

REQUIRED

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IMMEDIATE
O 091419Z OCT 91
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7705
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0347

ZYUW RUEHMOA8774 2821419

FORCES OVER THE LONGER TERM, IT ONLY MAKES SENSE TO
CONCENTRATE ON POST-REDUCTION FORCES. #28

~~SECRET SPECAT~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 28774

~~ENDS~~ DECAPTIONED

DOS

GENEVA FOR INST DELEGATION

~~E.O. 12958~~ DECLASS. ANDR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, UR

SUBJECT: ASD HADLEY MEETING WITH SOVIET DEPUTY FM
OBUKHOV, OCTOBER 7, 1991

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Date: MAR 24 2015
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. DURING THE VISIT OF THE UNDER SECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW DELEGATION TO MOSCOW, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE STEPHEN HADLEY MET WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OBUKHOV FROM 7:15 TO 8:45 P.M. ON 7 OCTOBER, TO FOLLOW UP ON THE 6 OCTOBER BARTHOLOMEW-OBUKHOV DISCUSSIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE MIRVED ICBMS. AT THE 6 OCTOBER BARTHOLOMEW-OBUKHOV MEETING, GENERAL LADYGIN HAD ARGUED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DE-MIRVING PROPOSAL WOULD RESULT IN A 2:1 U.S. ADVANTAGE IN STRATEGIC FORCES. THE U.S. AIM IN THE 7 OCTOBER MEETING WAS TO EXPLAIN THAT THE U.S. ANALYSIS YIELDED A VERY DIFFERENT RESULT, AND TO IMPRESS ON THE SOVIETS THE NEED FOR DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF EACH SIDE'S POST-START FORCE STRUCTURES AS A NECESSARY PRELUDE TO ANY SIGNIFICANT POST-START FORCE RESTRUCTURING/REDUCTIONS. OBUKHOV STRONGLY ENDORSED THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR SUCH DETAILED DISCUSSIONS. HOWEVER, DISAPPOINTINGLY, NO REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET MOD OR GENERAL STAFF ATTENDED THE MEETING. GENERALS OHELICHEV AND LADYGIN WERE EXPECTED, BUT OBUKHOV EXPLAINED THAT THEY HAD DECLINED AT THE LAST MINUTE. END SUMMARY.

3. PRESENT ON THE U.S. SIDE: ASD HADLEY, LTG SHALIKASHVILI, BG CURTIN, MR. MILLER, DR. KOCH AND MR. WALPOLE. PRESENT ON THE SOVIET SIDE: MR. OBUKHOV, MR. BY NAMEDOV AND MR. LYSENKO.

4. ASD HADLEY OPENED BY EXPLAINING THAT THE RATIOS FOR POST-START FORCE STRUCTURES WHICH GENERAL LADYGIN HAD PRESENTED AT THE 6 OCTOBER BARTHOLOMEW-OBUKHOV MEETING WERE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE WHICH THE U.S. HAD DEVELOPED. THE U.S. BELIEVED THERE WERE TWO POSSIBLE SOURCES FOR THAT DIFFERENCE.

5. FIRST, THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE TERM "POST-START FORCE"; FOR THE U.S., IT REFERS TO THE FORCES LEFT AFTER THE SEVEN-YEAR START REDUCTION PERIOD. SINCE WE ARE LOOKING AT STABILITY AND BALANCE OF

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REVIEW FOR DISTRIBUTION TO CIMCS
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ACTION (R,M)
INFO CJCS(1) J8(3) J5(1) SAC LO(0) SHAPE LNO(2)
SECDEF-W(1) SDIO(7) USDP-SPECIAL HANDLING(13)
USDA:AE(1) USDA:STAFF SAC(1) ASD:PA(2) ASD:PAE/SDF(1)
USDP-CH(1) USDP:PD(1) DB-AC(1) DA-SA(1) VP(1) DIO(1)
DB-461(1)
+OCSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+STOC
+HATS PENTWASHINGTON DC
+HQ SAC OFFUTT AFB NE//XP//
+OSIA WASHINGTON DC
+USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO
+DMA WASHINGTON DC//OPAC/OPMA//
+HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB DC

6. THE SECOND POSSIBLE SOURCE FOR THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. ANALYSIS AND GENERAL LADYGIN'S PRESENTATION IS THAT GENERAL LADYGIN MAY SIMPLY HAVE DELETED MIRVED ICBMS FROM EACH SIDE'S CURRENTLY-PLANNED 1999 FORCES WITHOUT MAKING ANY OTHER ADJUSTMENTS. THE U.S. APPROACH IN OUR ANALYSIS WAS QUITE DIFFERENT. EACH SIDE CAN ACT NOW TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF POST-START FORCE STRUCTURES, AND WORK TO REDUCE ANY DISPARITIES THAT COULD EMERGE AS A RESULT OF DE-MIRVING ICBMS.

7. ASD HADLEY PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN THAT, IF THE U.S.S.R. DECIDED NOW TO RETAIN A SIZEABLE SSBW FORCE IN ITS POST-START FORCE STRUCTURE, IT WOULD NOT BE PUT AT A DISADVANTAGE IF MIRVED ICBMS WERE ELIMINATED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE USSR COULD DECIDE TO KEEP ALL 14 OF ITS DELTA IIIS, ALL 8 OF ITS TYPHOONS, AND ALL 7 OF ITS DELTA IVS. IF IT DID SO, THE 2:1 RATIO MENTIONED BY LADYGIN WOULD NOT EMERGE. ALTHOUGH THE U.S. WOULD HAVE A SLIGHT ADVANTAGE IN TOTAL RV NUMBERS, THE USSR WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE IN NUMBERS OF SSBMS. FOR SURVIVABILITY PURPOSES, THE LATTER WOULD BE EXTREMELY BENEFICIAL. ASD HADLEY CONCLUDED BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE KEY POINT IS THAT, IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH GENERAL LADYGIN'S OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL, BOTH SIDES NEED TO ENGAGE IN A CANDID DISCUSSION OF EACH'S POST-START FORCE STRUCTURES. 8. OBUKHOV REPLIED THAT HE BELIEVED SUCH DISCUSSIONS COULD TAKE PLACE, BUT THAT ONE ARGUMENT FROM THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE THE QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. D-5 AND SOVIET SLIMS. ASD HADLEY AGREED THAT HARD TARGET KILL (HTK) CAPABILITY SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE TALKS WE PROPOSE. BUT HE ADDED THAT HTK CAPABILITY ONLY MATTERS IF USED AGAINST HARD, FIXED TARGETS LIKE SILOS -- TARGETS WHICH WOULD BE GREATLY

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REDUCED, OR ON THE SOVIET SIDE EVEN ELIMINATED, UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL. MR. MILLER ADDED THAT IT IS INCORRECT TO ARGUE, AS MR. ROGOV DID IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION ON 6 OCTOBER, THAT THE D-5 WOULD POSE A FIRST STRIKE THREAT IF MIRVED ICBMS WERE ELIMINATED. HTK CAPABILITY WOULD BE IRRELEVANT IF THE ONLY SOVIET ICBMS WERE SINGLE-RV MOBILES. MOBILE MISSILES IN GARRISON ARE SOFT TARGETS, FOR WHICH HTK CAPABILITY IS NOT NECESSARY. DISPERSED MOBILES ARE SURVIVABLE AGAINST ANY NUCLEAR WEAPON.

9. OBUKHOV INTERJECTED THAT HE FOUND THE U.S. PRESENTATION VERY INTERESTING. IN ESSENCE, HE SAID, YOU ARE SAYING THAT THE U.S. AND USSR NEED TO DISCUSS DIRECTLY ISSUES THAT WE USED TO DISCUSS ONLY INDIRECTLY, THROUGH ARTICLES, BOOKS AND SEMINARS. ASD HADLEY RESPONDED THAT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BELIEVES THE U.S. AND USSR NEED TO TALK AT THIS STAGE ABOUT UNDERLYING REALITIES, NOT ARMS CONTROL ARCANA. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON ICBM DE-MIRVING WILL REQUIRE EVENTUAL NEGOTIATION, BUT FIRST WE NEED INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF FORCE STRUCTURES.

10. OBUKHOV REPEATED THAT HE FOUND THE U.S. IDEAS VERY INTERESTING, AND WOULD INFORM HIS SUPERIORS OF THE CONVERSATION. HE REMARKED APPROVINGLY OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO DISCUSS STRATEGIC FORCES AND DOCTRINES "IN DEPTH, IN PRACTICAL TERMS". HE ALSO ENCOURAGED THE U.S. SIDE TO DISCUSS THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE ISSUES IN UNDER SECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW'S MEETING WITH MOD SHAPOSHNIKOV. HE DESCRIBED SHAPOSHNIKOV AS YOUNG, ENERGETIC, AND QUICK TO UNDERSTAND ISSUES IF THEY WERE PROPERLY EXPLAINED.

11. AT THE SAME TIME, OBUKHOV CAUTIONED THAT THE U.S. MUST UNDERSTAND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD HAVE VERY SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S

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PROPOSAL, GIVEN THE HISTORIC SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN ICBS AND THE HISTORIC U.S. ADVANTAGE IN SLBMs. OVERALL, THE DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC DOCTRINES AND FORCES SHOULD BE AIMED AT DEFINING A COMMON GOAL WHICH WILL PRODUCE STABILITY.

12. ASD HADLEY AGREED THAT THE ISSUES WHICH OBUKHOV RAISED NEED TO BE DISCUSSED, AND THAT THE OVERALL GOAL MUST BE STABILITY. HE ADDED THAT GENERAL LADYGIN MAY OFFER SOVIET OFFICIALS ARGUMENTS WHY THE U.S. ANALYSIS DOES NOT MAKE SENSE -- BUT THE U.S. NEEDS TO HEAR THOSE ARGUMENTS TOO. OTHERWISE, THE SIDES WILL NOT BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON WHAT WILL BE STABILIZING.

13. OBUKHOV THEN SAID HE WANTED TO RAISE ONE MORE SUBSTANTIVE POINT SO AS TO UNDERSTAND U.S. VIEWS. THE U.S. ARGUES THAT MIRVED ICBS ARE DESTABILIZING; WHY WOULD THE SAME NOT BE TRUE OF SINGLE-WV ICBS? ASD HADLEY ANSWERED THAT THE BASIC ISSUE IS PRICE TO ATTACK. THERE IS A TREMENDOUS ADVANTAGE IN STRIKING FIRST AGAINST MIRVED ICBS, AND NO SUCH ADVANTAGE IN STRIKING FIRST AGAINST A SINGLE-WV MISSILE.

14. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION OF THAT POINT, OBUKHOV EMPHASIZED THAT THIS CONVERSATION HAD ADDED GREATLY TO THE U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS. HE STATED THAT IT WAS A MUTUAL U.S.-SOVIET DUTY TO BECOME INVOLVED IN STABILITY DISCUSSIONS. FURTHER, HE UNDERSTOOD ASD HADLEY'S POINT ABOUT THE NEED TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS OF REAL FORCES; THE PARTICIPANTS IN THOSE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE PROFESSIONALS. THE FINAL GOAL SHOULD BE STABILITY AT LOW ECONOMIC PRICE. MR. HADLEY INTERJECTED THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ECONOMIC FACTOR FOR BOTH SIDES; IN THAT RESPECT, THE POSSIBLE SOVIET POST-START FORCE WHICH HE HAD OUTLINED EARLIER FEATURED EXISTING SSBMS, WHICH REPRESENTED SUNK COSTS.

15. MR. WILLER ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURES BEFORE START REDUCTIONS BEGIN, SO THAT IMPORTANT FUTURE FORCE OPTIONS ARE NOT FORECLOSED DURING THE REDUCTION PROCESS. OBUKHOV TOOK THE POINT, AND SAID THAT IT RAISED THE OVERALL ISSUE OF FUTURE FORUMS, WHICH THE U.S. AND SOVIET SIDES HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DISCUSS THOROUGHLY OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS. ASD HADLEY SAID THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND TO HIS GOVERNMENT THAT INITIAL DISCUSSIONS OF STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE TAKE PLACE IN SMALL, INFORMAL GROUPS; LATER THE RESULTS COULD BE HANDED OVER TO A MORE FORMAL GROUP. THE START BT

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DISCUSSIONS OF DOWNLOADING AND NEW TYPES PROVIDE GOOD EXAMPLES OF HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES WITHOUT A SOUND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF EACH SIDE'S FORCE STRUCTURES AND PLANS.

16. OBUKHOV REPLIED, AND ASD HADLEY AGREED, THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS ON STRATEGIC FORCES IN THE FUTURE MUST BE "MORE RATIONAL, MORE CONCRETE AND MORE OPEN". WE HAVE MUCH MORE OPPORTUNITY NOW TO DECIDE THESE ISSUES QUICKLY AND RATIONALLY; WE SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT. THE MEETING CLOSED ON THAT POSITIVE NOTE. STRAUSS BT

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Date: MAR 24 2015

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Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 24 MAR 2015 Authority: EO 13526
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Reason: _____
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