

CIA

EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs  
EO 13526 1.4(d)<25Yrs

[REDACTED] Maj, OSD

From: [REDACTED] MSG (MNB-NW) C2 SGM/Battle Captain  
Sent: Wednesday, December 15, 2004 1:49 AM  
To: [REDACTED] BG, OSD  
Cc: [REDACTED] (E-mail); [REDACTED] MSG (MNB-NW) C2 SGM/Battle Captain  
Subject: Ref Former Mosul Police Chief Barhawi

BARHAWI UPDATE  
20040926.ppt (5...

OSD 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

Sir,

BG Ham asked me to pass this information to you related to the former Mosul Police Chief Barhawi. There are three emails, minimum, that will be sent. This email has the PowerPoint presentation that has the list of all the products I will attach to a subsequent email(s), as well as the link diagram relating Barhawi to AIF.

Please let me know once you receive the information, and if there is anything else you need from us.

&lt;&lt;BARHAWI UPDATE 20040926.ppt&gt;&gt;

12/16

v/r

[REDACTED]  
MSG, USA  
Task Force Olympia C2 SGM  
Mosul, Iraq  
Camp Freedom  
DNVT: [REDACTED]  
DSN: [REDACTED]  
SIPR: [REDACTED]  
NIPR: [REDACTED]

Sir -  
Barhawi info as  
requested for BG Ham.

D

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: APR 11 2014

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. § 552

Chief, RDD, FSD, WHS

Date: 11 APR 2014 Authority: EO 13526

Declassify: Deny in Full:


Declassify in Part: X

Reason: 1.4(c)(1) + 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 1005.1.424 (6)



MDR: 14-M-2114

14-M-2114

11-M-1737



# MOSUL POLICE CHIEF BARHAWI



**OVERALL CLASSIFICATION OF THIS BRIEFING IS:**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

**28 SEP 04**

BARHAM JIGOUK & DAWOOD  
POLICE CORRUPTION MEDIA TRAINING



GENERAL JASSIM AL HAMDANI

POLICE CHIEF

MOSUL

AL HATRA MOVED TO HAMDANIYAH

AL HATRA MOVED TO HAMDANIYAH

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

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
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
COLONEL NAZAR  
POLICE INTELLIGENCE TASK FORCE  
MOSUL



COLONEL MOFOUK  
POLICE CHIEF  
TALL A'FAR



COLONEL JASSIM AL HAMDANI  
POLICE CHIEF  
AL HATRA MOVED TO HAMDANIYAH



SUPPORTERS OF  
THE AL JALLEH TRIBE - SHIA TRIBE - MUQTADA AL SADR  
THE AL HAYO TRIBE - WAHABBI TRIBE - AL QAEDA  
RECEIVE SALARY FROM NAJAF & FALLUJAH,  
FOR THEIR PASSIVE & ACTIVE SUPPORT OF AIF IN TALL A'FAR

AMIN MAHMOOD OTHMAN  
MAYOR  
TALL A'FAR



COLONEL DAWOOD  
ASSISTANT POLICE CHIEF  
TALL A'FAR

ABU ZANA AL-FARHAT  
& AIF INSURGENTS

MEETS WITH AT HIS HOME IN AL-GERGERI NEIGHBORHOOD

SECRET//REL TO USA, MOVI

**GENERAL BARHAWI**  
**MOSUL POLICE CHIEF**



~~SECRET//REL TO USA MCF~~

**CIIR 3SBCT209-134-04-037 DOI: 28 FEBRUARY 2004: TIES STRAINED.**

**(S) TWO IZPD GENERAL OFFICERS MURDERED 25 FEB 04 IN MOSUL.**

SUMMARY: ON 25 FEB 04, MAJOR GENERAL (MG) HEKMAR MAHMOOD MOHAMMED AND MG ABDUL ILAAH AL-ANAZ, BOTH IZP OFFICERS, WERE MURDERED SEPARATELY IN MOSUL, IZ. THERE WERE SEVERAL WITNESSES TO MG MOHAMMED'S MURDER. PRIOR TO THE OVERTHROW OF IRAQ'S FORMER REGIME, MG MOHAMMED WAS THE DEPUTY CHIEF, MOSUL POLICE. AFTER THE FALL OF THE REGIME, MG MOHAMMED'S SUDDENLY BECAME RICH. HE AND MAJ ZIAD AWNI, CURRENTLY THE CHIEF, AL HADBAA POLICE STATION, AL HADBAA NEIGHBORHOOD, WERE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED, AND WERE BOTH SUSPECTED OF HAVING STOLEN MONEY FROM THE FORMER IRAQI GOVERNMENT DURING ITS COLLAPSE. MG MOHAMMED'S RELATIONSHIP WITH GEN BARHAWI, COMMANDER AND CHIEF, MOSUL POLICE, WAS STRAINED.

**CIIR 3SBCT 209-134-04-054 DOI: 15 MARCH 2004: THREATS.**

**(S) IZPD INTERFERING WITH IRAQIS ATTEMPTING TO REPORT MATTERS OF POTENTIAL INTEREST TO COALITION FORCES.**

SUMMARY: IZP OFFICERS WORKING WITH U.S. MILITARY POLICE (MP) FREQUENTLY PREVENT IRAQIS FROM REPORTING INFORMATION ON CRIMINAL MATTERS TO MP'S. THE INFORMATION DETAILS AUTOMOBILE THEFTS, WEAPONS, BLACK MARKETING, AND ITEMS POTENTIALLY STOLEN FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. IZPD ARE ALSO DIRECTED TO HAVE NO UNAUTHORIZED CONTACT WITH COALITION FORCES. THERE IS A GROWING CULTURE OF ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENT IN THE MOSUL POLICE. THE OFFICERS WHO ARE PRO-U.S. FACE PERSECUTION FROM OFFICERS RANGING FROM GEN MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI, CHIEF OF POLICE, TO LOW LEVEL OFFICERS SUCH AS TAHA.


**DIIR SBCT 209-134-04-062 DOI: 25 MAY 2004: THREATS.**

**(S) INDIVIDUALS WHO CLAIM THEY ARE BEING THREATENED BY NCF TO NOT COOPERATE WITH COALITION FORCES.**

SUMMARY: ON 25 MAY 04, TAAGHRED M. GORW FOUND AN ENVELOPE WITH AN AFFIXED 7.62 MM AMMUNITION ROUND, UNDER HER DOOR. THE ENVELOPE CONTAINED A LETTER THAT THREATENED HER DUE TO HER EMPLOYMENT BY COALITION FORCES AND THE IZPD. GORW IS ALSO CURRENTLY TRAINING AT THE POLICE ACADEMY TO BECOME AN OFFICER IN THE IZP. IF SHE SUCCESSFULLY ATTAINS AN IZPD COMMISSION, SHE WILL BE THE ONLY FEMALE OFFICER IN MOSUL'S IZPD. SHE WORKS PART-TIME AT MOSUL MAIN IZP HEADQUARTERS, AL DAWASA NEIGHBORHOOD, MOSUL AS ONE OF IZPD CHIEF GEN BARHAWI'S SECRETARY.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

~~SECRET//REL TO USA MCF~~



~~SECRET//REL TO USA MOF~~

**DIIR SBCT 209-134-04-154 DOI: 08 AUGUST 2004: FINANCIAL CORRUPTION.**

(~~SECRET//REL TO USA MOF~~) PRIOR TO 5 AUG 04, BASED ON A VARIETY OF FACTORS, DURAYE KESHMOOLA, THE GOVERNOR OF NINEVAH PROVINCE, WAS STRONGLY CONSIDERING REMOVING AND REPLACING THE CURRENT CHIEF OF THE MOSUL IPD, MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI, WITH A NEW POLICE OFFICIAL.

SUMMARY: ALLEGATIONS OF GEN BARHAWI KNOWINGLY MISALLOCATING SALARIES FOR POLICE PERSONNEL WHO HAVE LITTLE TO NO INVOLVEMENT WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE DEPARTMENTS.

**DIIR SBCT 209-134-04-155 DOI: 08 AUGUST 2004: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY LINKED TO AN INVESTIGATION.**

(~~SECRET//REL TO USA MOF~~) ON 6 AUG 04, THE HOME OF RETIRED MG SALEM AL MALOOH WAS BOMBED.

SUMMARY: ON OR ABOUT 7 AUG 04, PERSONNEL FROM THE FAISALIA POLICE DEPARTMENT DEPLOYED TO A HOME ADJACENT TO THE RESIDENCE OF MJG SALEM, BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SUSPICIOUS NEIGHBORS, NFI. UPON ARRIVING, THE POLICE DETERMINED THE PREVIOUS OCCUPANTS HAD RECENTLY DESERTED THE HOME. EVIDENCE OF BOMB MAKING MATERIALS WAS FOUND AT THE HOME. NFI. INTERVIEWS OF NEIGHBORS DETERMINED INDIVIDUALS FROM YEMEN HAD LIVED IN THE HOUSE AS RECENTLY AS 6 AUG 04. THE YEMINIS ARE THE PRIMARY SUSPECTS IN THE BOMBING OF SALEM'S HOME THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE RAID OF THE YEMINIS' HOME WAS RECENTLY CLOSED. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED DURING THE INVESTIGATION IS BIGOTED, AND WAS PASSED FROM BG MAUFUK, CHIEF OF THE FAISALIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, TO THE INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATIVE TASK FORCE RECENTLY ESTABLISHED BY MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI.

**DIIR SBCT 209-134-04-160 DOI: 08 AUGUST 2004: INTEL TASK FORCE COLLECTION ON AIF INSURGENTS.**

(~~SECRET//REL TO USA MOF~~) MOSUL IP CHIEF GEN MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI HAS ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL TASK FORCE, LED BY COL NAZAR, TO HANDLE INVESTIGATIVE AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS REGARDING FOREIGN SUPPORT OF AIF ACTIVITIES. THE TASK FORCE IS COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF BARHAWI'S TRUSTED OFFICERS.

SUMMARY: BARHAWI MANAGES THE NORMAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION'S WORK WITH INFORMANTS THROUGH INSISTING ALL IDENTITIES OF INFORMANTS BE REVEALED TO HIM. ADDITIONALLY, BARHAWI INSISTS THAT HE APPROVE ALL FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR INFORMANTS NO OTHER OFFICIALS ASIDE FROM BARHAWI ARE PRIVY TO THE INFORMATION RECEIVED BY NAZAR'S TASKFORCE. BARHAWI HAS INCREASINGLY BEEN PRACTICING THE OLD ADAGE KNOWN AS "KNOWLEDGE IS POWER". I DO NOT BELIEVE GEN BARHAWI IS MAINTAINING POSITIVE CONTROL OVER THE FLOW OF INFORMATION IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE LEAKS TO AIF THROUGH IP INFORMANTS. HOWEVER, THAT IS HOW GEN BARHAWI IS RATIONALIZING HIS INCREASINGLY RESTRICTIVE POLICIES.

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~~SECRET//REL TO USA MOF~~

**GENERAL BARHAWI**  
**MOSUL POLICE CHIEF**



~~SECRET//REL TO USA MCF~~

**DIIR SBCT 209-134-04-159 DOI: 10 AUGUST 2004: FINANCIAL CORRUPTION.**

~~(SUPER SECRET//REL TO USA MCF)~~ IP STATIONS IN MOSUL, IZ ARE UNDER-FUNDED, AND THIS HAS GREATLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF IP OFFICERS IN MOSUL.

SUMMARY: FIVE FORMER OFFICERS IN THE IP SUBMITTED A MEMO TO MNF CLAIMING KNOWLEDGE OF RAMPANT CORRUPTION IN THE IP FORCE. THEY CLAIM GEN BARHAWI IS GUILTY OF CORRUPTION AND SHOWING GROSS FAVORITISM TOWARD THOSE IN HIS OWN TRIBE AND ASSOCIATES, VERSUS OTHER PERSONNEL. CURRENTLY ONLY THE AL-DAWASA IP STATION CAN SUPPORT MNF ACTIVITIES DUE TO LACK OF FUNDING AND PERSONNEL. 3-2 SBCT CHECK POINT 28 IS THE ONLY CP MANNED BY IP AMONG THE SEVEN LOCATED IN THE WESTERN SECTOR OF MOSUL. NONE OF THE OTHER SIX IP CHECKPOINTS ARE MANNED ON A REGULAR BASIS.

**DIIR 504-310-335-04-141 DOI: 17 AUGUST 2004: FAMILY TIES.**

~~(SUPER SECRET//REL TO USA MCF)~~ MOHAMMED KHALAF SHAKARA IS RELATED TO THE NINEWAH GOVERNATE, IZ, CHIEF OF POLICE, AS WELL AS A DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF IN AL HATRA, IZ.

SUMMARY: BARHAWI AND SHAKARA ARE BOTH FROM THE HAMDANI TRIBE. BOTH BARHAWI AND SHAKARA ARE RELATED TO COLONEL JASSIM AL HAMDANI, WHO WAS THE POLICE CHIEF OF AL HATRA UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 1 AUGUST 2004. AT THAT TIME, CHIEF BARHAWI MOVED JASSIM TO HAMDANIYAH, IZ. TO BE THE POLICE CHIEF THERE. BARHAWI MOVED HIM BECAUSE JASSIM WAS TOO OBVIOUS ABOUT ALLOWING TERRORISTS, INCLUDING SHAKARA, TO MOVE TO AND OPERATE IN AL HATRA

**DIIR 504-310-335-04-144 DOI: 18 AUGUST 2004: CORRUPTION WITHIN THE RANKS.**

~~(SUPER SECRET//REL TO USA MCF)~~ AN IRAQI POLICEMAN FROM HAMMAM ALIL, IZ, TOOK BRIBES AT THE CHECKPOINT AT THE GATES OF MOSUL ON HIGHWAY 1. THE NINEWAH GOVERNATE CHIEF OF POLICE PROMISED TO MOVE THE OFFICER TO A DIFFERENT POST.

SUMMARY: WHEN BARHAWI WAS INFORMED OF THIS BEHAVIOR, HE PROMISED TO MOVE THE OFFICER TO A DIFFERENT POST. WHEN ASKED WHY HE WOULD NOT FIRE THE OFFICER, BARHAWI EXPLAINED THAT ONLY THE IRAQI MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR IN BAGHDAD COULD FIRE POLICE OFFICERS. HE DID NOT PROMISE TO ASK THAT THE OFFICER BE FIRED.

**DIIR 504-310-332-04-120 DOI: 18 AUGUST 2004: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY LINKED TO FINANCIAL CORRUPTION.**

~~(SUPER SECRET//REL TO USA MCF)~~ APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS AGO, BARHAWI, POLICE CHIEF OF POLICE HEADQUARTERS, MOSUL, IZ, FIRED THA'RE FOR UNKNOWN REASONS.

SUMMARY: THA'RE ABDUL HAMEED MUSTAFA (PHONETIC), FORMER IZ POLICE OFFICER, POLICE HEADQUARTERS, MOSUL, IZ, CURRENTLY A SELF-EMPLOYED VEHICLE CONTRACTOR IS TRANSPORTING VEHICLES CONTAINING UNSPECIFIED EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE INTO IRAQ FROM SYRIA AND TURKEY. LOCAL RUMORS INDICATE THA'RE DISAPPEARED WITH \$900,000 US DOLLARS ALLOCATED FROM MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES TO IZ POLICE TO STRENGTHEN THEIR EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE. OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS, EXACT DATES AND TIMES UNRECALLED, THA'RE TRAVELED TO DIHOK AND ZAKHO SEVERAL TIMES TO CONDUCT MEETINGS WITH UNIDENTIFIED MEMBERS OF SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE AND UNIDENTIFIED AIF CONTACTS.

~~SECRET//REL TO USA MCF~~

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**GENERAL BARHAWI**  
**MOSUL POLICE CHIEF**



**SECRET//NOFORN**

**DIIR 504-310-332-04-122 DOI: 19 AUGUST 2004: LINKS TO AIF.**

(SUBJECT) DURING THE ATTACKS CONDUCTED BY AIF ON 4 AUGUST 2004, THE IZ POLICE DETAINED AND THEN RELEASED SEVEN AIF PERSONNEL FROM THE HUMERAH VILLAGE, MOSUL, IZ.

SUMMARY: BARHAWI MADE THE DECISION TO RELEASE THE SEVEN AIF PERSONNEL. HE TOLD THE AIF MEMBERS AS HE RELEASED THEM TO SAY HELLO TO THEIR FRIENDS AND TO LET THEM KNOW WE HAVE NOTHING AGAINST THEM. HE WENT ON TO REQUEST AIF NOT ATTACK IZ POLICE BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT AGAINST AIF ACTIVITIES, HOWEVER, THEY ARE FREE TO ATTACK MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES AS OFTEN AS THEY WISH.

**19 AUGUST 2004: CORRUPTION WITHIN THE RANKS.**

**MOSUL POLICE CHIEF'S FAILURE TO REACT TO POLICE WARNINGS ON 4 AUGUST 2004; POLICE CHIEF'S DEALINGS WITH SUBORDINATES.**

SUMMARY: MOSUL POLICE OFFICERS IN CHARGE OF THE AL-GHIZLANI DISTRICT OF MOSUL PHONED BARHAWI WITH AN IMMEDIATE REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE ON 04 AUGUST 2004, BARHAWI PROMISED TO SEND IMMEDIATE SUPPORT, HOWEVER THAT SUPPORT NEVER ARRIVED AND BARHAWI NEVER RECONTACTED THE UNIT TO LEARN OF ITS FATE. ALSO, BARHAWI CONTINUES TO HAVE FINANCIAL DEALINGS WITH SUBORDINATES, A SITUATION WHICH HAS CAUSED A FALL OUT

**8 JULY 2004: CORRUPTION WITHIN THE RANKS.**

**MOSUL ANTI-CORRUPTION OFFICE REPORT ON THE NINAWA POLICE FORCE.**

SUMMARY: THE MOSUL ANTI-CORRUPTION OFFICE PERFORMS AN ASSESSMENT ON THE CURRENT POLICE FORCE UNDER BARHAWI. AMONG THE ISSUES BROUGHT UP ARE THE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE, PAY ISSUES, THE QUALITY OF RECRUITS, AND THE INDISCRIMINATE HIRING AND FIRING OF POLICE OFFICERS BY BARHAWI.

**9 JUNE 2004: TIES STRAINED.**

**TENSIONS BETWEEN NINAWA GOVERNOR AND MOSUL POLICE CHIEF.**

SUMMARY: SINCE GOVERNOR KUSHMULLA HAS BECOME GOVERNOR, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL INCIDENTS OF DISRESPECT BY BARHAWI TOWARDS HIM, AN ATTITUDE SHARED BY HIS BROTHER IN THE IIP.

**20 JULY 2003: PAST HISTORY.**

**MOSUL POLICE CHIEF'S FORMER SERVICE AS AN IRAQI SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER.**

SUMMARY: BARHAWI SERVED IN MID JULY 2003 AS AN IRAQI SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER, AND BOASTED THAT AT THE BATTLE OF HADITHA HE LED FOUR ATTACKS AGAINST MNF AND KILLED MANY U.S. SOLDIERS.


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**SECRET//NOFORN**

OSD 1.4(c)(2)

CIA 1.4(c)(2)

~~GENERAL BARHAWI~~  
~~MOSUL POLICE CHIEF~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**5 AUGUST 2004: POLICE CORRUPTION.**

**EVENTS AT NINAWA GOVERNOR'S OFFICE DURING 4 AUG 2004 VIOLENCE IN MOSUL; PARTICIPATION OF NON-UNIFORMED POLICE IN ATTACKS.**

SUMMARY: JUST PRIOR TO VIOLENCE BREAKING OUT IN FRONT OF THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE IN MOSUL THE MORNING OF 4 AUG 2004, THERE WAS A NOTICEABLE DECREASE (APPROX. 90%) IN THE PRESENCE OF POLICE FORCES. BARHAWI CLAIMED THAT THE POLICE WERE FIGHTING THE INSURGENTS, DESPITE EVIDENCE (INCLUDING A VIDEO OF A POLICE OFFICER TAKING PART IN THE VIOLENCE) THAT POLICE WERE FACILITATING AIF ACTIVITY BY STANDING ASIDE.

**6 AUGUST 2004: FINANCIAL CORRUPTION.**

**CORRUPT AND ANTI-COALITION ACTIVITIES OF SENIOR MOSUL POLICE OFFICERS.**

SUMMARY: COALITION FUNDS THAT HAVE BEEN PUSHED OUT FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF POLICE FACILITIES AND CHECKPOINTS HAVE NOT BEEN BEING SPENT ON SUCH PROJECTS, RATHER THE CHEAPEST MEANS POSSIBLE ARE USED AND THE REMAINING FUNDS ARE EMBEZZLED, POSSIBLY BY BARHAWI WHO HAS SPENDING MEANS WELL BEYOND THE MEANS OF A POLICE CHIEF. ALSO SMUGGLING OPERATIONS ALONG THE SYRIAN BORDER ARE OFTEN ALLOWED TO CONTINUE AFTER A LARGE SUM OF MONEY IS PAID TO THE APPREHENDING OFFICER.

**13 AUGUST 2004: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY.**

**STATUS OF MOSUL POLICE CHIEF FOLLOWING 4 AUGUST 2004 VIOLENCE IN MOSUL.**

SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH APOLOGIZING FOR HEATED ARGUMENTS WITH THE NINAWA GOVERNOR, BARHAWI FAILED TO APOLOGIZE FOR, OR EXPLAIN, THE LACK OF A POLICE PRESENCE ON 4 AUGUST. BARHAWI AND HIS ENTIRE IMMEDIATE FAMILY ACQUIRED IRAQI PASSPORTS, AND AN ASSOCIATE OF BARHAWI FLED TO TURKEY FEARING BEING ARRESTED, INDICATING BARHAWI MAY INTEND TO LEAVE IRAQ UNANNOUNCED.

**6 AUGUST 2004: STRAINED TIES.**

**REQUEST OF NINAWA GOVERNOR TO REPLACE MOSUL POLICE CHIEF DUE TO PERFORMANCE ON 4 AUGUST 2004.**

SUMMARY: ON 5 AUGUST THE NINAWA GOVERNOR FORWARDED A WRITTEN REQUEST TO THE IRAQI MINISTER OF INTERIOR TO HAVE BARHAWI REPLACED AS THE POLICE CHIEF OF THE NINAWA PROVINCE. AMONG THE REASONS LISTED WERE CORRUPTION AND TIES TO THE BA'ATH PARTY.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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**GENERAL BARHAWI**  
**MOSUL POLICE CHIEF**



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**IIR 6 067 3507 04, 08 AUGUST 04: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY.**

~~(REF TO MOSUL)~~ **NEW MOSUL POLICE TASK FORCE TO INVESTIGATE FOREIGN TIES TO INSURGENT ACTIVITY.**

SUMMARY: BARHAWI HAS FORMED A NEW INTELLIGENCE UNIT TO INVESTIGATE FOREIGN TIES TO INSURGENTS, AND HAS ALSO STOVE-PIPED REPORTS FROM THE ORIGINAL INTELLIGENCE ASSETS OF THE IRAQI POLICE, AND IT IS NOT VIEWED AS LIKELY THAT HE IS ATTEMPTING TO ELIMINATE LEAKS IN THE SYSTEM.

**10 JULY 2004: CORRUPTION WITHIN RANKS.**

~~(REF TO MOSUL)~~ **FAILURE BY MOSUL POLICE CHIEF TO DIRECT POLICE RESOURCES AGAINST INSURGENTS.**

SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH BARHAWI AND HIS SENIOR OFFICERS ARE AWARE OF THE FAILURE OF SOME POLICE PRECINCTS TO ACT ON CURRENTLY AVAILABLE INSURGENT ACTIVITY, THEY HAVE FAILED TO EXERT PRESSURE TO CORRECT THIS ISSUE. ALSO BARHAWI AND SENIOR LEADERS KNOW THE IDENTITIES OF POLICE OFFICERS WHO FIRED ON NON-MILITARY U.S. GOVERNMENT VEHICLES IN LATE MAY OR EARLY JUNE.

**26 JULY 2004: CORRUPTION WITHIN RANKS.**

~~(REF TO MOSUL)~~ **DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTHWESTERN IRAQ DUE TO A LACK OF PERSONNEL AND CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE NINEWA CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN BI'AJ.**

SUMMARY: THE GOVERNMENT IN BI'AJ CONSIDERS THE SITUATION IN BI'AJ TO BE UNSTABLE AND WORSENING, THEY BLAME THE NINEWA CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN MOSUL FOR PREVENTING THEM FROM ADDRESSING THE SITUATION. A LIST OF OVER 200 CANDIDATES WERE SENT UP TO MOSUL TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE POLICE FORCE, BUT APPROVAL WAS GRANTED FOR LESS THAN 30 CANDIDATES. THE NAMES APPROVED WERE NOT AMONG THOSE CHOSEN BY THE MAYOR AND POLICE CHIEF, BUT WERE INDIVIDUALS WITH FAMILY CONNECTIONS TO THE POLICE CHIEF OR OTHER OFFICIALS. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT BARHAWI WAS POCKETING THE FUNDING INTENDED FOR THE POSITIONS THEY WANTED TO FILL.

**IIR 2 363 3104 04, 17 AUGUST 2004: LINKS TO AIF.**

~~(REF TO MOSUL)~~ **ANSAR AL-ISLAM LEADER RELATED TO IRAQI POLICE PERSONNEL.**

SUMMARY: BARHAWI IS RELATED TO SHAKARA THROUGH TRIBAL RELATIONS, THEY ARE BOTH ALSO RELATED TO POLICE CHIEF JASSIM AL HAMDANI WHO WAS MOVED FROM AL HATRA FOR BEING TOO OPEN IN ALLOWED INSURGENTS TO OPERATE IN AL HATRA.

**01 AUGUST 2004: SUSPICIOUS INVESTIGATION RESULTS.**

~~(REF TO MOSUL)~~ **RESULTS OF MOSUL POLICE CHIEF'S INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF NINAWA GOVERNOR 'USAMA KASHMULLA.**


SUMMARY: THE IRAQI POLICE COMPLETED IT'S INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF THE FORMER NINAWA GOVERNOR AND CONCLUDED THAT THE ASSASSINATION WAS NOT PREMEDITATED, THE INSURGENTS JUST HAPPENED TO BE IN THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME. A CONCLUSION THAT WAS REJECTED BY THE COUNCIL.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

OSD 1.4(c)(d) CIA 1.4(c)(d)

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**GENERAL BARHAWI**  
**MOSUL POLICE CHIEF**



**SECRET//NOFORN**

**202033ZSEP04: AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD POLICE CORRUPTION'S IMPACT ON IRAQI ELECTIONS**

**(S//NF) NINEWA SECURITY AFFECTS ELECTIONS EXPECTATIONS**

CHIEF BARHAWI'S INEFFECTIVENESS IS WELL NOTICED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS AND STILL NOTHING IS DONE TO REPLACE HIM EVEN THOUGH THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN RAISED BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT. THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF BARHAWI FROM HIS POSITION HAS NOT BEEN ACTED UPON.

OSD 1.4(c)(2) CIA 1.4(c)(2)

**09 SEP 04 POLICE INACTIVITY OR INEFFICIENCY**

**REFUSAL BY MOSUL POLICE AND OTHER SERVICES TO RESPOND TO EMERGENCY SITUATIONS**

AS OF EARLY SEPTEMBER 2004, THE MOSUL POLICE DEPARTMENT CONTINUED TO FAIL TO RESPOND TO EMERGENCY CALLS. POLICE OFFICERS ATTRIBUTED THEIR FAILURE TO RESPOND TO ORDERS FROM SENIOR POLICE OFFICIALS, INCLUDING CHIEF MUHAMMAD KHAYRI ((BARHAWI)).

**POLICE CHIEF INTIMIDATION**

**(S//NF) MOSUL POLICE CHIEF BARHAWI MAY BE PREPARED TO DEPART IRAQ (U)**

BARHAWI HAS NOT BEEN THE SAME SINCE HIS SISTER WAS KIDNAPPED. HE IS NOT AS AGGRESSIVE AS HE USED TO BE. BARHAWI IS PLANNING ON GETTING OUT OF IRAQ BEFORE THE TERRORISTS KILL HIM.

OSD 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

DIA 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

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**SECRET//NOFORN**

## OTHER REPORTING



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

### **29 JULY 2004: LINKS TO AIF.**

#### **IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD DECIDES TO HALT JOINT OPERATIONS WITH POLICE IN MOSUL.**

SUMMARY: AS OF LATE JULY, THE ING WERE NO LONGER ALLOWING THE MOSUL POLICE TO PARTICIPATE IN JOINT OPERATIONS WITH COALITION FORCES BECAUSE THE POLICE COULD NOT BE TRUSTED WITH TARGETING INFORMATION. ING BELIEVED THAT PREVIOUS TIP-OFFS HAD NOT BEEN LIMITED TO ISOLATED INCIDENTS INVOLVING JUNIOR POLICE OFFICERS OR EVEN ONE OR TWO BAD NEIGHBORHOOD POLICE FORCES. THE ING CONFRONTED BARHAWI WITH EVIDENCE OF SUCH ACTIVITY AND THEIR INTENTION TO DROP MOSUL POLICE FROM THEIR OPERATIONS.

### **20 JULY 2004: TIES WITH AIF.**

#### **ANTI-COALITION ACTIVITIES OF CURRENT NINAWA PROVINCIAL COUNCIL MEMBERS.**

SUMMARY: [REDACTED] WAS PROVIDING PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO TERRORIST LEADER MUHAMMAD KHALAF ((SHAKARA)), AKA ((ABU TALHA)). [REDACTED] WAS A MEMBER OF [REDACTED] AND WAS PROVIDING SHAKARA AND HIS FOLLOWERS WITH INFORMATION THAT WOULD HELP THEM AVOID CAPTURE. [REDACTED] AN IMAM [REDACTED] IN THE [REDACTED] NEIGHBORHOOD IN MOSUL, HAD ATTACKED THE COALITION, THE IIG, AND IRAQI PRIME MINISTER AYAD AL-((ALAWI)) [REDACTED] IN MID-JULY.

### **13 AUGUST 2004: COUNCIL TIES STRAINED.**

#### **FAILURE OF IRAQI ISLAMIC PARTY (IIP) MEMBERS TO RE-ENTER NINAWA PROVINCIAL COUNCIL; IIP PLANS TO OPPOSE UPCOMING IRAQI ELECTIONS.**

AS OF EARLY AUGUST 2004, THE NINAWA PROVINCIAL COUNCIL HAD DECIDED THAT NONE OF THE EIGHT IRAQI ISLAMIC PARTY (IIP) MEMBERS WHO HAD RESIGNED FROM THE COUNCIL IN LATE JULY COULD RETURN TO THEIR COUNCIL SEATS. AFTER 4 AUGUST, NONE OF THE IIP'S FORMER COUNCIL MEMBERS HAD EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN RETURNING TO THE COUNCIL AND THEY WILLINGLY SUBMITTED WRITTEN RESIGNATIONS. IIP LEADERS SUBSEQUENTLY ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD NOT SUPPORT UPCOMING ELECTIONS IN IRAQ AND PLANNED TO CALL ON FOLLOWERS TO AGITATE AGAINST ANY ELECTIONS. THE COMMITTEE OF ISLAMIC SCHOLARS SUPPORTED THE IIP IN THIS EFFORT AND BOTH PARTIES INTENDED TO ATTEMPT TO INCREASE THEIR SUPPORT IN THE COMING MONTHS FOR A POPULAR BOYCOTT OF ELECTIONS.

OSD 1.4(k)(2) CTA 1.4(c)(2)

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**MOSUL POLICE GEN MOHAMMED KADI  
MAHMOOD AL-BARHAWI ASSOCIATES AND  
CORRUPTION ACTIVITIES**

**OVERALL CLASSIFICATION OF  
THIS BRIEFING IS:**

**~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

**DECLASSIFIED IN FULL**

**Authority: EO 13526**

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**BARHAWI MOFOUK & DAWOOD**  
**POLICE CORRUPTION, AMMAN PROVINCE**



GENERAL DAWOOD

POLICE

AMMAN

AMMAN

AMMAN

MOHAMMED KHALAF SHAKRA

AMMAN

GENERAL DAWOOD MOFOUK  
POLICE DEPUTY FOR WESTERN MOSUL

**COLONEL NAZAR**  
**POLICE INTELLIGENCE TASK FORCE**  
**MOSUL (LIAISON TO BARHAWI)**



DETAINED. REPLACED WITH  
NEW POLICE CHIEF ISHMAEL

**COLONEL MOFOUK**  
**POLICE CHIEF**  
**TALL A'FAR**

**COLONEL JASSIM AL HAMDANI**  
**POLICE CHIEF**  
**AL HATRA MOVED TO HAMDANIYAH**



SUPPORTERS OF  
THE AL JALLEH TRIBE - SHIA TRIBE - MUQTADA AL SADR  
THE AL HAYO TRIBE - WAHABBI TRIBE - AL QAEDA  
RECEIVE SALARY FROM NAJAF & FALLUJAH,  
FOR THEIR PASSIVE & ACTIVE SUPPORT OF AIF IN TALL A'FAR

ABU ANAS (LEGISLATIVE)  
HASSAN FARHAT (TALL A'FAR)  
SLAEH JUMA SALIH (HAMMAM AL ALIL)  
MUHAMMED ANIF AL JABURI  
ABU ZIAD (SHARGAT)  
FNU LNU (SINJAR)

**AMIN MAHMOOD OTHMAN**  
**MAYOR**  
**TALL A'FAR**



REMOVED FROM OFFICE. GOVERNOR KASHMOULLA  
AWAITING LETTER OF REINSTATMENT FROM THE  
PRESIDENT


REPLACEMENT WAS MOHAMMED RASHEED HAMEED  
AHMAD

**COLONEL DAWOOD**  
**ASSISTANT POLICE CHIEF**  
**TALL AFAR**

**ABU ZANA AL-FARHAT**  
**& AIF INSURGENTS**  
MEETS WITH AT HIS HOME IN AL-GERGERI NEIGHBORHOOD

SECRET//NOFORN

**GENERAL PARHAM**  
**MOSUL POLICE CHIEF**



**SECRET//NOFORN**

**STATUS OF REPORTING - ROLLUP 16 OCT 2004**

PERFORMANCE	1				
TARGETING INSURGENTS	2				
BEHAVIORAL CHANGE	1				
LINKS TO AIF	4				
CORRUPTION W/IN THE RANKS	6				
FAMILY TIES TO AIF	2				
CREATION OF CTER	1				
CREATION INTEL TASK FORCE	1				
SUSP. ACTIVITY LINKED TO AIF	5				
FINANCIAL CORRUPTION	4				
THREATS TO PRO IZ & POLICE	3				
TIES STRAINED	3				

**SECRET//REL TO USA MCFI**


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
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# EXTREMIST NETWORK



**GENERAL BARHAWI**  
**MOSUL POLICE CHIEF**



**~~SECRET//REL TO USA MOF~~**  
**DIIR REPORTING IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER**

**CIIR 3SBCT209-134-04-037 DOI: 28 FEBRUARY 2004: TIES STRAINED.**

**~~(SECRET//REL TO USA MOF)~~ TWO IZPD GENERAL OFFICERS MURDERED 25 FEB 04 IN MOSUL.**

SUMMARY: ON 25 FEB 04, MAJOR GENERAL (MG) HEKMAR MAHMOOD MOHAMMED AND MG ABDUL ILAAH AL-ANAZ, BOTH IZP OFFICERS, WERE MURDERED SEPARATELY IN MOSUL, IZ. THERE WERE SEVERAL WITNESSES TO MG MOHAMMED'S MURDER. PRIOR TO THE OVERTHROW OF IRAQ'S FORMER REGIME, MG MOHAMMED WAS THE DEPUTY CHIEF, MOSUL POLICE. AFTER THE FALL OF THE REGIME, MG MOHAMMED'S SUDDENLY BECAME RICH. HE AND MAJ ZIAD AWNI, CURRENTLY THE CHIEF, AL HADBAA POLICE STATION, AL HADBAA NEIGHBORHOOD, WERE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED, AND WERE BOTH SUSPECTED OF HAVING STOLEN MONEY FROM THE FORMER IRAQI GOVERNMENT DURING ITS COLLAPSE. MG MOHAMMED'S RELATIONSHIP WITH GEN BARHAWI, COMMANDER AND CHIEF, MOSUL POLICE, WAS STRAINED.

**CIIR 3SBCT 209-134-04-054 DOI: 15 MARCH 2004: THREATS.**

**~~(SECRET//REL TO USA MOF)~~ IZPD INTERFERING WITH IRAQIS ATTEMPTING TO REPORT MATTERS OF POTENTIAL INTEREST TO COALITION FORCES.**

SUMMARY: IZP OFFICERS WORKING WITH U.S. MILITARY POLICE (MP) FREQUENTLY PREVENT IRAQIS FROM REPORTING INFORMATION ON CRIMINAL MATTERS TO MP'S. THE INFORMATION DETAILS AUTOMOBILE THEFTS, WEAPONS, BLACK MARKETING, AND ITEMS POTENTIALLY STOLEN FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. IZPD ARE ALSO DIRECTED TO HAVE NO UNAUTHORIZED CONTACT WITH COALITION FORCES. THERE IS A GROWING CULTURE OF ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENT IN THE MOSUL POLICE. THE OFFICERS WHO ARE PRO-U.S. FACE PERSECUTION FROM OFFICERS RANGING FROM GEN MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI, CHIEF OF POLICE, TO LOW LEVEL OFFICERS SUCH AS TAHA.

**DIIR SBCT 209-134-04-062 DOI: 25 MAY 2004: THREATS.**

**~~(SECRET//REL TO USA MOF)~~ INDIVIDUALS WHO CLAIM THEY ARE BEING THREATENED BY NCF TO NOT COOPERATE WITH COALITION FORCES.**


SUMMARY: ON 25 MAY 04, TAAGHRED M. GORW FOUND AN ENVELOPE WITH AN AFFIXED 7.62 MM AMMUNITION ROUND, UNDER HER DOOR. THE ENVELOPE CONTAINED A LETTER THAT THREATENED HER DUE TO HER EMPLOYMENT BY COALITION FORCES AND THE IZPD. GORW IS ALSO CURRENTLY TRAINING AT THE POLICE ACADEMY TO BECOME AN OFFICER IN THE IZP. IF SHE SUCCESSFULLY ATTAINS AN IZPD COMMISSION, SHE WILL BE THE ONLY FEMALE OFFICER IN MOSUL'S IZPD. SHE WORKS PART-TIME AT MOSUL MAIN IZP HEADQUARTERS, AL DAWASA NEIGHBORHOOD, MOSUL AS ONE OF IZPD CHIEF GEN BARHAWI'S SECRETARY.

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**~~SECRET//REL TO USA MOF~~**

**REPORTING: FEBRUARY - MAY 2004**

**GENERAL BARHAWI**  
**MOSUL POLICE CHIEF**



**~~SECRET#REL TO USA MOFF~~**  
**DIIR REPORTING IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER**

**DIIR SBCT 209-134-04-154 DOI: 08 AUGUST 2004: FINANCIAL CORRUPTION.**

(~~SECRET#REL TO USA MOFF~~) PRIOR TO 5 AUG 04, BASED ON A VARIETY OF FACTORS, DURAYE KESHMOOLA, THE GOVERNOR OF NINEVAH PROVINCE, WAS STRONGLY CONSIDERING REMOVING AND REPLACING THE CURRENT CHIEF OF THE MOSUL IPD, MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI, WITH A NEW POLICE OFFICIAL.

SUMMARY: ALLEGATIONS OF GEN BARHAWI KNOWINGLY MISALLOCATING SALARIES FOR POLICE PERSONNEL WHO HAVE LITTLE TO NO INVOLVEMENT WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE DEPARTMENTS.

**DIIR SBCT 209-134-04-155 DOI: 08 AUGUST 2004: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY LINKED TO AN INVESTIGATION.**

(~~SECRET#REL TO USA MOFF~~) ON 6 AUG 04, THE HOME OF RETIRED MG SALEM AL MALOOH WAS BOMBED.

SUMMARY: ON OR ABOUT 7 AUG 04, PERSONNEL FROM THE FAISALIA POLICE DEPARTMENT DEPLOYED TO A HOME ADJACENT TO THE RESIDENCE OF MJG SALEM, BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SUSPICIOUS NEIGHBORS, NFI. UPON ARRIVING, THE POLICE DETERMINED THE PREVIOUS OCCUPANTS HAD RECENTLY DESERTED THE HOME. EVIDENCE OF BOMB MAKING MATERIALS WAS FOUND AT THE HOME. NFI. INTERVIEWS OF NEIGHBORS DETERMINED INDIVIDUALS FROM YEMEN HAD LIVED IN THE HOUSE AS RECENTLY AS 6 AUG 04. THE YEMINIS ARE THE PRIMARY SUSPECTS IN THE BOMBING OF SALEM'S HOME THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE RAID OF THE YEMINIS' HOME WAS RECENTLY CLOSED. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED DURING THE INVESTIGATION IS BIGOTED, AND WAS PASSED FROM BG MAUFUK, CHIEF OF THE FAISALIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, TO THE INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATIVE TASK FORCE RECENTLY ESTABLISHED BY MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI.

**DIIR SBCT 209-134-04-160 DOI: 08 AUGUST 2004: INTEL TASK FORCE COLLECTION ON AIF INSURGENTS.**

(~~SECRET#REL TO USA MOFF~~) MOSUL IP CHIEF GEN MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI HAS ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL TASK FORCE, LED BY COL NAZAR, TO HANDLE INVESTIGATIVE AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS REGARDING FOREIGN SUPPORT OF AIF ACTIVITIES. THE TASK FORCE IS COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF BARHAWI'S TRUSTED OFFICERS.

SUMMARY: BARHAWI MANAGES THE NORMAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION'S WORK WITH INFORMANTS THROUGH INSISTING ALL IDENTITIES OF INFORMANTS BE REVEALED TO HIM. ADDITIONALLY, BARHAWI INSISTS THAT HE APPROVE ALL FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR INFORMANTS NO OTHER OFFICIALS ASIDE FROM BARHAWI ARE PRIVY TO THE INFORMATION RECEIVED BY NAZAR'S TASKFORCE. BARHAWI HAS INCREASINGLY BEEN PRACTICING THE OLD ADAGE KNOWN AS "KNOWLEDGE IS POWER". I DO NOT BELIEVE GEN BARHAWI IS MAINTAINING POSITIVE CONTROL OVER THE FLOW OF INFORMATION IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE LEAKS TO AIF THROUGH IP INFORMANTS. HOWEVER, THAT IS HOW GEN BARHAWI IS RATIONALIZING HIS INCREASINGLY RESTRICTIVE POLICIES.

**IIR 6 067 3507 04 DOI: 08 AUGUST 04: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY.**

(~~SECRET#REL TO USA MOFF~~) NEW MOSUL POLICE TASK FORCE TO INVESTIGATE FOREIGN TIES TO INSURGENT ACTIVITY.

SUMMARY: BARHAWI HAS FORMED A NEW INTELLIGENCE UNIT TO INVESTIGATE FOREIGN TIES TO INSURGENTS, AND HAS ALSO STOVE-PIPED REPORTS FROM THE ORIGINAL INTELLIGENCE ASSETS OF THE IRAQI POLICE, AND IT IS NOT VIEWED AS LIKELY THAT HE IS ATTEMPTING TO ELIMINATE LEAKS IN THE SYSTEM.

**~~SECRET#REL TO USA MOFF~~**

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**REPORTING: AUGUST 2004**

**GENERAL BARHAWI**  
**MOSUL POLICE CHIEF**



**SECRET//REL TO USA MOFI**  
**DIIR REPORTING IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER**

**DIIR SBCT 209-134-04-159 DOI: 10 AUGUST 2004: FINANCIAL CORRUPTION.**

~~(REL TO USA MOFI)~~ IP STATIONS IN MOSUL, IZ ARE UNDER-FUNDED, AND THIS HAS GREATLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF IP OFFICERS IN MOSUL.

SUMMARY: FIVE FORMER OFFICERS IN THE IP SUBMITTED A MEMO TO MNF CLAIMING KNOWLEDGE OF RAMPANT CORRUPTION IN THE IP FORCE. THEY CLAIM GEN BARHAWI IS GUILTY OF CORRUPTION AND SHOWING GROSS FAVORITISM TOWARD THOSE IN HIS OWN TRIBE AND ASSOCIATES, VERSUS OTHER PERSONNEL.. CURRENTLY ONLY THE AL-DAWASA IP STATION CAN SUPPORT MNF ACTIVITIES DUE TO LACK OF FUNDING AND PERSONNEL. 3-2 SBCT CHECK POINT 28 IS THE ONLY CP MANNED BY IP AMONG THE SEVEN LOCATED IN THE WESTERN SECTOR OF MOSUL. NONE OF THE OTHER SIX IP CHECKPOINTS ARE MANNED ON A REGULAR BASIS.

**IIR 2 363 3104 04 DOI: 17 AUGUST 2004: FAMILY TIES TO AIF.**

~~(REL TO USA MOFI)~~ ANSAR AL-ISLAM LEADER RELATED TO IRAQI POLICE PERSONNEL.

SUMMARY: BARHAWI IS RELATED TO SHAKARA THROUGH TRIBAL RELATIONS, THEY ARE BOTH ALSO RELATED TO POLICE CHIEF JASSIM AL HAMDANI WHO WAS MOVED FROM AL HATRA FOR BEING TOO OPEN IN ALLOWED INSURGENTS TO OPERATE IN AL HATRA.

**DIIR 504-310-335-04-141 DOI: 17 AUGUST 2004: FAMILY TIES TO AIF.**

~~(REL TO USA MOFI)~~ MOHAMMED KHALAF SHAKARA IS RELATED TO THE NINEWAH GOVERNATE, IZ, CHIEF OF POLICE, AS WELL AS A DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF IN AL HATRA, IZ.

SUMMARY: BARHAWI AND SHAKARA ARE BOTH FROM THE HAMDANI TRIBE. BOTH BARHAWI AND SHAKARA ARE RELATED TO COLONEL JASSIM AL HAMDANI, WHO WAS THE POLICE CHIEF OF AL HATRA . UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 1 AUGUST 2004. AT THAT TIME, CHIEF BARHAWI MOVED JASSIM TO HAMDANIYAH, IZ. TO BE THE POLICE CHIEF THERE.. BARHAWI MOVED HIM BECAUSE JASSIM WAS TOO OBVIOUS ABOUT ALLOWING TERRORISTS, INCLUDING SHAKARA, TO MOVE TO AND OPERATE IN AL HATRA

**DIIR 504-310-335-04-144 DOI: 18 AUGUST 2004: CORRUPTION WITHIN THE RANKS.**

~~(REL TO USA MOFI)~~ AN IRAQI POLICEMAN FROM HAMMAM ALIL, IZ, TOOK BRIBES AT THE CHECKPOINT AT THE GATES OF MOSUL ON HIGHWAY 1. THE NINEWAH GOVERNATE CHIEF OF POLICE PROMISED TO MOVE THE OFFICER TO A DIFFERENT POST.

SUMMARY: WHEN BARHAWI WAS INFORMED OF THIS BEHAVIOR, HE PROMISED TO MOVE THE OFFICER TO A DIFFERENT POST. WHEN ASKED WHY HE WOULD NOT FIRE THE OFFICER, BARHAWI EXPLAINED THAT ONLY THE IRAQI MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR IN BAGHDAD COULD FIRE POLICE OFFICERS. HE DID NOT PROMISE TO ASK THAT THE OFFICER BE FIRED.

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Authority: EO 13526  
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**SECRET//REL TO USA MOFI**

**REPORTING: AUGUST 2004**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
MOST POLICE CHIEF



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
DIIR REPORTING IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

**DIIR 504-310-332-04-120 DOI: 18 AUGUST 2004: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY LINKED TO FINANCIAL CORRUPTION.**

(~~WHILE REPORTING~~) APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS AGO, BARHAWI, POLICE CHIEF OF POLICE HEADQUARTERS, MOSUL, IZ, FIRED THA'RE FOR UNKNOWN REASONS.

SUMMARY: THA'RE ABDUL HAMEED MUSTAFA (PHONETIC), FORMER IZ POLICE OFFICER, POLICE HEADQUARTERS, MOSUL, IZ. CURRENTLY A SELF-EMPLOYED VEHICLE CONTRACTOR IS TRANSPORTING VEHICLES CONTAINING UNSPECIFIED EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE INTO IRAQ FROM SYRIA AND TURKEY. LOCAL RUMORS INDICATE THA'RE DISAPPEARED WITH \$900,000 US DOLLARS ALLOCATED FROM MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES TO IZ POLICE TO STRENGTHEN THEIR EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE. OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS, EXACT DATES AND TIMES UNRECALLED, THA'RE TRAVELED TO DIHOK AND ZAKHO SEVERAL TIMES TO CONDUCT MEETINGS WITH UNIDENTIFIED MEMBERS OF SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE AND UNIDENTIFIED AIF CONTACTS.

**DIIR 504-310-332-04-122 DOI: 19 AUGUST 2004: LINKS TO AIF.**

(~~WHILE REPORTING~~) DURING THE ATTACKS CONDUCTED BY AIF ON 4 AUGUST 2004, THE IZ POLICE DETAINED AND THEN RELEASED SEVEN AIF PERSONNEL FROM THE HUMERAH VILLAGE, MOSUL, IZ.

SUMMARY: BARHAWI MADE THE DECISION TO RELEASE THE SEVEN AIF PERSONNEL. HE TOLD THE AIF MEMBERS AS HE RELEASED THEM TO SAY HELLO TO THEIR FRIENDS AND TO LET THEM KNOW WE HAVE NOTHING AGAINST THEM. HE WENT ON TO REQUEST AIF NOT ATTACK IZ POLICE BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT AGAINST AIF ACTIVITIES, HOWEVER, THEY ARE FREE TO ATTACK MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES AS OFTEN AS THEY WISH.

6SD 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 10056429

**CHANGE IN BEHAVIOR.**

(~~WHILE REPORTING~~) MOSUL POLICE CHIEF BARHAWI MAY BE PREPARED TO DEPART IRAQ ~~DO~~ 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 10056429

SUMMARY: BARHAWI HAS NOT BEEN THE SAME SINCE HIS SISTER WAS KIDNAPPED. HE IS NOT AS AGGRESSIVE AS HE USED TO BE. BARHAWI IS PLANNING ON GETTING OUT OF IRAQ BEFORE THE TERRORISTS KILL HIM.

**FORMATION OF CT TEAM; DERIVED FROM BARHAWI'S IDEA.**

(~~WHILE REPORTING~~) NINEVEH GOVERNOR CREATING COUNTER TERRORISM UNIT FOR USE AS A PERSONAL SECURITY DETAIL - IRAQ

SUMMARY: THE NINEVEH PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR DURAID ((KASHMOULA)) WAS TAKING STEPS TO CREATE A COUNTER TERRORISM (CT) EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT (ERU) IN MOSUL, MODELED ON THE EXISTING ERU CREATED BY MOSUL CHIEF OF POLICE MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL ((BARHAWI)).

**IR 2 363 3279 04/TIARA, MNF-I HUMINT OPS BAGHDAD : DOI: 09 SEP: THREATS.**

(~~WHILE REPORTING~~) A RECENT FLYER CALLS FOR THE DEATH OF ANYONE SUPPORTING MULTINATIONAL FORCES


SUMMARY: (S//REL TO USA AND MCFI) ON 1 SEPTEMBER 2004, SOURCE PROVIDED A FLYER DISTRIBUTED WITHIN ARAB CROWDS IN VARIOUS CITIES IN IZ WITHIN THE LAST MONTH. THE FLYER STATES THE AL-THUGHOOR SCIENTIST ASSOCIATION FOR FATWA AND GUIDANCE, ISSUED A FATWA TO ALL MUSLIMS WHICH OVERRIDES ALL OTHER FATWAS RECENTLY ISSUED.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**REPORTING: AUG - SEPTEMBER 2004**

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~~GENERAL BARHAWI~~  
~~MOSUL POLICE CHIEF~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
DIIR REPORTING IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

[REDACTED] LINKS TO AIF.

(~~SECRET~~) GENERAL TARIQ HAMID AL HASSAWI THE MOSUL POLICE CHIEF'S DEPUTY FOR WEST MOSUL MAY BE THE LEADER BEHIND THE 04 AUGUST ATTACKS ON MNF.

SUMMARY: HAWASSI ARGUED WITH MOSUL POLICE CHIEF MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL ((BARHAWI)) AFTER THE FIGHT WHEN BARHAWI WANTED TO TAKE DOWN THE NAMES OF THE FAMILIES WHO CAME TO PICK UP THE BODIES OF THE AIF KILLED IN THE 04 AUG ATTACKS. HASSAWI REFUSED TO ALLOW THIS OR TO PROVIDE A LIST OF NAMES TO BARHAWI.

[REDACTED] LINKS TO AIF. (TRUCE BETWEEN BARHAWI AND SHAKARA.)

(~~SECRET~~) BARHAWI REACHED A TRUCE WITH SHAKARA WHO KIDNAPPED BARHAWI'S SISTER IN RETALIATION FOR BARHAWI'S SISTER IN RETALIATION FOR HIS ROLE IN THE MNF RAID ON QABR AL ABD.

SUMMARY: IN THE WEEK FOLLOWING BARHAWI'S SISTER'S CAPTURE, BARHAWI SENT AN EMISSARY, LIEUTENANT COLONEL TARIK ((ABBAS)) TO QABR AL ABD TO MEET WITH SHAKARA AND HIS MEN. IN THIS MEETING ABBAS SWORE THAT BARHAWI HAD ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH THE CAPTURE OF SHAKARA'S FAMILY AND HAD NO CONTROL OVER THEIR RELEASE. AFTER MUCH PLEADING BY ABBAS, SHAKARA AGREED TO RELEASE BARHAWI'S SISTER WITH ONE CAVEAT- BARHAWI WAS TO OVERLOOK SHAKARA'S TERRORIST OPERATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF MOSUL AND SHAKARA WOULD PROMISE NOT TO ATTACK BARHAWI. UPON AGREEMENT TO THIS CONDITION, BARHAWI'S SISTER WAS RELEASED.

DDA 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 1001C427


OSD 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 1001C.427

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

REPORTING: SEPTEMBER 2004

**GENERAL BARHAWI**  
**MOSUL POLICE CHIEF**



**SECRET//NOFORN**

**REPORTING IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER**

**9 JUNE 2004: TIES STRAINED.**

**TENSIONS BETWEEN NINAWA GOVERNOR AND MOSUL POLICE CHIEF.**

SUMMARY: SINCE GOVERNOR KUSHMULLA HAS BECOME GOVERNOR, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL INCIDENTS OF DISRESPECT BY BARHAWI TOWARDS HIM, AN ATTITUDE SHARED BY HIS BROTHER IN THE IIP.

**8 JULY 2004: CORRUPTION WITHIN THE RANKS.**

**MOSUL ANTI-CORRUPTION OFFICE REPORT ON THE NINAWA POLICE FORCE.**

OSD 1.4(c)(2)  
CIA 1.4(c)(d)

SUMMARY: THE MOSUL ANTI-CORRUPTION OFFICE PERFORMS AN ASSESSMENT ON THE CURRENT POLICE FORCE UNDER BARHAWI. AMONG THE ISSUES BROUGHT UP ARE THE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE, PAY ISSUES, THE QUALITY OF RECRUITS, AND THE INDISCRIMINATE HIRING AND FIRING OF POLICE OFFICERS BY BARHAWI.

**10 JULY 2004: CORRUPTION WITHIN RANKS.**

**FAILURE BY MOSUL POLICE CHIEF TO DIRECT POLICE RESOURCES AGAINST INSURGENTS.**

SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH BARHAWI AND HIS SENIOR OFFICERS ARE AWARE OF THE FAILURE OF SOME POLICE PRECINCTS TO ACT ON CURRENTLY AVAILABLE INSURGENT ACTIVITY, THEY HAVE FAILED TO EXERT PRESSURE TO CORRECT THIS ISSUE. ALSO BARHAWI AND SENIOR LEADERS KNOW THE IDENTITIES OF POLICE OFFICERS WHO FIRED ON NON-MILITARY U.S. GOVERNMENT VEHICLES IN LATE MAY OR EARLY JUNE.

**20 JULY 2003: LINKS TO AIF.**

**MOSUL POLICE CHIEF'S FORMER SERVICE AS AN IRAQI SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER.**

SUMMARY: BARHAWI SERVED IN MID JULY 2003 AS AN IRAQI SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER, AND BOASTED THAT AT THE BATTLE OF HADITHA HE LED FOUR ATTACKS AGAINST MNF AND KILLED MANY U.S. SOLDIERS.

**26 JULY 2004: CORRUPTION WITHIN RANKS.**

**DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTHWESTERN IRAQ DUE TO A LACK OF PERSONNEL AND CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE NINAWA CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN BI'AJ.**

SUMMARY: THE GOVERNMENT IN BI'AJ CONSIDERS THE SITUATION IN BI'AJ TO BE UNSTABLE AND WORSENING, THEY BLAME THE NINAWA CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN MOSUL FOR PREVENTING THEM FROM ADDRESSING THE SITUATION. A LIST OF OVER 200 CANDIDATES WERE SENT UP TO MOSUL TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE POLICE FORCE, BUT APPROVAL WAS GRANTED FOR LESS THAN 30 CANDIDATES. THE NAMES APPROVED WERE NOT AMONG THOSE CHOSEN BY THE MAYOR AND POLICE CHIEF, BUT WERE INDIVIDUALS WITH FAMILY CONNECTIONS TO THE POLICE CHIEF OR OTHER OFFICIALS. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT BARHAWI WAS POCKETING THE FUNDING INTENDED FOR THE POSITIONS THEY WANTED TO FILL.

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Date: APR 11 2014

**REPORTING: JUN - JUL 2004 / JUL 2003**

GENERAL BARHAWI  
MOSUL POLICE CHIEFSECRET//NOFORN  
REPORTING IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER**01 AUGUST 2004: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY LINKED TO AIF.****RESULTS OF MOSUL POLICE CHIEF'S INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF NINAWA GOVERNOR 'USAMA KASHMULLA.**

SUMMARY: THE IRAQI POLICE COMPLETED ITS INVESTIGATION INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF THE FORMER NINAWA GOVERNOR AND CONCLUDED THAT THE ASSASSINATION WAS NOT PREMEDITATED, THE INSURGENTS JUST HAPPENED TO BE IN THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME. A CONCLUSION THAT WAS REJECTED BY THE COUNCIL.

**5 AUGUST 2004: CORRUPTION WITHIN THE RANKS.****EVENTS AT NINAWA GOVERNOR'S OFFICE DURING 4 AUG 2004 VIOLENCE IN MOSUL; PARTICIPATION OF NON-UNIFORMED POLICE IN ATTACKS.**

SUMMARY: JUST PRIOR TO VIOLENCE BREAKING OUT IN FRONT OF THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE IN MOSUL THE MORNING OF 4 AUG 2004, THERE WAS A NOTICEABLE DECREASE (APPROX. 90%) IN THE PRESENCE OF POLICE FORCES. BARHAWI CLAIMED THAT THE POLICE WERE FIGHTING THE INSURGENTS, DESPITE EVIDENCE (INCLUDING A VIDEO OF A POLICE OFFICER TAKING PART IN THE VIOLENCE) THAT POLICE WERE FACILITATING AIF ACTIVITY BY STANDING ASIDE.

**6 AUGUST 2004: FINANCIAL CORRUPTION.****CORRUPT AND ANTI-COALITION ACTIVITIES OF SENIOR MOSUL POLICE OFFICERS.**

SUMMARY: COALITION FUNDS THAT HAVE BEEN PUSHED OUT FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF POLICE FACILITIES AND CHECKPOINTS HAVE NOT BEEN BEING SPENT ON SUCH PROJECTS, RATHER THE CHEAPEST MEANS POSSIBLE ARE USED AND THE REMAINING FUNDS ARE EMBEZZLED, POSSIBLY BY BARHAWI WHO HAS SPENDING MEANS WELL BEYOND THE MEANS OF A POLICE CHIEF. ALSO SMUGGLING OPERATIONS ALONG THE SYRIAN BORDER ARE OFTEN ALLOWED TO CONTINUE AFTER A LARGE SUM OF MONEY IS PAID TO THE APPREHENDING OFFICER.

**6 AUGUST 2004: TIES STRAINED.****REQUEST OF NINAWA GOVERNOR TO REPLACE MOSUL POLICE CHIEF DUE TO PERFORMANCE ON 4 AUGUST 2004.**

SUMMARY: REQUEST TO THE IRAQI MINISTER OF INTERIOR TO HAVE BARHAWI REPLACED AS THE POLICE CHIEF OF THE NINAWA PROVINCE. AMONG THE REASONS LISTED WERE CORRUPTION AND TIES TO THE BA'ATH PARTY.

**13 AUGUST 2004: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY LINKED TO AIF.****STATUS OF MOSUL POLICE CHIEF FOLLOWING 4 AUGUST 2004 VIOLENCE IN MOSUL.**


SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH APOLOGIZING FOR HEATED ARGUMENTS WITH THE NINAWA GOVERNOR, BARHAWI FAILED TO APOLOGIZE FOR, OR EXPLAIN, THE LACK OF A POLICE PRESENCE ON 4 AUGUST. BARHAWI AND HIS ENTIRE IMMEDIATE FAMILY ACQUIRED IRAQI PASSPORTS, AND AN ASSOCIATE OF BARHAWI FLED TO TURKEY FEARING BEING ARRESTED, INDICATING BARHAWI MAY INTEND TO LEAVE IRAQ UNANNOUNCED.

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Date: APR 11 2014

REPORTING: AUGUST 2004

~~GENERAL BARHAWI~~  
~~MOSUL POLICE CHIEF~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

REPORTING IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

**19 AUGUST 2004: CORRUPTION WITHIN THE RANKS.**

**MOSUL POLICE CHIEF'S FAILURE TO REACT TO POLICE WARNINGS ON 4 AUGUST 2004; POLICE CHIEF'S DEALINGS WITH SUBORDINATES.**

SUMMARY: MOSUL POLICE OFFICERS IN CHARGE OF THE AL-GHIZLANI DISTRICT OF MOSUL PHONED BARHAWI WITH AN IMMEDIATE REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE ON 04 AUGUST 2004, BARHAWI PROMISED TO SEND IMMEDIATE SUPPORT, HOWEVER THAT SUPPORT NEVER ARRIVED AND BARHAWI NEVER RECONTACTED THE UNIT TO LEARN OF ITS FATE. ALSO, BARHAWI CONTINUES TO HAVE FINANCIAL DEALINGS WITH SUBORDINATES, A SITUATION WHICH HAS CAUSED A FALL OUT [REDACTED]

**09 SEP 2004: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY LINKED TO AIF.**

**REFUSAL BY MOSUL POLICE AND OTHER SERVICES TO RESPOND TO EMERGENCY SITUATIONS**

SUMMARY: AS OF EARLY SEPTEMBER 2004, THE MOSUL POLICE DEPARTMENT CONTINUED TO FAIL TO RESPOND TO EMERGENCY CALLS. POLICE OFFICERS ATTRIBUTED THEIR FAILURE TO RESPOND TO ORDERS FROM SENIOR POLICE OFFICIALS, INCLUDING CHIEF BARHAWI.

**16 SEP 2004: TARGETING INSURGENTS.**

**AUTHORIZATION BY NINEWA GOVERNOR TO CONDUCT TARGETED ASSASSINATION OF INSURGENTS; NINEWA OFFICIALS' CONCERNS OVER EFFECT OF TALL'AFAR OPERATIONS IN MOSUL**

SUMMARY: THE SPIKE IN ACTIVITY AMONG INSURGENTS IN TALLA'FAR FORCED THE CURRENT GOVERNOR OF MOSUL KASHMULLA TO CALL AN EMERGENCY MEETING WITH LEADING SECURITY OFFICIALS. ONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS WAS CHIEF BARHAWI. AT THIS MEETING HE WANTED TO STATE HIS APPROVAL FOR TOUGHER WAYS OF KEEPING THE ACTIONS IN MOSUL TO A MINIMUM BY PERMITTING THE EXECUTION OF INDIVIDUALS CONDUCTING ATTACKS AGAINST ISF AND MNF.

OSD 1.4(c)(d) CIA 1.4(c)(d)

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REPORTING: AUG - SEPTEMBER 2004

**GENERAL BARHAWI**  
**MOSUL POLICE CHIEF**



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**AMERICAN EMBASSY BAGHDAD, DOI: 16 SEP 2004: PERFORMANCE.**

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ **BARHAWI BRIEFS EFFECTS OF OPERATION BLACK TYPHOON ON TALL'AFAR**

SUMMARY: CHIEF BARHAWI ATTENDED A MEETING AT CITY HALL TO MEET WITH TFO CG AND EMBASSY OFFICE MOSUL REGIONAL COORDINATOR ALONG WITH THE NEW TALL'AFAR MAYOR MOHAMMED RASHEED AHMAD. LIFE IS SLOWLY RETURNING TO NORMAL.

**AMERICAN EMBASSY BAGHDAD, DOI: 20 SEP 2004: PERFORMANCE QUESTIONED.**

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ **NINEWA SECURITY AFFECTS ELECTIONS EXPECTATIONS**

SUMMARY: CHIEF BARHAWI'S INEFFECTIVENESS IS WELL NOTICED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS AND STILL NOTHING IS DONE TO REPLACE HIM EVEN THOUGH HIS ISSUE HAS BEEN RAISED BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT. THE MATTER OF HIS REMOVAL OF BARHAWI FROM HIS POSITION HAS NOT BEEN ACTIONED UPON.

**AMERICAN EMBASSY BAGHDAD, DOI: 26 SEP 2004: TARGETING INSURGENTS.**

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ **DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR NORTHERN OIL DISTRIBUTION COMPANY MURDERED 23 SEP 2004**


SUMMARY: THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR THE NORTHERN OIL DISTRIBUTION COMPANY (NOC) WAS MURDERED SEPTEMBER 23 IN MOSUL. THE ATTACK, WHICH CAME LESS THAN ONE WEEK AFTER THE ATTEMPTED MURDER OF NOC'S DIRECTOR GENERAL IN MOSUL, HIGHLIGHTS BOTH THE CONTINUING TARGETING OF HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS AND THE INABILITY OF THE NINEWA POLICE TO SOLVE SUCH CRIMES. THERE HAVE BEEN DOZENS OF UNSOLVED MURDER CASES INVOLVING HIGH-PROFILE PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE USG AND/OR MULTINATIONAL FORCES IN NINEWA. THEY INCLUDE THE ASSASSINATION OF FORMER NINEWA GOVERNOR OUSSAMA KASHMOULA AND THE SON OF CURRENT GOVERNOR DOURAID KASHMOULA. THE TFO PROVOST MARSHAL AND THE POLMILOFF MET ON SEPTEMBER 21 WITH NINEWA POLICE CHIEF MOHAMMED KHAIRY MAHMOOD AHMAD AL BARHAWI TO OFFER INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE TO THE NINEWA POLICE IN SOLVING THESE CRIMES. CHIEF BARHAWI ACCEPTED THE OFFER. THE PROVOST MARSHAL IS ARRANGING TO HAVE MEMBERS OF THE U.S. ARMY'S CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DEPARTMENT MEET WITH CHIEF BARHAWI ON SEPTEMBER 25.

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Date **APR 11 2014**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**REPORTING: SEPTEMBER 2004**

**COLONEL AKEED MOFOUK**  
**TALL A'FAR POLICE CHIEF**



~~SECRET//REL TO USA MCTT~~

**DIIR 504-310-336-04-160 DOI: 21 JULY 2004: LINKS TO AIF.**

~~(S//REL TO USA MCTT)~~ TALL A'FAR POLICE CHIEF FACILITATES THE RELEASE OF A KNOWN AIF INSURGENT.

SUMMARY: AN AIF INSURGENT WAS ARRESTED BY THE TALL A'FAR POLICE; THEY CONFISCATED ONE RPG LAUNCHER FROM HIS RESIDENCE. THE AIF INSURGENT WAS INPROCESSED AT THE QARABASH POLICE STATION. SOON AFTER, COLONEL MOFOUK ARRIVED AT THE STATION AND SAID THE INSURGENT'S ARREST WAS UNAUTHORIZED AND WITHIN TEN MINUTES OF HIS ARRIVAL, THE INSURGENT WAS RELEASED. BOTH THE INSURGENT AND COLONEL MOFOUK LEFT THE STATION TOGETHER.

**DIIR 504-310-336-04-162 DOI: 29 JULY 2004: LINKS TO AIF.**

~~(S//REL TO USA MCTT)~~ TALL A'FAR POLICE CHIEF AND ASSISTANT AID INSURGENTS.

SUMMARY: COLONEL MOFOUK AND HIS ASSISTANT COLONEL ABDULLAH DAWOOD AL-FARHAT HAVE PERSONALLY OBSERVED AIF INSURGENTS PLACE IEDS IN UNKNOWN LOCATIONS IN TALLA'FAR. THEY HAVE NEVER TAKEN ANY ACTION TO HAVE THE INSURGENTS REMOVE THE IEDS, AND THEY WARN THE AIF WHEN U.S. FORCES ARE IN THEIR VICINITY. COLONEL DAWOOD'S SON AND BROTHER ARE ALSO KNOWN TO BE INVOLVED IN THE INSURGENCY IN TALLA'FAR. MICO COMMENT: SHOWS COLLABORATION BETWEEN MOFOUK AND HIS ASSISTANT POLICE CHIEF DAWOOD.

**DIIR 504-310-336-04-176 DOI: 06 AUGUST 2004: LINKS TO AIF.**

~~(S//REL TO USA MCTT)~~ TALL A'FAR POLICE CHIEF ATTEMPTS TO RELEASE AN INSURGENT FROM POLICE CUSTODY BY THREATENING THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING CHARGES AGAINST THE INSURGENT.

SUMMARY: AIF INSURGENTS DROVE THROUGH CHECKPOINT 101 ON 22 JULY 04; POLICE WERE ABLE TO STOP THE VEHICLE. BEFORE IT WAS SEARCHED, AIF ATTACKED THE POLICE WITH SAF AND A HAND GRENADE. POLICE RETURNED FIRE AND INJURED ONE AIF THAT WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE MOSUL HOSPITAL UNDER POLICE CUSTODY. A POLICE OFFICER FILED A REPORT REGARDING THIS INCIDENT. ON 06 AUGUST 04, COLONEL MOFOUK ARRIVED AT THE POLICE OFFICER'S RESIDENCE COVINCING HIM TO WITHDRAW HIS REPORT SO THE INSURGENT COULD BE RELEASED. MOFOUK THREATENED THE POLICE OFFICER TO WATCH HIMSELF.

**DIIR SBCT 520-139-04-021 DOI: 10 AUGUST 2004: LINKS TO AIF.**


~~(S//REL TO USA MCTT)~~ POLICE CHIEF AND MAYOR OF TALL AFAR COOPERATING WITH AIF TALL AFAR, IZ.

SUMMARY: THE TALL AFAR MAYOR OTHMAN AND POLICE CHIEF MOFOUK HAVE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE AL JALLEH TRIBE AND THE AL HAYO TRIBE. THE AL JALLEH TRIBE IS A SHIA TRIBE WITH CONNECTIONS TO MUQTADA AL SADR. THE AL HAYO TRIBE IS WAHABBI WITH CONNECTIONS TO AL QAEDA. OTHMAN AND MOFOUK AGREE TO GIVE EARLY WARNING OF ANY MULTI NATIONAL FORCES (MNF) RAIDS INTO THE NEIGHBORHOODS THAT THESE TRIBES LIVE IN. THIS IS TO FACILITATE THE TERRORISTS TO ESCAPE BEFORE THE RAID IS CONDUCTED.

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~~SECRET//REL TO USA MCTT~~

**COLONEL DAWOOD**  
**ASSISTANT TALL A'FAR POLICE CHIEF**



~~SECRET//REL TO USA MOFI~~

**DIIR 504-310-336-04-162 DOI: 29 JULY 2004: LINKS TO AIF.**

~~(SUBJECT TO CNA)~~ TALL A'FAR POLICE CHIEF AND ASSISTANT AID INSURGENTS.

SUMMARY: COLONEL MOFOUK AND HIS ASSISTANT COLONEL ABDULLAH DAWOOD AL-FARHAT HAVE PERSONALLY OBSERVED AIF INSURGENTS PLACE IEDS IN UNKNOWN LOCATIONS IN TALLA'FAR. THEY HAVE NEVER TAKEN ANY ACTION TO HAVE THE INSURGENTS REMOVE THE IEDS, AND THEY WARN THE AIF WHEN U.S. FORCES ARE IN THEIR VICINITY. COLONEL DAWOOD'S SON AND BROTHER ARE ALSO KNOWN TO BE INVOLVED IN THE INSURGENCY IN TALLA'FAR. MICO COMMENT: SHOWS COLLABORATION BETWEEN MOFOUK AND HIS ASSISTANT POLICE CHIEF DAWOOD.

**DIIR 504-310-336-04-186 DOI: 10 AUGUST 2004: LINKS TO AIF.**

~~(SUBJECT TO CNA)~~ ASSISTANT TALL 'AFAR POLICE CHIEF, COLONEL DAWOOD, MEETS WITH INSURGENTS FROM THE AL-FARHAT TRIBE IN TALL A'FAR.

SUMMARY: COLONEL DAWOOD HAS MET WITH ABU ((ZANA)) AL-FARHAT AND OTHER UNSPECIFIED INSURGENTS FROM THE AL-FARHAT TRIBE. THE MEETINGS (EXACT TIME UNKNOWN) ARE CONDUCTED IN DAWOOD'S RESIDENCE (CNA) IN THE AL-GERGERI NEIGHBORHOOD OF TALL 'AFAR, NFI. DAWOOD AND THE INSURGENTS MEET ANYTIME AFTER 1800 HOURS ON VARYING DAYS OF THE WEEK.

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Date: **APR 11 2014**

~~SECRET//REL TO USA MOFI~~

## OTHER REPORTING



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**29 JULY 2004: LINKS TO AIF.**

**IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD DECIDES TO HALT JOINT OPERATIONS WITH POLICE IN MOSUL.**

SUMMARY: AS OF LATE JULY, THE ING WERE NO LONGER ALLOWING THE MOSUL POLICE TO PARTICIPATE IN JOINT OPERATIONS WITH COALITION FORCES BECAUSE THE POLICE COULD NOT BE TRUSTED WITH TARGETING INFORMATION. ING BELIEVED THAT PREVIOUS TIP-OFFS HAD NOT BEEN LIMITED TO ISOLATED INCIDENTS INVOLVING JUNIOR POLICE OFFICERS OR EVEN ONE OR TWO BAD NEIGHBORHOOD POLICE FORCES. THE ING CONFRONTED BARHAWI WITH EVIDENCE OF SUCH ACTIVITY AND THEIR INTENTION TO DROP MOSUL POLICE FROM THEIR OPERATIONS.

**20 JULY 2004: TIES WITH AIF.**

**ANTI-COALITION ACTIVITIES OF CURRENT NINAWA PROVINCIAL COUNCIL MEMBERS.**

SUMMARY: [REDACTED] WAS PROVIDING PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO TERRORIST LEADER MUHAMMAD KHALAF ((SHAKARA)), AKA ((ABU TALHA)). [REDACTED] WAS A MEMBER OF THE [REDACTED] AND WAS PROVIDING SHAKARA AND HIS FOLLOWERS WITH INFORMATION THAT WOULD HELP THEM AVOID CAPTURE. [REDACTED] AN IMAM [REDACTED] IN THE [REDACTED] NEIGHBORHOOD IN MOSUL, HAD ATTACKED THE COALITION, THE IIG, AND IRAQI PRIME MINISTER AYAD AL-((ALAWI)) [REDACTED] IN MID-JULY.

**13 AUGUST 2004: COUNCIL TIES STRAINED.**

**FAILURE OF IRAQI ISLAMIC PARTY (IIP) MEMBERS TO RE-ENTER NINAWA PROVINCIAL COUNCIL; IIP PLANS TO OPPOSE UPCOMING IRAQI ELECTIONS.**

AS OF EARLY AUGUST 2004, THE NINAWA PROVINCIAL COUNCIL HAD DECIDED THAT NONE OF THE EIGHT IRAQI ISLAMIC PARTY (IIP) MEMBERS WHO HAD RESIGNED FROM THE COUNCIL IN LATE JULY COULD RETURN TO THEIR COUNCIL SEATS. AFTER 4 AUGUST, NONE OF THE IIP'S FORMER COUNCIL MEMBERS HAD EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN RETURNING TO THE COUNCIL AND THEY WILLINGLY SUBMITTED WRITTEN RESIGNATIONS. IIP LEADERS SUBSEQUENTLY ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD NOT SUPPORT UPCOMING ELECTIONS IN IRAQ AND PLANNED TO CALL ON FOLLOWERS TO AGITATE AGAINST ANY ELECTIONS. THE COMMITTEE OF ISLAMIC SCHOLARIS SUPPORTED THE IIP IN THIS EFFORT AND BOTH PARTIES INTENDED TO ATTEMPT TO INCREASE THEIR SUPPORT IN THE COMING MONTHS FOR A POPULAR BOYCOTT OF ELECTIONS.


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APR 11 2014

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Source: PUK 03 SEP 04




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
**Note:** Each 1<sup>st</sup> level LT has 5 sub lieutenants  
If the LT is a Kurd the leadership follows under Sa'ed Ahmed  
Shakara and Sa'ed are more like partners, but because the Arabs do not  
get along with the Kurds Sa'ed is their Amir. There are other Arab LT's  
under the leadership of Shakara.


~~SECRET REF TO USA, UK AND MCH~~

~~SECRET REL TO UK/CANADA/AUSTRALIA~~



~~SECRET REL TO UK/CANADA/AUSTRALIA~~





SECRET//NOFORN//UK//CANADA//AUSTRALIA

HAMMAM AL ALIL GROUP

TRAINED AND LIVED WITH AI  
IN BIYARA PRIOR TO JOINING  
WITH MKS

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Date APR 11 2014

AHMED ABDALLAH SULTAN

HAMADY SULAYMAN SULTAN

JAMAL IBRAHIM KHALIL AL  
HAMDANY

FAYSAL JASIM RAMAZAN

SHAHAB AHMAD SALIH

HAMAD ABDALLAH HAMAD

MUHAMMAD AHMAD SALIH

SHAKIR FATHY ALYAS AL  
JOUBRY

ABD MESLAT SALIH

FAWAZ JASIM MUNZIL

IHSAM MUHAJAM MASLAT

ABDALLAH MASLAT UWINA

SUAD WAAD JARO

NIHAD WAAD JARO

YASIR AHMAD ISMAIL

RAMAZAN ABDALLAH AL  
WAWY

SUHAD WAAD JARO

FERAS IBRAHIM AL HUADIDY

MAHMUD HARDAN AMIR

HARBY KHAMIS HAMID

MUHANAD MUHAMMAD ALI

AHMAD UBAYD TALHA

AJEL SHALAN RAJAB

MUHAMMAD KHALIF

SUHAM WAID JASIM

ALI KHALAF QADOURY

MUHAMMED SULTAN SALIH

FARIS SALIM KHZIR

ASEM ALI KHALAF

ZENO ALI KHALAF

SAMY ALI FATHY

AHMAD AWAD HADID

RAJAB MUHAMMED ALI

BASIL AHMAD ISMAIL

SALIH AZIZ AHMAD

MUWAFIQ JASIM RAMAZAN  
AL JABOURI

SECRET//NOFORN//UK//CANADA//AUSTRALIA

# TARGETING PORTFOLIO

## Muhammad Khayri Al-BARHAWI

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

### Description

MOSUL CHIEF OF POLICE

Name: Mohammad Khayri Al-Barhowie

Arabic Title: Mudeer Shurta (Chief of Police)

Phone: 765-963

Former Major General Iraqi Special Forces. Chief of Police for City of Mosul, since Jun 03. Mohammed is a survivalist and maintains strict control on inner workings of MPD. Chief Mohammed is a relative of the Mayor of Mosul and maintains close ties. He has appointed former Army officers to various ranks within the MPD. This has caused some resentment among veteran policeman. There have been numerous allegations of corruption and cronyism. Chief Mohamad has been vetted; he was a Fourth tier Ba'ath Party (Udw Qiyadat Firqah) Member. There has been one unsuccessful assassination attempt where the chief was wounded and two of his bodyguards were killed.

### Current Location

Unknown. It is possible he is in Baghdad, based on rumors he has been transferred there. We have no proof of this being fact.

Barhawi owns three houses in Mosul.

### Past Location

### Number and Type of Reports

OSD 1.4(c)(2)

3/2 SBCT Barhawi Briefing dtd 28 Sep 04 (and associated reports)  
AMEMBASSY Baghdad Report 202033ZSEP04

### Assessment

(S) Police Chief Barhawi has a history of corruption and ineffective performance. While possessing all the requisite tools to succeed, Barhawi brings a military perspective to his job that focuses on firefights with violent elements rather than on solving crimes. He has been reluctant to remove ineffective police leaders, most of whom he originally appointed. There are also reports of his corrupt hiring practices and of his using his position to promote anti-MNF activities. Tensions between Chief Barhawi and the ING and the Nineveh Provincial Council have been constant since mid-June 2004, including just prior to the assassination of the former Governor Kashmulla. According to [REDACTED] reporting, Nayef abu Anwar called Abu Sa'd (both individuals associated with Mujahideen TGT set 1114) [REDACTED] Anwar [REDACTED] and Abu Fahed (possibly referring to associate of Mosul based facilitator Abu Ahmed) [REDACTED] were going to transfer them (NFI) to Anwar on 29 Jun 04. NOTE: Although the report doesn't specify, it is believed the "them" refers to the release of AIF related detainees. This report came two hours after MAJ Thayer, Barhawi's deputy, contacted 3/2 SBCT PMO to request the release of five detainees

CIA 1.4(c)(2)

associated with a "chop-shop" suspected of making VBIEDs. Thayer left the 3/2 HQ thinking that the transfer was approved. The transfer was stopped when this report was received.

### Reports Pertaining to Target

OSD 1.4(c)(d)

CIA 1.4(c)(d)

20 JULY 2003: PAST HISTORY.  
MOSUL POLICE CHIEF'S FORMER SERVICE AS AN IRAQI SPECIAL FORCES  
COMMANDER.

### CIIR

3SBCT209-134-04-037 DOI: 28 FEBRUARY 2004: TIES STRAINED.  
( ) TWO IZPD GENERAL OFFICERS MURDERED 25 FEB 04 IN MOSUL.

CIIR 3SBCT 209-134-04-054 DOI: 15 MARCH 2004: THREATS.  
( ) IZPD INTERFERING WITH IRAQIS ATTEMPTING TO REPORT MATTERS OF  
POTENTIAL INTEREST TO COALITION FORCES.

9 JUNE 2004: TIES STRAINED.  
TENSIONS BETWEEN NINAWA GOVERNOR AND MOSUL POLICE CHIEF.

18 JUNE 2004: TENSION BETWEEN ICDC AND MOSUL POLICE CHIEF  
TENSIONS BETWEEN ICDC AND POLICE CHIEF BARHAWI BECAUSE BARHAWI  
ACCUSED AN ICDC OFFICER OF SHOOTING AN INNOCENT IZ CIVILIAN PASSING THROUGH A TCP.

DIIR SBCT 209-134-04-062 DOI: 25 MAY 2004: THREATS.  
( ) INDIVIDUALS WHO CLAIM THEY ARE BEING THREATENED BY NCF TO NOT  
COOPERATE WITH COALITION FORCES.

07 JULY 2004: CORRUPT HIRING PRACTICES/INEFFECTIVENESS  
AS OF EARLY JULY 2004, CORRUPT HIRING PRACTICES IN THE MOSUL POLICE  
DEPT HAD POPULATED THE DEPT WITH BA'ATH PARTY MEMBERS, INSURGENT SYMPATHIZERS,  
FORMER DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL SECURITY (DGS) MEMBERS, AND UNQUALIFIED OFFICERS.

08 JULY 2004: CORRUPTION WITHIN THE RANKS.  
MOSUL ANTI-CORRUPTION OFFICE REPORT ON THE NINAWA POLICE FORCE.

08 JULY 2004: CORRUPTION WITHIN THE RANKS.  
MOSUL ANTI-CORRUPTION OFFICE REPORT ON THE NINAWA POLICE FORCE.

10 JULY 2004: CORRUPTION WITHIN RANKS.  
FAILURE BY MOSUL POLICE CHIEF TO DIRECT POLICE RESOURCES AGAINST  
INSURGENTS.

20 JULY 2004: TIES WITH AIF.  
ANTI-COALITION ACTIVITIES OF CURRENT NINAWA PROVINCIAL COUNCIL  
MEMBERS.

26 JULY 2004: CORRUPTION WITHIN RANKS.  
DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTHWESTERN IRAQ DUE TO A LACK  
OF PERSONNEL AND CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE NINAWA CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN BI'AJ.

29 JULY 2004: LINKS TO AIF.  
IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD DECIDES TO HALT JOINT OPERATIONS WITH POLICE IN  
MOSUL.

01 AUGUST 2004: SUSPICIOUS INVESTIGATION RESULTS.  
RESULTS OF MOSUL POLICE CHIEF'S INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF  
NINAWA GOVERNOR 'USAMA KASHMULLA.

OSD 1.4(c)(2) CIA 1.4(c)(2)

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

[REDACTED] 04 AUGUST 2004: KIDNAPPING OF POLICE CHIEF'S SISTER  
[REDACTED] 03 AUGUST 2004, POLICE CHIEF BARHAWI'S SISTER WAS KIDNAPPED AND THE  
KIDNAPPERS DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE RESIGNATION OF CHIEF BARHAWI IN RETURN FOR  
THE RELEASE OF HIS SISTER.

[REDACTED] 05 AUGUST 2004: POLICE CORRUPTION.  
[REDACTED] EVENTS AT NINAWA GOVERNOR'S OFFICE DURING 4 AUG 2004 VIOLENCE IN  
MOSUL; PARTICIPATION OF NON-UNIFORMED POLICE IN ATTACKS.

[REDACTED] 05 AUGUST 2004: ATMOSPHERICS FROM MOSUL RESIDENTS  
[REDACTED] IT WAS BEING WIDELY DISCUSSED AMONG MOSUL RESIDENTS THAT THE SISTER  
OF POLICE CHIEF BARHAWI AND SENIOR IRAQI ISLAMIC PARTY MEMBER DR. RA'AD AL-  
BARHAWI HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED ON 03 AUGUST IN RETALIATION FOR THE POLICE CHIEF'S  
ARREST OF THE SISTER OF A TERRORIST.

[REDACTED] 06 AUGUST 2004: FINANCIAL CORRUPTION.  
[REDACTED] CORRUPT AND ANTI-COALITION ACTIVITIES OF SENIOR MOSUL POLICE OFFICERS.

[REDACTED] 06 AUGUST 2004: STRAINED TIES.  
[REDACTED] REQUEST OF NINEWA GOVERNOR TO REPLACE MOSUL POLICE CHIEF DUE TO  
PERFORMANCE ON 4 AUGUST 2004.

DIIR SBCT 209-134-04-154 DOI: 08 AUGUST 2004: FINANCIAL CORRUPTION.  
(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) PRIOR TO 5 AUG 04, BASED ON A VARIETY OF FACTORS, DURAYE  
KESHMOOLA, THE GOVERNOR OF NINEVAH PROVINCE, WAS STRONGLY CONSIDERING  
REMOVING AND REPLACING THE CURRENT CHIEF OF THE MOSUL IPD, MOHAMMED KADI  
MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI, WITH A NEW POLICE OFFICIAL.

DIIR SBCT 209-134-04-155 DOI: 08 AUGUST 2004: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY LINKED TO AN  
INVESTIGATION.  
(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) ON 6 AUG 04, THE HOME OF RETIRED MG SALEM AL MALOOH WAS  
BOMBED.

DIIR SBCT 209-134-04-160 DOI: 08 AUGUST 2004: INTEL TASK FORCE COLLECTION ON AIF  
INSURGENTS.  
(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) MOSUL IP CHIEF GEN MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI HAS  
ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL TASK FORCE, LED BY COL NAZAR, TO HANDLE INVESTIGATIVE AND  
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS REGARDING FOREIGN SUPPORT OF AIF ACTIVITIES. THE TASK FORCE  
IS COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF BARHAWI'S TRUSTED OFFICERS.

[REDACTED] SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY. DIA 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 100.56.424  
(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) NEW MOSUL POLICE TASK FORCE TO INVESTIGATE FOREIGN TIES TO  
INSURGENT ACTIVITY.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 100.56.424

DIIR SBCT 209-134-04-159 DOI: 10 AUGUST 2004: FINANCIAL CORRUPTION.  
(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) IP STATIONS IN MOSUL, IZ ARE UNDER-FUNDED, AND THIS HAS GREATLY  
REDUCED THE NUMBER OF IP OFFICERS IN MOSUL.

[REDACTED] 13 AUGUST 2004: COUNCIL TIES STRAINED.  
[REDACTED] FAILURE OF IRAQI ISLAMIC PARTY (IIP) MEMBERS TO RE-ENTER NINAWA  
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL; IIP PLANS TO OPPOSE UPCOMING IRAQI ELECTIONS.

[REDACTED] 13 AUGUST 2004: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY.  
[REDACTED] STATUS OF MOSUL POLICE CHIEF FOLLOWING 4 AUGUST 2004 VIOLENCE IN  
MOSUL.

[REDACTED] 13 AUGUST 2004: INSURGENT ATTACKS  
[REDACTED] 04 AUG 04, A COMBINED FORCE OF INSURGENT GROUPS REPORTEDLY COMPOSED  
OF AQ MEMBERS, THE ABU MU'SAB AL-ZARQAWWI GROUP (JAMA'AT AL-TAWHID WA'AL JIHAD),  
AS OPERATIVES, AND FORMER BA'ATHISTS LAUNCHED ATTACKS IN MOSUL AGAINST THE FIFTH

OSD 1.4(c)(2) CIA 1.4(c)(2)

OSD 1.4(2)(2) CIA 1.4(2)(2)

BRIDGE AT BAB SINJAR, THE GHAZLANI AIR BASE, THE HOME OF THE IRAQI INTERIM PRESIDENT YAWAR, THE HOMES OF THE MOSUL POLICE CHIEF AND HIS BROTHER, AND AT LEAST EIGHT POLICE STATIONS THROUGHOUT THE CITY.

**16 AUGUST 2004:** BARHAWI BLOCKS FIRING OF TALL 'AFAR POLICE CHIEF [REDACTED] THE LATE GOVERNOR KASHMULLA HAD FEARED IN JUNE 2004 THAT CONTROL OF TALL 'AFAR COULD BE LOST TO INSURGENTS. KASHMULLA HAD SOUGHT TO REMOVE THEN TALL 'AFAR POLICE CHIEF MUWAFFAQ AL-RAWI DUE TO HIS INEFFECTIVENESS IN CONTROLLING THE SECURITY SITUATION. BARHAWI SUCCESSFULLY BLOCKED THE ATTEMPTED FIRING OF RAWI, CONVINCING THE GOVERNOR TO AGREE TO A TWO WEEK PROBATIONARY PERIOD. RAWI WAS REMOVED IN AUGUST AND BLAMED FOR THE RAPID DETERIORATION OF SECURITY IN TALL 'AFAR BY MANY SENIOR SECURITY OFFICIALS IN MOSUL.

**DIIR 504-310-335-04-141 DOI: 17 AUGUST 2004:** FAMILY TIES.  
(CUBEL TO USA MOE) MOHAMMED KHALAF SHAKARA IS RELATED TO THE NINEWAH GOVERNATE, IZ, CHIEF OF POLICE, AS WELL AS A DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF IN AL HATRA, IZ.

**IIR 2 363 3104 04, 17 AUGUST 2004:** LINKS TO AIF.  
(CUBEL TO USA MOE) ANSAR AL-ISLAM LEADER RELATED TO IRAQI POLICE PERSONNEL.

**DIIR 504-310-335-04-144 DOI: 18 AUGUST 2004:** CORRUPTION WITHIN THE RANKS.  
(CUBEL TO USA MOE) AN IRAQI POLICEMAN FROM HAMMAM ALIL, IZ, TOOK BRIBES AT THE CHECKPOINT AT THE GATES OF MOSUL ON HIGHWAY 1. THE NINEWAH GOVERNATE CHIEF OF POLICE PROMISED TO MOVE THE OFFICER TO A DIFFERENT POST.

**DIIR 504-310-332-04-120 DOI: 18 AUGUST 2004:** SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY LINKED TO FINANCIAL CORRUPTION.  
(CUBEL TO USA MOE) APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS AGO, BARHAWI, POLICE CHIEF OF POLICE HEADQUARTERS, MOSUL, IZ, FIRED THA'RE FOR UNKNOWN REASONS.

**DIIR 504-310-332-04-122 DOI: 19 AUGUST 2004:** LINKS TO AIF.  
(CUBEL TO USA MOE) DURING THE ATTACKS CONDUCTED BY AIF ON 4 AUGUST 2004, THE IZ POLICE DETAINED AND THEN RELEASED SEVEN AIF PERSONNEL FROM THE HUMERAH VILLAGE, MOSUL, IZ..

**19 AUGUST 2004:** CORRUPTION WITHIN THE RANKS.  
[REDACTED] MOSUL POLICE CHIEF'S FAILURE TO REACT TO POLICE WARNINGS ON 4 AUGUST 2004; POLICE CHIEF'S DEALINGS WITH SUBORDINATES.

**20 AUGUST 2004:** BARHAWI'S SUBORDINATE, AL-HILLI, PROMOTES ANTI-MNF ACTIVITIES  
[REDACTED] AS OF EARLY AUGUST 2004, COLONEL MAZAHAM KHARALA AL-HILLI, HEAD OF THE AL-THAKAFA POLICE STATION NEAR THE MOSUL MEDICAL UNIVERSITY, WAS CONTINUING TO USE HIS POSITION TO PROMOTE ANTI-MNF ACTIVITIES.

**25 AUGUST 2004:** BARHAWI ORDERED TO FIRE TALL 'AFAR POLICE CHIEF [REDACTED] MID-AUGUST 2004, DEP MOI 'ALI GHALIB IDRIS ORDERED BARHAWI TO FIRE THE POLICE CHIEF OF TALL 'AFAR AND A SENIOR DEPUTY. THE TALL 'AFAR POLICE CHIEF WAS FIRED FOR BOWING TO INSURGENT PRESSURES, AND THE DEPUTY WAS FIRED FOR BEING AN INSURGENT. IDRIS STATED BARHAWI HAD LONG BEEN UNRESPONSIVE TO PROBLEMS WITH THESE TWO OFFICERS, BUT FOLLOWED THE ORDER TO FIRE THEM.

**29 AUGUST 2004:** CORRUPT ACTIVITIES OF BARHAWI AND AL-HILLI  
OFFICER [REDACTED] AS OF LATE AUGUST 2004, THE HEAD OF THE AL-THAKAFA POLICE DEPARTMENT, MAZAHAM KHARALA AL-HILLI, HAD BEEN PROMOTED TO THE RANK OF BRIGADIER GENERAL AND CONTINUED TO USE HIS POSITION FOR PERSONAL PROFIT AND ANTI-MNF ACTIVITIES. AL-

HILLI SOUGHT TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF SEVERAL SUSPECTED INSURGENTS IN LATE AUGUST IN RETURN FOR A BRIBE. AL-HILLI WAS ALSO INVOLVED IN MULTIPLE CORRUPT ACTIVITIES WITH BARHAWI, INCLUDING ILLEGALLY HOLDING A PHARMACIST PENDING A SOLICITED BRIBE.

65D 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2); 10000424

[REDACTED] POLICE CHIEF INTIMIDATION

[REDACTED] MOSUL POLICE CHIEF BARHAWI MAY BE PREPARED TO DEPART IRAQ (U)

[REDACTED] 09 SEP 04 POLICE INACTIVITY OR INEFFICIENCY DCA 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6); 10000424  
REFUSAL BY MOSUL POLICE AND OTHER SERVICES TO RESPOND TO EMERGENCY

SITUATIONS

CIA 1.4(c)(2)

OSD 1.4(c)(2)

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

## CI INFORMATION REPORT

### Classification and Record Management

Title: CIIR-3SBCT-209-134-04-037 Limited details regarding murder cases of two IZPD General Officers murdered 25 FEB 04 in Mosul, IZ

Report Number: CIIR-3SBCT-209-134-04-037

Case Number:

Record Creator: H1342

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats:

Release To: ~~REL US AND MCEL~~

Record Classified By:

~~Declassify On (YYYYMMDD):~~

~~Exemption: X-1~~

Record Type: Theater

Record Status: Active

Created (YYYYMMDD): 20040228014925

Modified (YYYYMMDD): 20040228112757

Community of Interest: Counterintelligence HUMINT

Classification Authorities

Classification Authority:

Report Details

Requirement

Requirement Reference: 1-23 INF SIR 5.A.

Requirement: SOR 5.A.1. Location and type of any attacks on IZP

Subject Reference Title:

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

Additional Requirements

Requirement Reference: 3 SBCT PIR 6

Requirement: 6. B.4. Attacks aimed at local officials.

Subject/Reference Title:

CIIR Subject/Title: Two IZPD General Officers murdered 25 FEB 04 in Mosul

CIIR Summary: (S) On 25 FEB 04, Major General (MG) Hekmar Mahmood Mohammed and MG Abdul Ilaah Al-Anaz, both IZP Officers, were murdered separately in Mosul, IZ. There were several witnesses to MG Mohammed's murder. Investigations continue into both cases; one vehicle involved with the killing of MJG Mohammed is in IZPD custody.

Category of Report: Antiterrorism/Force Protection

Requirement Priority Rating: Theater or Lower Echelon

Target

Target (person or facility or organization or other)

Person

Last Name:

First Name:

Middle Name:

Phonetic:

Facility

Facility Name:

Facility Type:

Description:

Organization

Organization Name:

Organization Type:

Description:

Location:

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

Individual Source: Yes

Reliability of Source: F - Reliability cannot be judged

Source ID Number: 134 P-134-009-04

Information Reliability: 6 - Truth cannot be judged

Information Date (YYYYMMDD): 20040226

Last Date of Acquisition (YYYYMMDD): 20040227

Report: 1. (S/REF US MCF) On 25 FEB 04, Major General (MG) Hekmar Mahmood ((Mohammed)) al Zubaydi, and MG Abdul Ilaah ((Al-Anaz)), both IZP Officers, were murdered in Mosul, IZ. MG Mohammed was buried at 1500 hours, 25 FEB 04, . 2. (S/REF US MCF) At approximately 0730 hours, 25 FEB 04, MG Mohammed, Information Administration Officer, HQ, Mosul Police, was murdered in an attack involving two vehicles. One of the vehicles, a black Opel driven by two Unidentified Individuals (UI), crashed during the attack, and the two UI fled the scene. Several people witnessed the incident. 2.A. (S/REF US MCF) Prior to the overthrow of Iraq's former regime, MG Mohammed was the Deputy Chief, Mosul Police. After the fall of the regime, MG Mohammed's suddenly became rich. He and MAJ Ziad ((Awni)), currently the Chief, Al Hadbaa Police Station, Al Hadbaa Neighborhood//SLF 340292//, were closely associated, and were both suspected of having stolen money from the former Iraqi Government during its collapse. MG Mohammed's relationship with GEN Barhawi, Commander and Chief, Mosul Police, was strained. No Further Information (NFI). 2.B. (S/REF US MCF) MG Mohammed is survived by two wives and several sons, to include Luqman Hekmar ((Mahmood)), an IZPD Officer. MG Mohammed had two houses, one located in Al Incisor Neighborhood (CNA), Mosul. At the time of his death, MG Mohammed drove a 1985 Toyota Super Saloon, licence plate number 183851 (Baghdad). Both the Toyota and the Opel are currently held at the Al Faysalia Station, Al Faysalia Neighborhood//SLF 340240//, Mosul. Investigation continues. 3. (S/REF US MCF) On 25 FEB 04, MG Abdul Ilaah ((Al-Anaz)), 55 years old, Chief, Al Hamdania Ba'ath Precinct, was murdered. MG Al-Anaz feuded with Ali Yazan and Yazan's brother, MAJ Abdul ((Ilaah)). Coalition Forces apprehended two of Ilaah's brothers, Abdul ((Salam)) and Abdul ((Ghanim)), on charges unrelated to MG Al-Anaz' death. NFI.

Comments: Field Comments: (S/REF US MCF) Source is an Iraqi Kurd with indirect access to the information. Source has reported in the past. Source is available for recontact.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

Field 1: Agent's Comments: (S/REL US MCM) Source collected this information from two of His contacts within the Mosul Police. Grids provided are designated to neighborhoods, not specific police departments.

Field 2:

Field 3:

Attachments

Attachments

Label:

Description:

File Name:

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

**Page determined to be Unclassified**  
**Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS**  
**IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5**  
**Date:**

**APR 11 2014**

## CI INFORMATION REPORT

### Classification and Record Management

Title: CIIR-3SBCT-209-134-04-054 IZPD interfering with Iraqis attempting to report matters of potential interest to Coalition Forces

Report Number: CIIR-3SBCT-209-134-04-054

Case Number:

Record Creator: H1342

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats:

Release To: ~~REL US AND NATO~~

Record Classified By:

~~Declassify On (YYYYMMDD):~~

~~Exemption: X-1~~

Record Type: Theater

Record Status: Active

Created (YYYYMMDD): 20040315151301

Modified (YYYYMMDD): 20040315152159

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

Community of Interest: Counterintelligence HUMINT

Classification Authorities  
Classification Authority:

### Report Details

#### Requirement

Requirement Reference: 1-23 INF PIR 5

Requirement: SOR 5.B.2. Uncooperative government agencies and personnel.

Subject Reference Title:

### Additional Requirements

Requirement Reference: 3/2 SBCT PIR 5  
Requirement: 5. A.3. Leader's support for or against policies that will affect 3/2  
SBCT operations.  
Subject/Reference Title:

CIIR Subject/Title: IZPD interfering with reports to Coalition Forces

CIIR Summary: ( ~~SECRET~~ ) IZP Officers working with U.S. Military  
Police (MP) frequently prevent Iraqis from reporting information on criminal matters to  
MP's. The information details automobile thefts, weapons, black marketing, and items  
potentially stolen from the U.S. Government. IZPD are also directed to have no  
unauthorized contact with Coalition Forces.

Category of Report: Antiterrorism/Force Protection

Requirement Priority Rating: Theater or Lower Echelon

Target

Target (person or facility or organization or other)

Person

Last Name:

First Name:

Middle Name:

Phonetic:

Facility

Facility Name:

Facility Type:

Description:

Organization

Organization Name:

Organization Type:

Description:

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div. WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

Location:

Individual Source: No

Reliability of Source: F - Reliability cannot be judged

Source ID Number: 134 O-016-021-04

Information Reliability: 1 - Confirmed by other sources

Information Date (YYYYMMDD): 20040313

Last Date of Acquisition (YYYYMMDD): 20040313

Report: 1. (S/REF US MGR) On many occasions in FEB 04 and MAR 04, several IZP Officers collocated with U.S. Military Police (MP) in Mosul, interfered with Iraqis attempting to report information of potential interest to Coalition Forces. The Iraqis had information related to such matters as automobile thefts, weapons, black marketing of goods; and the location of items they believe to be improperly procured from the U.S. Government, to include computer monitors and power generators. 2. (S/REF US MGR) The Iraqis attempted to report the matters to law enforcement personnel located at the Al Da Wasa Management Section, Headquarters, Governate Building, IVO Grid //SLF 236331//, IVO Al Dawasa Neighborhood, Mosul. Herein IZP and MP's attached to 3/2 SBCT, are available to receive reporting by informants and concerned citizens regarding criminal related matters. 3. (S/REF US MGR) IZPD Officers from the Al Da Wasa Management Section, to include 1LT Joda Gudil ((Taha)); and MAJ Saad Abad ((Ali)), OIC, Intelligence Section, are apathetic toward the majority of reports by concerned citizens of Mosul. Whenever Iraqis request to speak with Coalition Forces MP's, IZPD Officers usually tell them they cannot; claiming either the reported information is not valid, or the matters are unimportant. 4. (S/REF US MGR) On a couple of occasions when concerned citizens insisted on informing MP's of their information, Taha told them they would be arrested if they attempted to speak with Coalition Forces or if they returned to the Al Da Wasa Management Section at any point in the future. 4. (S/REF US MGR) Posted near the main doorway of the Governate Building's Al Da Wasa Management Section is a notice written in Arabic that translates: "No Unauthorized contact with Coalition Forces will be tolerated". This notice is intended to deter IZP working within the Mosul Police from reporting cases of corruption or other matters of potential interest to Coalition Forces. Violators of this policy face persecution by their coworkers, supervisors and official administrative actions; such as removal from positions of trust or possible termination of their employment within the IZPD.

Comments: (S/REF US MGR) Source is an Iraqi Arab with direct access to the reported information. Source has reported information previously. Source is available for recontact.

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Authority: EO 13526  
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Date: APR 11 2014

Field 1: Source Comments: (~~SECRET~~) There is a growing culture of anti-U.S. sentiment in the Mosul Police. The officers who are pro-U.S. face persecution from officers ranging from GEN Mohammed Kadi ((Mahmood)) AL Barhawi, Chief of Police, to low level officers such as Taha. Agent's Comments: (~~SECRET~~) Source 134O-134-042-04 provided THT 134 limited information that corroborated Source's report.

Field 2:

Field 3:

Attachments

Attachments

Label:

Description:

File Name:

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

DRAFT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

FROM: THT134, 209 MICO  
TO: CJ2X/HOC, CJTF7; 1-23 INF/S2, 1-23 INF  
INFO: CDR, 3/2 SBCT, ATTN: S2X/HOC

SERIAL: (U) DIIR-3SBCT-209-134-04-062.

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ).

IPSP: (U) IFC.

SUBJ: DIIR-3SBCT-209-134-04-062--THREAT TO LOCAL NATIONAL  
EMPLOYEE (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY  
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT IS ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET~~  
~~RELEASEABLE TO USIA AND MCFI~~

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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DOI: (U) 200405025.

REQS: 1. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCFI~~) 1-23 INF SOR 4.D.1. REPORT ANY  
HUMINT ASSOCIATED WITH THREATS AGAINST KEY INFRASTRUCTURE  
EMPLOYEES OR FPSF.

2. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCFI~~) 3-2 SBCT PIR 1.B.1. REPORT INDIVIDUALS  
WHO CLAIM THEY ARE BEING THREATENED BY NCF TO NOT COOPERATE  
WITH COALITION FORCES.

SOURCE: 1. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCFI~~) //6067012// AN IRAQI KURD WITH  
INDIRECT/DIRECT ACCESS TO THE REPORTED INFORMATION BY VIRTUE  
OF HIS SOCIAL CONTACTS. SOURCE HAS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY TO  
USMI/COALITION FORCES. SOURCE'S RELIABILITY HAS NOT YET BEEN  
DETERMINED. SOURCE IS A MUSLIM SUNNI OF THE AL DAHUKI TRIBE.

SUMMARY: (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCFI~~) ON 25 MAY 04, TAAGHRED M.  
GORW FOUND AN ENVELOPE WITH AN AFFIXED 7.62 MM AMMUNITION  
ROUND, UNDER HER DOOR. THE ENVELOPE CONTAINED A LETTER THAT  
THREATENED HER DUE TO HER EMPLOYMENT BY COALITION FORCES AND  
THE IZPD.

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TEXT: 1. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) AT APPROXIMATELY 0700 HOURS, ON 25 MAY 04, TAAGHRED M. ((GORW)) FOUND A LETTER PLACED UNDER HER DOOR, AT HER RESIDENCE IN AL SAHA NEIGHBORHOOD (CNA), MOSUL. AFFIXED TO THE ENVELOPE WITH TAPE WAS A 7.62MM AMMUNITION ROUND.

2. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) THE ENVELOPE CONTAINED A LETTER DISPLAYING HANDWRITTEN ARABIC SCRIPT, TRANSLATED AS FOLLOWS -- TO THE BITCH WHO WORKS WITH COALITION FORCES AND IRAQI POLICE. YOU HAVE ONE WEEK TO DECIDE TO QUIT. IF NOT, THERE WILL BE DEATH, DEATH, DEATH. SIGNED THE ARABIC UNION OF MUJAHADEEN.

3. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) GORW IS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE COP BLICKENSTAFF BARBER SHOP, AND ALSO WORKS PART-TIME AT MOSUL MAIN IZP HEADQUARTERS, AL DAWASA NEIGHBORHOOD//MGRSCOORD: 38SLF332225//, MOSUL AS ONE OF IZPD CHIEF GEN BARHAWI'S SECRETARY. GORW IS ALSO CURRENTLY TRAINING AT THE POLICE ACADEMY TO BECOME AN OFFICER IN THE IZP. IF SHE SUCCESSFULLY ATTAINS AN IZPD COMMISSION, SHE WILL BE THE ONLY FEMALE OFFICER IN MOSUL'S IZPD.

4. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) GORW DESTROYED THE LETTER AFTER READING IT. GORW DOES NOT KNOW WHO SENT THE LETTER AND HAS NOT BEEN THREATENED BEFORE. GORW IS NOT QUITTING EITHER HER POSITION WITH THE IZP, OR ON COP BLICKENSTAFF. HOWEVER, GORW IS MOVING INTO HER UNCLE'S HOUSE FOR SECURITY PURPOSES.

COMMENTS: (U) (FIELD COMMENTS) -- 1. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT WAS NOT CORROBORATED BY ADDITIONAL SOURCES. GRID COORDIANATES PROVIDED WERE DETERMINED BY 101ST GRID COORDINATE RECORDS AND ARE NOT SPECIFIC TO THE LOCATIONS.

2. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) SOURCE IS AVAILABLE FOR RECONTACT THROUGH HIS EMPLOYMENT BY COALITION FORCES.

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

PREP: (U) B7949.

ACQ: (U) MOSUL, IRAQ (20040525).

DISSEM: (U) FIELD-- CJTF-7.

WARNING: (U) REPORT IS CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ RELEASABLE TO USA AND MCF.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

DRV FROM: (U) USAINSCOM SCG 380-2, 5 AUGUST 1996.

~~SECRET (U) VI~~

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: APR 11 2014

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI//X1~~

DATE: 18 August 2004 15:55

REPORTING UNIT: 310THOPS

CITE: (U) NONE.

SERIAL: (U) DIIR-504-310-332-04-120

PASS:

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ); SYRIA (SY); TURKEY (TU)

IPSP: (U) IFC2410; IFC1584; IFC2310; IFC2350; IFC2420

SUBJ: DIIR-504-310-332-04-120/FORMER IRAQI POLICE OFFICER WORKING WITH ANTI-IRAQI FORCES AND SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT IS ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI//X1~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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DOI: 2004/08/18

REQS: (U) U-UEV-2410-003-04; X-UDX-1584-0021-04; U-UDX-2310-003-04MNF-I PIR 6; MNF-I PIR 7; MNC-I PIR 6;

SOURCE: (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~) //OTS 2363074504// SOURCE IS AN IRAQI NATIONAL OF KURDISH ETHNICITY WITH INDIRECT ACCESS TO THE REPORTED INFORMATION BY VIRTUE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS. SOURCE HAS REPORTED RELIABLY IN THE PAST. SOURCE AND INFORMATION ARE ASSESSED AS C-3.

SUMMARY: (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~) THA'RE ABDUL HAMEED MUSTAFA MEETS WITH SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE THROUGHOUT NORTHERN IRAQ. MUSTAFA ALSO SMUGGLES VEHICLES INTO IRAQ FROM TURKEY AND SYRIA WHICH CONTAIN UNSPECIFIED EXPLOSIVE ORDINANCE.

TEXT: 1. (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~) AS OF 18 AUGUST 2004, THA'RE ABDULHAMEED ((MUSTAFA)) (PHONETIC), FORMER IRAQI POLICE OFFICER, POLICE HEADQUARTERS, MOSUL //MGRSCoord:38SLF309227//, IRAQ (IZ),

AND CURRENTLY A SELF-EMPLOYED VEHICLE CONTRACTOR, IS TRANSPORTING VEHICLES CONTAINING UNSPECIFIED EXPLOSIVE ORDINANCE INTO IZ FROM SYRIA AND TURKEY.

2. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) APPROX TEN DAYS AGO, MOHAMMAD AL ((BARHAWY)), POLICE CHIEF OF THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS IN MOSUL, FIRED MUSTAFA FOR UNKNOWN REASONS (FIELD COMMENT-- LOCAL RUMORS INDICATE MUSTAFA DISAPPEARED WITH 900,000 USD ALLOCATED FROM MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES TO IRAQI POLICE TO STRENGTHEN THEIR EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE). OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS, EXACT DATES AND TIMES NOT RECALLED, MUSTAFA TRAVELED TO DIHOK //MGRSCoord: 38SLF2181//, IZ, AND ZAKHO (CNA), IZ, SEVERAL TIMES TO CONDUCT MEETINGS WITH UNIDENTIFIED MEMBERS OF SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE AND UNIDENTIFIED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) CONTACTS. DURING THESE TRIPS, MUSTAFA SPENT 45,000 USD ON A BRAND NEW TOYOTA LAND CRUISER MONICA (PHONETIC), 35,000 USD ON A BRAND NEW SILVER/GREY MERCEDES, PURCHASED A HOUSE IN ZAKHO, AND RENTED A HOUSE IN DIHOK. ADDITIONALLY, ON UNSPECIFIED OCCASSIONS, MUSTAFA USED HIS COALITION BADGE TO TRAVEL THROUGH IRAQI POLICE, IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD (ING), AND PESHMERGA CHECK POINTS TO AVOID BEING SEARCHED OR QUESTIONED ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES, NFI.

3. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) ON HIS FIRST FEW TRIPS TO DIHOK, MUSTAFA STAYED IN THE ZHIAN HOTEL (CNA). HE HAS SINCE RENTED A HOUSE, EXACT LOCATION UNKNOWN, IN DIHOK. THE HOUSE, HOWEVER, MAY NOT BE REGISTERED IN HIS NAME. WHILE IN DIHOK, MUSTAFA DRIVES HIS LAND CRUISER TO A CAR DEALERSHIP (CNA) OWNED BY ABU ((MUSHTAQ)), CAR DEALER, ASSOCIATE OF MUSTAFA, WORK TELEPHONE 722-1381, HOME TELEPHONE 722-6685. AT THE DEALERSHIP, MUSTAFA MEETS WITH UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS FROM SYRIA, TURKEY AND IZ. ON SOME OCCASIONS HE MEETS THEM AT THE DEALERSHIP TO TRAVEL TOGETHER IN THE LAND CRUISER AND LEAVE FOR ANOTHER LOCATION, NFI.

4. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) MUSTAFA MEETS UNIDENTIFIED CONTACTS AT THE ABRAHAM KHALIL CHECK POINT IN THE VICINITY OF //MGRSCoord: 38SKG841135// IN ZAKHO (CNA), IZ. HIS CONTACTS ASSIST HIM IN BUYING AND TRANSPORTING VEHICLES ACROSS THE BORDER FROM TURKEY INTO IZ. WHEN IN ZAKHO, MUSTAFA STAYS AT HIS HOUSE (CNA), WHICH HE BOUGHT AND REGISTERED UNDER THE NAME AZAAD MOHAMMED ((MYRO)) (PHONETIC), A KURDISH BUSINESSMAN, AND AN ASSOCIATE OF MUSTAFA'S, NFI.

5. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) ONCE MUSTAFA SECURES THE VEHICLES IN ZAKHO, SOME OF WHICH ARE CARRYING UNSPECIFIED EXPLOSIVE

DEVICES AND EQUIPMENT, HE CONTACTS OTHER IRAQI POLICE ASSOCIATES TO ASSIST HIM IN DISPERSING THESE VEHICLES TO AIF CELLS AND PERSONNEL THROUGHOUT MOSUL AND SURROUNDING AREAS, NFI.

6. (S//REL TO USA AND MCF) SOURCE COULD PROVIDE NO FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING MUSTAFA'S CONTACTS, ASSOCIATES, AIF ACTIVITIES, DESTINATION OR TARGETS OF POSSIBLE VEHICLE BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (VBIED), AND FREQUENCY OF TRAVEL TO AND FROM ZAKHO AND DIHOK, NFI.

COMMENTS: (SOURCE COMMENTS)-- (U) NONE.

(FIELD COMMENTS)-- 1. (S//REL TO USA AND MCF) SOURCE IS CONTINUING TO DEVELOP FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING MUSTAFA'S ACTIVITIES IN ZAKHO, DIHOK, AND MOSUL, TO INCLUDE HIS CONTACTS, ASSOCIATES, LOCATION AND DESTINATION OF VBIED'S, AND THE FULL EXTENT OF HIS AIF AFFILIATION.

2. (S//REL TO USA AND MCF) SOURCE IS ALSO WILLING TO TAKE COALITION FORCES TO THE DEALERSHIP AND ADDITIONAL LOCATIONS AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.

3. (U) SOURCE IS AVAILABLE FOR RECONTACT.

4. (OMT COMMENTS)-- (S//REL TO USA AND MCF) THIS REPORT ADDS TO PREVIOUS REPORTING OUTLINING AIF ACTIVITIES ORIGINATING IN SYRIA, HOWEVER, LEGITIMATE BORDER CROSSING PROCEDURES ARE UTILIZED AT THE TURKISH-IRAQI BORDER, PRESUMABLY TO KEEP FROM AROUSING SUSPICION ABOUT NUMBER OF VEHICLES CROSSING OR THEIR CONTENTS. NONE.

5. (THOPS COMMENTS)-- (U) NONE.

COMMENTS:

INSTR: (U) US NO.

PREP: (U) 2-72307

ENCL: (U) NONE.

ACQ: (U) MOSUL, IZ; (20040818)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD - OMT 33 AND S2X.

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET REL TO USA AND MCF

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

DRVFROM: (U) USAINSCOM SCG 380-2, 5 AUGUST 1996.

~~DECL. (U) K1~~

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: **APR 11 2014**

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCF//X1~~

DATE: 19 August 2004 21:09

REPORTING UNIT: 310THOPS

CITE: (U) NONE.

SERIAL: (U) DIIR-504-310-332-04-122

PASS:

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ)

IPSP: (U) IFC1583; IFC2410; IFC2350; IFC2420; IFC2430

SUBJ: DIIR-504-310-332-04-122/MEMBERS OF THE IRAQI POLICE ARE COOPERATING WITH A GROUP AFFILIATED WITH ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT IS ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCF//X1~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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DOI: 2004/08/19

REQS: (U) X-UDX-2410-0028-04; C-DI3-2430-103-04 MNF-I PIR 2; MNF-I PIR 3; MNC-I PIR 6;

SOURCE: (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCF~~) //OTS 2363074504// AN IRAQI NATIONAL WITH INDIRECT ACCESS TO THE REPORTED INFORMATION BY VIRTUE OF PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS. SOURCE HAS REPORTED RELIABLY IN THE PAST. SOURCE RELIABILITY AND INFORMATION ARE ASSESSED AS C-3.

SUMMARY: (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCF~~) DURING THE ATTACKS CONDUCTED BY ANTI-IRAQI FORCES ON 4 AUGUST 2004, THE IRAQI POLICE DETAINED AND THEN RELEASED SEVEN ANTI-IRAQI FORCES PERSONNEL FROM THE HUMERAH VILLAGE, MOSUL, IRAQ.

TEXT: (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCF~~) ON 4 AUGUST 2004, DURING AN ATTACK DIRECTED TOWARDS THE IRAQI POLICE HEADQUARTERS /MGRSCOORD:38SLF332265//, MOSUL, IRAQ (IZ), IRAQI POLICE CAPTURED AND DETAINED SEVEN UNIDENTIFIED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF)

PERSONNEL FROM THE AL HUMERAH (PHONETIC) VILLIAGE / MGSRCOORD:38SLF025469//, MOSUL, IZ. SHORTLY AFTER THEIR DETENTION, EXACT TIME NOT RECALLED, LIEUTENANT COLONEL (LTC) ((HAJI)), IRAQI POLICE OFFICER, IRAQI POLICE HEADQUARTERS, MOSUL, AND MOHAMMAD AL ((BARHAWY)), POLICE CHIEF, IRAQI POLICE, MOSUL, FORMER HIGH LEVEL BA'ATH PARTY MEMBER, MADE THE DECISION TO RELEASE THE SEVEN AIF PERSONNEL. BARHAWY TOLD THE AIF MEMBERS AS HE RELEASED THEM TO SAY HELLO TO THEIR FRIENDS AND TO LET THEM KNOW THE IRAQI POLICE IN MOSUL HAD NOTHING AGAINST THEM. BARHAWY WENT ON TO REQUEST AIF NOT ATTACK IRAQI POLICE BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT AGAINST AIF ACTIVITIES, HOWEVER, THEY ARE FREE TO ATTACK MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES (MNF) AS OFTEN AS THEY WISH, NFI.

COMMENTS: (SOURCE COMMENTS)-- (U) NONE.

(FIELD COMMENTS)-- 1. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) SOURCE PROVIDED THIS INFORMATION FROM AN EYEWITNESS WHO OVERHEARD HAJI AND BARHAWY TALKING WITH THE AIF PERSONNEL.

2. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) SOURCE WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP INFORMATION CONCERNING IRAQI POLICE AND THEIR AIF AFFILIATIONS AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

3. (U) SOURCE IS AVAILABLE FOR RECONTACT.

4. (OMT COMMENTS)-- (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) SOURCE HAS REPORTED RELIABLY IN THE PAST, HOWEVER EYEWITNESS REPORTING DESCRIBED BY SOURCE IS UNSUBSTANTIATED.

5. (THOPS COMMENTS)-- (U) NONE.

COMMENTS:

INSTR: (U) US NO.

PREP: (U) 2-72307.

ENCL: (U) NONE.

ACQ: (U) MOSUL, IZ; (20040819)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD - OMT 33 AND S2X.

WARNING: (U) REPORT ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET REL TO USA AND MCF~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFD//X1~~

DATE: 19 August 2004 07:33

REPORTING UNIT: 310THOPS

CITE: (U) NONE.

SERIAL: (U) DIIR-504-310-335-04-141

PASS:

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ)

IPSP: (U) IFC2400

SUBJ: DIIR-504-310-335-04-141/ ANSAR AL ISLAM TERRORIST RELATED TO IRAQI POLICE CHIEFS (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT IS ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFD//X1~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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DOI: 2004/08/17

REQS: (U) HCR J-TF7-2400-174-04; HCR J-TF7-2400-140-04 MNF-I PIR 3; MNC-I PIR 6;

SOURCE: (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFD~~) //23630443// AN ARAB IRAQI NATIONAL WITH DIRECT ACCESS TO REPORTED INFORMATION BY VIRTUE OF HIS PROFESSIONAL DUTIES. SOURCE HAS REPORTED RELIABLY IN THE PAST. SOURCE AND INFORMATION RELIABILITY ARE ASSESSED AS C3.

SUMMARY: (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFD~~) MOHAMMED KHALAF SHAKARA IS RELATED TO THE NINEWAH GOVERNATE, IRAQ, CHIEF OF POLICE, AS WELL AS A DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF IN AL HATRA, IRAQ.

TEXT: 1. (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFD~~) MOHAMMED KHALAF ((SHAKARA)), THE LEADER OF ANSAR AL ISLAM TERRORISTS IN THE REGION OF MOSUL, /MGRSCOORD:38SLF3423// IRAQ (IZ), IS RELATED TO THE NINEWAH PROVINCE CHIEF OF POLICE, GENERAL FNU ((BARHAWI)). THEY ARE BOTH FROM THE HAMDANI TRIBE, NFI.

2. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCFI~~) BOTH SHAKARA AND BARHAWI ARE RELATED TO COLONEL ((JASSIM)) AL HAMDANI, WHO WAS THE POLICE CHIEF OF AL HATRA //MGRSCoord: 38SKE9439// IZ, UNTIL APPROX 1 AUGUST 2004. AT THAT TIME, CHIEF BARHAWI MOVED JASSIM TO HAMDANIYAH, (CNA), IZ, TO BE THE POLICE CHIEF. BARHAWI MOVED HIM BECAUSE JASSIM WAS TOO OBVIOUS ABOUT ALLOWING TERRORISTS, INCLUDING SHAKARA, TO MOVE TO AND OPERATE IN AL HATRA, NFI.

3. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCFI~~) SHAKARA HAD WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN IRAQI POLICE CAR. HE WAS SEEN IN THIS VEHICLE IN SEVERAL DIFFERENT PARTS OF MOSUL DURING THE FIRST HALF OF AUGUST 2004, NFI.

COMMENTS: (SOURCE COMMENTS)-- (U) NONE.  
(FIELD COMMENTS)-- (U) SOURCE IS AVAILABLE FOR RECONTACT.

COMMENTS:

INSTR: (U) US NO.

PREP: (U) 2-A1876

ENCL: (U) NONE.

ACQ: (U) QAYYARAH WEST AIRFIELD, IZ (20040818)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD - NONE.

WARNING: (U) REPORT ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET~~ ~~SECRET TO USA AND MCFI/X1~~

DRVFROM: (U) USAINSCOM SCG 380-2, 5 AUGUST 1996

~~DECL: (U) AT.~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

DIIR 504-310-335-04-144; A HAMMAM ALIL POLICEMAN IS TAKING BRIBES.

DOI: 20040818

TEAM: 335

(S) IRAQI POLICE CAPTAIN ((FAOUZI)) WORKS FOR THE HAMMAM ALIL, IZ //MGRSCoord: 38SLF4303// POLICE. HIS PLACE OF DUTY IS THE TRAFFIC CONTROL POINT AT THE GATES OF MOSUL ON HIGHWAY 1, VIC //MGRSCoord: 38SLF300132//. DURING ONE HOUR ON 28 JULY 2004, HE TOOK AT LEAST 800 USD IN BRIBES TO ALLOW VEHICLES THROUGH THE CHECKPOINT INTO MOSUL. HE TOOK \$100 FROM A MAN CARRYING A PISTOL IN HIS CAR. HE ALSO TOOK \$100 EACH FROM SEVEN BLACK MARKET FUEL TANKER TRUCKS, NFI. GENERAL ((BARHAWI)) IS THE CHIEF OF POLICE FOR THE NINEVAH GOVERNATE, WITH AN OFFICE IN MOSUL, IZ //MGRSCoord: 38SLF3223//. WHEN HE WAS INFORMED OF THE OFFICER'S BEHAVIOR, HE AGREED THAT THE OFFICER SHOULD NOT BE TAKING BRIBES. HE PROMISED TO MOVE THE OFFICER TO A DIFFERENT POST. (SOURCE COMMENT--WHEN ASKED WHY HE WOULD NOT FIRE THE OFFICER, HE EXPLAINED THAT ONLY THE IRAQI MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR IN BAGHDAD COULD FIRE POLICE OFFICERS.) HE DID NOT PROMISE TO ASK THAT THE OFFICER BE FIRED, NFI.

(S) FIELD COMMENTS: AN ARABIC IRAQI NATIONAL WHO HAD INDIRECT ACCESS TO THIS INFORMATION BY VIRTUE OF HIS SOCIAL CONTACTS. SOURCE HAS REPORTED RELIABLY IN THE PAST. SOURCE AND INFORMATION RELIABILITY ARE EVALUATED C3.

(S) S2X COMMENTS: JASSIM AFROSH WAS THE PREVIOUS CHIEF OF POLICE FOR HAMMAM AL ALIL. HE WAS REPORTEDLY BEING INFLUENCED/ THREATENED BY SHAKARA (HIS COUSIN) AND HAD TO BE MOVED TO AL-HADR IN ORDER TO BE EFFECTIVE AND OUT OF HIS FAMILY'S INFLUENCE. WE HAVE RECEIVED PREVIOUS REPORTING OF BARHAWI BEING RELATED TO SHAKARA. BARHAWI REPORTEDLY CONTINUES TO COOPERATE WITH AIF.

SOURCE NUMBER: 2363044304

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: APR 11 2014

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCF//X~~

DATE: 11 August 2004 04:48

REPORTING UNIT: THT134

CITE: (U) NONE.

SERIAL: (U) DIIR-SBCT-209-134-04-154

PASS:

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ); TURKEY (TU).

IPSP: (U) IFC2610; IFC2600.

SUBJ: DIIR-SBCT-209-134-04-154/ LEADERSHIP UPHEAVALS IN IPD. (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT IS ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCF//X~~

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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DOI: (U) 20040808.

REQS: (U) U-UDX-1590-011-02; (C) 1-23 INF SOR 5.B.1. IDENTIFY GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES THAT INTERFERE WITH MNF OPERATIONS.

SOURCE: (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCF~~) //6 067 0074// AN IRAQI ARAB WITH INDIRECT ACCESS TO THE REPORTED INFORMATION BY VIRTUE OF HIS SOCIAL CONTACTS. SOURCE HAS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY TO USMI/MULTI NATIONAL FORCES. SOURCE HAS REPORTED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST. SOURCE IS A SUNNI MUSLIM OF AKRAWI TRIBE.

SUMMARY: (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCF~~) PRIOR TO 5 AUG 04, BASED ON A VARIETY OF FACTORS, DURAYE KESHMOOLA, THE GOVERNOR OF NINEVAH PROVINCE, WAS STRONGLY CONSIDERING REMOVING AND REPLACING THE CURRENT CHIEF OF THE MOSUL IPD, MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI, WITH A NEW POLICE OFFICIAL.

TEXT: 1. (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCF~~) PRIOR TO 5 AUG 04, BASED ON A VARIETY OF FACTORS, DURAYE KESHMOOLA (LNU), THE GOVERNOR OF NINEVAH PROVINCE, WAS STRONGLY CONSIDERING REMOVING AND REPLACING THE CURRENT CHIEF OF THE MOSUL IPD, MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD ((AL BARHAWI)) (FIELD COMMENT -- GEN MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI IS OFFICIALLY REFERRED TO AS GEN BARHAWI), WITH A NEW POLICE OFFICIAL.

2. (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCF~~) ON 5 AUG 04, GEN BARHAWI VISITED GOV DURAYE AT THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, AND THEY DISCUSSED BARHAWI'S JOB PERFORMANCE, THE

CURRENT LEVEL OF SAFETY FOR THE CITIZENS OF MOSUL, MGRSCoord:38SLF3327//, AND THE APPARENT LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY OF MANY POLICE WORKING WITHIN THE MOSUL POLICE DEPARTMENT, TO INCLUDE ALLEGATIONS OF GEN BARHAWI KNOWINGLY MISALLOCATING SALARIES FOR POLICE PERSONNEL WHO HAVE LITTLE TO NO INVOLVEMENT WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE DEPARTMENTS.

2.A. (S REL TO USA AND MCF) GEN BARHAWI ADMITTED HIS PERFORMANCE COULD BE IMPROVED. HE ASKED THE GOVERNOR TO HAVE MORE PATIENCE, AND ASSURED HIM THAT POLICIES TO IMPROVE ANY OF HIS DEPARTMENT'S SHORTCOMINGS WOULD BE ENACTED OR BETTER ENFORCED FROM THAT DAY FORTH. (SOURCE COMMENT -- BARHAWI HUMBLLED HIMSELF, AND PLED WITH THE GOVERNOR).

2.B. (S REL TO USA AND MCF) GEN BARHAWI ARGUED THAT DESPITE THE ASSAULTS ON 4 AUG 04, THE OVERALL LEVEL OF PUBLIC SAFETY HAD STEADILY IMPROVED SINCE MID 2004.

(1) (S REL TO USA AND MCF) GEN BARHAWI SAID THAT HIS EXPERIENCE COMMANDING MILITARY UNITS WAS AN ASSET TO THE POLICE, AND HIS EFFORTS LED TO MAKING THE POLICE A MORE FORMIDABLE FOE TO THE AIF. IPD HAD INCREASED THEIR LEVEL OF ALERTNESS, AND THEIR ABILITY TO RETURN FIRE WHEN FIRED UPON. BARHAWI ARGUED THAT AS A RESULT, AIF ATTACKS WERE DETERRED AND HAD THUS DECREASED. BARHAWI POINTED TO A TREND IN INCREASING AIF ATTACKS FOCUSED AGAINST THE POLICE AS EVIDENCE TO THE POLICE'S EFFECTIVENESS IN COUNTERING AIF FORCES. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ING AND THE IZP DURING THE ASSAULTS ON THE IZP AND ING ON 4 AUG 04.

(2) (S REL TO USA AND MCF) GEN BARHAWI ADVISED GOV DURAYE THAT BY REPLACING BARHAWI WITH A NEW CHIEF OF POLICE, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES WOULD CAUSE A LARGE AMOUNT OF TURMOIL AND POLITICAL SQUABBLING WITHIN THE RANKS OF THE POLICE. HE ARGUED THAT THE RELATIONSHIPS HE HAD ESTABLISHED WITH SENIOR IP OFFICERS, THE MNF, AND LOCAL POLITICIANS WERE CRITICAL TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE IP. BARHAWI STATED THAT MAKING THIS SAID CHANGE IN A KEY LEADERSHIP POSITION, AT THE CURRENT FRAGILE POINT IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S PROGRESS IN THEIR STRUGGLE WITH AIF, WAS ILL ADVISED, AND COULD BE DISASTROUS.

2.C. (S REL TO USA AND MCF) GOV DURAYE ADDRESSED ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION WITHIN THE POLICE FORCE. ONE SIGNIFICANT ALLEGATION WAS THAT IN MANY CASES POLICE RECEIVING SALARIES WERE NOT IN FACT ACTIVELY EMPLOYED AS POLICE. GOV DURAYE ASKED WHY HE RECEIVED RAMPANT REPORTS ABOUT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF THE 12,000 SALARIED POLICE OFFICERS EMPLOYED IN MOSUL NOT HAVING ANY ACCOUNTABILITY TO THEIR ASSIGNED DEPARTMENTS. (SOURCE COMMENT -- THE REPORTS THE GOVERNOR MENTIONED LIKELY DEALT WITH IP PERSONNEL RECEIVING SALARIES, THEN EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PROVIDING A PORTION OF THE PROFIT TO GEN BARHAWI, WHILE NOT ACTUALLY FULFILLING THEIR OBLIGATION AS POLICEMEN.) (FIELD COMMENT -- SOURCE WAS UNSURE EXACTLY HOW DIRECTLY THE DISCUSSIONS ON CORRUPTION DEALT WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF BARHAWI, VERSUS GENERAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT HIS SUBORDINATES.) NFI.

2.D. (S REL TO USA AND MCF) GOV DURAYE HAD DOCUMENTED SEVERAL OCCASIONS,

MOSTLY DURING EVENING HOURS, WHEN HE AND HIS AIDS DROVE AROUND DISTRICTS IN MOSUL AND FOUND LITTLE TO NO INDICATION OF POLICE PATROLS, CHECKPOINTS, OR OTHER TYPES OF PRESENCE. GOV DURAYE REPORTEDLY CONFRONTED GEN BARHAWI WITH THE DOCUMENTATION SUPPORTING HIS CLAIMS OF IDENTIFYING LITTLE TO NO POLICE COVERAGE IN MOSUL. HE ASKED BARHAWI HOW THIS WAS POSSIBLE CONSIDERING THE NEARLY 12,000 IP PERSONNEL ON THE CITY OF MOSUL'S PAYROLL. HE QUESTIONED BARHAWI HOW IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DETER CRIME WITH NO POLICE FOOTPRINT DURING THE HIGH CRIME PERIODS OF THE EVENING.

2.E. (S REL TO USA AND MCF) THE LEADING CANDIDATE FOR REPLACING GEN BARHAWI WAS RETIRED GEN ABDUL AZIZ (LNU), A FORMER CHIEF OF POLICE FOR MOSUL. HOWEVER, BASED ON THE RESULTS OF THEIR CONVERSATION, BARHAWI IS NOW CONFIDENT THAT HIS POSITION AS CHIEF IS RELATIVELY SECURE FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

3. (S REL TO USA AND MCF) ON OR ABOUT 30 JUL 04, MAJ THAYER, GEN BARHAWI'S CHIEF OF STAFF, WAS FIRED. DAYS AFTER HIS TERMINATION, THAYER, A RESIDENT OF AL TAHREER NEIGHBORHOOD //MGRSCoord:38SLF386286//, MOSUL, IZ, TRAVELED TO TURKEY, PURPORTEDLY FOR A VACATION. (SOURCE COMMENT -- THAYER WAS NOTORIOUS FOR INVOLVEMENT WITH CORRUPTION. MUCH OF HIS CORRUPT BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH CONTRACTORS INVOLVED WITH SUPPORTING MOSUL'S IPD, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INVOLVED BARHAWI. THAYER'S TRIP TO TURKEY LIKELY RELATED TO HIS CONNECTIONS WITH THE CONTRACTORS INVOLVED WITH THE MOSUL IPD).

COMMENTS: 1. (S REL TO USA AND MCF) (SOURCE COMMENTS) THERE IS A RUMOR CIRCULATING THROUGH THE IPD AND IRAQI GOVERNMENT THAT GEN BARHAWI HAD LINKS TO THE DEATH OF THE PREVIOUS GOVERNOR OF MOSUL. THE PREVIOUS GOVERNOR HAD MADE SIMILAR ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO BARHAWI AS THOSE BROACHED BY GOV DURAYE. I THINK DURAYE FELT THREATENED BY BARHAWI'S IMPLICATIONS OF THE HAZARDS OF REMOVING HIM FROM THE TOP POSITION IN THE POLICE DEPARTMENT.

2. (U) (FIELD COMMENTS) A. (S REL TO USA AND MCF) THE GRID COORDINATES PROVIDED FOR AL TAHREER NEIGHBORHOOD AND MOSUL WERE PROVIDED FOR GENERAL ORIENTATION PURPOSES ONLY, AND ARE NOT SPECIFIC TO THE REPORTED EVENTS.

B. (S REL TO USA AND MCF) SPECIFIC INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT WAS NOT CORROBORATED BY ADDITIONAL SOURCES.

C. (S REL TO USA AND MCF) ATTENTION IS INVITED TO DIIR-3SBCT-209-134-04-160 FOR INFORMATION ON A NEW INVESTIGATIVE AND INTELLIGENCE TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED BY GEN BARHAWI RELATED TO AIF ACTIVITY IN MOSUL.

D. (S REL TO USA AND MCF) THT 134 HAS A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF DEROGATORY REPORTING RELATING TO MAJ THAYER, INCLUDING DIIR-3SBCT-209-134-04-066, SOI-3SBCT-209-134-04-089, AND SOI-3SBCT-209-134-04-080.

E. (C) SOURCE IS AVAILABLE FOR RECONTACT THROUGH WEEKLY MEETINGS.

COMMENTS:

INSTR: (U) US NO.

PREP: (U) 2-72231.

ENCL: (U) NONE.

ACQ: (U) MOSUL, IZ (20040809).

DISSEM: (U) FIELD - NONE.

WARNING: (U) REPORT ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET REL TO USA AND MCF/VA~~

DRVFROM: (U) NONE.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date **APR 11 2014**

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CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFH~~

DATE: 11 August 2004 01:30

REPORTING UNIT: THT134

CITE: (U) NONE.

SERIAL: (U) DIIR-SBCT-209-134-04-159

PASS:

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ)

IPSP: (U) IFC2610; IFC2600.

SUBJ: DIIR-SBCT-209-134-04-159/ IP STATIONS UNDER-STRENGTH. (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY  
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT IS ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET//REL TO USA  
AND MCFH~~.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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DOI: 2004/08/10

REQS: (U) HCR-J-TF7-2610-132-04. (C) 1-23 INF SOR 5.B.1. IDENTIFY  
GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES THAT INTERFERE WITH MNF OPERATIONS.

SOURCE: (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCFH~~) //N/A// AN U.S. ARMY NON-  
COMMISSIONED OFFICER WITH INDIRECT ACCESS TO THE REPORTED  
INFORMATION BY VIRTUE OF HIS PROFESSIONAL CONTACTS. SOURCE HAS  
NOT REPORTED PREVIOUSLY TO USMI.

SUMMARY: (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCFH~~) IP STATIONS IN MOSUL, IZ ARE  
UNDER-FUNDED, AND THIS HAS GREATLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF IP  
OFFICERS IN MOSUL.

TEXT: 1. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCFH~~) IP STATIONS IN MOSUL  
//MGRSCoord:38SLF3327//, IZ, ARE UNDER-FUNDED, AND THIS HAS  
GREATLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF IP OFFICERS IN MOSUL.

2. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCFH~~) ON 06 AUG 04, AT MOSUL'S AL-WAKAS IP  
STATION //MGRSCoord:38SLF307210//, IP OFFICERS BEGAN QUITTING

WORK BECAUSE OF LACK OF PAY. AS OF 10 AUG 04, 22 IP OFFICERS HAD QUIT WORK.

3. (~~REL TO USA AND MCF~~) BEGINNING ON 08 AUG 04, AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF IP OFFICERS HAD QUIT WORK AT THE AL-RABIEN IP STATION //MGRSCoord:38SLF292254//, MOSUL. THE REASONS FOR THE RESIGNATIONS ARE -- LACK OF PAY, LACK OF JOB SAFETY, AND LACK OF SUPPORT FROM IP HQ. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHO QUIT IS CURRENTLY NEARLY 50 PERCENT OF AL-RABIEN STATION'S INTENDED PERSONNEL STRENGTH.

4. (~~REL TO USA AND MCF~~) AS OF 09 AUG 04, THE AL-KHAZRAJ IP STATION //MGRSCoord:38SLF322226// DOES NOT HAVE THE PERSONNEL TO MAN PATROLS TO SUPPORT MNF ACTIVITIES WITHIN ITS SECTOR.

5. (~~REL TO USA AND MCF~~) ON 03 AUG 04, OFFICERS STATIONED AT THE AL YARMOOK IP STATION //MGRSCoord:38SLF300226//, REPORTED TO US MILITARY POLICE THAT THE OFFICERS OF AL YARMOOK STATION HAVE GONE 47 DAYS WITHOUT ANY PAY. BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN PAID, MANY OF THE OFFICERS ARE EXPECTED TO QUIT.

6. (~~REL TO USA AND MCF~~) FIVE FORMER OFFICERS IN THE IP SUBMITTED A MEMO TO MNF CLAIMING KNOWLEDGE OF RAMPANT CORRUPTION IN THE IP FORCE. THEY CLAIM GEN BARHAWI IS GUILTY OF CORRUPTION AND SHOWING GROSS FAVORITISM TOWARD THOSE IN HIS OWN TRIBE AND ASSOCIATES, VERSUS OTHER PERSONNEL.

7. (~~REL TO USA AND MCF~~) CURRENTLY ONLY THE AL-DAWASA IP STATION //MGRSCoord:38SLF327222// CAN SUPPORT MNF ACTIVITIES DUE TO LACK OF FUNDING AND PERSONNEL. 3-2 SBCT CHECK POINT 28 //MGRSCoord:38SLF3080019700// IS THE ONLY CP MANNED BY IP AMONG THE SEVEN LOCATED IN THE WESTERN SECTOR OF MOSUL. NONE OF THE OTHER SIX IP CHECKPOINTS ARE MANNED ON A REGULAR BASIS.

COMMENTS: (U) (FIELD COMMENTS) 1. (~~REL TO USA AND MCF~~) GRID COORDINATES PROVIDED THE IZP STATIONS WERE PROVIDED FOR ORIENTATION PURPOSES ONLY, AND WERE ACQUIRED FROM 1-23 INFANTRY BATTALION RECORDS.

2. (~~REL TO USA AND MCF~~) SPECIFIC INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT WAS NOT CORROBORATED BY ADDITIONAL SOURCES.

3. (S) SOURCE IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR RECONTACT.

COMMENTS:

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~

DATE: 12 August 2004 01:21

REPORTING UNIT: THT134

CITE: (U) NONE.

SERIAL: (U) DIIR-SBCT-209-134-04-160

PASS:

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ); IRAN (IR); SYRIA (SY).

IPSP: (U) IFC2610; IFC2600.

SUBJ: DIIR-SBCT-209-134-04-160/ IP INVESTIGATION OF AIF IN MOSUL. (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT IS ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~.

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Authority: EO 13526  
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Date: APR 11 2014

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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DOI: (U) 040808.

REQS: (U) D-INT-2320-004-04; HCR-J-TF7-2610-132-04.(✓) 1-23 INF SOR 5.B.1.

SOURCE: (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~) //6 067 0074// AN IRAQI ARAB WITH INDIRECT ACCESS TO THE REPORTED INFORMATION BY VIRTUE OF HIS SOCIAL CONTACTS. SOURCE HAS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY TO USMI/MULTI NATIONAL FORCES. SOURCE HAS REPORTED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST.

SUMMARY: (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~) MOSUL IP CHIEF GEN MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI HAS ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL TASK FORCE, LED BY COL NAZAR, TO HANDLE INVESTIGATIVE AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS REGARDING FOREIGN SUPPORT OF AIF ACTIVITIES. THE TASK FORCE IS COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF BARHAWI'S TRUSTED OFFICERS.

TEXT: 1. (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~) MOSUL IP CHIEF, GEN MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD ((AL BARHAWI)) (FIELD COMMENT -- GEN MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI IS OFFICIALLY REFERRED TO AS GEN BARHAWI) HAS ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO HANDLE INVESTIGATIVE AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS REGARDING FOREIGN TIES TO AIF ACTIVITIES IN MOSUL. THE TASK FORCE IS LED BY COL NAZAR (LNU), AND IS COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF BARHAWI'S TRUSTED OFFICERS WITHIN THE MOSUL IP.

2. (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~) ALL IP INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS AND INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED BY IP PERSONNEL RELATED TO FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN AIF, OR HIGH PROFILE AIF ACTIVITIES, IS FORWARDED TO COL NAZAR'S OFFICE. MOSUL'S IP CHIEFS

ARE ON STRICT ORDERS TO KEEP KNOWLEDGEABILITY OF THE INFORMATION TO AS FEW AS POSSIBLE.

3. (~~REF TO USA AND MCF~~) MOSUL IP'S NORMAL SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE SECTION, DIRECTED BY COL SAAD YUNIS ((ABDULLAH)), AND COMPOSED OF APPROXIMATELY 15 PERSONNEL LOCATED THROUGHOUT MOSUL, IS READ ONTO LITTLE OR NONE OF THE SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED BY THE IP RELATED TO AIF IN MOSUL, PARTICULARLY THE INTEL ON FOREIGN LINKS TO AIF. (SOURCE COMMENTS -- BECAUSE ABDULLAH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIONS INTO MOSUL'S IP, GEN BARHAWI MONITORS HIM CLOSELY. HE ALSO MANAGES THE NORMAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION'S WORK WITH INFORMANTS THROUGH INSISTING ALL IDENTITIES OF INFORMANTS BE REVEALED TO HIM. ADDITIONALLY, BARHAWI INSISTS THAT HE APPROVE ALL FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR INFORMANTS).

4. (~~REF TO USA AND MCF~~) COL NAZAR HAS TWO ASSISTANTS, LTC ABDUL NASIR ((TOHALA)), AND LTC MAZIN (LNU). THEIR CHAIN OF COMMAND IS SEPARATE FROM NORMAL IP CHANNELS, AND ALL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED AND THE RESULTING ANALYSIS IS BRIEFED DIRECTLY TO GEN BARHAWI. (SOURCE COMMENTS -- BECAUSE OF BARHAWI'S "DICTATORSHIP" STYLE OF LEADERSHIP, NAZAR IS GIVEN ONLY LIMITED AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS OR COLLECT INFORMATION WITHOUT FIRST BRIEFING AND RECEIVING APPROVAL FROM BARHAWI. ALSO, NO OTHER OFFICIALS ASIDE FROM BARHAWI ARE PRIVY TO THE INFORMATION RECEIVED BY NAZAR'S TASKFORCE).

5. (~~REF TO USA AND MCF~~) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS COLLECTED BY COL NAZAR'S INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATIVE TASKFORCE, BIGOTED AS "NEED TO KNOW", ANALYZED BY NAZAR'S SUBORDINATES, AND THEN BRIEFED TO GEN BARHAWI --

5.A. (~~REF TO USA AND MCF~~) ALL INTELLIGENCE RELATED TO THE AIF ATTACKS IP, ING, AND MNF ON 4 AUG 04, TO INCLUDE THE RESULTS OF THE INTERROGATIONS OF THREE ARRESTED AIF PERSONNEL

5.B. (~~REF TO USA AND MCF~~) RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO YEMINIS SUSPECTED OF MAKING BOMBS IN FAISALIA//MGRSCoord:38SLF342242//, MOSUL. (FIELD COMMENT -- REF DIIR-3SBCT-209-134-04-155 FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON THE MATTER).

5.C. (~~REF TO USA AND MCF~~) RESULTS OF INTERROGATIONS AND INVESTIGATION OF SEVERAL IRANIANS AND SYRIANS STAYING AT A LARGE RESIDENCE IN AL SUMER NEIGHBORHOOD //MGRSCoord:385188//, MOSUL, IZ, SUSPECTED OF PLANNING, ENABLING, AND CONDUCTING THE EARLY AUG 04 SUICIDE VBIED ATTACK ON THE AL SUMER POLICE STATION (CNA) THAT CAUSED AT LEAST SEVEN DEATHS AND VIRTUALLY DESTROYED THE STRUCTURE ITSELF. NFI.

COMMENTS: 1. (~~REF TO USA AND MCF~~) (SOURCE COMMENTS) -- A. BOTH THE NEW INTELLIGENCE TASKFORCE AND GEN BARHAWI'S RESTRICTIVE POLICIES TOWARD THE NORMAL INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS SECTION OF THE MOSUL IP, ARE METHODS BARHAWI USES TO STOVEPIPE INFORMATION TO HIS OFFICE, THEREBY ENSURING HIS CONTROL OVER THE RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION. BARHAWI HAS



CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI//X1~~

DATE: 11 August 2004 05:14

REPORTING UNIT: THT134

CITE: (U) NONE.

SERIAL: (U) DIIR-SBCT-209-134-04-155

PASS:

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ); YEMEN (YE).

IPSP: (U) IFC2600; IFC2800.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

SUBJ: DIIR-SBCT-209-134-04-155/ AIF ATTACKS IN EASTERN MOSUL. (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED  
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT IS ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI//X1~~.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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DOI: 2004/08/08

REQS: (U) S-JTF-2600-0299-04.(C) 1-23 INF SOR 4.A.3. REPORT ANY HUMINT ASSOCIATED  
WITH EXPLOSIVES AND BOMB MAKING MATERIALS.

SOURCE: (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCFI~~) //6 067 0074// AN IRAQI ARAB WITH INDIRECT  
ACCESS TO THE REPORTED INFORMATION BY VIRTUE OF HIS SOCIAL CONTACTS.  
SOURCE HAS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY TO USMI/MULTI NATIONAL FORCES. SOURCE  
HAS REPORTED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST. SOURCE IS A SUNNI MUSLIM OF  
AKRAWI TRIBE.

SUMMARY: (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCFI~~) ON 6 AUG 04, THE HOME OF RETIRED MG SALEM  
AL MALOOH WAS BOMBED. LATER, PERSONNEL FROM THE FAISALIA POLICE  
DEPARTMENT DEPLOYED TO AN ABANDONED HOME ADJACENT TO SALEM'S  
RESIDENCE, WHERE THEY DISCOVERED MATERIALS FOR MAKING BOMBS. YEMENIS  
HAD RECENTLY DESERTED THE HOME.

TEXT: 1. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCFI~~) ON 6 AUG 04, THE HOME OF A RETIRED GENERAL  
GRADE POLICE OFFICER, MG SALEM (LNU) AL MALOOH, WAS BOMBED, NFI. SALEM'S  
HOME IS LOCATED NEARBY THE FORMER BA'ATH PARTY INTELLIGENCE OFFICES IN  
AL FAISALIA NEIGHBORHOOD //MGRSCoord:38SLF342242//, MOSUL, NFI. NO  
CASUALTIES RESULTED FROM THE EXPLOSION.

2. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCFI~~) ON OR ABOUT 7 AUG 04, PERSONNEL FROM THE FAISALIA  
POLICE DEPARTMENT DEPLOYED TO A HOME ADJACENT TO THE RESIDENCE OF MJG  
SALEM, BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SUSPICIOUS NEIGHBORS, NFI. UPON

ARRIVING, THE POLICE DETERMINED THE PREVIOUS OCCUPANTS HAD RECENTLY DESERTED THE HOME. EVIDENCE OF BOMB MAKING MATERIALS WAS FOUND AT THE HOME. NFI.

3. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) INTERVIEWS OF NEIGHBORS DETERMINED INDIVIDUALS FROM YEMEN HAD LIVED IN THE HOUSE AS RECENTLY AS 6 AUG 04. THE YEMINIS ARE THE PRIMARY SUSPECTS IN THE BOMBING OF SALEM'S HOME. NFI.

COMMENTS: 1. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) (SOURCE COMMENTS) THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE RAID OF THE YEMINIS' HOME WAS RECENTLY CLOSED. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED DURING THE INVESTIGATION IS BIGOTED, AND WAS PASSED FROM BG MAUFUK, CHIEF OF THE FAISALIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, TO THE INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATIVE TASK FORCE RECENTLY ESTABLISHED BY MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD ((AL BARHAWI)) (FIELD COMMENT -- GEN MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI IS OFFICIALLY REFERRED TO AS GEN BARHAWI), HEADQUARTERED AT MOSUL MAIN POLICE HEADQUARTERS, AL DAWASA NEIGHBORHOOD//MGRSCoord:38SLF332225//, MOSUL.

2. (U) (FIELD COMMENTS) A. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) THE GRID COORDINATES PROVIDED FOR AL FAISALIA AND AL DAWASA NEIGHBORHOODS WERE PROVIDED FOR GENERAL ORIENTATION PURPOSES ONLY, AND ARE NOT SPECIFIC TO THE REPORTED EVENTS.

B. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) SPECIFIC INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT WAS NOT CORROBORATED BY ADDITIONAL SOURCES.

C. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) ATTENTION IS INVITED TO DIIR-3SBCT-209-134-04-160 FOR INFORMATION ON A NEW INVESTIGATIVE AND INTELLIGENCE TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED BY GEN BARHAWI, CHARGED WITH INVESTIGATING AIF ACTIVITY IN MOSUL.

D. (S) SOURCE IS AVAILABLE FOR RECONTACT THROUGH WEEKLY MEETINGS.

#### COMMENTS:

INSTR: (U) US NO.

PREP: (U) 2-72231.

ENCL: (U) NONE.

ACQ: (U) MOSUL, IZ (20040809).

DISSEM: (U) FIELD - NONE.

WARNING: (U) REPORT ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET REL TO USA AND MCF~~ X1

DRVFROM: (U) NONE.

~~SECRET~~ (U) AT.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

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Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: **APR 11 2014**

PREC: R DTG: 151632Z AUG 04  
FROM: MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ

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~~SECRET/DEL TO USA AND MCF/34~~

SECTION 1 OF 2

QQQQ

~~SECRET/DEL TO USA AND MCF/34~~

CITE: (U) DIIR-SBCT-209-134-04-160.

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 067 3507 04.

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ); IRAN (IR); SYRIA (SY).

IPSP: (U) IFC2610; IFC2320.

SUBJ: IIR 6 067 3507 04/DOMINANT WARRIOR - NEW MOSUL POLICE TASK  
FORCE TO INVESTIGATE FOREIGN TIES TO INSURGENT ACTIVITY. (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED  
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT IS ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET/DEL TO USA AND MCF/34~~

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Date: APR 11 2014

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 040808.

REQS: (U) D-INT-2320-004-04; HCR-J-TF7-2610-132-04.

SOURCE: (~~SECRET/DEL TO USA AND MCF/34~~)/6 067 0074//AN IRAQI ARAB WITH  
INDIRECT ACCESS TO THE REPORTED INFORMATION BY VIRTUE OF HIS SOCIAL  
CONTACTS. SOURCE HAS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY TO USMI/MULTI NATIONAL  
FORCES. SOURCE HAS REPORTED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST.

SUMMARY: (~~SECRET/DEL TO USA AND MCF/34~~) MOSUL IRAQI POLICE CHIEF GEN  
MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI HAS ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL TASK  
FORCE, LED BY COL NAZAR, TO HANDLE INVESTIGATIVE AND INTELLIGENCE  
MATTERS REGARDING FOREIGN SUPPORT OF AIF ACTIVITIES. THE TASK FORCE

IS COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF BARHAWI'S TRUSTED OFFICERS.

TEXT: 1. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCTI~~) MOSUL IRAQI POLICE (IP) CHIEF, GEN MOHAMMED KADI MAHMOOD ((AL BARHAWI)) (FIELD COMMENT: GEN MOHAMMED

PAGE 6 RUEPGAB0824 ~~SECRET~~

KADI MAHMOOD AL BARHAWI IS OFFICIALLY REFERRED TO AS GEN BARHAWI) HAS

ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO HANDLE INVESTIGATIVE AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS REGARDING FOREIGN TIES TO AIF ACTIVITIES IN MOSUL. THE TASK FORCE IS LED BY COL NAZAR (LNU), AND IS COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF BARHAWI'S TRUSTED OFFICERS WITHIN THE MOSUL IP.

2. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCTI~~) ALL IP INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS AND INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED BY IP PERSONNEL RELATED TO FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT

IN AIF, OR HIGH PROFILE AIF ACTIVITIES, IS FORWARDED TO COL NAZAR'S OFFICE. MOSUL'S IP CHIEFS ARE ON STRICT ORDERS TO KEEP KNOWLEDGEABILITY OF THE INFORMATION TO AS FEW AS POSSIBLE.

3. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCTI~~) MOSUL IP'S NORMAL SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE SECTION, DIRECTED BY COL SAAD YUNIS ((ABDULLAH)), AND COMPOSED OF APPROXIMATELY 15 PERSONNEL LOCATED THROUGHOUT MOSUL, IS READ ONTO LITTLE OR NONE OF THE SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED BY THE IP RELATED TO AIF IN MOSUL, PARTICULARLY THE INTEL ON FOREIGN LINKS TO AIF. (SOURCE COMMENTS -- BECAUSE ABDULLAH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIONS INTO MOSUL'S IP, GEN BARHAWI MONITORS

HIM CLOSELY. HE ALSO MANAGES THE NORMAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION'S WORK

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WITH INFORMANTS THROUGH INSISTING ALL IDENTITIES OF INFORMANTS BE REVEALED TO HIM. ADDITIONALLY, BARHAWI INSISTS THAT HE APPROVE ALL FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR INFORMANTS).

4. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCTI~~) COL NAZAR HAS TWO ASSISTANTS, LTC ABDUL NASIR ((TOHALA)), AND LTC MAZIN (LNU). THEIR CHAIN OF COMMAND IS SEPARATE FROM NORMAL IP CHANNELS, AND ALL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED AND

THE RESULTING ANALYSIS IS BRIEFED DIRECTLY TO GEN BARHAWI. (SOURCE COMMENTS -- BECAUSE OF BARHAWI'S "DICTATORSHIP" STYLE OF LEADERSHIP, NAZAR IS GIVEN ONLY LIMITED AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS OR COLLECT INFORMATION WITHOUT FIRST BRIEFING AND RECEIVING APPROVAL FROM BARHAWI. ALSO, NO OTHER OFFICIALS ASIDE FROM BARHAWI ARE PRIVY TO THE INFORMATION RECEIVED BY NAZAR'S TASKFORCE).

5. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS COLLECTED BY COL NAZAR'S INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATIVE TASKFORCE, BIGOTED AS "NEED TO KNOW", ANALYZED BY NAZAR'S SUBORDINATES, AND THEN BRIEFED TO GEN BARHAWI --

5.A. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) ALL INTELLIGENCE RELATED TO THE AIF

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ATTACKS IP, ING, AND MNF ON 4 AUG 04, TO INCLUDE THE RESULTS OF THE INTERROGATIONS OF THREE ARRESTED AIF PERSONNEL

5.B. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO YEMINIS SUSPECTED OF MAKING BOMBS IN FAISALIA//MGRSCoord:38SLF342242//, MOSUL.

5.C. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) RESULTS OF INTERROGATIONS AND INVESTIGATION OF SEVERAL IRANIANS AND SYRIANS STAYING AT A LARGE RESIDENCE IN AL SUMER NEIGHBORHOOD //MGRSCoord:385188//, MOSUL, IZ, SUSPECTED OF PLANNING, ENABLING, AND CONDUCTING THE EARLY AUG 04 SUICIDE VBIED ATTACK ON THE AL SUMER POLICE STATION (CNA) THAT CAUSED  
AT LEAST SEVEN DEATHS AND VIRTUALLY DESTROYED THE STRUCTURE ITSELF.  
NFI.

COMMENTS: (SOURCE COMMENTS) 1. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) BOTH THE NEW INTELLIGENCE TASKFORCE AND GEN BARHAWI'S RESTRICTIVE POLICIES TOWARD THE NORMAL INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS SECTION OF THE MOSUL IP, ARE METHODS BARHAWI USES TO STOVEPIPE INFORMATION TO HIS OFFICE, THEREBY ENSURING HIS CONTROL OVER THE RELEASE OF THE

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INFORMATION. BARHAWI HAS INCREASINGLY BEEN PRACTICING THE OLD ADAGE KNOWN AS "KNOWLEDGE IS POWER".

2. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) I DO NOT BELIEVE GEN BARHAWI IS MAINTAINING POSITIVE CONTROL OVER THE FLOW OF INFORMATION IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE LEAKS TO AIF THROUGH IP INFORMANTS. HOWEVER, THAT IS HOW GEN BARHAWI IS RATIONALIZING HIS INCREASINGLY RESTRICTIVE POLICIES.

(FIELD COMMENTS) 1. (U) SPECIFIC INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT WAS NOT CORROBORATED BY ADDITIONAL SOURCES.

2. (~~SECRET TO USA AND MCF~~) GRID COORDINATES CORRESPONDING TO AL FAISALIA NEIGHBORHOOD AND AL SUMER NEIGHBORHOOD WERE PROVIDED FOR GENERAL REFERENCE PURPOSES ONLY, AND ARE NOT SPECIFIC TO THE ACTUAL REFERENCED LOCATIONS.

3. (U) SOURCE IS AVAILABLE FOR RECONTACT.

4. (U) MNF-I/C2X COMMENTS: THIS INFORMATION WAS COORDINATED FOR RELEASE WITH THE USCENCOM MNF-I/C2X, BAGHDAD, IRAQ, DSN (318)

BT

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

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~~SECRET~~

SECTION 2 OF 2

QQQQ

SUBJ: IIR 6 067 3507 04/DOMINANT WARRIOR - NEW MOSUL POLICE TASK  
822-2269 STUIII DSN (318) 822-2265.

INSTR: (U) US NO.

OSD 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 1005C.424

DIA 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 1005C.424

[REDACTED] (S/REF: [REDACTED]) (3 - 2 SBCT INTSUM 8 Sep 04) Mosul Police Chief Barhawi may be Prepared to Depart Iraq. The Mosul Chief of Police Mohammed Kadi Mahmood al ((Barhawi)) has used the newly created Counter-Terrorism Emergency Response Unit (ERU) as a personal security detail for himself and his family. Barhawi used the ERU to clear roads ahead of his vehicles for IEDS and ambushes, and has also sent them to protect his brother. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Police Chief Barhawi obtained 20 passports for himself and his family. (Source Comment-- Barhawi has not been the same since his sister was kidnapped. He is not as aggressive as he used to be. Barhawi is planning on getting out of Iraq before the terrorists kill him.) Chief of police Barhawi's former aide Colonel (FNU) ((Thaner)) was reportedly somewhere in Turkey waiting for Barhawi to leave Iraq for Turkey. Colonel Thaner's firing, after Barhawi's sister was abducted, was a ruse to allow him to leave Iraq with a large sum of money from Barhawi without drawing suspicion to why he was leaving Iraq.

OSD 1.4(c)+5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 1005C.424

DIA 1.4(c)+ 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 1005C.424

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 11 2014

Batch # 4293-2  
ISGM-2004-000496

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: APR 11 2014

The Accused (Thayier Abdulhameed Mustafa's) Statement, DOB 1972, and one of the previous Mosul Police Officers; ranked Major; and resides Hayy Al Muharebeen- Mosul states the following:

Affective April 2003, I was reemployed as a Captain in charge of the Commander's (Major General Abdulaziz Omer) body guard force for Mosul's chief of Police. I resumed working for the current Chief of Police (MG Mohammed Khayri Al Berhawi) until July 16 2004 were I resigned from my job due to terrorists spreading my picture on the Mosques, the picture was me with an American Officer; Barhawi was the only one aware of this picture.

Between May 15 2004 and June 30 2004 there were four contracts for Clothes, two for Bonds, one for Traffic belts, one for Shoes, one for Motorcycles, one for Armored helmets, three for Vehicles, one for Computers, Copy machines and Digital Cameras (to best of my knowledge) were all settled by the Americans for buying and bringing necessary materials for the Police. Regarding the first vehicle contract, I bought total of 20 (twenty) vehicles, 12 Pickup trucks, double cab (Extended) and 8 (eight) regular Pickups through a businessman in Mosul named (Talal Reeheli A'awad) who resides in Hayy Al Muthana - Mosul, my deal was him to pay him \$6,500 (Six thousand five hundred US Dollars) whereas vehicles were delivered for \$7,000 (Seven thousand US Dollars) each.

The second contract consisted of a total of 20 (Twenty) vehicles; 12 double cab pickups and 8 regular pickups through one of (Talal's) relatives named (Mohammed Jameel) again, the deal was based on \$6,500 per vehicle but delivered for \$7,000.

The third contract was settled in Dohuk with the Meediya Car Dealership owned by (Ayad Duski) again for 20 pickups, 12 double cab, and 8 regular

(End of page 1)

The deal again was \$6,500 for each vehicle, but delivered for \$7,000. Out of the entire deal, there were four contracts for Clothes; for \$200,000 (Two hundred thousand US Dollars) based on four payments for purchasing (12500) suits (custom) and (25000) Shirts which means two shirts and one pant, the contract was settled with (Arrow Head) Brigade (TC, he might mean 1st Brigade Commander or his representative) and (\$2,500) two thousand five hundred US dollars were obtained from this contract. Also the Bonds (Ties/ fetters) contract was consist of two contracts; first for purchasing two thousand and the second for buying one thousand. I did an agreement with a businessman in Mosul- Faysaliya, upon Chief of Police's recommendation who is one of his neighbors named (Abu Karzan). I gave him 8-9 deals (contracts) which in which he made \$2,500 profit. Of course (Mohammed Khayree Al Berhawi) had a share in all contracts being made with all businessmen, but I wasn't aware of the amount he was receiving. Regarding the reflective traffic belts (total of 50 belts), the American offer was for (\$30) per each belt whereas we made an offer for (\$22.5) each, and we agreed with so called (Abu Karzan) in this contract, I gain nothing out of it.

In all these contracts, Americans were giving us their offers and were asking businessmen and companies about them, we were telling them that there is a business man willing to sell the items for such price and they were agreed

upon. There was a contract for buying Computers, Copy machines and Digital Cameras. Berhawi sent me to (Abu Karzan) who was importing those items from (Dubai), we profited \$40,000 (Forty thousand US Dollars), I personally gave (Berhawi) \$20,000, took \$16,000 for myself and gave \$4,000 to so called Captain (Jalal).

There was also a contract for (Helmets and Armor). I took so called (Mustafa Ahmed Mustafa) AKA: (Abu Sirwan) who is affiliated with one of the KDP local branches in Mosul, with me for the deal.

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I took him to the Palace for the Americans but they did not agree with him on the price therefore, the Americans agreed with one of the other companies. I signed the contract because an Iraqi must sign the contract, they bought approximately (2,800) armed (TC, believe the writer means "body armor") and (800) Helmets, this deal was signed by (Olympia Forces) (PF, believe the writer means "Task Force Olympia"). This force (Task Force Olympia) is in charge of Mosul and the Kurdish provinces; but (Arrow Head) Brigade is in charge of Mosul only.

I signed the Motorcycle and Shoes contract with the Americans, but after I submitted my resignation, the Motorcycle contract was made with the Japanese through the internet to provide (18) 2004 full specification Honda (CC650) Motorcycles. I agreed with the Americans to buy each Motorcycle for (\$14,500), I brought them delivered in Mosul for (\$12,500), my net profit was approximately (\$36,000) for this contract. The Shoe contract also was after my resignation. I agreed with the Americans to buy each pair of (Turkish boot) for (\$23) while I bought each pair for (\$21), my profit was approximately (\$24,000).

There was another contract for buying Military Hats, but (Al Barhawi) forced me to give it to so called (A'amer Mahmood Sidou) who is one of the Mosul police Officers and notable Yazidys and (A'amer), who gave this contract to the so called, (Mustafa Ahmed) AKA (Abu Sirwan). We offered (\$5) for each Hat, but (AL Barhawi) wasn't in agreement on that and told us that the businessman's offer is the acceptable offer and it was (\$3.25). As a result, we gained (\$1,500) out of 15,000 Hats.

We ratified the Mosul Criminal Laboratory contract with American Lieutenant Colonel (Baxter) along with Iraqi Colonel (Mohammed) who ratified a contract for Criminal Lab. The initial amount of the contract was (\$167,000) later changed to (\$498,600). At that time, (Al Barhawi) sent me to AL A'alaf Company, the Company in which Col. Mohammed had an agreement. Later, we found out that Al Barhawi knows the Company's owner or some one works there called (Abu Farah).

(End of page 3)

Abu Farah was one of the Iraqi Army Officers with a rank of Lieutenant Colonel. When I visited him, Barhawi told me to tell him he has to bring us a (Military Mudhahat) (TC, Mudhahat is not a clear word) and (Blood test) equipment, not just the (Powder) for finger printing. The next day (Al Barhawi) told me to give up on this contract because the translator told (Al

Barhawi) "(THaier) has to be cautious", when I gave the Al A'alaf Company the money, the owner of the Company gave me the sum of (\$10,000) with his contentment. LTC, the author of the original document has poor sentence structure and word order, the above paragraphs are poorly written by the author of this document)

When The Ministry of the Interior started hiring Police in Mosul, the final figure was (8000) policemen, this number increased by (1800) policemen, Al Barhawi tried to obtain an authorization for the additional policemen by hiring 500 of them as a temporary policemen with a (\$100) monthly salary. However, when (Al Barhawi) along with Lieutenant Colonel (Haji Zibari) hired (1500 to 2000) policemen in Mosul, they hired only names and both (Al Barhawi) and LTC (Haji Zibari) receiving their salaries.

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**ACTION**

Attacks against Iraqis working with TF Olympia

Allegations of IPS Corruption

Positive Actions

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## REMARKS

22 FEB 04 - 3 x KIA - All were contract employees with TF Olympia  
 23 FEB 04 - 2 x KIA and 3 x WIA - All were contract employees at FOB Patrois  
 28 FEB 04 - 1 x WIA - Linguist attacked with Grenade  
 14 MAR 04 - 1 x KIA - Mukhtar Sabah Majeed Abdalla  
 15 MAR 04 - 4 x KIA - US Missionaries Killed  
 16 MAR 04 - 1 x KIA and 1 x WIA - Linguist's sister killed and brother wounded  
 16 MAR 04 - 1 x KIA - Iraqi Contractor beheaded  
 19 MAR 04 - 1 x KIA - Iraqi Diesel Mechanic Contractor  
 22 MAR 04 - 1 x KIA and 4 x WIA - FPS attacked IVO Food Warehouse  
 23 MAR 04 - 1 x WIA - Linguist's brother wounded in drive by shooting  
 29 MAR 04 - 1 x WIA - Linguist attacked by drive by shooting on way to work at FOB Freedom  
 12 APR 04 - 1 x KIA and 1x WIA - FPS enroute to work at FOB Freedom attacked  
 4 MAY 04 - 1 x KIA - Interpreter killed in drive by shooting  
 11 MAY 04 - 2 x WIA - 2 Contractors attacked in drive by shooting  
 1 JUN 04 - 1 x KIA - Titan Linguist killed while leaving his home for work at LSA Diamondback  
 3 JUN 04 - 1 x KIA - Sanateh Noel Nekha killed while riding in a taxi  
 17 JUN 04 - 2 Linguists attacked by drive by shooting  
 14 JUL 04 - 1 x KIA and 2 x WIA - Assassination of Governor Kashmoula  
 21 JUL 04 - FOB Sykes Gravel Truck Driver attacked in drive by shooting  
 22 JUL 04 - 2 x FOB Sykes Gravel Truck Drivers attacked in drive by shooting  
 21 AUG 04 - 5 x KIA and 3 x WIA - ING member and Regional Security Council Member's family attacked in drive by shooting  
 28 AUG 04 - 1 x KIA - Dr. Eman Younis-Hamdani attacked in drive by shooting  
 31 AUG 04 - 1 x KIA and 2 x WIA - 3 Contractors killed after leaving work at LSA Diamondback  
 7 SEP 04 - 1 x KIA - Governor Kashmoula's Son and an unidentified passenger killed in botched kidnapping attempt  
 12 SEP 04 - 4 x KIA and 3 x WIA - Ambush of Governor's Body Guards  
 27 SEP 04 - 1 x KIA - Samir Faisal Mohammed killed while attempting to escape from kidnappers. Killed in the middle of a crowded market, IPS make no headway in investigation

Cannot confirm date - 1 x KIA - Investigator Hickmit Mahmoud of the IPS killed

Multiple dates - Multiple x IPS and ING KIAs and Multiple x IPS and ING WIAs - Attacks on IPS and ING Patrols and Stations  
 Multiple incidents of threats against Iraqi Nationals who are cooperating with TF Olympia (Too Numerous to Count)

Al-Thakafa IPS Station - Released Prisoners after taking bribes. Held prisoners for ransom after Judge ordered release. Allowed illegal meat shipments to pass through checkpoints.  
 Sinjar IPS Station - IPS Officers accepting payment to smuggle illegal weapons through IPS checkpoints  
 Filfay IPS Checkpoint - IPS accepting bribes to allow vehicles to pass by without inspection. IPS charging fees for vehicles that pass through the checkpoint  
 Tal Alar IPS Station - Allegations of IPS at all levels aiding AIF efforts and failing to take action against AIF attacking TF Olympia  
 Al-Thakafa IPS Station - IPS members participate in Pro Saddam Rally  
 Facila IPS Station - Allegations of IPS abuse of prisoners  
 Qadr Abd IPS Station - Allegations that IPS willfully abandoned IPS Station allowing AIF to destroy it  
 Al-Ghiziani IPS Station - Station attacked on 4 AUG 04 - Other stations fail to respond to reinforce  
 1-West IPS Station - Allegations of corruption amongst senior IPS Leadership  
 1-West IPS Station - Allegations of IPS collusion with Terrorist Shakara  
 1-West IPS Station - IPS Leadership contacts 3/2 SBCT attempting to gain the release of detainees involved in VBIED manufacturing (MAJ Thayer contacted MAJ Plemmons on 29 JUN 04)  
 Rabiah IPS Station - IPS Captured sheep smugglers and accepted \$40,000 bribe to release them  
 1-West IPS Station - Allegations of IPS members warning residents of impending operations by TF Olympia and ING  
 Mosul IPS Stations - Allegations that IPS Leadership is pocketing salary funds and failing to pay IPS members  
 Mosul IPS Stations - Allegations of rampant nepotism in hiring and promotion practices  
 Mosul IPS Stations - Failure to respond to and investigate numerous complaints of AIF intimidation of Mosul citizens  
 Mosul IPS Stations - Reports of IPS members warning citizens and AIF of upcoming TF Olympia Cordon and Search Operations  
 Ninewa IPS Stations - Reports of IPS members taking kidnappings and selling handguns on black market for profit  
 Ninewa IPS Stations - Reports of numerous IPS quitting their jobs due to lack of pay. Sufficient pay is making it to the Ninewa Province but not making it to the IPS who earn it  
 Reports that citizens notified IPS of VBIED hours before attack on convoy (Report Unconfirmed) IPS did not respond  
 Mosul Traffic Police abandon post prior to VBIED attack and then return to their post


Assistance in the form of equipment provided to Al Biay IPS after request for support  
 Sheikh Fathi IPS Station - Abandoned station during 24 JUN 04 attacks, stood their ground during 4 AUG 04 attacks  
 Removal of Tal Alar IPS Chief and Deputy Chief  
 IPS located and disarmed numerous IEDs, VBIEDs, and VCIEDs through aggressive patrolling  
 Support to TIP and IET classes at MPSA - Attempts to reform / professionalize the Ninewa IPS

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Chief of Police receptive to TF Olympia recommendations  
Chief of Police reacts quickly to TF Olympia requests for assistance and information  
New Chief of Police appointed in Tai Afar - Positive reforms of IPS begin and stabilize the city  
Chief of Police supportive of Jordan Police Academy - Provides a total of 710 candidates in SEP and OCT  
Mosul IPS deploy to Al Kisik in order to conduct operations in Tai Afar - resulting in capture of complete mortar system, RPGs, and other explosives


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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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Date: APR 11 2014



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
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Date: APR 11 2014



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
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
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
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OSD 1.4(c)(d) CDA 1.4(c)(d)


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
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
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
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Date: APR 11 2014




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
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
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CIA 1.4(c)(X)

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
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
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
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OSD 1.4(2)(c)


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CIA 1.4(X)

OSD 1.4(2)(2)


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CIA 1.4(X)

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
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
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CIA 1.4(X)

OSD 1.4(2)(d)




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
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
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CIA 1.4(c)(2)


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OSD 1.4(c)(6)


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
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OSD 1.4(c)(d) CIA 1.4(c)(d)

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
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


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
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
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
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CIA 1.4(c)(d)

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
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
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
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CIA 1.4(c)(d)

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
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
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
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CIA 1.4(c)(d)

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