



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

MC 10726

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I-24049/70

14 August 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador Rabin

JS US-C-5526(b)(1);

EO (3526 Section  
3.3(b)(6))

Attached is a Talking Points paper for use in your meeting with Ambassador Rabin this afternoon. State Department suggests that you tell him you will give him a copy of it at the end of your meeting, noting that it is unsigned and thus just for his information as an exact record of your discussions. You should inform him, however, that your discussion does constitute an agreement in principle to sell these items to Israel, and our understanding of the conditions under which Israel agrees to purchase them.

The reference in paragraph 5 to the condition already made by Mr. Sisco that the equipment will not be used prior to [REDACTED]

A written list of the number of items and estimated costs will be forwarded to General Zeira, the Israeli Attache, today by the Chairman of the Middle East Task Group.

Attachment

*Robert J. Pranger*

ROBERT J. PRANGER  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
Near East & South Asian Affairs

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J 5054. 552 (b) (1);  
EO 13526 Section  
3.3 (b) (6)

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR RAFFIN

1. The US has approved the provision to Israel of the equipment which Israel would require, in addition to material already provided, to carry out strikes. [REDACTED]

2. This package includes some \$7 million worth of equipment, including ground ELINT, ALQ-87 cannisters for the C band, chaff dispensers and ALT2/ Jammers. These are particularly important, as they are effective in the X and C bands as well as the S band, and we are hopeful they will prove valuable.

3. The package also includes a number of SHRIKE's, in the S-band, plus [REDACTED] and special fuzes. If used by Israel, this would be their first use outside Southeast Asia, and as you are aware, this constitutes in our eyes a very significant decision.

4. We are prepared to begin delivery immediately, after appropriate contracts are signed, though there may be some slight delay as one or two items; i.e., the H240 chaff dispensers are just beginning production and may be delayed several months. When added to the EC-97 and the two RF-HCs we have already agreed to provide, this package should enable Israel, in case of need, to carry out successful attacks [REDACTED]. It will not, of course, ensure that there will be no losses on Israel's part, but it may substantially reduce losses.

5. This package is, we believe, firm evidence of the degree of US support for Israel, and demonstrates the seriousness which DoD has attached to Israel's military security. We have given Israel's requests our closest attention, and have devoted many hours of study to possible contingencies, before approving this package. Because of the unique nature of this decision, we must ask for certain assurances from the Government of Israel in addition to the assurance already conveyed to Assistant Secretary Sisco that this equipment will not be used by Israel unless the cease-fire is broken by resumption of hostilities by the other side:

a. We would not expect this equipment to be used [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED] under no circumstances should be used against anything except clearly military targets;

c. Finally, we expect that Israel will hold this secret very closely. We believe it would be most unfortunate if this talk were to become public knowledge during the cease-fire.

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[REDACTED]

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6. We would like to call attention, again, to the problem of payments. We know this is getting close attention from your government, as it is in ours. DoD, however, has a serious problem in that we are obliged to commit our own funds to cover these expenditures, so while we are hopeful that a large enough credit package can be worked out to cover Israel's needs, in the meantime we need your cooperation in helping us meet our own obligations.

7. As a last point, I would like to note--as I am sure you have observed--that this package is not a final answer in case [REDACTED]. We know this, just as you do. We, like you, are studying what is militarily possible and least costly should [REDACTED]. Without sounding alarmist, I would like to urge your careful consideration of all alternatives before deciding on a strategy based primarily on [REDACTED]. We have already shared some of our Vietnam experience with General Zeira, and perhaps later we can discuss this subject again. One thing is clear: it is very difficult and very costly to attempt a continuous suppression/destruction campaign against [REDACTED].

JS 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1);

EO 13526 Section 3.3(b)(6)

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JS SU-5-(.552(b)(1))  
EO 13526 Section  
3.3(b)(6)

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT PACKAGE

NOTE: All items are available within 90 days unless otherwise noted.

Prices are approximate.

Contractual arrangements to be worked out between GOI and OSD/ISA (Military Sales) representatives.

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<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Estimated Cost</u>
0467A 7A [REDACTED]		
7A FMU-72 Fuze	100	\$ 270. ea
7A AGM-45-3 or 3A (B Band) Shrike	40	\$ 17,250. ea
7C MOD Kit (Required to adapt F-4E acft for AGM-45 missile)	12	\$ 920. ea
7C IAU-34 Launcher Rail (Required 4 per acft for AGM-45 missile)	40	\$ 1,704. ea
7C AGE & Test Equipment Set for AGM-45	2	\$ 1,520. ea
7C ISSI for Control Unit AGM-45	2	\$ 1,150. ea
7C Initial Spares Set for AGM-45	2	\$ 3,750. ea
7E AIQ-87 "C" Canisters	11	\$ 33,000. ea
7E AIQ-87 AGE	1	\$10,000. ea
7E AIQ-87 & 4th S (1934)	24	\$ 50,000. ea
7E AIQ-87 AGE	2	\$ 50,000. ea
7E AIQ-87A	4	\$15,000. ea
7C AIQ-87A AGE	1	\$10,000. ea
7C B-24 CRAFT	50	\$ 15,000. ea
7E CRAFT	40	\$ 15,000. ea

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- Notes:
1. This equipment package will include a Ground ELINT package, details of which will be provided as soon as they are available.
  2. Technicians and tactical expertise will be made available as necessary

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