARTHOLOMEW ASKED THAT THE U.S. SIDE'S
QUESTIONS AND THE ENSUING DISCUSSION BE TAKEN NOT IN A
SPIRIT OF NEGOTIATING THE STEPS TO BE TAKEN, BUT OF
OBTAINING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING SO AS TO INFORM THE USG
MORE FULLY REGARDING SOVIET INTENTIONS. OBUKHOV AGREED
THAT THE CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE CREATIVE AND
CONSTRUCTIVE, AIMED AT FACILITATING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
TWO PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES. IN GOING THROUGH THE
POINTS, IT WOULD BECOME CLEAR WHERE UNILATERAL STEPS
ALREADY WERE PARALLEL, WHERE THERE WERE ITEMS TO BE
RESOLVED, AND WHERE FURTHER U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS OR
CONSULTATIONS MIGHT BE REQUIRED.

ALL WARHEADS FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE
MISSILES TO BE ELIMINATED
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9. BARTHOLOMEW ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. SIDE UNDERSTOOD
CORRECTLY THAT, ONCE THE RELEVANT ACTIONS CITED IN THE
GORBACHEV SPEECH WERE COMPLETED, THERE WOULD REMAIN NO
SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR ANY SURFACE-TO-SURFACE
MISSILE WITH A RANGE SHORTER THAN AN ICBM (5500 KM). IN
AN ASIDE, BARTHOLOMEW DREW BROAD GRINS FROM THE SOVIET
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES BY SAYING HIS IRON RULE WOULD BE
BT

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NOT TO ASK ANY QUESTIONS HE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO
ANSWER HIMSELF. HE THEN SAID THAT, WERE THE SOVIET SIDE
TO ASK HIM THAT QUESTION, HE WOULD SAY "YES, YOU
UNDERSTAND CORRECTLY; THERE WILL BE NO U.S. FORCES WITH
NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR ANY SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE WITH
A RANGE BELOW 5500 KM." THANKING BARTHOLOMEW FOR HIS
HELP, OBUKHOV SAID THAT, SINCE WEAPONS SUBJECT TO THE INF
TREATY HAD BEEN ELIMINATED, AND SINCE UNDER THE OCTOBER 6
GORBACHEV INITIATIVE SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS
WOULD BE ELIMINATED, THERE WOULD REMAIN NO NUCLEAR
WARHEADS FOR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES BELOW
INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE. THUS, THE ANSWER WAS AFFIRMATIVE.

10. OBUKHOV, NOTING THAT THE SIDES WERE CLARIFYING
PARALLEL ACTIONS AND THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ANSWERED
THE U.S. QUESTION AFFIRMATIVELY, ASKED HOW THE U.S. WOULD
ANSWER THE SAME QUESTION. BARTHOLOMEW REPEATED HIS
EARLIER AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE.

11. OBUKHOV ASKED WHETHER, AS APPEARED FROM THE TEXT OF
THE U.S. PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE, THE U.S. SIDE WOULD

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ELIMINATE ALL NUCLEAR ARTILLERY "SHELLS" WHILE EXPECTING THE USSR TO DESTROY ITS "NUCLEAR ARTILLERY." BARTHOLOMEW EXPLAINED THAT NO ASYMMETRY WAS INTENDED, AND THAT THE U.S. EXPECTED BOTH SIDES WOULD DESTROY NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS.

U.K. PARTICIPATION

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12. LADYGIN ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. SIDE HAD ANY INFORMATION TO SUPPLEMENT REPORTS THAT THE U.K. WAS INTERESTED IN JOINING THE U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS INITIATIVE. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THE U.S. SIDE HAD NO FORMAL INFORMATION.

U.S. WITHDRAWAL AND DESTRUCTION TIMETABLES

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13. ROGOV QUOTED IN PART A PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY DEFENSE SECRETARY CHENEY THAT AS THE U.S. DISMANTLED WARHEADS, THE PLUTONIUM WOULD BE PRESERVED IN A LESS DANGEROUS FORM, TO BE KEPT JUST IN CASE IT SHOULD HAVE TO BE USED AGAIN TO PRODUCE WARHEADS. ROGOV ASKED WHETHER, UNDER THE U.S. TRANSPARENCY PRINCIPLE, THE U.S. WOULD INFORM THE USSR SHOULD THIS OCCUR. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THIS WAS A QUESTION THE U.S. HAD NOT YET EVEN ASKED ITSELF. REGARDING TIMETABLES, HOWEVER, HE WAS ABLE TO SAY NOW THAT THE U.S. ESTIMATED IT WOULD TAKE EIGHT OR NINE MONTHS TO COMPLETE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THESE WEAPONS FROM SHIPS AND SUBMARINES. (DURING THE AFTERNOON SESSION, OBUKHOV TOLD BARTHOLOMEW THAT, IN REPORTING TO WASHINGTON, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO KNOW THAT IT WOULD ALSO TAKE EIGHT OR NINE MONTHS FOR THE SOVIET SIDE TO REMOVE ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES FROM ITS SURFACE SHIPS AND SUBMARINES.) BARTHOLOMEW SAID IT WOULD TAKE ROUGHLY THREE YEARS FOR THE U.S. TO COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL AND PULL-BACK OF ALL GROUND-LAUNCHED NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND ARTILLERY SHELLS. REGARDING THE RATE OF DESTRUCTION OF WARHEADS AND BOMBS, BARTHOLOMEW SAID THE U.S. SIDE WOULD BE PREPARED TO INFORM THE SOVIET SIDE -- AS SOON AS THE INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE -- WHEN THE PROCESS WOULD BEGIN AND WHEN IT WAS LIKELY TO BE COMPLETED, AND TO PROVIDE PERIOD REPORTS IN BETWEEN REGARDING THE DESTRUCTION PROCESS.

14. WHILE PRECISE INFORMATION WAS NOT YET AVAILABLE, BARTHOLOMEW STATED, THE U.S. EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO DESTROY 1600-2000 WARHEADS PER YEAR. SEVERAL THOUSAND WOULD BE DESTROYED AS A RESULT OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE, BUT THERE WAS ALSO A SIGNIFICANT BACKLOG OF OLD WEAPONS AWAITING DESTRUCTION. IF FORCED TO ESTIMATE, BARTHOLOMEW SAID, HE WOULD SAY DESTRUCTION WOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE MID-1990S.

U.S. DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES

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15. REITERATING THAT THE U.S. SIDE WOULD PROVIDE DETAILED INFORMATION ON PROCEDURES AS IT BECAME AVAILABLE, BARTHOLOMEW DREW ATTENTION TO THE U.S. BT

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PROPOSAL FOR A DIALOGUE ON HOW TO DESTROY THESE WEAPONS IN A SAFE AND ENVIRONMENTALLY CORRECT WAY. HE THEN SAID THAT THE U.S. SIDE WOULD DESTROY THE ARMING, FUZING AND FIRING SYSTEMS AND MECHANICAL STRUCTURES OF WARHEADS, AND WOULD PROCESS THE NUCLEAR MATERIAL FROM THE WARHEADS FOR SUBSEQUENT USE IN NAVAL PROPULSION SYSTEMS, FOR STORAGE, OR FOR PERMANENT DISPOSAL. BARTHOLOMEW STRESSED THAT THE U.S. WAS PROVIDING INFORMATION ON AND DISCUSSING PROCEDURES NOT FOR THE PURPOSE OF NEGOTIATING TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS, BUT SIMPLY FOR TRANSPARENCY'S SAKE. HE SAID THE U.S. SIDE ASSUMED THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD DO THE

SAME WITH RESPECT TO TRANSPARENCY IN THE CONDUCT OF ITS OWN PROGRAM. HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN WHAT THE SOVIET PROCEDURES WOULD BE.
NO TRADITIONAL VERIFICATION
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16. OBUKHOV NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF DISCUSSING WHAT "ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS" ACTUALLY MEANT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TWO INITIATIVES. HE SAID THE SIDES HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS PROCESS MUCH FASTER THAN IF THEY HAD BEEN CONDUCTING TRADITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, IN WHICH IT WOULD HAVE TAKEN OVER A YEAR JUST TO AGREE ON APPROACHES. HE ASKED WHETHER OR NOT THE U.S. SIDE INTENDED TO USE SOME KIND OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (CBMS) IN THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND WHETHER THE U.S. SIDE HAD ANY ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF ELIMINATION PROCEDURES. BARTHOLOMEW REPLIED THAT THE U.S. DID NOT ENVISION ANY VERIFICATION OR CBMS AS THOSE TERMS HAD BEEN DEFINED IN THE PAST. WERE THE SIDES TO ATTEMPT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION AND CBMS IN THIS AREA, HE QUIPPED, ACTUAL DESTRUCTION WOULD BEGIN IN THE YEAR 2008. INSTEAD, THE U.S. SIDE INTENDED SIMPLY TO BE QUITE OPEN AND CLEAR REGARDING WHAT IT WAS DOING AND WHEN, AND TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS THE SOVIET SIDE MIGHT HAVE ABOUT THE PROCESS.

NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS BELOW SLBM RANGE TO REMAIN ON SUBMARINES
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17. BARTHOLOMEW ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. UNDERSTANDING WAS CORRECT THAT AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE STEPS OUTLINED IN THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD REMAIN ON BOARD SOVIET SUBMARINES SAVE SLBMs. HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WAS AFFIRMATIVE; THERE WOULD BE NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS ABOARD U.S. SHIPS OTHER THAN SLBMs. OBUKHOV SAID THE SAME WOULD HOLD TRUE FOR THE SOVIET SIDE.

18. ROGOV ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. DECLARATION THAT IT WOULD DESTROY ROUGHLY 50 PERCENT OF ITS TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON SURFACE SHIPS AND SUBMARINES WAS AN OFFICIAL STATISTIC OR JUST AN APPROXIMATE FIGURE. BARTHOLOMEW REPLIED THAT THIS WAS THE BEST ESTIMATE THE U.S. SIDE COULD CURRENTLY PROVIDE, BUT THAT THE FIGURE HAD SOME STANDING.

19. REFERRING TO THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ELIMINATE ROUGHLY 50 PERCENT OF THE NAVAL WEAPONS WITHDRAWN, BARTHOLOMEW ASKED WHAT PERCENTAGE THE SOVIET SIDE INTENDED TO ELIMINATE. OBUKHOV UNDERTOOK TO PROVIDE AN ANSWER LATER. EXPRESSING HIS UNDERSTANDING, BARTHOLOMEW SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS SOME WEEKS AHEAD OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS UNILATERAL RACE; OBUKHOV REPLIED THAT IT WAS ROUGHLY ONE AND A HALF MONTHS.

WARHEADS TO BE STORED FAR FROM OPERATIONAL UNITS
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20. TURNING TO STORAGE AREAS FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHDRAWN FROM SHIPS AND SUBMARINES, BARTHOLOMEW ASKED WHERE THE CENTRAL STORAGE AREAS WOULD BE, AND WHETHER IT WOULD BE PART OF THE SOVIET "PHILOSOPHY" FOR THEM TO BE AWAY FROM OPERATIONAL FORCES. LADYGIN SAID CENTRAL STORAGE AREAS WOULD BE SEPARATE FROM OPERATIONAL FORCES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PORTION OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS RETAINED FOR AIR DEFENSE WOULD BE KEPT AT A SIGNIFICANT DISTANCE FROM AIR DEFENSE UNITS, SO THEY WOULD NOT BE RIGHT NEARBY AND WOULD NOT BE CAPABLE OF BEING RAPIDLY INSTALLED. LADYGIN SAID THE PROCESS WOULD TAKE TIME. AS PLACES FOR CENTRAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE WERE MADE BT

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AVAILABLE BY THE PROCESS OF ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR

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ARTILLERY SHELLS, MORE WEAPONS COULD BE BROUGHT THERE. BARTHOLOMEW NOTED THAT, BY AND LARGE, THE U.S. PHILOSOPHY WAS THE SAME: WEAPONS WOULD BE STORED AWAY FROM OPERATIONAL UNITS, THOUGH PERHAPS NOT IN EACH AND EVERY CASE.

CLARIFYING A MISTRANSLATION
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21. LADYGIN NOTED THAT, IN HIS DECLARATION CONCERNING GROUND-BASED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PRESIDENT BUSH HAD SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD "BRING HOME AND DESTROY ALL OF OUR NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS AND SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS." BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD GONE ON TO SAY THAT "WE WILL, OF COURSE, ENSURE THAT WE PRESERVE AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN EUROPE. THAT IS ESSENTIAL TO NATO'S SECURITY." BARTHOLOMEW ELIMINATED THE MISUNDERSTANDING BY CORRECTING THE RUSSIAN MISTRANSLATION, WHICH HAD OMITTED THE WORD "AIR-DELIVERED;" HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT ONLY AIR-DELIVERED NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE RETAINED IN EUROPE.

RATIONALE FOR TIMETABLES; NEGOTIATION NOT APPROPRIATE
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22. EARLIER IN THE MEETING, OBUKHOV HAD SUGGESTED THE SIDES THINK OUT LOUD REGARDING THE ELIMINATION PROCEDURES THE SIDES WOULD ADOPT FOR THE SYSTEMS BEING ELIMINATED -- THE PROCEDURES USED IN THE INF TREATY. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT, IN TERMS OF PROCEDURES -- HOW WEAPONS WOULD BE DESTROYED AND WITHIN WHAT TIMEFRAMES -- THE U.S. SIDE WOULD BE PREPARED, AS A MATTER OF OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY, TO INFORM THE SOVIET SIDE QUITE FULLY. AS SOON AS THIS INFORMATION BECAME CLEAR ON THE U.S. SIDE, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE INFORMED; WE ASSUMED THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD DO LIKEWISE. BARTHOLOMEW POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE INF TREATY HAD NOT DEALT WITH WARHEAD DESTRUCTION, BUT RATHER WITH MISSILE DESTRUCTION. OBUKHOV SAID IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR BOTH SIDES TO KNOW APPROXIMATE TIMEFRAMES FOR ELIMINATION MEASURES.

23. LADYGIN ASKED WHETHER THE SIDES SHOULD NOT AT LEAST AGREE ON THE TIMETABLES FOR ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR MUNITIONS. BARTHOLOMEW EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. SIDE SAW NO NEED FOR FORMAL AGREEMENT ON A TIMETABLE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THESE WEAPONS. IT WOULD BE USEFUL AND OF INTEREST FOR BOTH SIDES TO BE VERY FORTHCOMING ABOUT WHEN, AND FOR HOW LONG, ELIMINATIONS WOULD BE CONDUCTED. THE U.S. SIDE INTENDED TO PROVIDE PERIODIC REPORTS FOR THIS PURPOSE, BUT A FORMAL AGREEMENT WAS UNNECESSARY. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THE U.S. WAS ASSUMING THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD DEMONSTRATE SERIOUSNESS IN CARRYING OUT THEIR INTENDED PROGRAMS. OBUKHOV QUIPPED "WHICH SIDE WILL DEMONSTRATE GREATER LABOR PRODUCTIVITY?" BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE U.S. INTENTION WAS TO PROCEED WITH WITHDRAWAL AND DESTRUCTION IN THE FASTEST, SAFEST, MOST ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND WAY POSSIBLE -- I.E., THE ONLY CONSIDERATIONS THAT WOULD BEAR ON THE SPEED OF DESTRUCTION WOULD BE SAFETY, EFFICIENCY, THE AVAILABILITY OF FACILITIES, AND SO ON. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF MILITARY UTILITY, OR OF TRYING TO KEEP SOME WEAPONS. 24. BARTHOLOMEW EXPLAINED THAT HIS THREE-YEAR ESTIMATE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF GROUND-LAUNCHED WEAPONS FROM EUROPE WAS BASED ON A CALCULATION OF WHAT WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE IN TERMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY CONCERNS IN EUROPE REGARDING MOVEMENTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES, AND SO ON. SIMILARLY, THE EIGHT-NINE MONTHS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE WEAPONS FROM SHIPS AND SUBMARINES WAS BASED ON THE REQUIREMENT TO WITHDRAW THE WEAPONS AS THE SHIPS RETURNED ON PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED PORT VISITS FOR MAINTENANCE AND OVERHAUL; IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO BRING ALL THE SHIPS IN AT ONCE. DESTRUCTION WAS MORE COMPLICATED, BARTHOLOMEW EXPLAINED, BUT ITS TIMETABLE (WHICH THE U.S. SIDE WOULD PROVIDE AS MORE PRECISE INFORMATION BECAME AVAILABLE) WAS BASED ON SIMILAR FACTORS.

25. OBUKHOV ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. ENVISIONED THAT THE SIDE WITH MORE WEAPONS WOULD HAVE MORE TIME FOR DESTRUCTION. BARTHOLOMEW EXPLAINED THE U.S. VIEW THAT BT

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THE TWO SIDES, AND THE WORLD SITUATION, WOULD BENEFIT AS EACH SIDE FOLLOWED ITS OWN PATH IN IMPLEMENTING THESE MATCHING STEPS AS QUICKLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE. THIS SHOULD BE THE CHIEF CRITERION. HE SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT AS TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE U.S. SIDE'S INTENTION; THE U.S. WAS ASSUMING THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD PROCEED IN AN ANALOGOUS MANNER.

26. LADYGIN EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH BARTHOLOMEW'S STATEMENT ON SERIOUSNESS OF INTENT WITH RESPECT TO ELIMINATION TIMETABLES. HE SAID THAT IN MENTIONING AN AGREED TIMETABLE, HE HAD NOT MEANT A SCHEDULE, BUT ONLY A POSSIBLE END DATE, TAKING ACCOUNT OF ALL THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE PROCESS: NUMBERS, CAPABILITIES, TRANSPORT, ELIMINATION FACILITIES, ETC. REGRETTABLY, LADYGIN SAID, THE SOVIET INDUSTRIAL ELIMINATION CAPACITY WAS SOMEWHAT LESS THAN THE ESTIMATED U.S. ANNUAL CAPACITY OF 1600-2000 WARHEADS MENTIONED BY BARTHOLOMEW. THUS, IT COULD TURN OUT THAT THE SOVIET TIME PERIOD COULD STRETCH BEYOND THAT OF THE U.S. HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE SIDES GO IN THE SAME DIRECTION IN COOPERATING, SO THERE WOULD BE NO AMBIGUITIES OR RECRIMINATIONS LATER.

27. BARTHOLOMEW CALLED THIS A USEFUL STATEMENT -- THE KIND HE HAD IN MIND WHEN HE SPOKE OF TRANSPARENCY AND COMMUNICATION. IF BOTH SIDES TOOK THIS APPROACH, THEY WOULD SEE THEY WERE EACH DEALING SERIOUSLY WITH THEIR OWN SITUATION. IF IT TOOK THE SOVIET SIDE SOMEWHAT LONGER, THIS WOULD NOT BE A REASON FOR THE U.S. SIDE TO SLOW DOWN ITS OWN PROGRAM; WE WANTED TO PROCEED AS RAPIDLY AS SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS WOULD PERMIT. THE SIDES' TIMETABLES DID NOT HAVE TO COINCIDE PRECISELY. DELAYING FOR THAT REASON WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF WHAT THE SIDES WERE SEEKING TO ACCOMPLISH. THAT SAID, BARTHOLOMEW CONTINUED, THE WITHDRAWAL AND DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD HAVE PRIORITY IN ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES. AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE U.S. SIDE HAD ALWAYS BEEN CONSCIOUS OF THE VULNERABILITY OF THESE WEAPONS TO TERRORISM, UNAUTHORIZED USE, EXPLOITATION AS POLITICAL FOOTBALLS, ETC.

STABILITY BETTER SERVED BY RETAINING SOME SEA-BASED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CENTRAL STORAGE AREAS
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28. OBUKHOV ASKED THE U.S. SIDE'S COMMENT ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE FULLY, ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, ALL NAVAL NUCLEAR TACTICAL WEAPONS. BARTHOLOMEW REPLIED THAT THE U.S. WAS PLANNING TO ELIMINATE ABOUT 50 PERCENT OF ITS SEA-BASED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHILE PUTTING THE REST IN CENTRAL STORAGE, MOST LIKELY AWAY FROM OPERATIONAL UNITS. BARTHOLOMEW EXPLAINED THE U.S. BELIEF THAT WORLD STABILITY AND SECURITY WERE BETTER SERVED BY ITS OWN APPROACH TO NAVAL WEAPONS; THIS WAS VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WORLD AS A WHOLE, NOT JUST THAT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AS IN THE PAST.

NOT ALL SOVIET AIR DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BE DESTROYED
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29. BARTHOLOMEW ASKED WHAT PERCENTAGE OF ITS AIR DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THE SOVIET UNION INTENDED TO DESTROY, AND WHAT WAS THE RATIONALE FOR DESTROYING SOME, BUT NOT ALL. OBUKHOV SAID THIS WAS NECESSARY IN VIEW OF THE STRONGER BOMBER CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. SIDE. REGARDING THE PERCENTAGE, OBUKHOV UNDERTOOK TO ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE AN ANSWER LATER IN THE MEETING. DURING THE AFTERNOON SESSION, HE SAID 50 PERCENT, OR PERHAPS EVEN MORE, OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON AIR DEFENSES WOULD BE

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DIFFERING VIEWS ON AIR-BASED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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30. OBUKHOV ASKED FOR U.S. COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT THE TWO SIDES WITHDRAW FROM TACTICAL AVIATION UNITS AND KEEP AT CENTRAL STORAGE AREAS, ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS INCLUDING GRAVITY BOMBS AND AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES. OBUKHOV NOTED THAT IN THIS RESPECT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL HAD GONE BEYOND THE U.S. PROPOSAL, AND ASKED WHAT WERE THE PROSPECTS FOR REACHING AN AGREEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING IN THIS REGARD. REPLYING ON A PERSONAL BASIS, BARTHOLOMEW REFERRED TO NEWS REPORTS BT

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OF SOME OBJECTIONS WITHIN THE PENTAGON TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, AND SAID THERE WOULD BE SOME IN OTHER PLACES TOO WHO WOULD NOT BE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE PROPOSAL. NEVERTHELESS, HE EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO HEAR MORE ABOUT THE SOVIET IDEA, CAUTIONING AT THE SAME TIME THAT HIS PERSONAL INTEREST SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS ANYTHING BUT THAT.

31. IN SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, OBUKHOV SAID THAT IF BOTH SIDES DID THIS RECIPROCALLY IT WOULD FACILITATE A MORE SUBSTANTIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUE. THERE ALREADY WAS CONSIDERABLE SIMILARITY, IF NOT IDENTITY, IN THE SIDES' APPROACHES ON GROUND-BASED AND SEA-BASED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS; FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES THEY WOULD BE DESTROYED, EXCEPT FOR THE PORTION THAT WAS STORED. OBUKHOV ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE LOGICAL TO SUPPLEMENT THIS WITH A THIRD COMPONENT -- A DECISIVE ACTION TO LIMIT TACTICAL AIR-BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY REMOVING THEM TO STORAGE, WHICH IN THE SOVIET VIEW WOULD SERVE THE GOALS OF PROMOTING STABILITY AND SECURITY.

32. BARTHOLOMEW ACKNOWLEDGED THIS ARGUMENT, BUT EXPLAINED THAT AFTER CONSIDERATION IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT THE ROLE OF THESE WEAPONS IN ENSURING NATO'S SECURITY DID NOT PERMIT US TO DO MUCH ABOUT THIS ISSUE. HE NOTED THAT THERE ALSO MIGHT BE OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS FOR THE U.S. AIR FORCE IN TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH THIS IN BOTH EUROPE AND THE U.S., SEPARATING THE UNITS. EUROPE WAS A VERY TIGHT AREA. AT THIS POINT THE SIDES ADJOURNED FOR LUNCH.

33. DURING THE AFTERNOON SESSION, BARTHOLOMEW ASKED WHETHER HE HAD WANTED TO SAY SOMETHING ON AIR-DELIVERED WEAPONS. OBUKHOV IN TURN ASKED FOR A RE-EVALUATION OF THE U.S. POSITION. HE CALLED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO REMOVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM FRONTAL TACTICAL AVIATION A STEP OF SERIOUS STABILIZING SIGNIFICANCE. HE UNDERSTOOD BARTHOLOMEW TO SAY THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH SPACE IN EUROPE FOR CENTRAL STORAGE OF SUCH SYSTEMS. HE ASKED THE U.S. POSITION, JOKING THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD SPACE AVAILABLE BEYOND THE URALS.

34. YEVSTAF'YEV RAISED THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO AIR-BASED SYSTEMS, ASKING WHETHER, HAVING DESTROYED GROUND-BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND REDUCED SEA-BASED ITEMS, THERE MIGHT THEN BE A SHIFT TOWARD THE AIR-BASED COMPONENT. BARTHOLOMEW REPLIED THAT THIS WAS UTTERLY ALIEN TO U.S. THINKING; EVERYTHING ABOUT THE U.S. INITIATIVE INVOLVED DOWNWARD, NOT UPWARD TRENDS IN FORCE LEVELS. THERE WERE NO SUCH PLANS. BUT BARTHOLOMEW CALLED THE SEPARATION OF WEAPONS FROM OPERATIONAL UNITS AND PLACING THEM IN CENTRAL STORAGE A SERIOUS IDEA, AND AN ATTEMPT TO ACCOMPLISH SOMETHING WITH RESPECT TO THIS CATEGORY OF WEAPONS. ON THE ONE HAND, THERE WERE SOME REAL PRACTICAL RESERVATIONS; THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF STORAGE AND SECURING OF AIR-DELIVERED NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS

PROBABLY THE SAFEST WAY WE HAD; REPLACING IT WOULD BE VERY COSTLY AND WOULD PROBABLY ENCOUNTER RESISTANCE PURELY ON PRACTICAL GROUNDS. MOREOVER, WORKING IT OUT IN EUROPE IN A CONFINED SPACE WOULD BE DIFFICULT, THOUGH NOT IMPOSSIBLE. BARTHOLOMEW CONCLUDED BY SAYING THE U.S. WOULD STUDY THE IDEA.

35. LADYGIN CHIMED IN THAT ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT AND EXPENSIVE, DOING SOMETHING IN THE AREA OF AIR-BASED TFW WOULD BE A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. ROGOV ADDED THAT THE U.S. AND SOVIET INITIATIVES COMBINED WERE REMOVING MOST MEANS OF ESCALATING TO NUCLEAR CONFLICT. HE ASKED WHY ONE SHOULD LEAVE ONLY THIS WHILE REMOVING ALL OTHER ELEMENTS OF NUCLEAR ESCALATION. ROGOV ADDED THAT IN THE PAST THERE HAD BEEN QUESTIONS REGARDING U.S. FORWARD DEPLOYMENT. WITH THE BIG STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS NOW IN THE WORKS, HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD NOT ARISE, BUT NOTED IT MUST BE KEPT IN MIND SINCE EVERYTHING WAS INTERCONNECTED. ROGOV NOTED THAT IN THE STRATEGIC SPHERE THE U.S. WAS TAKING WEAPONS OFF HEAVY BOMBERS AND PUTTING THEM IN STORAGE. THIS WAS A PRECEDENT; SO WAS THE SLCM ASPECT OF THE START PACKAGE. HE ASKED WHY NOT APPLY THESE APPROACHES IN THE AREA OF AIR-DELIVERED NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BT

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SECOND SESSION: 3:00 P.M. - 6:45 P.M.

TREATMENT OF SLCMS
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36. AFTER OPENING PLEASANTRIES, OMELICHEV ASKED, WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S. INTENT TO REMOVE ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES, INCLUDING SLCMS, FROM SURFACE SHIPS INCLUDING AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, FROM ATTACK SUBMARINES, AND FROM NAVAL AVIATION, WHETHER THE SLCMS TO BE REMOVED WOULD HAVE RANGES OVER OR UNDER 800 KMS. HE ALSO ASKED WHETHER THESE MISSILES WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE 60 PERCENT ELIMINATION PLANNED BY THE U.S. SIDE. BARTHOLOMEW REPLIED THAT WITHIN EIGHT TO NINE MONTHS THE ONLY U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF ANY TYPE REMAINING AT SEA, ABOVE OR BELOW THE SURFACE, WOULD BE SLCMS ON SUBMARINES. HE SAID THE U.S. PROBABLY WOULD NOT DESTROY ANY OF THE SLCMS; IT MADE MORE SENSE TO GET RID OF THE NUCLEAR DEPTH CHARGES. NEVERTHELESS, HE POINTED OUT, THERE WAS A GREAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HAVING NUCLEAR TOMAHAWK MISSILES STORED CENTRALLY ON LAND AND HAVING THEM LOCATED ABOARD VESSELS ON PATROL IN CERTAIN WATERS. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT FOR NOW HE COULD ONLY SAY THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO ELIMINATE GROUND-BASED 155MM AND 8-INCH HOWITZERS AND SMOKE BOMBS, BUT AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS REGARDING WHICH SEA-BASED ITEMS WOULD BE ELIMINATED.

37. LADYGIN ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. INTENDED TO CONTINUE PRODUCTION OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR SLCMS. BARTHOLOMEW REPLIED THAT THE CURRENT U.S. SLCM PRODUCTION RUN WAS DUE TO END IN ABOUT ONE YEAR. IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, AND IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THESE WEAPONS WERE BEING WITHDRAWN FROM DEPLOYED STATUS, BARTHOLOMEW SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WAS ANY DEMAND FOR MANY MORE SUCH SLCMS.

38. BARTHOLOMEW THEN ASKED WHAT THE USSR INTENDED TO DO

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WITH THE TONS OF SLICMS IT POSSESSED, AND WITH ITS STILL-OPEN SLICM PRODUCTION LINE. OBUKHOV SAID THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD HANDLE ITS SLICMS AS THE U.S. INTENDED TO DO, REMOVING THEM FROM SUBMARINES TO SOME CENTRAL PLACE AND ELIMINATING A PART OF THEM -- I.E., A PART OF SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD BE ELIMINATED. BARTHOLOMEW ASKED WHAT WOULD BE DONE WITH THE PRODUCTION LINE. OBUKHOV SAID HE EXPECTED THERE WOULD BE A REASONABLE DECISION TO CEASE THE SENSELESS BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION
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Date: AUG 20 2014

39. TO BETTER UNDERSTAND ASPECTS OF THE GORBACHEV SPEECH CONCERNING STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION, BARTHOLOMEW NOTED SOVIET PLANS TO HALT DEVELOPMENT OF THE SMALL MOBILE ICBM AND OF A MODERN SRAM, AND TO REFRAIN FROM MODERNIZING THE SMALL RAIL-MOBILE ICBM. HE ASKED WHAT ICBM MODERNIZATION EFFORTS WOULD REMAIN IN LIGHT OF THE GORBACHEV SPEECH. OBUKHOV REPLIED THAT THE LIMITS THE U.S. WAS GOING TO PLACE ON STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION HAD NOT ESCAPED SOVIET ATTENTION; THE SOVIET STEPS BARTHOLOMEW HAD CITED WERE INTENDED AS A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO U.S. CONCERNS. REGARDING THE HALT TO SMALL ICBM DEVELOPMENT, OBUKHOV SAID THE PROGRAM WAS IN FACT BEING TERMINATED; THE RAIL MOBILE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM ALSO WAS BEING TERMINATED. THESE PROGRAMS SIMPLY WOULD NOT EXIST; THE SAME WAS TRUE FOR MODERNIZATION OF SHORT-RANGE ATTACK MISSILES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS.

40. BARTHOLOMEW ASKED WHAT ICBM MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS WOULD BE LEFT AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF WHAT OBUKHOV HAD DESCRIBED. THE UNITED STATES WOULD RETAIN ONLY ITS BT

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SINGLE-RV ICBM PROGRAM; WHAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD CALLED FOR, AND WAS HOPING FOR, WAS THAT THE SAME WOULD BE TRUE OF THE SOVIET SIDE ONCE THE CUTBACKS WERE COMPLETED. OBUKHOV ASKED WHETHER BARTHOLOMEW WAS REFERRING TO ICBMS, SLBMS, AVIATION, OR WHAT; BARTHOLOMEW RESTATED THE QUESTION. OBUKHOV SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION AFTER STUDYING THE ISSUE. NAZARKIN ASKED WHETHER BARTHOLOMEW HAD BEEN REFERRING TO ONLY ONE "ICBM" MODERNIZATION PROGRAM; BARTHOLOMEW CONFIRMED THIS WAS CORRECT.

WHY NOT ALSO CONFINE ROAD-MOBILE ICBMS TO BASES?
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41. BARTHOLOMEW ASKED WHETHER THE "PERMANENT BASING AREAS" REFERRED TO BY GORBACHEV WERE THE SAME AS "RAIL GARRISONS." THE SOVIET SIDE CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE. BARTHOLOMEW THEN ASKED WHY NOT APPLY THIS ALSO TO ROAD-MOBILE ICBMS. CITING REPORTS OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS INVOLVING FIELD-DEPLOYED SOVIET SS-25 MISSILES, HE NOTED THAT THESE WERE EVEN MORE VULNERABLE THAN RAIL-MOBILES TO SUCH INCIDENTS. OBUKHOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS ALSO CONCERNED OVER THIS ISSUE, BUT NOTED THAT RELIABLE SECURITY MEASURES WERE BEING UNDERTAKEN WITH RESPECT TO THESE WEAPONS; THE SOVIET SIDE WAS GRATEFUL TO THE U.S. SIDE FOR AGREEING TO A CFE OUTCOME THAT PERMITTED THIS.

42. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF GENERAL STRATEGY, OBUKHOV SAID, IT WAS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT ICBMS WERE RENDERED MOBILE FOR SURVIVABILITY REASONS, TO ENSURE STABILITY. BARTHOLOMEW ASSURED OBUKHOV HE WAS NOT APPROACHING THE ISSUE AS ONE OF A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO GAIN AN ADVANTAGE; THE U.S. INTEREST WAS IN HAVING THE SIDES TRY TO TAKE A NUMBER OF STEPS CONSISTENT WITH THE REALIZATION THAT THE CONFRONTATION AND THE THREAT OF A "BOLT FROM THE BLUE" WERE THINGS OF THE PAST. THUS THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY NEED FOR BOMBERS ON ALERT, GROUND-BASED MISSILES ON

ROADS, ETC. BARTHOLOMEW URGED THE SOVIET SIDE TO CONSIDER CONFINING ROAD-MOBILE MISSILES TO BASES BOTH AS STRATEGICALLY JUSTIFIED, POLITICALLY INTERESTING, AND CONSISTENT WITH OTHER MEASURES (SUCH AS TAKING BOMBERS OFF ALERT), APART FROM CONSIDERATIONS OF DANGERS ON THE ROADS.

43. OBUKHOV AGREED THAT THE NEW POLITICAL REALITIES WERE LEADING TO NEW SOLUTIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS LIMITATION ISSUES. AT THE SAME TIME, HE CONTINUED, THERE WERE ISSUES THAT CONCERNED THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE SIDES, RELATED TO STABILITY. WHILE SEEKING WAYS TO LIMIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE ONE HAND, IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO UPSET THE STRATEGIC BALANCE ON THE OTHER HAND. OBUKHOV NOTED HOW SERIOUSLY THE U.S. SIDE VIEWED ITS OWN SUBMARINE NUCLEAR FORCES, AN AREA OF SERIOUS U.S. ADVANTAGE OVER THE USSR; RECENTLY HE HAD READ IN THE U.S. PRESS THE VIEW THAT SOVIET MOBILE ICBMS WERE A SMALL COMPENSATION FOR THE U.S. SLBM ADVANTAGE. NEVERTHELESS, OBUKHOV SAID, MOBILITY OF STRATEGIC FORCES (NOT ONLY OF ROAD-MOBILE ICBMS, BUT OF HEAVY BOMBERS AND SLBMS) WAS AN ISSUE THE SIDES COULD DISCUSS IN THEIR FORTHCOMING STRATEGIC STABILITY CONSULTATIONS. BARTHOLOMEW NOTED THAT A BOMBER AT 35,000 FEET OR A SUBMARINE AT 1000 FEET WERE NOT NEARLY AS VULNERABLE AS A GROUND-BASED ROAD-MOBILE ICBM OUTSIDE KIEV OR KANSAS CITY.

REMOVING MISSILES FROM ALERT: PROCEDURES
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44. AT BARTHOLOMEW'S REQUEST, SHALIKASHVILI EXPLAINED THAT IN THE PROCESS OF REMOVING MISSILES FROM ALERT STATUS THE U.S. HAD ALREADY MECHANICALLY DISABLED THE ALARM SYSTEM IN THE SILO AND ERASED THE LAUNCH CODES FROM THE MISSILE LAUNCH CONTROL COMPUTERS' MEMORY. THUS, THE MISSILE COULD NOT BE LAUNCHED AT ALL. THIS PROCEDURE HAD ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED ON 460 MINUTEMAN-11 MISSILES. THUS, THOUGH STILL IN THEIR SILOS, THESE 460 MINUTEMAN-11 MISSILES COULD NOT BE LAUNCHED. THE U.S. WAS GOING TO PROCEED FURTHER; THE NEXT STEP WAS TO REMOVE THE WARHEADS FROM THE MISSILES AND REMOVE THE MISSILES FROM THE SILOS. SHALIKASHVILI REFERRED TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S COMMITMENT TO ELIMINATING THESE SYSTEMS ON AN ACCELERATED BT

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BASIS ONCE THE START TREATY WAS RATIFIED.

45. LADYGIN ASKED EXACTLY WHAT WAS MEANT BY "MECHANICALLY DISABLED;" HE ALSO ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF WHAT WAS MEANT BY REMOVAL OF A COMPUTER PROGRAM. HE ASKED WHETHER "MECHANICALLY DISABLE" MEANT TO DISCONNECT AND REMOVE FROM THE SILO. SHALIKASHVILI SAID IT WAS A MECHANICAL INTERRUPTION BY A SAFETY MEASURE, TO CLARIFY WHAT WAS MEANT, CURTIN ADDED THAT STEPS WERE TAKEN TO PRECLUDE THE MISSILE FROM RECEIVING ANY LAUNCH SIGNAL, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS NOT PHYSICALLY REMOVED FROM THE SILO. THIS WAS CALLED "SAFING" THE MISSILE, AND WAS ROUTINELY DONE WHEN MAINTENANCE WAS TO BE PERFORMED ON THE MISSILE, SO THE MISSILE COULD NOT RECEIVE A LAUNCH SIGNAL. BARTHOLOMEW TOLD LADYGIN IT WAS VERY SIMPLE: YOU PRESS THE BUTTON AND NOTHING HAPPENS; YOU TURN THE KEY AND NOTHING HAPPENS, BECAUSE THE BEAST'S NERVOUS SYSTEM IS TURNED OFF. ITS BRAIN HAS BEEN ERASED AND IT HAS BEEN TURNED INTO AN IDIOT. THE NEXT STEP IS TO REMOVE ITS FIRST ...

46. LADYGIN SAID THE U.S. WAS ALREADY A FEW STEPS AHEAD OF THE SOVIET SIDE, WHICH HAD ALREADY TAKEN SOME ICBMS OFF ALERT NOT ONLY BY MAKING LAUNCH MECHANICALLY IMPOSSIBLE, BUT ALSO BY MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO SEND A SIGNAL. HE SAID THE SIDES WERE MOVING IN THE SAME DIRECTION, BUT SPECIAL CONSTRUCTION FEATURES OF THE SIDES' RESPECTIVE MISSILES WOULD LEAD TO DIFFERENCES IN THE PROCEDURES THE SIDES WOULD HAVE TO FOLLOW TO REMOVE

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MISSILES FROM ALERT STATUS. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE THE MINUTEMAN-II (A SOLID-FUEL MISSILE) COULD BE REMOVED FROM ITS SILO AS SOON AS ITS WARHEADS WERE REMOVED, SOVIET LIQUID-FUEL MISSILES WOULD HAVE TO HAVE THEIR FUEL REMOVED FIRST. BARTHOLOMEW QUIPPED THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT TO BE THERE WHEN THAT WAS DONE; LADYGIN REPLIED THAT NEITHER WOULD HE, HAVING BEEN A VICTIM OF AN ACCIDENT IN THAT SITUATION. LADYGIN SAID HE JUST WANTED TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT, REGARDING THE ACCELERATED TEMPO OF MISSILE ELIMINATION, THE PROCEDURE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE COMPLICATED FOR LIQUID-FUEL MISSILES AND SAFETY ISSUES WOULD BE INVOLVED. (LATER IN THE MEETING, OBUKHOV QUIPPED THAT NO ONE HAD MENTIONED PROCEDURES FOR TAKING SLBMs OFF ALERT STATUS.) WHAT TYPES OF SOVIET MISSILES ARE GOING OFF ALERT?

47. BARTHOLOMEW, SUMMING UP, SAID 450 U.S. MINUTEMAN-II MISSILES WERE ALREADY OFF ALERT AND COULD NO LONGER BE LAUNCHED; HE ASKED WHEN THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THE SAME RESULT WITH ITS 503 MISSILES. SECONDLY, BARTHOLOMEW NOTED THAT THE U.S. SIDE WAS ALREADY PROCEEDING, EVEN BEFORE START RATIFICATION, TO REMOVE THE WARHEADS FROM THOSE MISSILES AND TO EXTRACT THE MISSILES FROM THEIR SILOS. HE ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD DO THE SAME, SAYING THIS WOULD BE USEFUL FOR BOTH SIDES. THIRDLY, AS THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID, ONCE START WAS RATIFIED THE U.S. SIDE WOULD ACCELERATE DESTRUCTION OF SILOS AND LAUNCHERS AS REQUIRED UNDER START PROCEDURES. HE NOTED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR BOTH SIDES TO DO THIS, THOUGH THE U.S. SIDE INTENDED TO PROCEED IN ANY CASE. AS A STARTING POINT, HE SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE PROVIDE, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND PREFERABLY IMMEDIATELY, SPECIFIC INFORMATION AS TO WHICH ICBM TYPES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE 503 ICBMS BEING TAKEN OFF ALERT, HOW MANY THERE WERE AND WHERE THEY WERE LOCATED; IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO KNOW WHEN THE PROCESS WOULD BEGIN AND WHEN IT WOULD BE COMPLETED. BARTHOLOMEW EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS NOT A U.S. PROPOSAL ON DEMAND, BECAUSE THE U.S. SIDE WAS GOING AHEAD WITH REMOVING MISSILES FROM ALERT AND FROM THEIR SILOS. SIMPLY, IN A SPIRIT OF TRANSPARENCY, IT WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES TO PROVIDE THE INFORMATION.

48. OBUKHOV, EXPRESSING SATISFACTION WITH THE INFORMATION REGARDING THE 450 MINUTEMAN-II MISSILES, SAID THE U.S. SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBTS THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ALREADY RENDERED INOPERATIVE THREE NUCLEAR SUBMARINES WITH 44 LAUNCHERS, AND WAS IN THE PROCESS OF DOING THIS WITH THREE MORE, WITH 48 LAUNCHERS. THE U.S. SIDE ALSO SHOULD NOT DOUBT THAT AS A RESPONSE TO THE U.S. INITIATIVE THE SOVIET SIDE WAS TAKING 503 ICBMS OFF ALERT, INCLUDING 134 MIRVED MISSILES WITH A CONSIDERABLE BT

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NUMBER OF WARHEADS. (FYI: THESE FIGURES WERE CORRECTED IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS LATER THE SAME DAY AND THE NEXT DAY. END FYI.) OBUKHOV SAID THE EXCHANGE OF DATA WAS USEFUL IN HELPING THE SIDES UNDERSTAND THE DEVELOPING SITUATION AND THE PROCESSES BEING IMPLEMENTED. OBUKHOV CONTINUED THAT WITHIN THE 503 ICBMS BEING TAKEN OFF ALERT, 129 ALREADY WERE OFF ALERT AND ELIMINATION OF THEIR SILO LAUNCHERS HAD BEGUN. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THIS INFORMATION WAS USEFUL IN FACILITATING ACHIEVEMENT OF THE SIDES' COMMON GOAL.

49. OBUKHOV ASKED WHETHER HE WAS CORRECT THAT THE U.S. SIDE HAD NOT YET BEGUN ELIMINATION OF ITS SILO LAUNCHERS. BARTHOLOMEW CONCURRED, SAYING THE U.S. PROPOSAL WAS TO ACCELERATE THE PROCESS ONCE THE START TREATY WAS RATIFIED. HOWEVER, DE-ACTIVIZATION OF MISSILES HAD ALREADY BEGUN.

50. NOTING THAT HE WOULD BE ASKED IN WASHINGTON WHAT TYPES OF MISSILES WERE INCLUDED IN THE 503, 134 AND 129 NUMBERS CITED EARLIER BY OBUKHOV, BARTHOLOMEW SAID IT WOULD BE GOOD TO HAVE THIS ANSWER BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, TO AVOID BEING INUNDATED BY CONFLICTING ESTIMATES FROM VARIOUS USG AGENCIES. OBUKHOV SAID HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN THE ANSWER. (FYI. AT THIS POINT LADYGIN ROSE TO GIVE ORDERS TO KOLTUNOV. END FYI.) BARTHOLOMEW STRESSED THAT IT WOULD ADD IMPACT TO THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT IF THE PRECISE NUMBERS OF EACH TYPE COULD BE CITED, INSTEAD OF JUST THE OVERALL FIGURE OF 503.

51. TOWARD THE END OF THE MEETING, LADYGIN PROVIDED A RESPONSE TO WHAT HE TERMED BARTHOLOMEW'S "FAIR" REQUEST FOR A BREAKDOWN OF THE 503 FIGURE BY TYPE:

RS-10 (SS-11): 326;
RS-12 (SS-13): 40;
RS-16 (SS-17): 47;
RS-18 (SS-19): 90.

BARTHOLOMEW NOTED THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE PREVIOUS FIGURE OF 134 AND THE CURRENT SUM OF 137 SS-19 AND SS-17S. LADYGIN, ACKNOWLEDGING THIS PUT HIM ON THE SPOT, PROMISED A FAIR ANSWER TO THIS "FULLY WARRANTED" QUESTION. HE RECALLED OBUKHOV'S STATEMENT THAT 129 ICBMS HAD ALREADY GONE OFF ALERT; THESE WERE:

RS-10 (SS-11): 126; AND
RS-16 (SS-17): 3.

LADYGIN EXPLAINED THAT THE THREE SS-17S WERE ALSO MIRVED AND THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR; 137 WAS THE CORRECT FIGURE. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THIS WAS VERY USEFUL AND VERY HELPFUL.

START RATIFICATION
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52. ROGOV ASKED WHEN THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION INTENDED TO SUBMIT THE START TREATY FOR RATIFICATION. BARTHOLOMEW REPLIED THIS WOULD HAPPEN AS SOON AS THE NORMAL DOCUMENTATION HAD BEEN PREPARED -- AN ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE EXEGESIS; HIS GUESS WAS EARLY NOVEMBER, THOUGH THIS WAS NOT AN OFFICIAL USG STATEMENT. ROGOV ASKED WHETHER THE TREATY WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE CURRENT SESSION OF CONGRESS; BARTHOLOMEW SAID IT WOULD.

FURTHER STRATEGIC FORCE REDUCTIONS: QUALITY VERSUS QUANTITY
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53. OBUKHOV SAID THE GORBACHEV DECLARATION THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD CUT ITS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO A LEVEL OF 5000 WARHEADS WAS A VERY SERIOUS UNILATERAL STEP, AND SAID AN ANALOGOUS U.S. STEP WOULD BE WELCOMED. HE ASKED FOR BARTHOLOMEW'S COMMENT. BARTHOLOMEW REPLIED THAT THIS QUESTION RAISED AN ISSUE MUCH LIKE THE SOVIET-PROPOSED GOAL OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN THE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS. BARTHOLOMEW REMINDED OBUKHOV OF THE SIDES' SHARED VIEW THAT WHILE SEEKING REDUCTIONS, THE SIDES WANTED THEN TO BE OF THE KIND THAT CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY. WHILE NUMBERS DID COUNT, EVEN MORE IMPORTANT WERE THE QUALITY AND KIND OF WEAPONS BEING REDUCED. THIS BT

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WAS WHY, EVEN IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S INITIATIVE, THE U.S. SIDE HAD BEGUN TO ADDRESS WHAT KINDS OF REDUCTIONS TO MAKE TO ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY. THUS, INSTEAD OF PROPOSING A NUMBER, THE U.S. SIDE PROPOSED TO ELIMINATE A CLASS OF WEAPONS IT CONSIDERED DESTABILIZING: GROUND-BASED MIRVED ICBMS. THE SIDES HAD DISCUSSED THESE PHILOSOPHICAL/ANALYTICAL ISSUES IN THE PAST, BARTHOLOMEW SAID, AND PROBABLY WOULD DO SO IN THE FUTURE.

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54. OBUKHOV CONFIRMED THAT THE STRENGTHENING OF STRATEGIC STABILITY IN THE REDUCTION PROCESS WAS A COMMON GOAL. HE SAID A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH WAS NEEDED TO REACH THAT GOAL; ONE ELEMENT OF SUCH AN APPROACH SHOULD BE CONSIDERATION OF OBJECTIVELY EXISTING ASYMMETRIES IN THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE SIDES. AS FAR AS PHILOSOPHY WAS CONCERNED, THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES THAT TO STRENGTHEN STRATEGIC STABILITY IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER ALL IMPORTANT FACTORS THAT DETERMINE STABILITY.

55. BARTHOLOMEW ACKNOWLEDGED OBUKHOV'S POINT CONCERNING DIFFERENCES IN THE SIDES' FORCE STRUCTURES. THAT SAID, HE APPEALED TO THE SOVIET SIDE TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION IN THE NEW STRATEGIC CONTEXT. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THE U.S. SIDE SAW NO STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE FOR ANYONE BY MOVING TOWARD ELIMINATION OF GROUND-BASED MIRVED ICBMS. IN OUR VIEW THIS WAS GETTING AT THE MOST DESTABILIZING ELEMENT IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. THIS WAS NOT A QUESTION OF MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS; BARTHOLOMEW EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT, AS THE SIDES LOOKED AT THE NUMBERS AND AT EACH SIDE'S REQUIREMENTS, THERE WOULD BE SOME GROUNDS FOR ELIMINATING GROUND-BASED MIRVED ICBMS.

56. TOWARD THE END OF THE MEETING, OBUKHOV AGAIN ASKED WHAT U.S. REACTION HE COULD REPORT TO HIS LEADERS REGARDING THE SOVIET INTENTION TO REDUCE ITS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARHEADS TO 5000 UNDER START, AND ITS DESIRE THAT THE U.S. ADOPT AN ANALOGOUS APPROACH. HE ALSO ASKED FOR A RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT, IMMEDIATELY AFTER START RATIFICATION, THE SIDES BEGIN INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS APPROXIMATELY BY 50 PERCENT. BARTHOLOMEW REPEATED THE HIGH POINTS OF THE U.S. POSITION HE HAD STATED PREVIOUSLY:

-- THE U.S. SIDE TAKES THE SOVIET INTENTION TO REDUCE TO 5000 WARHEADS AS EVIDENCE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SOVIET INTENT TO CONTINUE TO SQUEEZE DOWN STRATEGIC FORCES. THE U.S. SIDE SHARES THIS SERIOUS INTENT.

-- THAT SAID, THE U.S. SIDE FEELS A BETTER APPROACH TO ACHIEVING STABILITY AT LOWER FORCE LEVELS IS QUALITATIVE REDUCTIONS, FOCUSING ON THE NATURE OF THE SYSTEMS TO BE REDUCED (AND NOT BEING GUIDED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE BY NUMBERS), AND ON THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO REDUCE LAND-BASED MIRVED ICBMS.

THUS, BRIEFLY, BARTHOLOMEW SUMMARIZED, THE U.S. SIDE TAKES THE SOVIET IDEAS AS EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS INTENT REGARDING STRATEGIC FORCES, WHICH WE SHARE; WE THINK WE HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF HOW TO PROCEED AND HOPE TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET SIDE OF THIS. OBUKHOV SAID THIS ISSUE SHOULD BE A SUBJECT FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS SUCH A COMPLEX SUBJECT, THAT THERE PROBABLY WAS NO OTHER WAY TO GET THE DESIRED RESULTS.

ELIMINATING MIRVED ICBMS /-----/

57. NAZARKIN ASKED, REGARDING THE BUSH PROPOSAL FOR AN AGREEMENT TO ELIMINATE MIRVED ICBMS, WHETHER HE HAD UNDERSTOOD CORRECTLY THAT THE U.S. WANTED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THIS DURING THE FORTHCOMING STRATEGIC STABILITY TALKS, WHICH THE SIDES HAD AGREED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO HOLD. BARTHOLOMEW REPLIED THAT THIS SEEMED TO MAKE THE MOST SENSE, THOUGH ANOTHER WAY COULD BE FOUND IF DESIRED. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO RATIFY THE START TREATY AS THE FOUNDATION AND FRAMEWORK FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS, BARTHOLOMEW SAID.

COMPARING POST-START FORCE STRUCTURES /-----/

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58. OBUKHOV ASKED, HYPOTHETICALLY, IF THE SIDES WERE TO ELIMINATE GROUND-BASED MIRVED ICBMS, HOW THE SIDES WOULD MAINTAIN THE WARHEAD BALANCE. BARTHOLOMEW SAID HE THOUGHT THE SIDES HAD A BASIS FOR DISCUSSING THIS; IT WAS NOT AS THOUGH THE USSR DID NOT HAVE AN IMPORTANT SEA-BASED ELEMENT IN ITS STRATEGIC FORCES, OR NO HEAVY BOMBER FORCE. THUS, THIS PROPOSAL DID NOT BEGIN WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF IMBALANCE.

59. AT BARTHOLOMEW'S REQUEST, HADLEY EXPLAINED THE FORCE STRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL, AS VIEWED BY THE U.S. SIDE. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE TWO SIDES' FORCES WERE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT IN CHARACTER, HE SAID THAT NEVERTHELESS THE FORCES WOULD STILL BE ROUGHLY COMPARABLE AND CERTAINLY ADEQUATE FOR DETERRENCE. BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE ROUGHLY 300-500 SINGLE-RV ICBMS, THE U.S. ICBMS IN SILOS AND THE SOVIET ICBMS MOBILE, WHICH WOULD GIVE THE SOVIET SIDE AN ADVANTAGE IN TERMS OF SURVIVABILITY. BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE VERY ROBUST SLBM FORCES, THOUGH OF A DIFFERENT CHARACTER. THE U.S. MIGHT HAVE MORE RVs ON SLBMs, BUT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD HAVE MORE SSBNs ON WHICH ITS SLBMs WERE DEPLOYED. THE U.S. WOULD HAVE 18 SSBNs AT MOST, WHILE THE SOVIET SIDE MIGHT HAVE 26 OR MORE, DEPENDING ON HOW IT DECIDED TO HANDLE ITS POST-START FORCE STRUCTURE. AS EVERYONE REALIZED, IT WAS THE VESSEL THAT COUNTED IN TERMS OF SURVIVABILITY, SO THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD HAVE A MORE SURVIVABLE FORCE THAN THE U.S. SIDE. REFERRING TO HIS PREVIOUS SPIRITED DISCUSSIONS WITH LADYGIN ON BOMBER FORCES, HADLEY SAID IT WAS FAIR TO SAY THE U.S. SIDE HAD A MORE ROBUST BOMBER FORCE THAN THE SOVIET SIDE. HOWEVER, THE REASON WAS THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD A MUCH MORE ROBUST AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY THAN THE U.S. SIDE. THUS, THE U.S. BOMBERS WOULD HAVE MORE DEFENSES TO OVERCOME. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SUBSTANTIAL AIR DEFENSES, WHEREAS THE U.S. SIDE DID NOT.

60. THUS, HADLEY CONTINUED, THE U.S. HAD TRIED TO PUT ITS PROPOSAL IN THE CONTEXT OF FORCES THAT MIGHT RESULT. THIS WAS NOT "OLD THINKING" OR SEEKING ADVANTAGE; IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY. IT WOULD HELP THE DISCUSSION IF THE SIDES COULD EXCHANGE WHAT THEY EACH BELIEVED THEIR POST-START FORCE STRUCTURES WOULD LOOK LIKE. THE U.S. SIDE HAD ALREADY PROVIDED THIS INFORMATION; IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD DO THE SAME.

61. OBUKHOV COMMENTED THAT A REALLY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION LAY AHEAD REGARDING FURTHER REDUCTIONS. NOTING THAT A BROAD SOVIET REACTION TO HADLEY'S PRESENTATION WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT A FUTURE OCCASION, HE ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. ANALYSIS HAD TAKEN ASW INTO ACCOUNT. HADLEY SAID IT HAD NOT; THIS WAS AN AREA WHERE BOTH SIDES HAD MAINTAINED THEIR OWN PROGRAMS. HADLEY SAID HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO INCLUDE IT IF THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVED IT SHOULD BE INCLUDED. HE HAD INCLUDED AIR DEFENSES BECAUSE THE ASYMMETRY WAS SO GREAT THAT IT HAD RISEN TO A LEVEL OF STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE; THE ASYMMETRY WOULD REMAIN EVEN AFTER THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS.

62. CONCERNING ASYMMETRY, HADLEY ADDED THAT ASW HAD BEEN INCLUDED IMPLICITLY BECAUSE, IN POST-START FORCES, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD HAVE MORE SSBNs THAN THE U.S. SIDE, AND THUS A MORE SURVIVABLE FORCE. BARTHOLOMEW CALLED THE EXCHANGE CONSTRUCTIVE, AND URGED IT CONTINUE IN ANOTHER FORUM, IN WHICH THE SIDES COULD DISCUSS WHAT THEY ANTICIPATED THEIR FORCES WOULD BE AFTER START. THIS WOULD INFLUENCE CONSIDERATION OF THESE ISSUES.

63. LATER IN THE MEETING, LADYGIN SAID THE U.S. POSITION REGARDING QUALITY AND QUANTITY WAS CLEAR. THE SOVIET SIDE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE U.S. PHILOSOPHY REGARDING STABILIZING AND DESTABILIZING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE SOVIET VIEW WAS DIFFERENT: IT BELIEVED ALL TYPES OF

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STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS HAD THEIR OWN CHARACTERISTICS AND ALL WERE RATHER THREATENING. THE SIDES HAD TO START FROM WHERE THEY WERE -- THEIR FORCES WERE ASYMMETRICAL.

64. LADYGIN PROCEEDED TO OUTLINE THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE GROUND-BASED MIRVED ICBMS. FIRST, IT WOULD SHARPLY UPSET BT

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THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. ONE IMPLICATION WAS THAT IT WOULD TEND TO ACHIEVE A BALANCE ONLY IN THE ICBM COMPONENT OF THE FORCES, BUT NOT IN THE OTHERS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. SIDE CURRENTLY HAD A TWO-TO-ONE ADVANTAGE IN NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON SSBNs; ON HEAVY BOMBERS IT WAS THREE-TO-ONE. EVEN IF THE U.S. NUMBERS WERE IMPLEMENTED (ONLY 18 U.S., 26 SOVIET SSBNs), A TWO-TO-ONE RATIO WOULD STILL BE PRESERVED. THUS, THE TOTAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS RATIO WOULD GO FROM A ONE-TO-ONE RATIO TO A TWO-TO-ONE RATIO IN THE U.S. FAVOR.

65. SECONDLY, LADYGIN CONTINUED, TO AVOID ASYMMETRY WHILE IMPLEMENTING HADLEY'S IDEA WOULD ENTAIL HUGE COSTS. THIS WAS WHY THE SOVIET POSITION WAS TO LOOK AT THE ULTIMATE RESULT, CONSIDERING THE REALITIES AND THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AS IT IS NOW. THIS WAS NOT A SUBJECT FOR TODAY'S CONSULTATION, BUT ONE FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

66. BARTHOLOMEW CALLED LADYGIN'S REPLY MORE SUBSTANTIVE AND SERIOUS THAN PAST PRESENTATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT; IT CONTAINED MUCH TO THINK ABOUT. LADYGIN HAD ENDEAVORED TO EXPLORE, OBJECTIVELY, THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL. THE SIDES' NUMBERS HAD LED TO DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS. THIS SHOWED MORE DIALOGUE WAS NEEDED, AND THE SIDES NEEDED TO LOOK AT THEIR POST-START FORCES TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THIS ISSUE. THE DISCUSSION SHOULD CONTINUE. OBUKHOV SAID THE SIDES' VIEWS WERE IDENTICAL; FUTURE DRASTIC REDUCTIONS REQUIRED AN INTENSIVE DIALOGUE.

67. AS THE SIDES AGREED TO CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS THE FOLLOWING DAY, OBUKHOV THANKED THE U.S. SIDE, SAYING THE RESULTS OF THE DAY'S DISCUSSIONS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE NEW ATMOSPHERE AND THE PRESIDENTS' INITIATIVES. STRAUSS BT

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Date: 20 AUG 2014 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: Deny in Full:
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Reason: 3.2(h)(5), (6) + (6.2(a))
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Department of Energy Declassification Review	
1 st Review Date: 7/16/13	Determination: [Circle Number(s)]
Authority: <input type="checkbox"/> DC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DD	1. Classification Retained
Derived From:	2. Classification Changed To:
Declassify On:	3. Contains No DOE Classified Info
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