

SECRET NOFORN

CIA
EO 13526
1.4(c)<25Yrs

(S) CJCS External Review of Guantanamo Bay Intelligence Operations (U)

(S) I. BACKGROUND:

(S) On 17 JUN 2002 Acting Commander, US Southern Command requested CJCS provide SOUTHCOM assistance with an external review of ongoing Guantanamo Bay [REDACTED]. Under guidance provided by Director, Joint Staff, a team of subject matter experts from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the US Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca AZ, was tasked to perform the external review.

18 The external review team received the following mission statement:

(b) In addition, CINCSOUTH also requested the team look at the following specific evaluation tasks:

(S) The team conducted its external review during the period 14 August through 04 September 2002 with visits and interviews of all involved agencies. The team traveled to SOUTHCOM Headquarters, Miami, Florida, and the US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from 21-28 August, 2002.

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Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WIIS
Date: 15 Aug 2014 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X + 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(7)(D)
Reason: (b)(1), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G), (b)(7)(H), (b)(7)(I), (b)(7)(J) +
MDR: 1U -M- 3329

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14-M-3329

JS 1.4(a),(g)+

OSD 1.4 (C)

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

DIA 1.4(c),(g)+

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5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

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Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: AUG 15 2014

(S) II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

(S) If the United States is to truly conduct a Global War on Terrorism we must adopt a long-term view of that war

[REDACTED]

We should realize that our nation faces an entirely new threat framework and if we plan to win this struggle we must invest both human capital and infrastructure

The detainees at GTMO have

[REDACTED]

seen numerous successes and should be

work

(S) During its evaluations, the External Review Team discovered

[REDACTED]

There is no orchestrated public affairs or media strategy

[REDACTED]

no long term perspective of any kind. Other problems include a bifurcated command structure with multiple, parallel, non-supportive chains of command

[REDACTED]

The

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JS 1.4 (a), (g) + DIA 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3)
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5) 10 U.S.C. 474 + (b)(5)
OSD 1.4(c)

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

entire mission is woefully undermanned and until a new [REDACTED] is approved, shortages will continue to negatively impact the mission. The current facilities at Guantanamo, to include detention, housing and [REDACTED] are totally inadequate for a mission of such national importance.

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] Similarly, the lack of any US Government Public Policy or Public Diplomacy Strategy has damaged the operation. A constant stream of visitors, unfettered media access, and an almost total lack of Public Affairs guidance have all [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] Shortsighted incremental development and focus has hindered mission success and the lack of long-term perspective is evident.

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] the external evaluation team spent a great deal of effort examining the six specific mission tasks included in the SOUTHCOM request.

[REDACTED]

(S) 1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

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Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: AUG 15 2014

DIA 1.4(c) +

5 U.S.C. 552

061(3);

10 U.S.C. 424

OSD SUBC.

552 (b)(3);

10 U.S.G. 424

(b) (5) DPP, (b) (5) ACP. Reflects the efforts of all players (DoD and

(S) No formal coordination agreement currently exists between DOD and non-DOD agencies. Coordination is largely informal, tentative and primarily the result of individual efforts.

- Several facts serve to "bind" all participating agencies.
 - The detainees belong to DOD, therefore coordination

(S) RECOMMENDATION: Formalize the efforts of non-DOD players

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

JS 1.4(a),(g) +
SUSC. 552(h)(5)

DIA 3300
SUSC. 552(h)(5)
10USC. 4114 (b)(1)

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Such agreement and organization would codify responsibilities for a greater unity of effort.

(S) 3.

(S)

(S) 4. The relationship between the GTMO JTF(s) and [REDACTED]

(S) There is currently no formal relationship between [REDACTED]

The Joint Task Forces are subordinate to SOUTHCOM and report through Commander US Southern Command to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and reports directly to the Secretary of the Army who reports to the Secretary of Defense. [REDACTED]

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JS 1.4(a),(g)

DIA 5 USC 392 (b)
10 USC 4211 ~~SECRET~~

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

and no authoritative statement prioritizing or unifying the two missions has been issued by the Secretary of Defense.

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] gathering evidence for Military Commissions. However, at present any such commission lacks an overall stated strategy within DOD. This has had a negative impact on the overall

[REDACTED]

- The delay in the transfer/release assessments by law enforcement is directly related to law enforcement's inability to adequately assess the prosecutorial value of individuals.

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[REDACTED]

(S) **RECOMMENDATIONS:** Develop and promulgate a DOD prosecutorial strategy, which speaks specifically to coordination with DOJ. An overall strategy regarding which cases will be removed to US Federal court would allow all prosecutors, both at DOD and DOJ, to focus on the cases they will handle in the forum for which they are responsible.

- Designate a lead prosecutor to implement the overall strategy, to facilitate prioritization of existing criminal cases, and to direct the transfer assessment by determining which cases have no prosecutorial value.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (e.g., Walter D. Ladd).

- Define the Military Commission concept of operations. Closely integrate a prosecutorial team with operations at GTMO.

(S) **5. Taskings in support of detainee legal defense issues.**

(S) Civilian litigation requests impact [REDACTED] Short-fused, unvetted taskings in support of DOJ federal litigation are onerous and time consuming and create a significant drain on [REDACTED] manpower.

- During May 2002 and the months prior [REDACTED] received numerous short-fused requests for litigation support from DOJ to DOD. The requests were for such items as affidavits, witness interviews, and documents related to particular cases. These taskings were important in supporting ongoing federal litigation efforts.

- In May 2002, [REDACTED] received approximately a dozen such requests. One request alone required [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These short-fused requests require an enormous amount of time and coordination within [REDACTED] before a response can be provided.

- In recent months, the requests for litigation support appear to have reduced in number commensurate with litigation. [REDACTED]

JS 1.4(a),(g) OSD 1.4(c)

DIA 5 USC.

SSZ(b)(3),

10 USC. 424

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

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prosecutorial efforts in their infancy, the need for litigation support will only expand. Only legitimate requests for support should be forwarded to [REDACTED]. Finally, the proper responding entity must be identified and it is not always [REDACTED].

(S) RECOMMENDATION: Use established military chain of command and communications for processing litigation support requests as a means of ensuring a thorough review of the requirements and to ensure the appropriate directorate is tasked with responding. DOD and DOJ or other relevant interagency element should do so via a Memorandum of Agreement

(S) 6. Determine if [REDACTED]

(S) The current [REDACTED]

(S) RECOMMENDATION: The new [REDACTED] specify [REDACTED] leadership and key/essential personnel should be assigned for two year accompanied tours. These "key" personnel (2 year PCS accompanied tours) should include JTF leadership, [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] should also include essential personnel (1 year PCS unaccompanied tours) for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and "temporary" (179 day TDY tours for junior support (J1, J4, J5) staff personnel. This assignment policy in concert with 100% [REDACTED] fill will [REDACTED]

Current Naval Base instructions will support two-year accompanied tours for [REDACTED]. Assignment policies should be consistent for all Services.

(S) III. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS:

(S) 1. POLICY

(S) A. [REDACTED]

(S) Observation: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The "immediate" startup of Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) operations, short term funding focus, and use of "as is" facilities have proven detrimental to the long term GWOT mission.

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JS 1.4(a),(g)+ DIA 1.4(a)+
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5) 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3),
10 U.S.C. 424

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OSD 1.4(C)+
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3),
10 U.S.C. 424

(S) Recommendation

1.3. Inadequate Detention Facilities

(S) Observation

reports from Congress have expressed concerns that the current detention facilities at GTMO degrade the [redacted] by failing to provide adequate security variation, incentives to encourage detainee cooperation, and sufficient capacity.

(S) Discussion

(S) Operational flexibility is required for detainee management, e.g., changing [redacted] Only one section of 204 units was built with adequate [redacted] Rotations to this section provide obvious benefits.

Facilities flexibility enables the commander to

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

JS 1.4(a),(g)+
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

DIA 5 U.S.C.

10 U.S.C. 424

OSD 1.4 (C) +

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424

control [REDACTED]

(S) **Recommendations:** DIA SOUTHCOM to create a Master Facilities Plan. Such a plan should include the following requirements:

- Current military operations necessitate greater capacity overall; a medium security facility might be built for considerably less cost. Building a medium security facility would facilitate more communal living arrangements for [REDACTED] or those awaiting potential transfer or release. [REDACTED] would support [REDACTED] and assist the detainee operations commander in punishing those detainees who commit misconduct.

- An expanded capacity to allow for routine maintenance plan - units completed a few months ago are already rusted near the toilets & sinks. The exterior of all the general population facilities is also degraded. The overcrowding restricts the ability for easy maintenance.

(S) **C. Transfer/Releases have not occurred despite an approved process**

(S) **Observation:** [REDACTED] desire to begin transferring appropriate [REDACTED] [REDACTED] leaders unanimously agree that [REDACTED]

(S) **Discussion:** Leaders at GTMO desire transfer of appropriate persons immediately for several reasons:

- Overall movement of some detainees would [REDACTED]

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Authority: E.O. 13526
Chief, Records & Policies Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

JS 1.4(a),(g) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

OSD 1.4(C),(e) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 474

DIA

5 U.S.C.
552(b)(6),

10 U.S.C. 474

[REDACTED] These are many other examples of how [REDACTED] the transfer/release of some detainees to [REDACTED]

- Transfers/releases from GTMO could return the camp to its operational capacity [REDACTED]

- Leaders at GTMO also believe that the longer detainees remain at GTMO, the *greater the chance that they will become hardened jihadists*, thus increasing the risk posed by these individuals to the United States.

(b) Thus far, only two detainees have been transferred out from GTMO - [REDACTED]

The transfer process is designed to provide the decision-makers in Washington with two recommendations - [REDACTED] and SECARMY. Once these two recommendations [REDACTED] a decision can be made, per the approved policy. [REDACTED] has provided approximately 20 recommendations [REDACTED] SECARMY has provided three. Hence, [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] will not provide recommendations for transfer/release [REDACTED] because they have [REDACTED]

- There appears to be [REDACTED]

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Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: AUG 15 2014

JS 1.4(a), (g) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

DIA 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

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OSD 1.4 (C)

(S) Recommendations: Expedite Transfer/Release Processes:

[REDACTED] This could hasten the simultaneous (or nearly simultaneous forwarding) of recommendations to OSD from both entities.

- Appropriate DOD officials should provide the law enforcement and risk assessment guidance [REDACTED] to facilitate investigations.

- Appropriate DOD officials should determine the appropriate standard of investigation [REDACTED] and provide guidance.

(S) D. Public Policy Plan

(S) Observation: Currently no USG Public Policy Strategy exists. OSD-PA, OJCS, SOUTHCOM-PA, and JTFs all operate independently with no overarching strategy.

(S) Recommendation: [REDACTED] lead effort in coordination with SOUTHCOM Staff [REDACTED] to construct "USG Public Diplomacy Strategy".

(S) 2. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

(S) A. [REDACTED]

(S) Observation: [REDACTED]


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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

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DIA SUSC.552(b)(3), 1A

JS 1.4(a), (g) +
SUSC.552(b)(5)




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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

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JS 1.4(a),(g)+ 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

DIA 1.4(c),(e),(g)+
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C.
424



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

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$$JS\ 1.4(a), (g) +$$

$$5\ USL\ 552(b)(5)$$

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DIA 1.4(c) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424

(S) B. PSYOPS/IO

18) Observation:

(b) The environment at GTMO and the circumstances under which the detainees are being held

Discussion

has experienced limited success
at GTMO.

(5) Recommendations:


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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

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DIA 1.4(c),(g)+ 5 USC 552(b)(3)

CIA 1.4(c)

JS 1.4(a),(g)+
5 USC 552(b)(3)




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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

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DIA 1.4(c) + S U S C. 552(b)(3) / AUG 15 2014

JS 1.4 (a), (g) + S U S C. 552(b)(3)
CIA 1.4(c)




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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Business Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

SECRET NOFORN

JS 1.4(a),(g) + 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(3)

DIA 1.4(c) +
5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424
+ (b)(5)



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Authority: EO 1.3526
Chief, Records & Business Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2004

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DIA 1.4(c) + 5 USC 552(b)(1)

OSD 1.4(C) +
5 USC 552(b)(3); 10 USC 424

JS1.4
(a), (g) +
5 USC
552(b)(5)

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Authority: EO 13526
Class: Executive & Business Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b) (1) [REDACTED]
(2) [REDACTED]

JS 1.4(a), (g) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

OSD 1.4(c) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424 + (b)(5) + 1.4(g)

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DIA 1.4(c), (g) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424 + (b)(5)

(S) Recommendation:

(S) The concept of flexibility

is effective and should be continued.

allowing for the immediate transfer of primary interest to another element

as information on

individuals, as it is developed, is logical and should be continued.

The future should allow for participation by organizations not already at

OSD, DoT, Treasury, Customs, ATF, and other agencies sets

the precedent.

(S) *Integrating Venus.*

Each equity depends to a greater degree on the other because practically speaking the extremely high volume of demands it and each other's information reports are of value to all involved.

Because of the sophistication required in approach and personnel, the numerous legal and procedural issues, cultural familiarization required and skill sets needed by operations personnel across the federal board, this venue should be a course of instruction provided to operational and other key personnel prior to deployment which is addressed elsewhere in this report.

(S) Lastly, although the operations commentary centered on process, as stated elsewhere in this report, not until changes are made to the physical facility will application of proper interrogation techniques be

SECRET NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

JS 1.4(a),(g)+ 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

OSD 1.4(c),(e),(g)+ 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

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DIA 1.4(c),(e),(g)+

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

possible. A dormitory atmosphere pervades the general population
lookup, which, no matter how austere looking and efficiently managed,
provided a support structure to the detainees. This is because

Process improvement recommendations
these interrogations are on balance incremental in nature
able to be accomplished with minimum disruption.

INTELLIGENCE CONTINGENCY FUNDS (ICF)

(S) F.

(S) Observation: The facility
in use is a former Naval Security Group building that is too small for

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

OSD 1.4(c)+ 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424+ 1.4(e), (g)

JS 1.4(a), (g)

current and projected [REDACTED] and
intelligence operations.

DIA 1.4

(c), (e), (g)+

5 U.S.C. 552

(b)(3);

10 U.S.C. 424

Recommendation: Work with HPSCI/SSCI for an emergency
intelligence appropriation to fund construction of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] modeled on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition, investigate the possibility of designating another large
building on Naval Base Guantanamo [REDACTED] If a building exists, a
small amount of construction money may drastically change this
situation for the better.

Recommendation: Direct findings from senior headquarters to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] operations at Guantánamo Bay.

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

SECRET NOFORN

OSD 1.4(c), (e), (g) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

DIA 1.4(c), (e), (g) +
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

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Authority: E.O. 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

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Authority: E.O. 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

(S) Recommendation: SOUTHCOM should delegate authority to
to accept or reject requirements tasking,

(S) Discussion:

(S)

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JS 14(a)(g)

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(S) The [REDACTED] authorizes seven CM&D

[REDACTED]

The [REDACTED] should enable [REDACTED] three people to move forward.

(S) Recommendation [REDACTED]

(S) 3. TRAINING

(S) A. New Skill Set

(S) Observation [REDACTED]

(S) Discussion

(S) [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

JS 1.4(a),(g) + 5 U.S.C. 552

DIA 1.4 (c), (g) +
5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(3), 10 U.S.C.
424


OSD 1.4(c),
(g) + 5 U.S.C.
552(b)(3),
10 U.S.C. 424

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Date: AUG 13 2014



...to establish a "Terrorism University"
...common orientation curriculum for personnel assigned to

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JS 1.4(a), (g)

OSD 1.4(c)

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DIA 5 USC 552(b)(3),
10 USC 424

the GTMO operation. "TU" training would target all personnel who contact detainees with specific training focus on their particular billet or function. This training should be received prior to their deployment in order to minimize the degradation and impact on the GTMO operation conducting remedial training. Interrogators and debriefers who have worked at [REDACTED] detention center should be sent to "TU" as advisors/instructors. (See Annex A "Curriculum")

(S) B. Lessons Learned:

(S) Observation: "Lessons Learned" are not being captured at Joint or Service Levels.

(S) Recommendations:

[REDACTED]

(S) PERSONNEL

(S) Tour Lengths

(S) Observation: Personnel turbulence caused by the current [REDACTED] tour lengths severely impacts and

hinders [REDACTED]

(S) Discussion:

[REDACTED]

Tour lengths should balance factors of continuity and flexibility based upon mission requirements. Key billets - leadership [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] need to be staffed for long-term continuity. NAVBASE GTMO has shown its ability to immediately [REDACTED] essential personnel [REDACTED]

should [REDACTED]

The balance of personnel (other staff and support personnel) may be assigned on temporary duty tours so long as adequate provisions are [REDACTED]

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

A 1.4(c) + 5 USC 552(b)(3);
10 USC 424

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OSD 5 USC 552(b)(3);
10 USC 424 + 1.4(c)

1.4(c)(g)

made for on-site overlapping turnover time. All services should follow similar assignment guidance.

(S) Recommendations

(S) The new [redacted] specify [redacted] leadership and key/essential personnel be assigned for two year accompanied tours. These "key" (2 [redacted] accompanied tours) should include JTF leadership [redacted]. The [redacted] should also include [redacted] accompanied tours) for [redacted] and "temporary" (179 TDY tours for junior support (J1, J4, J6) staff personnel. This assignment policy in concert with 100% [redacted] fill will [redacted]

[redacted] two-year accompanied policy in [redacted] policies on this [redacted] should be [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) B. Force Structure

(S) Observations [redacted] will continue to encounter continued [redacted]

[redacted] in accordance with the proposed [redacted]

(S) **Discussion:** Service force structures still reflect Cold War threat scenarios and are not optimized to prosecute a Global War on Terrorism. All Services [redacted] and should build [redacted] future expanding [redacted]

[redacted] decision to [redacted]

[redacted]

FOR [redacted]

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

JS 1.4(a),(g)

DIA 1.4(e)+5 USC 552(b)(3)
10 USC 424

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass. Div, NIS
Date: AUG 15 2014

(S) Observation [redacted] especially [redacted]
Army personnel [redacted] to unable [redacted]
[redacted]
severely hindering [redacted]
Bay. Previously [redacted] would [redacted] are not
required [redacted]

(S) Discussion [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

SECRET NOFORN

JS 1.4 (a)(g)

OSD 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424 + (b)(5)

DIA 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424 + (b)(5)

impossible

Furthermore, the

and it is difficult to perform his primary duties during additional time

Intermittent

Intermittent

Intermittent

Intermittent

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2014

(S) Observation: Inadequate numbers of [redacted] at
Guantánamo Bay hindered [redacted]

(S) Discussion:

(S) [redacted] runs a linguist pool to support [redacted]
The linguist pool does not support [redacted] for [redacted] languages
spoken by the detainee population [redacted]

(S) The War on Terror requires the US Government, the Department of
Defense, and the Services to reexamine the requirements [redacted]

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JS 1.4(a), (g)

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DIA S U.S.C. 552(b)(6)
OSD S U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

(S) Recommendations:

(S) Request the [REDACTED] lead an evaluation of future government, specifically [REDACTED]

(S) Direct the [REDACTED] to expand its capacity to accommodate the requirements [REDACTED]

(S) Direct the [REDACTED]

(S) Direct the [REDACTED]

(S) Examine the possibility of [REDACTED] to meet mission requirements at Guantanamo Bay [REDACTED]

(S) Examine the exploitation of [REDACTED] to enhance existing and future [REDACTED] at Guantanamo Bay.


Prepared by [REDACTED] Chief, GTMO External Review

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Date: AUG 15 2014

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#2



DIA reviewed document and determined some portions exempt from public release//wcd//3 April 2014

CIA
EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs

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Office of the Secretary of Defense 5056.552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WIIS
Date: 15 AUG 2014 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 1.4(c)+5056.552(b)(3), 1.4(c)(4)+(b)(5)
MDR: 14 -M- 3329

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AGENDA



POLICY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS TRAINING PERSONNEL

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2

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POLICY

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3

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$$JS\ 1.4(a), (g) +$$

$$S\ 6.5d, 552(b)(5)$$

POLICY: LONG-TERM NOT COMMITMENT



- **Observation:** There is no overarching coherent GTMO plan (policy, facilities, public affairs, C2). The "immediate" start-up of GTMO operations, short term funding focus, and "as is" facilities. No unity of effort.
- **Recommendations:**
 - Build USG public policy strategy
 - Media strategy with nested PSYOPS plan
 - OSD-PA; CJCS, SOUTHCOM, JTF
 - Interagency Strategy
 - Master Facilities Plan

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We must realize that our nation faces an entirely new threat framework and if we plan to win this struggle we must invest both human capital and infrastructure in this

They can provide us with insight into a world whose stated goal and intention is the destruction of the United States and we ignore such a valuable resource at our own peril.

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POLICY: DETENTION AND INTERVIEW TECHNIQUES

• Observation: Current detention policies provide only two levels of segregation for the general population and maximum security for high-risk detainees.

• Regulation: (b) (7)(F)

6/26/2012

OSD 1.4(c)

group near \$4 million security calls. The telephone calls have been spreading and

Current military operations necessitate greater capacity overall; a medium security facility might be built for much less \$\$\$\$. Building a medium security camp would envision more communal living arrangements for [REDACTED] or those pending final decision on transfer recommendation. [REDACTED]

- **Require expanded capacity to allow for maintenance plan** – units completed a few months ago are already rusted by heads & sinks. The exterior of all the general population facilities is also degraded. The overcrowding restricts the ability for easy maintenance.

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POLICY: TRANS

Observations: Transfer policy was implemented

Recommendations:

Investigation

JS 1.4(a)(g)+
S 656.552(b)(5)

DD: 656.552(b)(2);
656.424

6/26/20

JS 1.4(a), (g) +
SUSC. 552(b)(5)

POLICY WITH RECOMMENDATIONS

• **Discussions:**

[REDACTED]

• **Recommendations:**

- Develop & promulgate DOD's prosecutorial strategies
- Define Military Commission concept of operations

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Date: AUG 15 2014

Delay in the transfer/release assessments by law enforcement is directly
related to law enforcement's inability to adequately assess the prosecutorial

[REDACTED]

• A stated prosecutorial strategy, which speaks specifically to coordination with DOJ would allow all prosecutors, both at DOD and DOJ, to focus on the cases they will handle in the forum for which they are responsible. A lead prosecutor would implement the overall strategy, to facilitate prioritization of existing criminal cases, and to direct the transfer assessment by determining which cases have no

6/26/20

prosecutorial value. Prosecution [redacted] dispose of cases
resulting in plea bargains (e.g., [redacted])
[redacted]

JS 1.4(a)(g)

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Date: AUG 15 2014

6/26/21

JS 1.4(a),(g)+

5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

CIA 1.4(c)


OSD 1.4(c)

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Date: AUG 15 2014



(or other formalizing organization) would formalize the
... of non-POD players
... participation is required in
... not only in broadly protecting US national
... but also in how to use foreign delegations and
... in US control
In
reality, at the lowest level all CMO players report excellent cooperation.

JS 1.4(a),(g)

PLAN

Public Policy Strategy

Recommendations:

- OSD-PA lead effort in coordination with Joint Staff and SOUTHCOM staff to construct "USG Public Diplomacy Strategy"
- Protect detainee operations
- Build responses to potential scenarios

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- No guidance to SOUTHCOM from Higher

- Combat Camera/OSD-PA problems

- Need a nested overarching strategy which incorporates all aspects of public policy, media, and detainee operations

- Hurricane, Natural disaster, detainee death, enemy attack, accidents

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INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS


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10

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6/26/21



JS 1.4(a),(g)+ 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

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Date: AUG 15 2014

DIA 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

DIA 5 U.S.C. 552

6/26/21

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JS 1.4(a),(g)+5 US. 552(b)(5)

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Date: AUG 15 2014

JS 1.4(a),(g)+ 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

DIA 1.4(c)+ 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424

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INTEL OPERATIONS: PSYOPS/IO

• **Current Status:**

• **Recommendations:**

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Information Operations should be at the strategic level and prep US and international public opinion regarding the potential release/transfer of identified detainees or their unanticipated death due to illness or natural causes.

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
JS 1.4(a)(g) + S US-C.552(b)(5)

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CIA 1.4(c)

1.4(a)(9) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)
+ 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

6/26/2



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Date: AUG 15 2014

6/26/20

JS 1.4(a), (g) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

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Date: AUG 15 2014

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Date: AUG 15 2014


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6/26/20

JS 1.4/1.4(c)

JS 1.4/1.4(c)

6/26/20



JS 1.4(a), (g) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

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Date: AUG 15 2014

(S) 5 U.S.C.
552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C.
424 + (b)(5)

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INTEL OPERATIONS INTERROGATIONS

Observation

16

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The situation boiled down to one issue—the senior manager of the element did not have the authority required to accomplish

[REDACTED]

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Date: Aug 15 2014

The nests tasking review and assignment, in the element that can then quickly and authoritatively tasking. This saves time and also results in tasking

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rejection/acceptance authority is now in SOUTHCOM J2.

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Date: AUG 15 2014

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INTEL OPERATIONS: ICF



Observations: Lack of intelligence contingency funds (ICF) adversely impacts intelligence operations.

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Army has the responsibility to fund [redacted] interrogation operations. Reportedly Army Intelligence Command encountered coordination issues within the Army General Counsel's office that delayed provision of ICF to [redacted]. Per the [redacted] General Counsel, 27/1440 Aug, the issue is resolved. Army INSCOM was developing procedure on how to disperse and account for GTMO ICF. Because no funds have been received by [redacted] this observation should be continued until verification is received that [redacted] actually receives ICF. Recommend withdrawal of this observation upon when funded.

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 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
 Date: AUG 15 2014

6/26/20

JS 1.4(a),(g)

DIA 5U5C
SS2(b)(3);
10.686.424

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INTEL OPERATIONAL FACILITIES

• Observation: [REDACTED]

• Recommendations:

- Approve larger building or construct new BCIF

[REDACTED]

6 26 2012 18 SECRET//NOFORN//X1

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Date: AUG 15 2014

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TRAINING

6 26 2012

19

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JS 1.4(a)(g)

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TRAINING: NEW SKILL SETS

Observations: [REDACTED]

Recommendation: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] establish a Terrorism University to provide a common orientation curriculum for GTMO personnel

- Terrorism 101
- Al-Quaida 101
- Cultural orientation
- The Mideast
- Islam 101
- Databases/datamining

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Date: AUG 15 2014

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- Analyst Tools

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Date: AUG 15 2014

6/26/20

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TRAINING LESSONS LEARNED

• **Observation:** "Lessons Learned" are not being captured at Joint or Service Levels.

• **Recommendations:**

- Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) should visit and publish
- Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS) should review organization, Joint operations
- Service Schools harvest current operations for Lessons Learned and TTP
- Intel School, MP School, OSI, CID

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31

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• Army G3 has sent "custodial custody" team to GTMO to look at the confinement operation.

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Date: AUG 15 2014

6/26/21

DIASUSC.
SSZ(6)(3),
10 USC 424

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TRAINING: CURRENT/FUTURE FRAMEWORK

Observation

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TRAINING: CURRICULUM FRAMEWORK

• Recommendations:

- Expand Arabic language thru-put capabilities
- Incorporate more cultural sensitivity and historical background into Arabic courses

Courses must:

- Include more interrogator both practical exercises, "terrorism" training scenarios and "working with translators" segments
- Current thru-put exceeds recommended instructor/student ratios
- Should language be required for [REDACTED]

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23

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PERSONNEL

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24

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JS 1.4(a),(g)

DFA SUBC

(S2)(b)(3)

(S2)(b)(3)

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PERSONNEL: TOUR LENGTHS

• **Observation:** Current [REDACTED] tour lengths do not enhance intelligence operations.

• **Recommendations:** Tour lengths must be based on mission requirements. [REDACTED] should designate:

- "Key billets", Leadership [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] (2 year PCS accompanied)

- [REDACTED] (1 year PCS unaccompanied)

- 10Y, Staff Support personnel (179 day tours)

- CDR, Naval Base GTMO evaluate capacity to support [REDACTED] on two year accompanied tours

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25

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Date: AUG 15 2014

JS 1.4(a)(g)

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• Other commitments for low density personnel

- FORSCOM refused to take

- 1997 Army FORSCOM

• Recommendations:

- Approve recommended tour length changes
- Leverage more "coalition support" (linguists)
- Army evaluate force structure for long-term GWOT
- Expand/Grow inventory of "high demand/ low density" MOSs

6 26 2012 26 SECRET//NOFORN

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 Date: AUG 15 2004
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• For the past ten years, the Army has complained about the same "high demand/low density" MOSs. Only action has been to further reduce the inventory of these exact MOSs with 1997

-Primarily Intelligence and Military Police specialties

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-Despite many volunteers FORSCOM has refused all requests

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PERSONNEL

• Observations:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] POW
Interrogation has required only SECRET.

• Recommendations:

- Upon identification for OTMO assignment [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

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27

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PERSONNEL: LINGUISTS

Observations: The Global War on Terror presents an entirely new requirement for linguists.

- Continually expanding future requirement for Arabic speakers
- Both military and contract linguists
- Formerly insignificant languages and dialects now key (Pashtu, Dari, Ulghar)
- Machine language translation technologies

Recommendations:

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- 26 July memo Mr Tenant to Rep Sherwood Boehlert

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