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102-16(b)

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Log No. 79-2133 S+SS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 17 2014

8 JUN 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR LT. GENERAL CHARLES A. GABRIEL, AF/XO

SUBJECT: Mission Element Need Statement, Satellite Operations Capability (U)

MERS-2

(U) The draft MENS forwarded in June 1979 for comment is a very well constructed document. The following comments are offered, referenced to the various sections in the MENS:

(a) II. Threat: We need to add one more threat - [redacted] which is a major Soviet effort and, if successful, can result in decreased effectiveness and increased vulnerability of our space systems.

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(a) I believe the threats can be prioritized as follows: (1) [redacted] (2) [redacted] (3) [redacted] (4) [redacted] and (5) [redacted]. Suggest you do not delete what you have, but highlight the more important military threats either by reordering in priority or underlining important sentences so the reader will understand the relative importance to a Satellite Operations Capability.

author

(a) You should explain in more detail what [redacted] and the consequences. The writeup on [redacted] is inadequate. Let's expand if it is a viable threat.

IV. Assessment, A. Deficiencies:

OSD 3.3(b)(1),(6)

(a) Vulnerability must be expanded if [redacted] is indeed a threat. Under the threat section, [redacted] is discussed extensively, yet here in this section it is treated minimally. Also, if [redacted] is a problem, it should be added.

(U) Under Natural Disasters the airplane landing on the STC is not convincing, and hurts our credibility. Put it in as an after thought, or think of a more probable accident. Accidental fires may be a greater hazard.

IV. ASSESSMENT, B. Technological Opportunity:

(U) This section could be stronger. Opportunities exist to (1) avoid single node and enhance space system survivability; (2) provide more

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on 7 June 1995~~

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Office of the Secretary of Defense 5U.S.C. 3552
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Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
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Reason: 3.3(b)(1)(B) + 5U.S.C. 3552(b)(6)
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capability (bird tending); (3) consolidate new ground stations; and,
(4) provide for growth (but start small). Discuss GPS and other new
programs where ground stations can be incorporated in SOC.

I'll be glad to discuss my comments with you further at your convenience.
Suggest you start incorporating these comments now - even though there may
be more to follow from other offices.

(SIGNED)

Harvin C. Atkins
Director
Offensive & Space Systems

[REDACTED] and OD(OSS)

3E139 x [REDACTED] 7 June 79

GSD 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

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102-16(b)
X 1307-02
Log No. 79-2136 STSS

8 JUN 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR LT. GENERAL CHARLES A. GABRIEL, AF/XO

SUBJECT: Mission Element Need Statement, DOD Shuttle Operations Capability (U)

(U) This is in response to your June 1979 memorandum transmitting the subject MBNS for comment. This MENS is a major improvement over prior drafts. Following suggestions are referenced to the sections in the MENS.

(U) 1.B. Task: Delete the first sentence as written and replace it with a brief paragraph containing the following points: (1) DOD dependence on space systems is growing; (2) the Shuttle will be an integral part of our space operations when DOD missions are flown; (3) by the mid-1980s we will be totally dependent on the Shuttle for access to space; (4) we are depending on the Shuttle with its new capabilities to achieve more effective, responsive space operations at lower costs; and, (5) military manned space operations will become routine in the Shuttle era.

(U) The reference to military contingency planning needs to be amplified to distinguish it from normal Shuttle mission contingency planning (abort, accident on orbit, loss of computers or communications).

(U) 1.B. 3: The need for EMP protection is questionable and needs to be thought through further.

(U) 1.B. 4: Meaning is not clear. In peacetime, STS can support some operations which are more survivable than STS. DOD Shuttle Operations Capability survivability should not be the weak link in Shuttle system survivability, neither should it be overdone.

(U) 1.B. 5: Should not Soviet jamming and even EMP be added to this section?

(U) II. Threat: The main threats that we are concerned about appear to be (1) [redacted] (2) [redacted] (3) [redacted] (4) [redacted] and (5) [redacted]. Do not delete what you have, but find a way to highlight for the reader what you consider most important (underline sentences or reorder threats). Accidental fires may be one of the most severe threats.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)(B)

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(U) II.B. Man Made Threat: The threat here applies to NASA Shuttle Mission Control facilities as well as to DOD Space Shuttle Mission Control facilities. Therefore, strike out DOD where used in this context.

(U) II.B. 2: This is obvious and not needed.

(U) II.B. 3: Any Soviet efforts to negate will depend on how they perceive the Shuttle, or any particular DOD payload being launched on the Shuttle, as a threat. This is for clarification.

(U) III.B. Planned Control Capabilities: More description is needed on JSC and their MCC. I suggest this be a lead paragraph. Explain that JSC controls flights from KSC and VAFB for all users including DOD. Add brief descriptions of NASA networks, the TDRSS, and Centers that relate to JSC MCC. Also, we have to tie in JSC MCC to our SPADOCS and NCA. The controlled mode discussion should follow this paragraph.

(U) IV.A. 1. Vulnerability: I suggest you follow the arrangement you used on the SOC MENS and treat, under separate headings, Natural Disaster (hurricane, flood), Hostile Acts, and Accidents (accidental fires).

(U) IV.A. 2. Security: This may be a valid deficiency. Some documentation is needed, however, to substantiate the need to handle payload related data above the Secret level at JSC. Then, we need to state why it is impractical to handle such data at JSC (i.e., too costly, too much risk sensitive data will be acquired by Soviets, too much interference with civil operations, etc.). We need to state how we will conduct sortie operations using JSC until a DOD facility is available.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

(U) IV.A. 3. Control, 4. Charter, 6. Operability: The theme appears to be that to fully exploit the capabilities of the Shuttle to achieve more effective, flexible, and responsive military space operations, DOD needs a Shuttle control capability that is fully integrated with DOD's systems for control of all military forces. Perhaps these three paragraphs in the MENS can be shortened and sharpened to support this theme.

(U) IV.A. 3: In a period of austerity, this argument is not going to be very compelling, especially outside the Pentagon. We have already run into trouble with OMB on it. Emphasis here may be counterproductive. Suggest shortening.

(U) IV.A. 5: Citing two studies with significantly different results may be counterproductive.

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(U) IV.A. 6: If the point in the last sentence is a strong one, it could be expanded.

(U) IV.B. Technological and Programmatic Opportunity: This is weak. Opportunities exist to (1) avoid a single vulnerable node in national Shuttle system, thereby enhancing Shuttle survivability and in turn DOD sp space system survivability; (2) improve our space system security against Soviet intelligence collection; (3) provide some additional capability as needed for Shuttle flight control; (4) backup civil missions where required; (5) enhance effectiveness of our space operations.

This paragraph should state that even with a DOD Shuttle control capability, some DOD missions would still be conducted from KSC to exercise the backup role of KSC with its controlled mode capability.

(U) V. Dispersed Facilities: Add this paragraph as you did in the SOC MENS to introduce the thought of physical separation from natural threats.

(U) V.B. Interoperability: The point on mutual backup is a good one. Could be expanded.

(U) E. Timing of Need: Please do not equivocate. State clearly when you want it.

(U) VI.A. Existing Capability: In parallel with III.A., should read "None." No DOD or NASA capability now exists.

(U) Our strongest selling point is that critical national capabilities depend on a single node at JSC. Next best points are security and JSC work-load. The MENS boilerplate format should not stand in the way of these themes. I will be glad to discuss my comments with you further at your convenience. Suggest you start incorporating these comments now, even though there may be more to follow from other offices.

(SIGNED)

Marvin C. Atkins
Director
Offensive & Space Systems

md OD(OSS)
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DS) 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

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