# Almost Successful Recipe:
# The United States and East European Unrest prior to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution

Throughout the Cold War the United States tried to maintain a delicate balance in its policy toward the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe.* It sought to promote enough disaffection to loosen their ties to the Soviet Union but not so much as to provoke violence and brutal retaliation by the local Communist regimes or Moscow. In a 1953 remark that applied to the entire region, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) James Conant said the aim in East Germany was to "keep the pot simmering but not to bring it to a boil."[1] When the pot boiled over, as it did there in 1953 and in Poland and Hungary in 1956, the Eisenhower administration made clear, as would later administrations, its unwillingness to intervene militarily, a move that might precipitate war with the Soviet Union. Over the years labels attached to the policy meant little. Whether called containment or liberation, bridge building, a gentle nudge, or détente, the approach toward the Soviet bloc, with temperature adjustments and varying emphases, basically followed the same recipe. (U)

The administration's passivity in responding to unrest masked an internal debate inherited from Truman's over how best to maintain the balance.[2] Early studies

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* This study treats East Germany as one of the East European satellites, along with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, although policymakers often viewed East Germany separately from the others or as linked to the overall German question.

emphasized the apparently more aggressive nature of Eisenhower's policy, giving much weight to Republican rhetoric during the 1952 presidential campaign that seemed to signal a break with Truman's approach, and to the persistent recommendations of Eisenhower's activist aide, C. D. Jackson.[3] They contended that the goal was to "roll back" Soviet control of Eastern Europe, words that appeared infrequently in policy papers or government officials' private and public statements. Later works have pointed out that the administration early on abandoned thoughts of overthrowing the satellite regimes and instead sought to encourage their evolution along the lines of Tito's national communism in Yugoslavia.[4] Other recent scholarship has argued that while Eisenhower may not have pursued as aggressive a policy as once thought, in effect he talked a tough game. As a result, the administration's bellicose rhetoric needlessly prolonged the Cold War and laid the groundwork for a U.S. "national security state."[5] (U)

U.S. interest in the region, dating back to World War I and derived from emotional ties felt by Americans of East European descent, assumed a military aspect after World War II. In its dealings with the USSR, the Truman administration tried to use American resources and power to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence, a policy promulgated by diplomat George Kennan that became known as containment. When communists seized power in one East European country after another and threatened to do so in France and Italy, the administration countered with strong measures, including Truman Doctrine assistance to Greece and Turkey, Marshall Plan aid to Western Europe, airlifting food and supplies into West Berlin during a Soviet blockade, and taking the lead in establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (U)

The operative policy paper on Eastern Europe, NSC 58/2 of December 1949, noted that the westward advance of Soviet power had been checked, at least for the time being, and substantial progress had been made in developing the defensive capabilities of the Western European nations. "The time is now ripe for us," the paper stated, "to place greater emphasis on the offensive to consider whether we cannot do more to cause the elimination or at least a reduction of predominant Soviet influence in the satellite states of Eastern Europe." It continued:

> These states are in themselves of secondary importance on the European scene. Eventually they must play an important role in a free and integrated Europe; but in the current two-world struggle they have meaning primarily because they are in varying degrees politico-military adjuncts of Soviet power and extend that power into the heart of Europe . . . . So long as the USSR represents the only major threat to our security and to world stability, our objective with respect to the USSR's European satellites must be the elimination of Soviet control from those countries and the reduction of Soviet influence to something like normal dimensions.

The paper stressed that only measures short of war were to be employed. A resort to war "should be rejected as a practical alternative,"[6] an injunction which guided policymakers throughout the Cold War.

To help achieve the objective U.S. intelligence and military organizations established contact with resistance elements in the communist-dominated countries. The outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950, raising fears that the Soviet Union might launch an attack on Western Europe, made such contacts seem more important. A decision was made to try to develop large-scale underground forces in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland, to retard the advance of the Red Army if war came and to assist U.S. airmen downed behind enemy lines. In part to meet this possible military requirement in Europe and also because of the war in Asia, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), the CIA's

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covert operational arm, expanded dramatically. Between 1949 and 1952 personnel strength increased ten-fold and its budget soared from [redacted] Expectations varied as to what could be accomplished behind the Iron Curtain. Army and Air Force representatives thought much "could be done by clandestine means in Eastern Europe to develop resistance mechanisms capable of producing a massive retardation contribution." State, CIA, and some Defense officials put aside their belief that these representatives "were engaging in a very great deal of wishful thinking" and "went along."[7] (U)

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*The 1952 Election Campaign: Tit for Tat*

The 1952 election, which saw Eisenhower decisively defeat Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson and the return of the Republicans to the White House after an absence of two decades, represents an illusory watershed in policy toward Eastern Europe.[8] The issue dominated the early part of the campaign, with Republicans denouncing the Truman administration's policy of containment as too defensive. Eisenhower and others, particularly the party's chief foreign policy expert, John Foster Dulles, who had resigned his position as ambassador at large to take an active part in the campaign, called for greater U.S. initiative in weakening the Soviet hold on the satellites without promoting violence, what they called the "peaceful liberation" of countries behind the Iron Curtain. Although their words were obviously aimed at Americans of East European descent, they believed in what they were saying. The rhetoric was not just a gimmick designed to win votes. But the harsh attacks produced a sharp response from Democrats, who castigated the talk of liberation as recklessness. Partisan hyperbole thus obscured the two parties'

underlying agreement on how to deal with Eastern Europe and left the impression that the new administration would pursue a more forceful policy than it intended. (U)

In addition to Dulles, the campaign brought to prominence C. D. Jackson, an executive with *Time-Life* and President of the National Committee for a Free Europe (later renamed the Free Europe Committee). Jackson, who had worked under Eisenhower during World War II on psychological warfare operations, arranged an unusual meeting in May 1952 in Princeton, New Jersey, to discuss ways to strengthen efforts in this field. Participants included academics, representatives from Radio Free Europe (RFE), and prominent government officials, including CIA Deputy Director Allen Dulles and State's Charles Bohlen. Jackson told the group that RFE had created salients in Eastern Europe but was not prepared to follow up, because no one thought it could have been done "as deep and as fast." He claimed that U.S. high-level officials had failed publicly to state a long-term desire for the satellite peoples to be free. Yet "two billion people are looking over our shoulder all the time, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and they are going to get encouragement or discouragement or faith or despair out of what our big men say. The 'big man' doesn't have to be precise."[9] (U)

After much discussion the group drafted a statement for a high-level official to make. Allen Dulles preferred that it be issued soon, before the political parties' nominating conventions in July. If it appeared to be an electoral appeal, "it will lose its effect abroad to the people to whom it is addressed." He was not too concerned about its impact on the satellite populations:

> I am not sure that one of the things that we have lacked in these countries is maybe a martyr or two to inspire these people. This thing is never going to come about unless there are people who are ready and willing to stand

> up and be counted and take the consequences. After all we have had over a hundred thousand casualties in Korea—but there are more than eighty million in Eastern Europe, and if we have been willing to accept these casualties, I wouldn't worry if there were a few casualties or a few martyrs behind the Iron Curtain without desiring to stir up a situation of a revolt.

Dulles thought that the United States had essentially been on the defensive in conducting psychological operations. Perhaps the time had "come when in certain areas, among them the 'satellite' states, we should go over to the offensive." Bohlen did not feel the proposed statement contained anything Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson had not already said. Although he and Dulles agreed to work on getting the government to release it, nothing seemed to have come of their efforts.[10] (U)

Jackson had more success elsewhere. He sent a copy of the conference proceedings and statement to the person he hoped would become the "big man," his former boss, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe General Eisenhower, who had recently declared his candidacy for president. Impressed with Jackson's call for a more vigorous psychological warfare program, Eisenhower used him during the campaign as an adviser and speechwriter.[11] It is perhaps more than coincidental that many of the ideas the Princeton group discussed appeared a fortnight later in a magazine article written by Foster Dulles, Allen's brother, which strongly criticized the administration's containment policy.[12] His views were nothing new. He had said much the same thing in a 1950 book in which he argued that history had shown how dictatorships could "be shaken from within" by peaceful methods.[13] (U)

At its July convention the Republican Party adopted a foreign policy platform plank, largely the handiwork of Foster Dulles, promising that it would repudiate secret

understandings entered into during World War II, specifically the Yalta agreement, which, it charged, had consigned Eastern Europe to the Soviet sphere of influence. It would also make clear that the United States, "as one of its peaceful purposes, looks happily forward to the genuine independence" of the satellite nations. What gave the plank a partisan bite was the declaration that the new policy would "mark the end of the negative, futile and immoral policy of 'containment' which abandons countless human beings to a despotism and godless terrorism." The Democratic Party platform said some of the same things, yet in a milder way: "We look forward to the day when the liberties of Poland and the other oppressed Soviet satellites . . . will be restored to them and they can again take their rightful place in the community of free nations." It promised to expand Voice of America (VOA) programming "for penetration of the 'Iron Curtain,' bringing truth and hope to all the people subjugated by the Soviet empire."[14] (U)

Before launching his campaign, Eisenhower met with Republican Congressman Charles Kersten (Wis.), sponsor of an amendment to the 1951 Mutual Security Act appropriating $100 million for the purpose of recruiting, training, and arming East European refugees to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[15] Kersten, who talked about forming the refugees into units for use in overthrowing the satellite governments, tried to elicit from the candidate an endorsement of his objective. Eisenhower refused. While Democratic nominee Stevenson privately expressed alarm over the Republicans' anxiety "to create the illusion of some positive foreign policy of their own," the British Embassy in Washington thought their comments at the beginning of the campaign were "surprisingly mild and reasonable." Instead of condemning the Truman administration's basic policies, Eisenhower and Dulles maintained that these

policies had been poorly implemented. "Indeed, if we leave aside the legitimate political rhetoric—upon which much of the discussion by the press and politicians has naturally been focused," the Embassy remarked, "we find like the Red Queen that after all this running we are very much where we were before." It noted that Dulles had explained "emphatically that he does not want a series of bloody uprisings and reprisals, but rather to preoccupy the Kremlin with its own homework and with holding down the restiveness of its captives." He had been reticent to describe specific actions, proposing little that was not already "covered by present policies, save for the emphasis on greater coherence which is in fact needed." The Embassy regarded his statements and the platform "as almost straight electioneering, albeit electioneering with as wide an eye open as possible to the likelihood that opportunities for radical change will not look so brilliant when the facts have to be faced." Hence, Dulles had made "great efforts to describe a policy which really seems to be different and more forthright but at the same time to avoid commitments to specific action which might boomerang dangerously."[16] (U)

The liberation theme produced the campaign's initial major disagreement, with the Republicans firing the opening salvo. In late August, before the American Legion convention in New York, Eisenhower delivered his first major campaign speech, declaring that "the American conscience can never know peace" until the satellite peoples "are restored again to being masters of their own fate." The U.S. Government "must tell the Kremlin that never shall we desist in our aid to every man and woman of those shackled lands."[17] (U)

However, W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and an unsuccessful contender in 1952 for the

Democratic presidential nomination, warned that the notion of liberation was a "trap" that would lead to premature uprisings, like the 1944 Warsaw uprising.* Dulles called Harriman's view "nonsense." The only trap he saw was in the Democrats' platform, because "they look forward to liberation of all these peoples, but they aren't willing to do anything about it. That's a trap to get votes. . . ." He denied that Eisenhower's policy meant violent revolution. Instead, "quiet" methods like passive resistance, work slowdowns, and industrial sabotage would be employed.[18] (U)

Republican statements brought a rebuke from Stevenson, who called them "irresponsible and dangerous." He suggested that Dulles "could serve the country better with more candor and less claptrap." Speaking in a heavily Polish-American Detroit suburb, he said that Eisenhower's speech "had aroused speculation here and abroad that if he were elected, some reckless action might ensue in an attempt to liberate the people of Eastern Europe from Soviet tyranny." He vowed he "would not say one reckless word on this matter," because the "grip of Soviet tyranny upon your friends and relatives cannot be loosened by loose talk or idle threats." Elsewhere in Michigan on the same day, Stevenson declared that he had no fundamental difference with Eisenhower on foreign policy, which he described as "building the unity and collective strength of the free countries to prevent the expansion of Soviet dominion and control" and "gradually but surely lessen the relative power of the Soviet Union on world events." President Truman

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* On 1 August 1944, as the Red Army approached Warsaw, Polish resistance forces within the city rose up against the Germans. During the 63 days of fighting that followed, Soviet forces did not enter the city. As many as 15,000 Polish insurgents and upwards of 150,000 civilians were killed.

joined the fray, defending his administration's approach to Eastern European problems and denouncing the insincerity of Republican rhetoric.[19] (U)

Like the British Embassy, the Voice of America stood outside the partisan electioneering. In a broadcast to Western Europe, it stressed that the Republican and Democratic candidates agreed on the main points of foreign policy. Despite a charge by Moscow's *Pravda* that Eisenhower's speech meant that he intended to conquer Eastern Europe and Asia and concern expressed in West European newspapers over what he did mean, the VOA assured listeners he had said nothing about using force to liberate the satellites and that Dulles had emphasized the peaceful nature of the process. "In saying that the American conscience can never be at peace while so many captive peoples live in slavery," the VOA continued, Eisenhower was "expressing the profound feeling Americans have not only now, but have had throughout their history." It quoted Stevenson as voicing essentially the same sentiment. In fact, later in the month sounding much like Eisenhower and Dulles, Stevenson held out the hope that "the intensification of peaceful pressures against the Soviet Empire will sharpen the internal contradictions within that empire; that, in time, free peoples may lift their heads again in Eastern Europe, and new policies and leadership emerge within the Soviet Union itself."[20] (U)

During the campaign Eisenhower reminded Dulles to make clear in his public statements that the liberation of the satellites would come through peaceful means, something that Dulles on one occasion had failed to do. Eisenhower also privately assured a former Polish general involved with the decision to launch the 1944 Warsaw uprising that he would continue to support the liberation of the satellite nations without encouraging their peoples to start premature or futile uprisings. After the election, Dulles,

whom Eisenhower promptly named as his Secretary of State, went to great lengths to point out that the nation's foreign policy would remain fundamentally the same under the new administration. Journalist C. L. Sulzberger stated that Europeans wanted 'very much to have a full explanation of the new political word 'liberation' and to know what it means in terms of policy," which he thought might not differ that much from Truman's approach. It was "not yet understood that it can represent a logical maturation of what is so widely known as 'containment.'"[21] (U)

Did Dulles regret the excessive campaign rhetoric he and others had employed? Probably not. At his confirmation hearing in January 1953, where Democratic members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chided him for Republican distortions of the historical record, he defended the denunciations of the Truman administration as factual, but he did not want to justify them at the hearing for fear of "reopening old controversies." Years later Livingston Merchant, who served under Dulles as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, observed that he "had a certain amount of practical political cynicism." Dulles thought that "both sides in an American election use an extravagance of language to clothe what may be really very small differences which the public should be sufficiently sophisticated to accept." For him, talking about "rollback" was "clothing in exaggerated electioneering language a thought in which he believed—namely that a more aggressive policy of containment should be pursued, with the ultimate hope for a result of a loosening of the ties between the satellites and the Kremlin." Robert Bowie, who became State's Director for Policy Planning, said that Dulles never "thought that 'liberation' meant what it was labeled by people who were trying to make fun of it." He never intended to use force to liberate the satellites; he

"simply did not like the overtones of containment, or at least the way in which containment was accepted by some people—namely, as settling for the status quo." But Dulles had not clearly worked this out in his own mind, according to Bowie, and his phrasemaking "made him subject to the quite legitimate criticism that he didn't really mean what he appeared to be saying." Indeed, only a few months into the new administration, Eisenhower's only criticism of Dulles was that he sometimes did not understand the effect of "his words and manner" on other people.[22] (U)

During the campaign each party thus fashioned a straw man for attacking the other. Republican charges that Truman's containment policy represented weakness, born of a willingness to accept the long-term subjugation of the satellite peoples and perhaps "sell them down the river," were patently false. As was the Democrats' portrayal of Republican advocacy of a more vigorous containment policy as tantamount to a call for war. (U)

*Sobering Setbacks*

How realistic was the talk during the campaign about ending communist rule in Eastern Europe? On this question opinion within the government was divided, at least regarding the short-term capabilities for stirring revolt. Recent operations, according to a CIA paper in 1952, "revealed that the Communist authorities do not have complete control of the situation in these countries, and that the area can be successfully penetrated." On the other hand, a Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) staff member felt that capabilities for penetration "had in the main been decreasing and that we had no clear way to increase them in sight." By 1952 many émigrés at Radio Free Europe had begun to doubt whether liberation of their homelands would occur soon, a view shared by

Franklin Lindsay, CIA's Deputy Chief for Political and Psychological Warfare. A trip to Europe during the late summer persuaded him that new techniques, especially in stimulating "unorganized mass passive resistance," had to be developed. Lindsay concluded that the increasingly effective security controls behind the Iron Curtain made it quite difficult for resistance organizations to conduct subversive operations with any significant impact, much less survive.[23]

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* The author did not conduct research in the files of the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps at the NACP. The only published account of its European operations is Sayre and Botting, *America's Secret Army*, which focuses primarily on the organization's history prior to 1945.

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Still another fiasco, not yet fully apparent, involved [redacted] operations in Albania. The substantial literature on the subject leaves certain aspects of the operations unclear. While attention has tended to focus on the degree of responsibility of Soviet mole Kim Philby for their ultimate failure, the impression has arisen that U.S.



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activity was more extensive than it really was and that its primary aim was to overthrow the Communist regime of Enver Hoxha. In fact, U.S. objectives, mostly of a probing nature, were not intended to topple him.[27] (U)

Neither the United States nor Great Britain maintained diplomatic relations with the tiny, economically backward country. The British broke off talks to reestablish relations in 1946 after Albanian mines in the Strait of Corfu damaged two British destroyers causing 44 fatalities. That same year U.S.-Albanian negotiations to resume relations collapsed over disagreement regarding the Albanian Government's assumption of the country's prewar indebtedness.[28] (U) CIA 1.4(c) OSD 1.4(c)

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

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The agency concluded that a successful overthrow was unlikely, a conclusion that produced a more modest aim—"to reduce the value of Albania by persistently and continuously undermining Communist authority and by harassing the regime with domestic difficulties." The idea of an overthrow was not abandoned but put on a back burner. On learning that the American approach now was "to let Hoxha stew in his own

juice," a Foreign Office representative quipped that British policy would go further by adding "a little pepper."[33] (U)

U.S.-sponsored infiltrations did not begin until November 1950, a year later than originally planned. They were a tragic comedy of errors. The first involved nine men parachuting into the country. Fortunately, the pilot had trouble locating the drop point, where security forces again were waiting. In frustration he dropped the men at a considerable distance. Nevertheless, one was captured, while the others made their way out via Yugoslavia. A second mission in July 1951, this time with 12 men, resulted in complete disaster: 10 were killed and the others captured. In October the survivors were tried in public in Tirana. During the trial the Americans inexplicably dropped another team of five, which also encountered a waiting security force that killed two of them; the others escaped.[34] (U)

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Certainly, the prospect of overthrowing Hoxha had not increased. In November 1951 an intelligence estimate concluded that the Albanian resistance represented a nuisance but "not an immediate threat" to the regime. If it remained divided and without substantial external aid, the security forces would be able to control it. The estimate noted

that Albania's neighbors--Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia--all preferred "continuance of the status quo to a change which would be favorable to the others."[36] (U)

Instead of bringing operations to a close, the dismal results led the CIA [redacted] merely to modify their approach by conducting smaller and hopefully more secure operations [redacted]

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Despite seemingly better results, doubts lingered. Often portrayed as a zealous advocate of paramilitary operations in Eastern Europe, the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, Frank Wisner, voiced reservations as early as June 1952. As Smith had done the previous fall, Wisner pointed to the project's cost, as well as the way it reduced the agency's capability to go after "other and perhaps more useful targets." Furthermore, a liberated Albania would become an economic drain on the United States. Wisner said it might be wiser to concentrate on disorganizing the country's already weak economy, "thus leaving the Russians with the unhappy alternative of pouring in resources of their own or allowing the fate of a rotting and desperate Albania to appear before all the world

as further evidence of what becomes to countries and peoples within the Soviet orbit."[39]

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An intelligence estimate at the end of 1952, also reflecting wariness, indicated that all of Albania's neighbors and Great Britain still opposed an attempt to overthrow Hoxha. They would resent any coup attempt carried out against their advice or without consultation as a "reckless and provocative action," especially if the U.S. hand was apparent. Regardless of the outcome, the major Western European powers would feel "too much had been risked for too small a potential gain."[40] (U)

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The agency was also having difficulty meeting the two requirements U.S. military authorities had established for it in Eastern Europe: developing escape and evasion (E & E) facilities for U.S. servicemen's use in the event of war with the Soviet Union and creating paramilitary capabilities to help retard an initial Soviet advance. From 1950 on the CIA had attempted to infiltrate agents into all the bloc countries to contact existing resistance groups or stimulate formation of such groups, but had "found no organized resistance worthy of the name."

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On top of these problems, relations between Defense officials and the CIA were not always smooth. While the Deputy Secretary of Defense was the department's designated representative for dealing with the CIA, day-to-day liaison on covert operations and paramilitary activities was handled by the Office of Psychological Policy, which in July 1953 was expanded and renamed the Office of Special Operations. The office head, retired Marine General Graves Erskine, often delegated liaison responsibilities to staff member William Godel. [redacted]

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Though East Germany was a special case where U.S. assets were greater and operational difficulties less pronounced, the Eisenhower administration inherited an extremely shaky situation in the other satellites: the declining success of illegal infiltration; absence of evidence that organized resistance groups existed; the CIA's termination or shrinkage of more than half its projects and curtailment of the training of nearly all émigré paramilitary units; [redacted] the embarrassing and costly [redacted] operations; and an Albanian project bereft of British involvement and of questionable efficacy and security. With Albania, however, Truman

did what Eisenhower eight years later, with preparations to invade Cuba, would do for Kennedy. Each turned over to his successor well-advanced plans to attack a communist government, ventures that would both end in disaster. (U)

*Stalin's Death: "The Chance for Peace"*

The death on 5 March 1953 of Josef Stalin, the dictator who had ruled the Soviet Union for almost three decades, should not have found the Eisenhower administration poorly prepared. But it did. The previous November the PSB had put together a contingency paper detailing actions to take in the event Stalin died. But Jackson, now Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Cold War Activities, dismissed the paper as terribly inadequate and argued, after Stalin's death, that it be scrapped and a completely new effort undertaken.[46] (U)

The key element in a fresh plan Jackson and the PSB hastily devised was a speech to be given by the President offering the olive branch to the new collective Soviet leadership headed by Georgii Malenkov, a speech that came to be called "The Chance for Peace." Not delivered until 18 April, it evolved out of intensive discussion and numerous drafts, with input from several persons. The delay greatly upset Jackson, who told the President he considered his first weeks on the job a failure because he had not persuaded him, Secretary Dulles, or anyone else "that it was essential to move immediately on *the* single most important event since V-J Day."[47] (U)

In substance as well as tone, the speech differed significantly from what some drafters had originally intended. Walt Rostow, for one, felt it should give the Soviet bloc peoples "a new vision of possibilities" by emphasizing "strands which unite rather than divide them from the rest of the world." It should refer to Soviet military and economic

achievements, the World War II alliance with the West, and the Russian cultural heritage, and recognize the "legitimacy" of Russian security interest in Europe. Along with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Rostow thought that there should be a major diplomatic conference, preferably involving the four major heads of state. When the Department of State strongly opposed holding a conference, the idea was dropped.[48] (U)

Another drafter, Paul Nitze, head of State's Policy Planning Staff and briefly a holdover from the Truman administration, urged that the speech not imply that liberation of the satellites was "a necessary precondition for achievement of other advances toward a peaceful world, while describing it as a necessity for a general and lasting settlement."[49] On the other hand, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roger Kyes wanted the speech to make the "lifting" of the Iron Curtain "a sine qua non for peace." Eisenhower inclined to Nize's view. A few days before the address, the President told speechwriter Emmet Hughes that he wanted to add a short paragraph, saying "we know a lot of these things will take years—I mean obviously we aren't going to liberate East Europe tomorrow, my god that's a job for ten years—but what we want, what we want first and above all, it's simply this—some ACTS, ANY acts that show a desire to be nice boys."[50] (U)

In the speech Eisenhower held out hope for a "broader European community conducive to the free movement of persons, of trade, and of ideas" which, along with "the full independence of the East European nations could mean the end of the present unnatural division of Europe." He posed a key question for the Soviet leadership: "Is it prepared to allow other nations, including those of Eastern Europe, the free choice of their own forms of government?"[51] (U)

Whatever olive branch Eisenhower himself may have intended to hold out was pulled back shortly thereafter by Dulles in his own address to the same gathering, which played down the possibilities of an East-West accommodation. This may have been what U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain Winthrop Aldrich had in mind when he complained a few weeks later that he did not have "the vaguest idea what American policy is because every time Eisenhower sets it out in a speech, Dulles makes another speech modifying it."[52] (U)

Some scholars have dismissed Eisenhower's speech as primarily a propaganda gesture to keep Stalin's successors off balance. Certainly, there was this element in the PSB's intentions. According to an ambitious PSB plan, the United States during the first few weeks after the speech was to identify the issues it felt most important and place the onus on the Soviet Union for failing to accept U.S. offers to resolve them. This initial period would be followed by a series of steps "to make the Kremlin assume maximum liability" if it did not accept the President's proposals. During this phase, measures would "be taken to generate the seeds of disunity and to probe for vulnerabilities in the Soviet system." If events proved very favorable, these steps might lead to a third phase: "*Climax* in which the communist system would break into open internal conflict."[53] (U)

Despite Republican rhetoric during the election campaign about the satellites' throwing off their communist yokes and the PSB's enthusiasm, few within the U.S. Government believed that major disturbances could break out. CIA Director Dulles told a gathering of correspondents in April 1953 that "you don't have civil uprisings in a modern totalitarian state, as you did in France; you don't revolt in the face of tanks,

artillery and tear gas. Revolutions are now at the top, with the army going to one side or the other."[54] (U)

Dulles's pessimism reflected a view the CIA had formally adopted. With the Polish experience fresh in mind, it concluded that the chances of mounting successful resistance operations in Eastern Europe had grown slim. "Defensive and provocative measures taken by Soviet and satellite security services are continually improving in scope and quality," the agency reported to the President's Committee on International Information Activities. Moreover, the "capabilities and contacts" of émigré groups in their home countries were "constantly diminishing" to the point where, "with very few exceptions, they can no longer serve independently to maintain the will to resist in the countries concerned or to procure intelligence." Nearly all their claims had proven empty. Instead of trying to stir popular resistance, the agency planned to concentrate on governmental and communist party leadership: OSD 1.4(c)

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As might be expected, some émigré employees at Radio Free Europe disagreed. Although the station began in 1952 to moderate the strident tone of its broadcasts, a reversion to form took place in the period after Stalin's death. An "ultraliberationist" approach briefly surfaced, "in which every trick in the psychological warrior's bag would be utilized to press developments behind the Iron Curtain toward their ultimate denouement." This thinking, reflected in the [redacted] RFE broadcasters

regarding "The Chance for Peace" speech, emphasized that it marked "the end of the American policy of containment" and "the beginning of the Eisenhower policy of liberation." Listeners were to be told that liberation, previously only an aspiration, was now "a major article of policy and a condition of any future peace."[56] (U)

The administration now turned its attention to finding a way to utilize for military purposes the manpower represented by the thousands of displaced persons in Europe. The idea, also behind the Kersten amendment, was nothing new. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R, Mass.) sponsored a bill in 1950 providing for alien enlistment in the U.S. Army, but the response had been disappointing. The Army also had created labor service organizations composed of German nationals and East Europeans to perform non-combat duties and thus relieve regular service personnel of these responsibilities. U.S. military authorities were generally cool to the notion of forming such personnel into combat units, primarily because of concern about the poor quality of potential recruits. When Lodge, whom Eisenhower appointed Ambassador to the United Nations, managed to obtain the President's backing in the spring of 1953 for establishing a Volunteer Freedom Corps (VFC), support for the concept surged but waned when the West German Government raised objections and Eisenhower lost interest. For the next few years the VFC remained under consideration, but despite backing from Lodge and Jackson, by 1955 it had effectively been abandoned.[57] (U)

Another potential source of East European manpower for possible use in wartime or other emergencies were demobilized Polish veterans in Western Europe that could be activated as volunteers. General Władysław Anders, a World War II hero and member of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, claimed the support of nearly 100,000 such

veterans. Anders began in 1952 [redacted] more to support his organization's publication and community activities and for his value as a symbol than his men's steadily diminishing fighting ability, [redacted] At one point in 1955, Defense's General Erskine, [redacted] admitted that he could not take seriously Anders's claim that people in Poland looked incessantly to the exiled government for leadership in their struggle against Soviet domination. "I often feel," Erskine remarked, "that émigrés who have been out of their countries and have avoided the hardships imposed upon their compatriots are not truly material for revolutionary leadership."[58] [redacted] OSD 1.4(C) CIA 1.4(c)

In the spring of 1953 the United States had virtually no assets inside the satellites, save for East Germany, or outside—short of the direct employment of U.S. forces--to assist and sustain any outbreak of violence. But in spite of setbacks elsewhere, at least the Albania project was still alive. It had received a boost when the PSB in November 1952 recommended that a plan be prepared to detach the country from the Soviet bloc, thus resurrecting the final phase of the original Anglo-American scheme. Without identifying the source, it noted that a "preliminary estimate" had concluded that Albanian personnel could accomplish the task without overt involvement of Western military forces.[59]

[redacted]

OSD 1.4(c) CIA 1.4(c)

*Turmoil in Czechoslovakia and East Germany*

Perhaps RFE broadcasts contributed to the turmoil developing in Eastern Europe in the spring of 1953. But localized strikes and disturbances, such as the short-lived food

rioting that broke out in Bulgaria in May, had their own roots and were not uncommon in the region. Nor was it surprising that Czechoslovakia became the first satellite to experience major unrest. The only one that had enjoyed a prewar democratic government, it was also the last taken over by the communists. Moreover, the people were generally westward-looking. Geography played a part. The industrial city of Plzeň, for example, was farther west than any major satellite city except those in East Germany. (U)

Ironically, what provoked the trouble was the Czechoslovak Government's announcement on 31 May of a currency reform that would have wiped out savings accounts, exactly what RFE had rumored would happen the previous year. The next day workers at the Škoda manufacturing plant in Plzeň, protesting the announced reform, staged a demonstration that led to rioting and the sacking of government buildings.[62] (U)

At most, the U.S. role in the events was indirect--the result of recent history. In the spring of 1945 American troops liberated the Plzeň area, while the Red Army freed the rest of Czechoslovakia. By the end of 1946 both U.S. and Soviet forces had left the country, but in Plzeň memory of the American presence was still strong. During the demonstration striking workers carried a banner proclaiming that "the boys from the USA will come back again." Others paraded behind youths carrying Czechoslovak and American flags. The turmoil ended the following day with the arrival from Prague of special security forces, imposition of a curfew and martial law, and the arrest of 2,000 people. Dozens were injured, but there were no fatalities. The U.S. Embassy in Prague apparently did not learn of what had taken place until several days later.[63]

As discontent over currency reform spread to other regions, including Prague, the government finally admitted in a radio broadcast that the reform had been "met with open

resistance and condemnation." Although the public reaction in Prague was the most violent the Embassy had seen in two years, it believed no open outbreaks would occur without effective leadership or "dramatic assurances of assistance from the non-Communist world."[64] (U)

On the heels of the Czechoslovak turmoil, a more serious outbreak of violence took place right under American noses in Berlin that spread to hundreds of cities and towns in East Germany. It started with a strike on 16 June by East Berlin construction workers protesting an increase in work norms announced in late May, followed by a massive rally the next day that turned into violence and which was eventually put down by Soviet troops when local police proved not up to the task. (U)

The U.S. role prior to and during the uprising was substantial, but—despite an abundant literature—certain aspects remain obscure.[65] Two sharply different views have emerged. Then, and for years afterward, East German and other communist sources charged that Western agents, particularly Americans, instigated and helped spread the unrest in accordance with a long-planned X-Day operation. Allen Dulles allegedly came to Berlin to oversee it, a charge without foundation, although the press did report the arrival in the city on 12 June of Eleanor Dulles, a German specialist at the State Department and Allen's and Foster's sister.[66] (U)

The United States had no X-Day plan. Like all other interested parties—Soviet, East and West German Governments, British, and French, it was surprised by the outbreak of unrest. West Berlin Mayor Ernst Reuter and both the U.S. and British High Commissioners for Germany were out of the country; Jackson was in Cleveland, Ohio, not Washington. Under the circumstances, it is highly unlikely that plans for an uprising,

if they had existed, would have been carried out at this time. Communist allegations were nothing new. For years they had been talking about the plan and had fixed 1948 as the date of origin with Allen Dulles as the mastermind.[67] Like frequent attacks against the Kersten amendment, propaganda about an X-Day plan not only emphasized the U.S. Government's sinister, aggressive designs, but also suggested that its capabilities for action were greater than they actually were. (U)

Blaming outside instigation, a reflexive response of communist regimes to domestic disorder during the Cold War, was understandable. So too was the opposing Western view that the uprising was entirely spontaneous, that it grew out of widespread disgust with the regime, and that no external incitement was involved. As Secretary Dulles remarked to Frank Wisner a year later, "the less we put our label" on the East German uprising, "the better it is." He added that "outbreaks are wonderful if they appear spontaneous." [68] But the truth regarding the East German events is probably closer to the Communist view than many Western accounts have acknowledged. (U)

There can be no doubt about U.S. intentions. While avoiding incitement to open insurrection, the United States sought to promote in East Germany the kind of labor unrest that in fact developed in 1953. According to a PSB paper the previous fall, the object was to stiffen popular "resistance to Soviet-Communist rule and thus (a) weaken the political, economic, and military system in the Soviet Zone; and (b) to lay the groundwork for eventual incorporation in the free Western community." This would be accomplished "by conducting in a non-attributable manner psychological, political, and economic harassment activities in the Soviet Zone, and to prepare, under controlled conditions, for such active forms of resistance as may later be authorized."[69] (U)

The CIA's Berlin Operations Base (BOB), one of its largest overseas unit,



[redacted]

The popular West Berlin station, Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), furnished the United States an additional instrument for both disseminating propaganda and collecting intelligence. Not only did it provide air time to several West German organizations, including the Combat Group and the League of Free Jurists,

[redacted]

CIA 1.4(c) OSD 1.4(c)

What set RIAS broadcasts apart from those of other stations, including the BBC and Radio Free Europe, was that it regularly and openly urged listeners to take specific actions. For example, when collective contracts were introduced in Soviet zone industrial plants, the station hammered away at the difficulties they posed for workers and learned from East Zone visitors that workers in a particular factory had successfully petitioned to improve their working conditions. As the station's deputy director, Gordon Ewing, explained,

> If you reported that in one plant, the actions of those men were going to be imitated in other plants and then sure enough, men would come in from other plants and say, aha, we've done it too. You could start the ball rolling. It was absolutely fascinating to observe the power of broadcasting in these special circumstances. By 1953, at the beginning of 1953, the people working full-time on Soviet zone broadcasts began talking in the

> editorial meetings about what they thought was a developing new spirit in the Zone. They began to get a feeling of more resistance.[74]

In the period prior to the uprising, RIAS regularly reported on the growing labor troubles, programming whose objective a journalist described as "slow, patient sabotage." A leading scholar has concluded that its commentary on successful strikes came "close to giving instructions for rebellion."[75] (U)

The Western argument that the uprising was spontaneous rests in part on the contention that it was a complete surprise.[76] This is only partly true. The CIA certainly did not harbor much hope that discontent in East Germany and elsewhere following Stalin's death would provoke an uprising. As Director Allen Dulles had done a few months before, its Office of Current Intelligence discounted the signs of unrest and their potential for further development, because they were not "inspired by organized indigenous resistance movements, which no longer are known to exist in any Eastern European Satellite." It thought that the efficient police apparatus in each country would effectively control any manifestations of organized resistance and contain and suppress spontaneous outbreaks of unrest.[77] (U)

RFE may have been one of the few organizations that understood what was happening. In Czechoslovakia, it said, popular resentment of the currency reform had produced "results far beyond our expectations," leading to demonstrations that anywhere other than a police state "would amount to a potentially revolutionary uprising." It also heralded a 10 June East German Government resolution backtracking on measures designed to Sovietize the economy as "the greatest retreat from communism which has occurred in any Soviet satellite since 1947." The weakness of the satellite governments

and popular resistance to them seemed "greater than anyone has yet assumed." A program guidance regarding Czechoslovakia said the moment was ripe to increase "passive resistance and by taking all possible steps by which fighters for freedom are capable without jeopardizing the even more active role they may have to play in the future."[78] (U)

RIAS, too, perceived a changed mood in East Germany after Stalin's death. Staff members responsible for analyzing listener mail noticed that "people were speaking up for the first time." In May the station began accumulating evidence of strikes throughout the Soviet Zone. During the broadcast campaign against the raising of work norms, it received letters describing 16 industrial sit-down strikes. On the evening of 15 June the station reported three isolated demonstrations that day in East Berlin against the new norms, a story that other news services, doubting its authenticity, did not carry.[79] (U)

To what degree was the U.S. Government or the organizations it supported responsible for the decision to launch the strike? An internal report by Soviet officials in Germany charged that the construction workers' strike committee maintained ties with agents of West Berlin organizations who incited them to act. Although an early non-communist study stated unequivocally that "no Western agents tried to influence the construction workers on or before" the day of the strike, later ones have speculated on whether this indeed had happened. A British post-mortem supports this view. The SPD Ost-Buro admitted to British officials that it had met with strike leaders visiting its West Berlin office on the 16th and 17th and discussed action they would take.[80] This seems, however, the only direct connection beforehand that West German organizations had with the strikers. (U)

Once the trouble began on 16 June the role of RIAS and the West German organizations is more difficult to assess. Louis Fischer, an American journalist who arrived in Berlin just after the outbreak of the violence, asserted that RIAS "was the general staff and signal corps of the rebellion, encouraging the citizenry to rise, giving them political slogans, telling them 'to exploit the uncertainty and insecurity of the authorities." Another account concluded that the station "was perhaps more deeply involved in the events than many observers would have liked." Its broadcasts "served as something of a command post" by transmitting "information about the location of the protesters in Berlin, explaining problems and demands, reporting the results of negotiation, and through its information sources in the GDR, acted as a catalyst for protests in other East German cities." The station came "perilously close to involvement."[81] (U)

Late that afternoon a delegation of striking workers appeared at RIAS and asked to go on the air. Ewing opposed it, not only because their lives would be endangered if they returned to the East but also because their use of the facility would make the station "a participant instead of a reporter." And report it did. It was the first media source to announce that a major strike had taken place. By evening Ewing had decided to devote the entire commentary to the day's events. (U)

A recent study maintained that the station's commentary that evening, rebroadcast throughout the night and into the early morning, aimed "to transform a general strike against work quotas into a revolt against the GDR that focused on achieving major political reforms." It helped make RIAS a partner of the strike movement by "stressing the bond between the station and its listeners and pushing protesters to try and achieve

greater gains." The commentary closed with the words, "We, dear listeners, would be happy if we could continue to report of further victories in the coming days." In approving the text of the commentary, Ewing acted largely on his own. "It was impossible," he recalled, for a State Department official in Washington "to tell me what to do with RIAS. He couldn't conceivably know enough or have the spirit of it, the feeling for this extraordinary event, and for that matter, neither could a man sitting down in Bonn." He did telephone a friend working in HICOG's political section, Charles Hulick, who advised him that the line should be "sympathetic reporting." The broadcasts were more than reportorial. Hulick, after staying up much of the night listening to them, called Ewing and said, "My god, Gordon, watch your step. You can start a war with that station." This may have been around 5 a.m. on the 17th, about the time that Soviet tank units began to move into the city and RIAS issued a call for the people of East Berlin to support the demonstrators. A member of the U.S. mission in Berlin later praised the informal guidance given Ewing by Hulick and another colleague in the mission, James Ruchti.[82] It is conceivable that Hulick or Ruchti were in telephone contact with Washington. (U)

Another area of uncertainty is how much credit RIAS deserves for spreading word of the trouble to the rest of East Germany. Its broadcasts of 16 and 17 June were reportedly heard as far away as Leipzig, Magdeburg, Erfurt, Dresden, Merseburg, and Halle, leading one journalist to conclude that without them, while Berliners would have still known of the strike because word-of-mouth would have spread the news to the suburbs, the Soviet Zone "would not have learned about it for days, and the national insurrection might never have taken place."[83] (U)

There is good reason, however, to question the extent of RIAS's reception. Because of its growing popularity, East German authorities began during the fall of 1952 a massive jamming of its transmissions. By the following May, according to an internal U.S. Government report, jamming had limited the station's audible range to Berlin and the Brandenburg area around the city. According to one scholar, RIAS's role in the uprising, though important, should not be exaggerated, since "it could not be received in some of the towns that witnessed the greatest upheaval." For example, a strike leader in Bitterfeld said that jamming equipment there was so powerful that "you seldom could hear RIAS." Interviews with refugees in the fall of 1953 revealed that over a two-year period the station had lost about a quarter of its zone listeners because of jamming.[84] (U)

Did RIAS or any other U.S. organization egg on the demonstrators once the trouble started? There certainly were Americans present in the unruly crowds in the Soviet sector on the 16th, one of them a RIAS staff member whom Ewing sent to learn what was happening. And Eleanor Dulles saw the trouble first-hand. While she was in a meeting on the morning of the 17th, someone rushed in and announced, "The plasterers and other construction workers in white smocks are running into the British sector across the line from East Berlin!" The meeting broke up, and Dulles and the others joined a crowd gathering near the Brandenburg Gate and Potsdamer Platz. Standing on the fringe, she heard people shout, "We want freedom." She then visited the U.S. Mission where she had lunch, while Western Allied military and political officials held a closed meeting. After lunch, accompanied by a friend in the German Red Cross, she went to the sector border. "The crowd was raging," she recalled. "My friend told me not to speak but to carry his briefcase. He was afraid if they knew I was American, they might mob me.

They came to him shouting, 'Why don't the Amis give us guns? We could take over their guard posts. We could free the city.'"[85] (U)

On the morning of 17 June U.S. Berlin Element and RIAS despatched staff members all over the city to gather information; some wound up at Potsdamer Platz when the shooting started. Early that morning Ewing asked the same person sent the day before to return to the Soviet sector, where he phoned in reports to the station about the influx of Soviet troops. At one point he found himself in the middle of a demonstration with people throwing rocks and breaking windows. A sudden rainstorm sent him home to change wet clothes, fortunately just before the Soviets closed the border and declared martial law. Communist authorities later identified his car and license plates as having been in East Berlin, which they cited as evidence of the American plans for X-Day.[86] (U)

No evidence has been found to implicate U.S. personnel working the demonstrations to stir up trouble. A member of the British Military Government's Political Section discounted the more extreme communist statements about Western instigation, although he felt "Western incitement on June 17th may have slightly speeded up the reaction." RIAS broadcasts of the strikers' demands gave the impression that workers should remain on strike until they were met, and he further believed the station's announcement of the demands, along with specifying the time and place of the planned rally, "may have had a perceptible effect in increasing the number of workers who came out the following morning." In general, he considered the programs as tending toward "the sensational." Many featured eyewitness accounts of the rioting, which could only "have served to excite tempers."[87] (U)

RIAS came under attack from two sides: from the communists and others for encouraging the uprising and from critics in the United States for being insufficiently anti-communist. Because the United States could not publicly admit that RIAS had helped promote the uprising, the official line emerged that by simply reporting developments the station spread the news of what was happening but did not stimulate action. That spring and summer Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wis.) and other members of Congress were attacking overseas information programs as being sympathetic to communism. RIAS received special scrutiny. Ewing, whose German wife had aroused suspicion for visiting the Soviet Union as a young woman during the 1930's, was summoned to Washington by McCarthy in late June, but he refused to come. Such attacks on the station created a dilemma for those who valued its work. Asked by a reporter about McCarthy's charges, an unnamed high official in Bonn, probably Conant, replied, "The management of RIAS will stand on its record as an effective agency against communism, especially at this critical time." The difficulty was to defend the station without suggesting that, contrary to U.S. policy, it had instigated or promoted the uprising. Shepard Stone of the Ford Foundation and former High Commissioner John McCloy defended RIAS and its employees. McCloy told Secretary of State Dulles that the station was "partly responsible for the East German uprising" and that he did not "want to see McCarthy blunt their best weapon." Apparently because of McCloy's intervention and probably that of others, the State Department approached McCarthy, who agreed to drop his summons of Ewing.[88] (U)

Also difficult to assess are the roles played by American military, political, and intelligence personnel in Berlin. Their general response was restraint, but with

exceptions. Cecil Lyon, the top U.S. civilian official in the city who also served as Deputy U.S. Commandant, recalled that "we were terrified that the whole thing might blow up. Our one worry was to prevent West Berliners from charging over to help their colleagues on the other side. Because then the Russian troops would have fired on them. We would have had to send our troops to protect them . . . ." More succinctly, another American official characterized the response by the three Western commandants, all of whom were relatively new on the job, as "Got to be careful that we don't have a revolt spilling over into our part of the city."[89] The commandants apparently gave little or no thought to providing arms to the demonstrators or assisting them in any way. (U)

The United States had prepared contingency plans to deal with possible Soviet harassing measures restricting access to the city, perhaps even a reinstitution of a complete blockade as had occurred in 1948.[90] But Berlin Command had done no planning for a huge public disturbance in the Soviet sector. Not until 10 a.m. on the 17th, well after Soviet troops entered the city and the massive rally began, did its G-2 Section realize that a revolt was taking place and decide to set itself up in the Command's operations room to support Commandant Maj. Gen. Thomas Timberman.* Military officials were not the only ones surprised by the magnitude of the unrest. Conant recalled, "We were all caught unawares, without any plans, for which all of us got sufficient blame." Lyon nevertheless

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* Timberman became commandant in January 1953. A Chinese language specialist, he had served in the China theater during World War II. One of his staff in Germany described him as 'extremely shrewd and a very good negotiator," while he struck journalist Sulzberger as "a very affable guy" who 'seems to spend much of his time socially." (Diary entry, 23 Aug 53, Sulzberger, *Long Row of Candles*, 893-94) (U) French Commandant General Pierre Manceux-Demian had also assumed his position in January

took umbrage at a journalist's contention that he and Timberman "didn't know this thing was going to happen, and when it did happen, they didn't know what to do."[91] (U)

British and French military authorities viewed developments quite differently than the Americans. According to a U.S. member of the Kommandatura staff, some Western officials were upset because the Germans had taken up arms "against an allied power." The British "were worried stiff that the occupation forces might be attacked and they might have to take action." Generally, they thought the Americans were too sympathetic to the rioters and insufficiently so to the Soviets. The British High Commissioner in effect told Conant, "You Americans are playing much too favorably to the people who are revolting over there. How do you know the West Germans won't turn around and start throwing rocks at you?"[92] (U)

Timberman and his British and French counterparts met at 11 a.m. on the 17th and again late that afternoon.[93] At the morning meeting they agreed that since their mission was to preserve order, they should try to dissuade any West Berliners or East Zone residents transiting the western sectors from taking part in the demonstrations. They also disapproved of the sites near the Soviet sector border where West Berliners intended to hold sympathy demonstrations later that afternoon.[94] Timberman, who had under his command around 6,000 troops--mostly Army constabulary, ordered their confinement to quarters at 5 p.m.[95] (U)

The Commandants undoubtedly had been in telephone contact with their superiors, probably beginning late in the day on the 16th, but no record or even reference

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1953. Major-General Charles F. C. Coleman became the British Commandant in October

to their conversations has been found. Only a few references exist to telephone traffic between political officials in the city and Washington. Ewing recalled that on the 17th Berlin Element reported by cable and telephone to Washington "like mad." British Prime Minister Churchill also directed the Foreign Office to stay in touch with Berlin by telephone and provide him periodic reports on the situation.[96] (U) CIA 1.4(c)

OSD 1.4(c) What did the West German groups [redacted] do during the uprising? Here the British again provided an informed, mildly critical perspective. They learned that the Combat Group on three occasions had sent up balloons with pamphlets. Twice on the 17th the British also spotted a van probably belonging to the SPD at a sector border broadcasting appeals to East Berlin police to defect, and on the following morning the SPD launched its own leaflet balloons. In language similar to that used by the communists, the British concluded that incitement by West Berliners had the greatest effect along the sector boundaries "where there was appreciable mingling of crowds between East and West and provocation from Western hooligans and political parties." The mingling "may have had some wider effect in encouraging the demonstrators to believe they had Western support." Twice on the afternoon of the 17th British Commandant General Coleman had to admonish the West Berlin police chief to stop the acts of incitement. That evening Coleman issued an order specifically forbidding the Combat Group from further balloon launchings in the British sector. In the end, he concluded: "Though general encouragement from the West may have contributed to the scale of the demonstration on June 17 and incitement by West German agencies

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1952.

doubtless aggravated the situation on the sector borders, I am satisfied that it was not in any way responsible for the outbreak of disorders." A U.S. intelligence estimate characterized the outbreak of open resistance on 16-17 June as "largely spontaneous."[97] (U)

Because the French High Commissioner in Bonn also believed the disturbances were at least in part incited by West Berliners, the U.S. High Commissioner's Office went to considerable lengths in discussions with British and French colleagues "to disclaim any direct action by German propaganda groups" in which the Americans were "covertly interested." The British Deputy High Commissioner, like General Coleman, saw no evidence to suggest that Western incitement was more than "a secondary cause" of the disturbances after they had already started. A subsequent visit to Berlin confirmed his view that incitements from across the sector boundary "were sporadic and small-scale, due to excess of zeal by professional propagandists." He was convinced that British authorities, and probably also the French, were doing everything possible to avoid any pretext for communist charges of Western incitement. But he was "not so happy about the American sector, where the propagandists do not always seem under control."[98] (U)

A dispute has arisen about recommendations the BOB made during the crisis. According to the head of the CIA's Eastern European Division, John Bross, the BOB chief cabled Washington asking permission to distribute pistols and Sten guns to the rioters. Bross contacted Wisner, who said, "Give support and offer asylum. But don't issue guns." Wisner felt that since the Red Army had 22 divisions in East Germany, "it would amount to murder." Allen Dulles never forgave Bross for not taking a more aggressive position. Jackson, also upset at the failure to supply the rebels with arms, told

Bross that it did not matter whether people were killed as a result, since "the blood of martyrs" would help discredit the Soviet system.[99] (U)

A BOB officer had a somewhat different recollection. According to him, the message to Washington did not concern providing arms. Instead, it urged that the United States "make some plausible military gesture that would give the Soviets pause to think before the Red Army clanked further over the hapless East Germans." It "suggested symbolic mobilization of the Sixth Infantry Regiment," Timberman's token garrison force in Berlin, and putting U.S. forces in West Germany, particularly the 82d Airborne Division, on combat alert and moving them close to the Iron Curtain. The message argued that "the East Germans would not have risen against their oppressors without open and covert U.S. support." "The United States should," it said, "stand up to its responsibilities, even if it meant risking a showdown with the Russians."[100] No message supporting either version has been found. (U)

In the end, the U.S. High Commissioner's office provided a succinct, balanced description of the U.S. role:

> The East Germans were enabled and encouraged to exploit the momentary period of Soviet-SED weakness due to the presence of the Western Allies and their controlled German agencies in West Berlin. These combined forces had succeeded in keeping a spirit of resistance in the past. When the first signs of open resistance became apparent on June 16, these same forces were instrumental in nourishing and expanding sporadic, unorganized demonstrations into a more organized and sustained public demonstration of defiance, throughout East Berlin and the Zone.[101] (U)

*Washington's Belated Response*

However inadequate the Truman administration's contingency plan for dealing with Stalin's death might have been, it at least anticipated his demise. For the outbreak of

widespread violence behind the Iron Curtain, like the East German uprising, nowhere in the U.S. Government had any planning been done. The basic reason was that Washington, as Allen Dulles had confidently said in April, did not consider such an occurrence possible. (U)

The cautious, tardy response was much as it had been to Stalin's death. By the time Washington digested what was happening, it was all but over. A six-hour time difference helped events outrun the policymakers' ability to react. At a mid-morning press conference on the 17th at about the same time Soviet forces were effectively mopping up in Berlin, Eisenhower called the uprising "a significant thing" but claimed ignorance because "my dispatches are a little behind the papers this morning." The British Embassy in Washington reported that other U.S. comment, official as well as informal, was "equally cautious."[102] (U)

In telephone conversations that morning with officials in Berlin and Bonn, State's Office of German Affairs confirmed the accuracy of press reports regarding the previous day's demonstration. Its briefing paper noted that the Western Commandants had "taken every possible precaution to prevent sympathy demonstrations in West Berlin from violating the Sector boundaries and thereby creating a dangerous situation." Media were being "instructed to report the demonstrations factually and as fully as possible." They were to emphasize their spontaneous nature and the Commandants' efforts to keep them "from taking on dangerous proportions." For the time being State did not intend to seek a high-level statement, "because we do not wish to run the risk of identifying ourselves with the demonstrations."[103] (U)

After Jackson returned to Washington during the afternoon of the 17th, he set up a working group to start planning for what he termed the "aftermath" of the uprising and the Czechoslovak unrest. The working group's suggestions reflected interest in the uprising's wider ramifications:

> We should give all possible moral support to the East Berliners' efforts to improve their conditions, in order to help them achieve actual benefits *or to stimulate further Soviet repression* [author's emphasis], The latter would in turn provide us with ammunition at forthcoming political conferences (Bermuda, Korea, etc.), but care should be taken to avoid neutralist suspicion on the U.S. as instigators of the East Berlin uprisings. It would be psychologically significant at this juncture to capitalize on the Berlin developments in other parts of Eastern Europe, especially where some resistance has shown its head, such as Czechoslovakia, Rumania, etc.[104] (U)

At the regularly scheduled weekly NSC meeting on the morning of 18 June, Allen Dulles asserted that the United States had "absolutely no hand" in inciting the East German riots, which were "evidence of the boundless discontent and dissension behind the Iron Curtain." Jackson observed that events had moved past the riot stage and were close to insurrection. The problem was "whether to abet the development. It was perfectly possible to fan the flames of discontent, but if we did so we could be sure that heads would roll." Eisenhower agreed, adding that "the heads would be those of our friends." A decision to intervene would depend "on how widespread the uprising became." If disorder spread to China or the Soviet Union, "we would probably never have a better chance to act, and we would be well advised, for example, to supply arms." Eisenhower thought that if providing arms to the East Germans "was just inviting a slaughter of these people, you certainly didn't supply the arms." Jackson did not let the matter drop. Should the United States, he asked, help make the turmoil more serious and widespread?

Eisenhower replied it was not quite time to do so. It would first have to spread to China. While the Soviet Union would have no difficulty in crushing uprisings in Europe, it would find it difficult to contend with unrest there and in the Far East. The President directed the PSB to prepare an operational plan to exploit the unsettled situation and indicated he would convene a special NSC meeting, if necessary, to consider it. Jackson felt he had made the case as strongly as possible that the recent disturbances "might be the start of something."[105] (U)

The plan (PSB D-45), not completed in draft until 22 June, magnified the scope of unrest, citing not only East Germany and Czechoslovakia, but also signs of trouble in Romania, Albania, and Hungary. It saw "little likelihood that the spirit of resistance in Eastern Germany will abate" and stated that "popular resentment in all the European satellites is near the boiling point." The situation presented "the greatest opportunity for effective U.S. psychological operations to help roll back Soviet power that has yet come to light." Jackson called the draft a huge "waste basket," because "we put everything anybody could think of into it." When he went over it orally with the NSC Planning Board, however, it was unimpressed. He recorded his distress over its "apathy or lack of appreciation of unfolding opportunity."[106] (U)

When Jackson presented to the NSC on 25 June a summary list of recommendations drawn from the draft, which he thought met with "considerable enthusiasm," he explained that the PSB had tried to avoid approaching the question "in a starry-eyed and unrealistic fashion." One of the few criticisms, a remark by Secretary Dulles with which Eisenhower agreed, suggested that the list give more emphasis to

"passive, as opposed to active resistance." With this change and revision of another paragraph, the NSC adopted and the President approved the list.[107] (U)

An unabashed call for action, the draft plan's objectives were to (1) nourish resistance to communist rule "without compromising its spontaneous nature," (2) undermine satellite governments' authority, and (3) exploit unrest as "proof that the Soviet Empire is beginning to crumble." Short-term measures included (1) "covertly" stimulating "acts and attitudes of resistance short of mass rebellion;" (2) establishing, "where feasible, secure resistance nuclei capable of further large-scale expansion;" and (3) encouraging "elimination of key puppet officials." Some long-term measures, which the plan noted would require considerable preparation and depend on developments, were in fact unrealistic--Jackson's disclaimer notwithstanding. Among those with no likelihood of implementation were the organizing, training, and equipping of "underground organizations capable of launching large-scale raids or sustained warfare when directed" and the promoting of "cooperation between satellite resistance elements and nationalists in non-Russian, Soviet Republics."[108] (U)

Impatience was partly responsible for the PSB recommendations. Pointing to disturbances in Bulgaria, signs of unrest in the Baltic, and the East German uprising, a staff member argued that "the time is propitious to encourage disaffection and unrest" throughout the satellites and even the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union. He was not worried that the uprisings might fail: "If we really believe what we say, the people cannot be much worse off than they are already. Some will die; in fact, probably large numbers, but with the MGB [*Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti*—Soviet Ministry of State Security] operating efficiently, they die in numbers every year anyway. Unless

someone can project the possibility of a chance that is better than we have at the present time, then this is the moment of execution."[109] (U)

By contrast, high-level public comments were restrained. Except for the President's brief remarks on the 17th, they were also late in coming. Two weeks after the trouble started, Eisenhower and Dulles expressed admiration for those Germans who had taken action but rejected the idea of U.S. intervention. Dulles essentially repeated what he had said during the election campaign. He had long believed that the Soviet Union was overextended and that the satellites would eventually regain their independence, "particularly if the free peoples kept alive the hope of the captives and showed them that they were not forgotten."[110] (U)

Eisenhower was somewhat ambivalent. When asked at a press conference whether opportunities existed for taking concrete action to liberate the satellites, he at first responded negatively and unequivocally: "I do not believe that there is any thought of taking any physical action of any kind that could be classed as intervention." However, he backed off by declaring, with the circumlocution he often employed on such occasions, that official public comment "should be directed towards showing what is the meaning of that kind of thing under these situations, and to try to show people that are suffering like that they do have friends in the world and people that are standing by to help so far as is possible."[111] He did not indicate what kind of help this might be. (U)

That the administration was learning the difficulty of responding quickly and decisively to developments in the Soviet bloc was apparent only to some. One of Secretary Dulles's aides suggested to White House speechwriter Emmet Hughes that the President in his public addresses should remind people how the administration's

"dynamic foreign policy" had achieved results and had even contributed to the arrest in late June of Soviet spy chief Lavrenti Beria. Hughes's reaction: "Such pap. We have been confronted with matchless opportunity—Stalin's death, the messy triumvirate, the Germans' revolt, now Beria's fall—and the sober truth is that we have no idea what to do with these opportunities."[112] (U)

*What If It Happened Again?*

For the next several months the possibility of another outbreak and how to respond preoccupied Washington officials. (U)

East Germany remained a likely place. Before returning home, Eleanor Dulles, again accompanied by her German Red Cross friend, visited a refugee camp sheltering many of the demonstrators. "We walked through the camp (I was assumed to be German) and talked with various groups of men. Each time we stopped to ask questions, a large group gathered around and closed in on us arguing among themselves and speaking vehemently about the events." Some of the men "could not wait to get back to the east sector to show the Communists what they could do to them." Several spoke of the need for Allied support: "If the Americans do not help us now they had better go home." Others said, "What are the British and French thinking if they don't help us."[113] (U)

The State Department, noting that recent unrest had created the impression among some in Washington that Soviet control of the satellites might be starting to crumble, asked the embassies in Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, and Bucharest "whether chronic popular discontent with regimes has recently shown tendency to take overt and bolder form and, if so, how, when and where." But each post reported no sign of growing unrest or that regime controls were weakening.[114] (U)

Those who favored a more aggressive policy, like Jackson, found few sympathetic listeners. At a Cabinet meeting on 10 July, Allen Dulles stated that Beria's fall was almost as serious a blow to the Soviet Union as Stalin's death. Jackson then made a plea for action, contending that Beria's disappearance would send shock waves through secret police ranks throughout the satellites. "If we really step in," he said, "we could have passive resistance on a grand scale." Yet his comments elicited no reaction, and the discussion turned to domestic issues.[115] (U)

In the wake of the East German uprising, the United States successfully carried out a massive program in West Berlin, for both humanitarian and propaganda reasons, to supply food to East Berliners willing to cross the sector boundary to receive it.[116] And it undertook a sharply focused initiative to heighten unrest elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In mid-July Radio Free Europe and Free Europe Press combined on a crash project, code-named Prospero, to launch more than 6,000 balloons carrying 10 million leaflets and other items into Czechoslovakia. The targets were industrial and mining districts in northwest Bohemia, the Ostrava region, and the areas around Prague and Plzeń. On one side of the leaflets were photographs of the East Berlin riots, on the other a text recounting those events as well as the purge of Beria. The text stressed the growing strength of popular resistance in Czechoslovakia, the weakening grip of the government, and the extent of outside support: "We want you to know that you are not alone: Among the masses of people behind the Iron Curtain the fire of revolt is smouldering and its sparks are flying from country to country. Everywhere in the free world your friends are with you. Their help will grow as your determination grows." The message provoked

controversy within RFE. One director complained about the stupidity of giving such advice; another threatened to resign when it was proposed.[117] (U)

It also caused concern at the CIA. Tracy Barnes [redacted] thought that while a "Philadelphia lawyer" might not technically construe the message as advocating revolt, most people--particularly those behind the Iron Curtain--would. They would also infer that active support would be provided. What Barnes urged was a clarification of U.S. policy:

> This type of program is fine if we really mean it. It is my impression however that if a revolt occurred and help was needed, it is extremely doubtful that it would be forthcoming in any strong military way or even in the form of direct equipment and materiel support. If my conclusion is correct, it seems to me more than probable that within a relatively short time, the advantage which we can rightfully say has fortuitously been given us will disappear and backfire pretty badly. On the other hand if my conclusion as to the support is wrong, the time has certainly come for the ambiguity to be removed from our policy position.

Assuming that active support would not be given, Barnes recommended that RFE's propaganda be softened.[118] [redacted] OSD 1.4(c) CIA 1.4(c)

Richard Helms, the agency's Chief of Operations, thought that "the fuzzy thinking" behind policy toward the satellites was "caused by a desire at top levels of the Government to make good on certain campaign pledges at the expense of hard headed appraisals of the operational problems in terms of the basic facts of life." There seemed "an inclination to raise hob in the satellites and beat up on the Red Chinese, since this would be popular on the domestic political scene, but there is no compensating intention to devote the necessary overt forces and support to insure a favorable outcome to such aggressive cold war approaches." Wisner joined the chorus, saying that Barnes and Helms had raised the same questions he was recently discussing with Dulles, Deputy

Director for Intelligence Robert Amory, and others, namely: "What is our ultimate objective in stirring up trouble in East Germany and the satellites, and what major or over-riding policy are we working" to support? He stated that "we have a certain responsibility as operators to continue to press for as much clarity in our policy guidance as can be obtained."[119] [redacted] CIA 1.4(c) OSD 1.4(c)

A reluctance to face the issue persisted, even among the diplomats most involved. Though the guidance prepared for the September 1953 meeting in Vienna of U.S. ambassadors and ministers to the Soviet satellites included the question of what the United States "should do if events similar to those of June 17" reoccurred in East Germany or other satellites, the representatives avoided addressing the question. They discussed at length the need for a more cautious policy, one that would avoid incitement to violence and would hopefully prevent a reoccurrence of something like the East German uprising. They agreed that at present there existed no chance for successful uprisings in the Soviet bloc, including East Germany, so the United State should not encourage them. When Conant asked Ambassador to the Soviet Union Charles Bohlen what he thought that country would do if another explosion occurred behind the Iron Curtain, he replied that Moscow would take whatever measures were necessary to deal with it. It would be "a frightful exhibition of Western impotence if the West encouraged an uprising and then did nothing."[120] (S)

In the spring and summer of 1953 the administration conducted re-examinations of overseas information policy and basic national security policy. The first effort, resulting in a lengthy, detailed report in late June by the President's Committee on International Information Activities headed by William Jackson, left one unhappy official

in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, William Godel, with the impression that U.S. political warfare activities "during the past five years have been characterized by lack of inter-departmental understanding, poor coordination, lack of clear policy and direction, and a record of some rather dismal failures, expensive both in money and international understanding."

[redacted]

CIA 1.4(c) OSD 1.4(c)

A second effort, the Solarium exercise (so named because it grew out of a May discussion Eisenhower had with Secretary Dulles in the White House solarium) established three panels of experts from within and outside the government to defend alternative national strategies. In simplified terms, they were containment, liberation, and a blend of the two. The panels worked in secret for six weeks before presenting their recommendations to the President in an all-day session on 16 July. For Panel C, whose task was to defend the liberation strategy, the objective was "to force the Soviets to shift their efforts to holding what they already have rather than concentrating on gaining control of additional territories and peoples and at the same time to produce a climate of victory encouraging to the free world." Its final report stressed the need for stand-by forces "to support the military in the event of war and to exploit unrest in the absence of war even if we are not now presently capable of building U.S. controlled underground resistance movements in the Satellites." It perceived a widening gap between what was needed in this area and what was available. "When it is fully understood that the stand-by

apparatus which the military will require on D-Day is the same apparatus required to exploit targets of opportunity such as the recent uprisings in East Germany, the tragic consequences of this gap become readily apparent." The panel recommended a continuation of efforts to hamper Soviet control and to keep alive the aspirations of the satellite peoples for independence without "inciting them to premature and suicidal insurrection," while at the same time building up a covert underground "in preparation for more intensive activity at a later date."[122] (S)

In the opinion of George Kennan, a member of the panel defending containment, Eisenhower made a brilliant summation of the competing arguments at the concluding session. He spoke "with a mastery of the subject matter and a thoughtfulness and a penetration that were quite remarkable." Kennan left with the conviction that "Eisenhower was a much more intelligent man than he was given credit for being." The President made clear that he had rejected Panel C's defense of liberation. Jackson had the same impression, but noted that Eisenhower's remarks disturbed him because they "virtually threw cold water on all action."[123] (U)

As a follow-up to the Solarium exercise, the CIA prepared an estimate in coordination with the rest of the intelligence community "as to whether time was on our side" in the Cold War. The estimate concluded that in one sense time was on the side of the Soviet Union, since it was closing the economic gap with the United States. Moreover, Soviet acquisition of weapons capable of crippling the United States meant the end of American invulnerability to direct attack. However, two factors favored the United States. One was the improving U.S. position as Western defense capabilities around the Soviet periphery continued to increase. The other was the inherent weakness of the Soviet

empire: "While no collapse within the Soviet bloc can be foreseen, the USSR may lack vitality over the long run. From this point of view time may be on the side of the U.S., but this factor will not show up critically for 10 or 15 years yet."[124] (U)

Still optimistic about the possibility of stirring revolt in Eastern Europe, Jackson nevertheless recognized the dangers involved. It was wrong, he told an Army War College audience in October, to say that nothing could be accomplished. If the President "were to ask for an uprising in a satellite country he could have it fairly soon. . . . but then there would be one terrible mess, because it could only work if closely geared into the over-all forward movement of this entire government. We just can't be creating little salients anymore."[125] (U)

He continued to believe discontent rife. "There is a sensing in the intelligence community," Jackson informed Under Secretary Smith in November, "that serious food scarcities are going to affect Soviet control of their satellites during the coming winter. . . . this area promises to be a prime target of opportunity." He wondered whether the June PSB plan took "sufficient account of the various contingencies which might arise" and whether enough attention was being paid to "actions we would take if we were faced with a repetition of the June 17 incidents on a widespread scale, an indigenous general strike call, or food riots. We might even be confronted with a premature mass uprising 'a la Warsaw,' deliberately provoked by the Soviets."[126] (U)

Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) staff members, who drafted much of the language in Jackson's memo for Smith, also called his attention to unsubstantiated press reports from Berlin and London that between 5,000 and 10,000 "anti-communist East Germans, Czech partisans, and Red army deserters, directed by a unified command, were

fighting their way to freedom in the West." Jackson apparently did not put much stock in the rumors, for they were not mentioned in his memo to Smith. The omission was wise; the exodus was far less than thought. The group consisted of only five Czechs who had crossed the border seeking contact with Western officials in Germany--three made it successfully. Soviet and East German authorities and their propaganda organs had overreacted, as thousands of troops were employed on a largely fruitless month-long manhunt.[127] (U)

As memory of the June upheaval faded, fewer people were willing to accept the contention that another violent outbreak was imminent. When Jackson raised the possibility at a January 1955 OCB meeting that riots were almost certain in Berlin during the upcoming Foreign Ministers conference, "everybody nodded their heads," he observed, "but nothing was decided." He told Smith and Allen Dulles that "it would be dreadful negligence on our part if this kind of dramatic development took place and we were totally unprepared." He assured them he was "not suggesting an airlift of 75mm, recoilless rifles, which is what I have been accused of."[128] (U)

Jackson had left *Time-Life* on a twelve-month leave of absence; his return was pushed back from January until April 1954 to allow him to attend the Berlin conference.[129] Afterward, he told the President in a sort of farewell message: "If, during 1954, we have the guts and the skill to maintain constant pressure at all points of the Soviet orbit, we will get dividends from such a policy. Furthermore, our pressure can take the form of much bolder harassment than we have yet felt advisable. . . ." Eisenhower asked him to provide specifics, which he spelled out in writing. Several suggestions, focusing on propaganda to the satellites, were conventional. Others, in the form of direct

action in East Germany, were more daring: (1) infiltrating and organizing factory cells in order to instigate 'a series of flash strikes and demonstrations over an extended period of time," (2) sabotaging "industrial and agricultural shipments out of the East Zone destined for Russia," and (3) secretly applying "terroristic pressure" against members of the East German regime. He added that "if an Ulbricht* or two didn't show up at the office some morning, few would weep." One can only speculate whether he meant they should be murdered or merely scared away from reporting for work.[130] (U)

Jackson discussed the proposals with Wisner and Allen Dulles. On 26 March Wisner responded, agreeing with some, such as intensifying certain propaganda efforts, but taking issue with organizing factory cells to foster strikes and demonstrations. Because the Soviets would be able to identify the agitators and inflict reprisals, "we would want to assess the program in terms of net over-all gain, and one of our major considerations, therefore, would be the expense to CIA in terms of the loss of leadership and members. [redacted] The recommendation for terroristic pressure, Wisner felt, "would quite obviously, require a prior decision on the highest level. If this were forthcoming, we could very likely organize and execute such an action. Consideration should be given to whether such action would be significant unless taken as a part of a larger program for armed revolt." Wisner posed the "Number One question thus far unanswered" regarding the stirring of unrest in the satellites: "Suppose that our efforts are

CIA 1.4(c) OSD 1.4(c)

* Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party (*Sozialistische*

successful and that there comes to pass an outbreak of violence of large proportions and of a magnitude which would pose the kind of challenge to the Russians that would require them to move in on the situation with massive (military) repressive measures. The question is—what would *we* do then?"[13] [redacted] OSD 1.4(c)

*Albanian Finale*

On another issue—Albania, Jackson also weighed in heavily but wound up losing. During the summer of 1953, that country's detachment from the Soviet bloc, an idea put on hold until after the June Italian national election, assumed new life as a result of the troubles in Czechoslovakia and East Germany and the purge of Beria. (U) CIA 1.4(c)

[redacted]

*Eienheitzpartei Deutschlands* or SED).




It may have been this document or an earlier version that Richard Bissell, a Princeton University professor temporarily working in Washington for the CIA, recalled seeing. He concluded that the plan was "preposterous." Bissell, who some years later would become the chief architect of the Bay of Pigs invasion, felt the United States would not be able to support an Albanian operation at such a great distance, and its size ensured it would not remain secret. "It would have put the Bay of Pigs in the shade," he recalled.[134] (U)

The NSC immediately took up the CIA paper. Though Jackson tried to speed implementation of the recommendations, Secretary Dulles urged first creating a task force to coordinate action. The PSB decided that the initial step would be consultation

with the British, then discussions with the Greeks, Yugoslavs, and Italians. On learning of the plan, Eisenhower observed that "Albania was a very difficult case because of the question of who gets it and who gets hurt."[135] (U)

For different reasons, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff looked coldly on the proposal. William Godel in OSD's Office of Special Operations felt it was "not a plan but an attempt to relieve CIA of pressure to do something, and nothing will come of it" because it was contingent on State's taking too many preliminary actions. "If we wait till State *actually does all* [emphasis in the original] of these things, Albania will remain a Soviet satellite forever." Godel and his office head General Erskine proposed concentrating on Bulgaria instead of Albania.[136] [redacted]

For the Joint Chiefs, the overthrow of Hoxha had lost much of its appeal. A member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the JCS long-range planning body, told CIA representatives that the plan's initial phases almost entirely concerned State and CIA. Although Albania's detachment "would have relatively little strategic value," he agreed that "the psychological impact would be great." Still, an unsuccessful operation "would have most serious psychological and diplomatic repercussions in Western Europe and elsewhere."[137] The formal JCS response on 3 September was even more negative. The plan "should be discouraged" because "potential gains would not justify the military commitments likely to develop" and favorable trends underway in the Balkans "might be disrupted."[138] [redacted]

At State, Policy Planning Staff Director Robert Bowie and Raymond Thurston, Deputy Chief of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, also expressed reservations.

[redacted]

Both agreed that preliminary diplomatic soundings could be made, but Thurston wanted them to focus on "contingency plans" in the event of armed hostilities or to deal with "a totally spontaneous uprising." He was opposed to "concerted action to stimulate such an uprising or bring it to fruition." Thurston stated that the chief regional objective was achieving a "working agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy," meaning a settlement of their dispute over Trieste, and that exacerbating the Albanian problem would only increase tensions between the two countries.[139] (S) OSD 1.4(c)

[redacted] CIA 1.4(c)

This is exactly what happened. On 29 December 1953 Radio Tirana announced that it had captured and would soon publicly try the agents infiltrated by the United States. The announcement did not deter Jackson, before he left government service in the spring of 1954, from continuing to urge that preliminary planning be undertaken to detach Albania from the Soviet bloc "in anticipation of an eventual green light." He accepted the rationale for the delay, namely the still unresolved Trieste dispute. But when he discussed the matter with the President, Under Secretary Smith, and Allen Dulles in March 1954, they reaffirmed the decision to take no action until Trieste was settled.[141] (U)

In April 1954 the trial in Tirana and sentencing to death of seven men [redacted] sent into Albania effectively ended U.S. thoughts of intervention. Plans were instead made "to take advantage of any sudden favorable developments," including the spontaneous outbreak of revolt. But by the beginning of 1955 the intelligence community concluded that although a few remaining resistance bands, isolated from one another and without much in the way of arms or supplies, might remain active for a while, the security forces would eventually liquidate them.[142] [redacted] CIA 1.4(c)

*Less Vigorous Stirring (NSC 174)* OSD 1.4(c)

Throughout 1953 administration officials were engaged in drafting a new policy paper on Eastern Europe to replace one dating back to 1949. Finally approved in December 1953 as NSC 174, it ruled out use of military force to liberate the satellites either directly or through support of revolutionary movements. U.S. military intervention probably would precipitate general war, would be unacceptable to the American people, and would be condemned by world opinion. The United States should avoid encouraging premature action by anti-Soviet elements "which will bring upon them reprisals involving further terror and suppression. Continuing and careful attention must be given to the fine line, which is not stationary, between exhortations to keep up morale and to maintain passive resistance, and invitations to suicide."[143] (U)

Tilghman B. (Skip) Koons, an NSC special staff member who worked on the paper, noted a basic conflict that the Solarium exercise had tried to resolve: "If the United States is not willing to intervene by force in the Satellites to support anti-communist uprisings, if it is unwilling to risk general war by such or related actions, and if it feels that the net advantage to the United States of the freeing of the satellites is at best small

(this has been the conclusion to date), then the best that can be done is to straddle the issue. This means that you do what you can to keep alive hope in eventual freedom without encouraging open revolt." The paper admitted "the impossibility of laying down at this time firm courses of action" for responding to open revolt. "The problem," argued Koons, "has to be kept in mind, however, and the appropriate departments and agencies should be as prepared as possible on a continuous basis with alternative courses of action which might be adopted."[144] (S)

When Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert Cutler briefed the NSC on the paper, he analyzed "the crucial issue of avoiding premature revolt." Director of the Foreign Operations Administration Harold Stassen voiced concern about the the paper's failure to indicate a "course of action or plan which the United States would follow in the event of a successful revolt by one of the countries against its Soviet masters." Both Allen Dulles and Jackson assured him that plans were being made for this contingency.[145] (U)

This was not true. Wisner made a point of researching the question and could find nothing authorizing the CIA to plan for exploiting satellite uprisings or inciting them. The only guidance even touching on the question was an admonition regarding East Germany, which emerged in CIA exchanges with HICOG the previous summer to "keep the pot simmering—but to avoid boiling it over." He also came across an OCB instruction that had been carried out to stockpile explosives and demolition materials in Europe for use if needed. But he emphasized that "we have NO policy guidance governing the infiltration thereof either at the present time or under any specific set of circumstances in the future." Troubled by the "lack of understanding at higher government levels on this general

subject," Wisner urged that the CIA either obtain guidance to clarify its responsibilities or disabuse people of the notion that "we are all set to go, or are in the process of developing plans to touch off or support uprisings in the satellites." His own understanding, shared by Helms and Barnes, was that current policy did not call for provoking uprisings, which he felt could succeed only if outside military forces were prepared to march in and actively help the insurgents consolidate and hold their gains. Nor were there "any adequate US forces . . . to move in and give support to an attempted revolt." He continued to believe that the present policy of encouraging resistance to the satellite regimes "in order to keep the pressure on and to retard the consolidation of Soviet controls" was the proper one. But, he said, "it is one of the most difficult, unanswered questions of the day as to what US or Western policy would be in case of an attempted revolt occurring in any of the satellites within the foreseeable future and prior to the withdrawal of Soviet military power from the immediate or adjacent area."[146] (U)

Within the agency, Wisner, Helms, and Barnes were not alone in their concern. Noting that NSC 174 "affords more leeway in stimulating satellite revolt but cautions against the incitement of premature revolt that would sacrifice resistance movements unnecessarily and prohibits U.S. military involvement in support of satellite liberation," John Bross, head of the East European Division, felt that an armed uprising in East Germany would fail because of the presence of the Red Army and the improved repressive capabilities of the regime. "Unless significant quantities of munitions and other support are introduced from the outside on a sustained basis," he said, "and undoubtedly unless U.S. military forces were overtly committed to support an East German revolt, we believe that the resistance elements would be liquidated in a very

short time." Chances of a successful revolt in Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia, he believed, were "nil." The only possible contingencies he envisioned involved civil resistance, such as "widespread strikes, agricultural non-deliveries, civil disobedience, food riots, or the like." However, he admitted that CIA had "no plans for internal action in the event of any of the above happenings."

[redacted]

OSD 1.4(c) CIA 1.4(c)

Given the President's disinclination to support unrest within the satellites, the coolness of the State Department and diplomats to the idea, and opposition at the CIA among high officials other than Allen Dulles, Jackson was obviously swimming against a strong tide. While a historian, the first who mined the fascinating output of recommendations and remarks that Jackson made during his roughly year's tenure as White House special assistant, called him "one of the most significant figures in U.S. Cold War history," another scholar's assessment is closer to the mark: "He possessed one of Washington's lowest batting averages, in terms of ideas accepted and put into practice, but he seldom let failure discourage him from swinging away the next time up."[148] (U)

Jackson remained concerned about the lack of planning for a major outbreak of violence in Eastern Europe. No longer in the government, he wrote to Allen Dulles in February 1955 arguing that it was time "to get going" on the Albania operation and activate the Volunteer Freedom Corps as quickly as possible. The latter action would "take care of a certain number of youthful exiles, possible problem children because they

have nothing to do and no hope," and would "also furnish satellite nationalist cadres for eventual emergencies." He asked, "What are we prepared to do if the tension in the satellites were to reach a critical mass and blow this year?" Jackson was not sure whether the CIA Director knew the answer, but he thought the VFC, if not the complete answer, was 'at least a start."[149] (U)

Jackson's departure from Washington created a shortage of imaginative ideas for exploiting unrest in Eastern Europe. In August 1954, an OCB working group, describing what should be done during the next six months to be ready "to exploit any future disturbance similar to the East German riots of 1953," came up with only two actions: (1) keep harvest results for the current year under review with an eye to exploiting possible shortages with offers of food or other action, and (2) have the CIA and the United States Information Agency (USIA) analyze the East German uprising and develop "specific courses of action to be taken in the event of a similar occurrence." The agencies were to report their findings by 1 December. The NSC Board Assistants noted that "although the time for a significant rollback of Soviet power may appear to be in the future, the U.S. should be prepared, by feasible current actions or future planning, to take advantage of any earlier opportunity to contract Communist-controlled areas and power." With an Albania operation now off the table, they suggested that the working group examine other possible actions, "particularly a major coordinated action by all agencies designed to detach one of the important Soviet satellites from the Soviet bloc."[150] (U)

The joint CIA-USIA response, submitted in January 1955, was almost entirely negative. The two agencies pointed out that if something like the East German uprising occurred again, "the position which the U.S. Government must take would not differ

materially from the stand we assumed in 1953." Current policy "severely circumscribed" actions the United States might take. It must not do anything to (1) precipitate hostilities (e.g. armed aid, logistic support, etc), (2) cause a premature uprising and annihilation of dissident elements because of exhortations or unsupportable promises, and (3) alienate allies. If a revolt did occur, the United States would have to confine itself to disseminating information, expressing sympathy, providing moral support, and taking "whatever political steps would be deemed feasible and effective at the time.[151] (U)

*The Thaw and Khrushchev's Secret Speech*

During 1955 statements regarding U.S. policy continued to reflect the changing attitude toward Eastern Europe, what some called an evolutionary rather than revolutionary approach. Instead of encouraging resistance within the Soviet bloc, a new basic national security policy paper (NSC 5501) adopted in early January 1955 called for fostering changes in the character and policies of Soviet bloc governments by "influencing them and their peoples toward the choice of those alternative lines of action which, while in their national interests, do not conflict with the security interests of the U.S." If "resolutely pursued, this general strategy offers the best hope of bringing about at least a prolonged period of armed truce, and ultimately a peaceful resolution of the Soviet bloc-free world conflict and a peaceful and orderly world environment."[152] (U)

The shift in emphasis was reflected in another paper the NSC approved at the end of January (NSC 5505/1) that focused on exploiting the Eastern European region's vulnerabilities. This paper, which included a summary of a report by a committee chaired by Max Milliken of M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies (CENIS), identified two considerations that should govern strategy:

a. Barring external military aid and intervention, no anti-regime revolt in the Satellites could succeed at present. The United States is not now prepared to undertake such aid and intervention. Accordingly, although it is in the interest of the U.S. to foster conditions which, in the event of either general war or changed circumstances may be favorable to revolt (or related activities, such as sabotage, partisan movements, etc.), it is not in U.S. interest at the present time to encourage revolution as a major element of its strategy toward the Satellites.
b. Belief on the part of Satellite and Soviet leadership that the U.S. is implacably dedicated to the overthrow of both Satellite and Soviet regimes may negate the possibility of exerting U.S. influence towards a more acceptable evolution of Satellite or Soviet society.

Planners were urged to keep a variety of contingencies in mind so that assets could be maintained "to exploit crisis situations or general war, so far as this can be done without prejudicing carrying out the above strategy." The new strategy was to govern political warfare operations, "departure from which should be undertaken only for cause and with a clear recognition of possible conflict."[153] (U)

The statement of policy listed several principles to be applied in exploiting discontent: (1) creating and increasing "popular and bureaucratic pressures" to produce evolutionary change in governmental policies and conduct which would reduce the chance of a Soviet attack on the United States, (2) continuing to oppose the Soviet system and "to state its evils" while stressing evolutionary rather than revolutionary change and providing assurance that the United States did not intend to impose by force its ideas of government on Soviet bloc countries; and (3) generally portraying the causes of discontent "not as inherent conditions reparable only by revolution but as conditions susceptible to correction by the regime if it should choose to take the necessary action." Covert operations would "not necessarily have to conform to these principles, but were to be conducted so as not to impair their effectiveness."[154] (U)

The new approach stemmed not only from the practical difficulties of conducting operations behind the Iron Curtain, but was also a response to the willingness by the post-Stalin Soviet leadership to negotiate with the West. Two international proceedings in 1955--the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty in June and the Geneva Summit Conference in July--produced a less confrontational climate which encouraged the United States to soften its stance. (U)

The Austrian State Treaty, requiring withdrawal from the country that fall of all occupying military forces—Soviet as well as Western--and the maintenance of Austrian neutrality, increased the exposure of the satellites to the outside world. This was especially true of Hungary, which acquired a new frontier with the West, and Czechoslovakia, whose borders with the West were extended. The OCB believed this would "increase the ferment and discontent in these two countries." It also expected that a visit by Soviet leaders to Belgrade and a resultant declaration recognizing "the possibility of achieving 'socialism' in diverse ways" would have a significant effect on the satellites. Unless the Soviet Union was prepared to relax control, "increased passive resistance and non-cooperation may follow." Aware that U.S. capabilities remained limited for directly influencing developments, particularly for developing organized resistance, the OCB nevertheless thought "the fluid diplomatic situation" presented the greatest opportunity for furthering the objectives of policy toward Eastern Europe since the adoption of NSC 174 in December 1953.[155] (U)

The Geneva Summit Conference of July 1955, the first gathering of the leaders of the four major powers since 1945, produced agreement among them to work for greater East-West cooperation, including the exchange of people and information and the

breaking down of economic barriers. Never a fan of summit meetings, Secretary Dulles was especially opposed to this one. According to Bohlen, he "felt the spectacle of the President of the United States shaking hands with the Russians" would have a harmful effect on resistance elements behind the Iron Curtain. Bohlen thought just the opposite, that "the spectacle of the President of the United States and the Soviet leaders sitting down apparently in reasonable amity to discuss things would tend more to weaken the Communist hold" on the satellites.[156] (U)

The question was how much emphasis during the conference the Western powers should place on the satellites' lack of independence. Although the British and the French agreed to having the issue raised, Bohlen believed the Soviets would strongly oppose any formal discussion of it. The NSC issued rigid guidance for the U.S. delegation, stipulating that it maintain and publicly assert that "Soviet control of the satellites is one of the principal causes of world tension and is incompatible both with lasting conditions of peace and with the basic principles of freedom and self-determination." It was instructed to "seek every opportunity to weaken or break the Soviet grip on part or all of the satellite area" and "avoid in all circumstances any action that even appears to indicate any abandonment of this objective." However, Dulles believed they should not insist on making the satellites a matter for negotiation and felt he probably could accomplish more in private conversations than in formal sessions. Bearing out Bohlen's prediction, the Soviets showed little willingness to discuss the satellites. As CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Amory later described the Soviet reaction, "the minute you'd touched on their belt, their cordon sanitaire from Poland to Bulgaria, they just froze up; and, almost equally as strong on East Germany." They were intent, he said, on projecting an

image of strength, that they would not be pushed around, and that "they will not take, lying-down" the liberation of the satellites.[157] (U)

Nevertheless, Dulles came away from the conference in a hopeful frame of mind. Asked at a congressional hearing whether the United States should help the Soviet Union increase its standard of living, he replied that so long as it maintained an empire in Eastern Europe, it was "not good business to help it, because I believe that economic weaknesses and strains are going to be very potent in breaking that grip." If the grip was broken and the Soviet Union returned to "its normal boundaries," he thought it would probably "be better to help and to give their people a higher standard of living and a stake in peace which they do not now have." He did not want to put an exact date on when that contraction would occur, "but the way things are going, I think within 5 years that there is a very good chance that will happen."[158] (U)

To allay fears in the satellite countries that the conference and a follow-up meeting of foreign ministers had meant the United States was losing interest in seeking their independence, Eisenhower and Dulles broadcast over Radio Free Europe a Christmas message to the peoples of Eastern Europe. Soviet First Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev criticized it as not being in accord with the views expressed in Geneva. The White House responded that it had been "made abundantly clear" at the conference "that the 'spirit of Geneva' could not and did not involve any relaxing of the peaceful purpose of the United States to achieve liberty and justice for the oppressed peoples of the world." The statement concluded: "The peaceful liberation of the captive peoples has been, is, and, until success is achieved, will continue to be a major goal of the United States foreign policy."[159] (U)

Now made more pronounced by the "spirit of Geneva," the inherent ambivalence in policy toward the satellites continued to cause concern within the U.S. Government. Early in 1956, the OCB again took note of the limited U.S. capabilities for influencing events in the region, "particularly in the development of organized resistance which could basically alter the status of the satellites." The continuation of détente would make it difficult to promote passive resistance and other anti-communist activities. Striving for negotiated settlements and encouraging evolutionary changes were "not always compatible with programs intended to keep alive the hopes and aspirations of the captive peoples." The OCB suggested a re-examination of policy toward the satellites that would provide "some guidance as to the resolution in practice of such incompatible policies." It was not optimistic: "It may be that the United States will have to undertake to follow simultaneously two policies with inconsistent courses of action, representing divergent approaches to the one objective."[160] (U)

The unexpected then occurred. Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech in February 1956 at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in which he denounced Stalin for crimes he had committed, created a sensation in the Communist bloc and accelerated the thaw in relations with the West.[161] The idea has since gained widespread acceptance that the U.S. Government's obtaining a copy of the speech represented a major achievement. Secretary Dulles called it "the greatest feat by American Intelligence in a number of years." Much later CIA official Ray Cline went further, saying it was one of the agency's "greatest coups of all time."[162] Exactly how it obtained the text is not clear, a cloudiness CIA representatives may have fostered to enhance the aura of the agency's effectiveness. But the accolades do not seem justified.

The Western powers secured at least four copies of the speech, all seemingly from Poland and all at approximately the same time. The United States acquired two, the British and the French one each.[163] [redacted]

Acquiring a copy in Poland, where they were sold on the black market, was not that difficult. A communist party official in Warsaw recalled that more than 15,000 copies were printed and distributed. He claimed to have given copies to a French correspondent and to two American reporters who, according to him, transmitted them to the West. However, one of the reporters later denied that they received copies. Although the United States tried to persuade the Yugoslav Government to furnish it a copy and journalist Louis Fisher reportedly obtained extracts from a Yugoslav source, all evidence points to Poland as the source of the text the CIA obtained apparently early in May [redacted] The Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, Willard Barber, also claimed credit for obtaining a copy. He borrowed it from a Polish source and had Army communications staff at the embassy photostat it and transmit the text to Washington. The French probably got theirs from one of their correspondents in Warsaw. On 14 May Bohlen reported that a French colleague in Moscow had shown him a copy of a dispatch from the French Embassy in Warsaw containing what was purported to be a summary of the speech, which the Embassy considered authentic.[164] (U) OSD 1.4(c) CIA 1.4(c)

The key question was what to do with the text. At Allen Dulles's meeting with his deputies on 16 May, Wisner announced that the agency had obtained a copy of the speech. Noting that its authenticity had not been confirmed, he asked what dissemination

should be made. After discussing the matter further, he gave a copy to a British Embassy official in Washington, [redacted] Angleton claimed that Allen Dulles offered a reward for obtaining the speech and that the CIA had it for a few days without telling anyone in order to have its authenticity checked. Shown a copy, Kennan prepared for Wisner a detailed analysis of the document and its probable impact. According to Angleton, Dulles said, "What we do with it will depend on the President and my brother."[166] [redacted] CIA 1.4(c) OSD 1.4(c)

Consideration was given to disseminating the speech through the Free Europe Committee, but committee officials were disinclined to do so, in part because it would raise questions as to how it had come into their possession and also because it stood to gain as much from the document's release whoever published it. Cline recalled that he favored making the entire speech public but that Wisner and Angleton objected, wanting instead to feed certain parts of the speech to select audiences to maximize its impact. He stated that Allen Dulles, with his brother's concurrence, did not make the decision until 2 June to release the full text, which the *New York Times* printed two days later. In circulating the published version to overseas posts, the British Foreign Office said it was "believed to emanate from Polish sources."[167] [redacted]

Publication of the speech has been credited for helping fan the unrest in Eastern Europe that nearly brought the collapse of Soviet rule that autumn. This claim, too, is largely undeserved, for the shockwaves that Khrushchev's speech sent throughout the regionoccurred primarily in the spring, well before the text appeared in print in the West.

In Poland, for example, discussion of the speech already had helped create factions among the ruling elite, emboldened party activists in their criticism of the higher echelons, and encouraged Polish society in general to challenge the basic tenets of the Communist system.[168] (U)

In Hungary the speech was apparently not translated into Hungarian. But the general contents became known and raised hopes that there would follow, if not a clear-cut break with the past, at least a moderating of the government's harsher practices. An address in mid-May by Communist Party leader Matyas Rakosi, in which "he ranted against U.S. imperialism and spoke openly about alleged American support of spies and saboteurs" and which seemed to the U.S. Legation "almost a throwback to the old Stalinist times," disappointed those "harboring even most cautious hopes and has given rise to even greater general discontent and disaffection towards Rakosi." The legation recommended that he be attacked as strongly as possible, because some Hungarian and party officials "would welcome and silently acclaim a diplomatic offensive aimed at Rakosi and his secret police" which they could use in their efforts to bring about reform.[169] (U)

Satellite unrest obviously worried Moscow. At a May Day luncheon in the Kremlin attended by Soviet bloc diplomats, Khrushchev castigated Poland's leaders, who, he said were turning their backs on the Soviet Union, looking to the West, and thinking of leaving the socialist camp. The Yugoslav Ambassador was struck by Khrushchev's reference to the "camp," implying that differences with Poland were an internal Soviet affair, not as though they concerned Moscow's relations with another

country. It gave him the impression that "the Russians are prepared to use force to keep the 'camp' under their complete control."[170] (U)

Despite the ferment, by early June few Western observers predicted significant challenges to communist governments or violent upheavals in the region. State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research saw the changes occurring as manifestations of flexibility by the governments, which implied "tone and toughness" and reflected "regime self-confidence." The bureau concluded that "under present circumstances the existing system of entrenched Soviet controls appears adequate to offset any unexpected vulnerabilities that such experiments may produce."[171] (U)

The CIA's Senior Research Staff on International Communism took a longer view. While the Soviet party congress in February would likely spur the satellites to seek their own roads to socialism, an outside chance existed that communism itself would mellow, not during the next decade, but more likely over a generation or two:

> Once freed from the confines of permanent tensions, mental attitudes may develop which could become stronger than Communist faith and discipline. Such a transformation would be slow, at first hardly noticeable, but it might work itself up persistently from the grass roots to the "leading circles." It is impossible to estimate how long such a process would need to become apparent, nor is it possible to foresee its ultimate outcome. Much would depend on the character of future Soviet leadership.[172] (U)

*The Spark in Poznań*

The United States had good reason to be pleased with the turmoil in the communist world following Khrushchev's speech. In a 21 June address Dulles hammered away at the speech's implications, which he termed "the most damning indictment of despotism ever made by a despot." Reiterating one of his favorite themes, Dulles said, "If we can continue to show freedom as a dynamic liberalizing force, then we need not fear

the results of the peaceful competition which the Soviet rulers profess to offer. More than that, we can hope that the forces now at work within the Soviet Union and within the captive countries will require that those who rule shall increasingly conform to principles of freedom." This would usher in "a world-wide era of true liberalism," a possibility "now clearly visible for the first time in many years."[173] (U)

During a closed meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee several days later, Dulles declared the Soviet system in serious trouble with Khrushchev perhaps "on the ropes." If the United States could maintain pressure, "a very great disintegration within the apparatus of the international communist organization" would occur. Once the satellites began to break away, Dulles felt, no one could tell where the process might end. The key thing was "to get cracking in there, and once you get the crack in and you use the leverage, you may open the door a lot further than the fellows think that first permit you to get the crack."[174] (U)

On 27 June Dulles held the State Department's first televised news conference. According to columnist James Reston, he entered the room "full of bounce and confidence" and seemed to gloat over developments in the Soviet bloc: "The Secretary was like a military commander suddenly perceiving a crack in the enemy's line. He identified it with a whoop and ordered a general offensive."[175] His remarks, in fact, were more restrained than they had been before the Senate committee. He noted that a revolt against the Stalinist legacy was taking place in the communist world. For the present the West's main task was "to maintain, support vigorously, and resourcefully adapt to new conditions the basic policies of unity which are now beginning to pay off." Although focusing primarily on the repercussions of Khrushchev's speech on Western communist

parties, he also referred to the changes taking place in the satellites: "I believe that there is a growing tide within the Soviet bloc in favor of greater liberalization, greater humanity, greater freedom of speech, greater enjoyment of the fruits of labor, and opportunity to think and speak more freely."[176] (U)

According to Reston, Soviet experts in Washington found it difficult to see how Dulles could expect "to deepen and widen the breach in the Communist world by proclaiming publicly that these divisions jeopardize the unity and success of the whole communist movement." Many believed "the deep divisions within the Communist Party are more likely to be encouraged by silence than by jubilant pronouncement in the State Department." Dulles later admitted to the President that his remarks had been hyperbolic. When Eisenhower informed him of a letter the White House had received criticizing his public statements about Khrushchev's difficulties, he replied that it had been "very important from the standpoint of the Mutual Security legislation to portray our past policies as successful and to have some reason such as their success for continuing these policies."[177] (U)

Events moved faster than Dulles anticipated. The very evening of his news conference, officials from the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, attending the Poznań international trade fair in western Poland, found themselves seated in a restaurant with a Polish businessman, who confided, "You know, this place is going to blow sky high tomorrow." Asked what he meant, the man replied, "Yep, they're going out on the streets and they're gonna raise hell." The Americans returned to their hotel and telephoned a report to the embassy. The next day they witnessed mass demonstrations and riots that shook the Polish government and reverberated throughout Eastern Europe, but they had

nothing to do with instigating or encouraging the violence. "We were very much on the sidelines," one recalled. "We stayed on the fringes of the mob, and I don't think we had particularly good insights as to what was going on."[178] (U)

The riots started early in the morning of 28 June when workers at the Zispo manufacturing plant, upset over unfair work norms and poor pay, proclaimed a general strike, marched into the city center, and were joined by workers from other factories and townspeople. As the crowd swelled to 100,000 people, some attacked a prison and freed inmates; others destroyed equipment on the roof of a government building used to jam Western radio broadcasts; still others besieged the headquarters of the state security apparatus and broke into arsenals where they seized arms. Local security forces could not deal with the violence. By late afternoon two Polish armored and two infantry divisions, some 10,000 soldiers and 360 tanks, began entering the city.[179] (U)

Although the United States had not been officially represented at the fair, the embassy quickly sought to show the flag. In the absence of Ambassador Joseph Jacobs, Chargé d'Affaires Barber rode from Warsaw to Poznań in the embassy's limousine adorned with an American flag. Having received "instructions to be as ostentatious as possible," he "drove back and forth through the streets" to make visible the U.S. presence.[180] (U)

British and U.S. diplomats thought that the presence of so many foreigners in the city for the trade fair had contributed to the demonstrators' decision to act. For visitors, as well as residents, the fighting became a spectacle. One eyewitness felt he was "in the middle of a Wild West movie." Another compared the event to spectators watching a tennis match at Wimbledon. Most of the fighting occurred the first day, but sporadic

confrontations lasted for three more. In the end 57 people were killed and some 600 wounded. More than 700 were arrested; many prisoners were beaten and tortured to extract confessions that Western intelligence agencies were behind the demonstrations.[181] (U)

Secretary Dulles first learned of the uprising when his brother Allen telephoned on the evening of the 28th. The secretary remarked, "When they begin to crack, . . . they can crack fast. We have to keep the pressure on." During a discussion with his staff the next morning about how to respond, he emphasized the need to apply pressure on Soviet economic vulnerabilities, because "the Soviet economy is overextended: they are trying to match and indeed surpass the U.S. military effort; they are trying to increase their capital development; they are trying to develop their foreign aid program." He spoke of "the need to take risks" when going "on the offensive." "Nothing is achieved," he said, that did "not have some risk to it and we should not seek to make all our programs riskless."[182] (U)

Much as in 1953, the official U.S. response took the form of relatively mild public statements and an offer of food. The State Department expressed shock at the shooting of people who had merely been expressing grievances, extended sympathy to their families, and noted that "all free peoples will be watching the situation closely to see whether or not the Polish people will be allowed a government which will remedy the grievances which have brought them to a breaking point." An offer by the U.S. Government to send food through the International Red Cross to alleviate the economic distress that had contributed to the outburst was rejected by the Polish Government. Vice President

Richard Nixon* made only brief public mention of the events, saying they "eloquently illustrate" the "modern type of colonial imperialism the Communists have imposed." By voice vote the Senate approved a resolution expressing deep admiration for the people of Poznań; the House unanimously urged that the Polish situation be brought before the United Nations.[183] For Radio Free Europe the most important task, according to an internal postmortem, had been to avoid encouraging listeners "to engage in bloody but useless sacrifices" but also to keep "listeners from feeling abandoned." Its narrow, difficult course was to "hearten but not incite, sympathize but not deplore."[184] (U)

Although U.S. propaganda had aimed at loosening control of the satellite governments over their populations and no doubt had some effect on the Polish people, however difficult to measure, the United States played no direct part in stimulating or prolonging the riots. Its involvement was definitely less than it had been in East Germany in 1953. Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. told State officials the policy had always been "that we take no action which would precipitate troubles behind the Iron Curtain which would lead directly to bloodshed." All agencies had assured him that they had not violated this policy with regard to the Poznań events. An inter-agency Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems, chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Jacob Beam, had responsibility for coordinating on a day-to-day basis the U.S. Government's responses. During the committee's discussion on 2 July, "the view was expressed that, while such violence should be exploited in appropriate ways to call

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* On 8 June Eisenhower suffered an attack of ileitis, an inflammation of the intestines, and was admitted to Walter Reed Hospital in Washington, D.C. On 30 June he left the

attention to Soviet domination of the satellites, it is U.S. policy not to incite abortive revolts." Beam later told the OCB: "No open encouragement of additional rioting or revolts is being given but there is no discouragement of additional spontaneous demonstrations."[185] (U)

At the OCB meeting on 3 July, both Hoover and Allen Dulles raised the possibility of discussing the riots in the United Nations. Beam cautioned against this, because "it might be harmful to our long-term interest should these internal disturbances become a matter of discussion by a UN agency." When Beam mentioned the idea to his committee, he again expressed reservations, commenting that the General Assembly probably would not take up the matter because few countries would support such a move. However, he said, State would explore the possibility of bringing it before the Economic and Social Council and raising the entire satellite issue before the General Assembly when it convened in November.[186] State also concluded that the Security Council would not inscribe the matter, and if it did, no favorable outcome would occur. Other countries would view the riots as strictly an internal Polish matter.[187] (U)

In communist countries the reaction to Poznań was along predictable lines. Propaganda organs throughout the bloc blamed Western instigation. *Pravda* claimed that "imperialist and reactionary Polish underground agents, taking advantage of certain economic difficulties, incited serious disturbances and street disorders." Soviet organs continued to harp on the Kersten amendment, condemning the Senate's recent appropriation in the Mutual Security Act of an additional $25 million "for subversive

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hospital and began a period of recuperation at his Gettysburg, Pennsylvania farm. He

activities." In fact the Senate had approved only $5 million in the form of grants to private organizations to maintain "the will for freedom" in Eastern Europe.[188] (U)

Echoing charges it had made after the 1953 uprising, the East German communist press saw Allen Dulles as the mastermind behind the riots. For evidence it cited his brother's "well thought out statement for the American State Department on the happenings in Poznan almost before any news came out of Poland,"[189] an apparent reference to the Secretary's 27 June news conference. When asked a few weeks later about communist charges that the Kersten amendment authorized the subversion of foreign governments, Secretary Dulles said Congress had taken no final action on the mutual security bill, but whatever amount was appropriated would be used only for "making known to the peoples of the world the good fruits of a free society. It is not going to be used for subversive activities as it is alleged."[190] (U)

It is difficult to say to what extent Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders believed that the United States instigated the riots. Given to bluster, Khrushchev complained a few weeks later to the Yugoslav ambassador about anti-Soviet elements in Poland, Hungary, and other satellites who were using Yugoslavia as a model for turning to the West and splitting the Soviet bloc. "Behind it all stood Dulles," he said, who "had gone a lot further this time" than was thought possible. The Americans had incorrectly drawn the conclusion that the Soviet Union was weak. "We shall show them that they've made a great mistake."[191] (U)



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returned to Washington on 15 July.

*Fresh Ingredients*

By the summer of 1956 the reorientation of policy toward the Soviet bloc begun as far back as 1952 was well along. In early June the NSC Planning Board had under consideration new policy papers calling for expanded East-West trade and more informational and cultural contacts with the communist world, as well as a new overall policy paper on relations with the satellites.[192] (U)

Given the third major outbreak of anti-regime violence within the bloc in three years, and especially viewed against the backdrop of growing political and cultural ferment in the satellites, one would have thought further outbursts would be anticipated and planning begun for that contingency. This was the conclusion of C. L. Sulzberger, who lamented that the Western powers, despite the advice of many diplomatic experts, had not coordinated their policies after the East German uprising to decide what to do if something like it reoccurred in Eastern Europe. It was now "an urgent necessity," since "a new wave of reactions, hopes, debates and possibly turbulence may again shiver through the orbit."[193] (U)

Before 1956, East Germany was the only country where U.S. planners thought disturbances might again break out, though they regarded the probability slight even there. Nevertheless, the OCB in May 1955 had deemed it "useful for planning purposes to consider what action the United States should initiate in the event of a mass uprising at some future date." It noted that West Germany's achievement of sovereignty and the Austrian State Treaty, "along with continued dissatisfaction over internal economic and political conditions might eventually lead to such an uprising in East Germany." The board noted that existing policy ruled out incitement to open revolt and restricted

"psychological warfare to the maintenance of the resistance potential of the East German population." Given these limitations, it recommended several weak diplomatic, economic, and propaganda measures, including having RIAS and USIA extensively cover any disturbances that might break out. A year later, in May 1956, the OCB noted that comments on these proposals by the missions in Bonn and Berlin and subsequent developments had shown certain of the recommendations to be impracticable.[194] In short, the East German effort produced little of significance. And no record has been found that any contingency planning was done to cover the possibility of an uprising elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. (U)

Final consideration of the new East European paper coincided with the immediate aftermath of the Poznań riots. The Planning Board approved, without major changes, State's draft and circulated it for discussion at the NSC's 12 July meeting. Designated NSC 5608, the paper "somewhat modified the statement of US basic objectives in Eastern Europe" and "redefined the general courses of action to bring them into conformity with the present situation in Eastern Europe and with a more realistic assessment of US capabilities to effect developments in that area." It recognized that the security apparatuses in the bloc countries made it difficult to conduct covert operations there and that specific operations required much time to prepare. Because of recent setbacks, it was "of the utmost importance to proceed with extreme care in this field with a view to solid accomplishment for the long run." The paper rejected two extremes: either using military force to liberate the satellites, or accepting Soviet control for an indefinite period. Between them lay a large area for actions to weaken and eventually eliminate the Soviet hold. But the paper cautioned that this would not happen in the near future.[195] (U)

At the 12 July meeting presided over by Vice President Nixon, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Dillon Anderson said the new paper reflected a shift in emphasis. The old objective was to undermine the regimes, the new one to foster changes in them. Anderson paused in his remarks to allow discussion of the paper's recommendation that the administration seek congressional approval for greater flexibility in using economic incentives with the satellites, such as offering surplus agricultural commodities. Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey argued that Congress, which had been balking at other administration requests, would never approve. Supporting Humphrey, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson said he did not want to raise the standard of living in the satellites by providing surplus food, thereby indirectly promoting their political stability and military power. Secretary Dulles pointed out that the paper did not advocate trade with the satellites. It merely wanted the U.S. Government to be able to make such an offer to a satellite government which it could not reject without putting pressure on the Soviet Union to match the offer. If accepted, the United States would gain political influence in that country. It was more a question of political and economic warfare—"gestures and feints" in confronting the communist bloc--than of trade. Dulles recalled that "when we made our offer recently to the people of Poznan, we never seriously thought that we would be able to provide food to these people. Our main idea was to embarrass the Government of Communist Poland." When Nixon said he also agreed with Treasury's position, Dulles replied that he had no intention for the present to go before Congress seeking such authority and would agree to delete the disputed language. But if the situation later warranted it, he would request such authority. (U)

At Dulles's request, they turned to a paragraph in the paper calling for the United States to "encourage the satellite peoples in passive resistance to their Soviet-dominated regimes when this will contribute to minimizing satellite contributions to Soviet power or to increasing pressures for desirable change." In doing so the United States was to "avoid incitements to violence or to action when the probable reprisals or other results would yield a net loss in terms of U.S. objectives." Dulles considered this paragraph "too negative in character" and proposed adding the following clarifying statement:

> In general, however, do not discourage, by public utterances or otherwise, spontaneous manifestations of discontent and opposition to the Communist regime, despite risks to individuals, when their net results will exert pressures for release from Soviet domination. Operations which might involve or lead to local violence will be authorized only by the Secretary of State and the Director of CIA on the basis of feasibility, minimum risk, and maximum contribution to the fundamental interests of the United States.

The situation had changed in Eastern Europe, he believed, and "it might be quite useful for the United States to have some violent outbursts in the satellite countries. Moreover, we shouldn't necessarily be appalled by the fact that if such uprisings occurred a certain number of people would be killed. After all, one cannot defend or regain liberty without some inevitable loss of life." Dulles added that of course he did not want to have "a lot of low-level officials running around and stirring up riots and uprisings in the satellite countries." Only under exceptional circumstances and only after the most careful and cautious consideration at the very highest levels should such disturbances be encouraged. (U)

Nixon opposed any policy based on the view that essentially nothing could be done to change the status quo—an attitude he attributed to George Kennan. He felt the

paper had such a tone; it suggested that "the United States should relax because it can do nothing to remedy the unhappy conditions in the satellites." On the other hand, Special Assistant William Jackson pointed out that the paper, with conditions now more favorable for action in Eastern Europe, allowed the United States to be more active "short of violence." Allen Dulles said that the new paper would not restrict the CIA in any way from carrying out activities already under way, such as RFE broadcasts, balloon operations, support of exile groups, and encouraging defection. (U)

Reverting to the concerns Nixon had expressed, Secretary Dulles said that certain language, and the negative tone of a paragraph in the annexed staff study, had greatly bothered him since it would prevent the United States from encouraging outbreaks like the 1953 East German uprising and the Poznań riots. "Sometimes unrest of this sort and uprisings like these," he said, "were an important part of the way we have to play the game." Nixon voiced agreement: "After all, we are not saying that we are going to initiate uprisings and violence in the satellites. We are merely saying that that we will not always discourage such uprisings and violence if the uprisings should occur spontaneously." (U)

The members generally agreed with Allen Dulles's expressed reservations about supporting national communism, which, he said, might be "very damaging to the democratic, idealistic, and religious people in the satellites who looked to the United States for guidance and ultimate relief. He thought "carefully selected assistance" should be given to national communist movements "in certain circumstances" and "very discreetly and perhaps only by covert means." When Wilson expressed strong disapproval of support for any national communist movement, Secretary Dulles

explained that the objective was simply to loosen the ties between a satellite and the Soviet Union. He did not advocate open support of national communist movements. The Vice President added that "from the point of view of domestic politics or of our international relations" nothing would "be worse than the occurrence of a leak tending to indicate that we at the highest levels were agreeing on a policy for national communism under any circumstances." Discussion then focused on ways to prevent leakage of the contents of the new paper, which Foster Dulles called "rather a rarity among our policy papers, in that in this paper we were dealing with the offensive vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc, rather than, as usual, dealing with the defensive." The council finally decided to take out certain sensitive portions and include them, along with Dulles's proposed additional statement, in a limited distribution appendix.[196] (U)

One has to wonder whether those present felt freer to express themselves as they did because of Eisenhower's absence. In any event, on 18 July Eisenhower, now back at the White House, approved the amended paper (NSC 5608/1) after directing that the appendix stipulate that certain operations required the authorization of the the Secretary of State and the President and that it omit reference to the Director of Central Intelligence. As approved, the appendix was carefully hedged, legalistic, and vague. The United States, it stated, should do the following:

1. Avoid incitements to violence or to action when the probable reprisals or other results would yield a net loss in terms of U.S. objectives. In general, however, do not discourage, by public utterances or otherwise, spontaneous manifestations of discontent and opposition to the Communist regime, despite risks to individuals, when their net results will exert pressures for release from Soviet domination. Operations which might involve or lead to local violence will be authorized only by the Secretary of State with the approval of the President on the basis of feasibility,

minimum risk, and maximum contribution to the basic U.S. objectives in NSC 5608/1.

2. As a means of encouraging the eventual establishment of freely elected governments in the satellites as a disruptive device and not as an end in itself, be prepared on a case-by-case basis generally, covertly, and under appropriate policy guidance to assist nationalism in any form where conducive to independence from Soviet domination and* when U.S. and free world cohesion would not be jeopardized thereby.[197] (U)

NSC 5608/1 diverged from its predecessor (NSC 174) in two seemingly contradictory ways. It represented what the Planning Board had intended—a further shift toward an evolutionary approach, what some like Nixon saw as a softer policy. But its appendix was a move in the other direction--toward greater willingness to view bloodshed in the satellites as desirable and, in certain well-proscribed circumstances, to undertake operations that might precipitate violence. Although the Poznań riots came up only in passing during the 12 July discussion, they likely contributed to the greater willingness of Secretary Dulles and others to embrace the latter approach. This dual policy, framed in a slightly different way than previously, continued to reflect the underlying ambivalence in the U.S. attitude toward unrest in the region. (U)

The riots not only made an impression on Secretary Dulles, but also on his brother. A few days after the President approved the new policy, the CIA Director repeated to a visitor the same sentiments the Secretary had expressed about the desirability of bloodshed in the satellites and that he himself had voiced at the 1952 Princeton meeting.

> I got very angry with some of my people for not sending others after the June 17th [1953] thing in Germany. It would have been horrible if people had gotten killed. But the horrible thing in that Czechoslovakian thing [1953 Plzeń riots?] was that nobody got killed. I'd have felt much better about that and the Czechoslovakian people would have stood much higher in the world's estimation if there had been a thousand or ten thousand people killed in that. We kill more people on the roads every day for no purpose. They were killed in that Poznan affair. You've got to take some risks and you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs.[198] (U)

The President may not have agreed. When the NSC met in September to consider revising policy toward East Germany, this time with Eisenhower presiding, a new draft paper had a special annex with language virtually identical to that in the appendix to the East European paper. The body of the paper called for encouraging passive resistance "when this will contribute to minimizing East German contributions to Soviet power or to increasing pressures for reunification" and for fostering "disaffection in the East German armed forces." Eisenhower and now Foster Dulles, too, expressed reservations. If strikes or violence broke out, said Dulles, the communists could claim that the United States was responsible. Eisenhower, unsure whether passive resistance included strikes, worried about encouraging the East German people "to run risks and incur reprisals when we are not actually in a position to help them." He preferred to say that passive resistance should be encouraged so long as it did not involve reprisals against the population. Special Assistant Jackson explained that passive resistance, not violence, was the objective; the latter possibility was covered in the special annex. Not satisfied, Dulles argued that if the statement on passive resistance became known, the communists might contend that the

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* In approving NSC 5608/1, Eisenhower directed that the words "nationalism in any form where conducive to independence from Soviet domination and" replace the words "'National Communist' movements" that had been in NSC 5608.

United States had encouraged the kind of violence that had broken out in Poznań. Despite all the questioning, no substantive changes occurred in the language. The NSC decided merely to remove from the body of the paper statements about encouraging passive resistance among the general population and disaffection within the East German armed forces and add them to a limited distribution special annex.[199] (U)

Did the United States in the late summer and fall of 1956 carry out the kinds of activities in Eastern Europe and East Germany—"operations that might involve or lead to local violence"—that the new NSC papers' annexes sanctioned? Far from conclusive, available documentation suggests that these kinds of operations did not take place. (U)

What the CIA apparently had in mind was a stepped-up propaganda campaign directed at the satellites. At the same time that the Planning Board was drafting NSC 5608, the agency was developing its own new policy paper, "A Comprehensive Covert Plan for the Satellites,"[200] which apparently took a somewhat more aggressive line than the NSC paper. The agency's Clandestine Services Division felt that the NSC effort did not adequately reflect the degree of change that had occurred within the satellites nor "the real opportunities that the U.S. and other western powers may have to influence the direction of these changes and the resultant ferment," which it believed the CIA paper "more adequately covered."[201] [redacted] CIA 1.4(c) OSD 1.4(c)

The CIA also prepared a new statement of policy governing the operations of the Free Europe Committee, which it felt accorded with its own paper on Eastern Europe. The statement noted that because "political warfare depends upon contact with the enemy, there is now a real opportunity to wage it in the satellites. This opportunity is the more exploitable because of the many indications that events in the satellites are moving

more rapidly than the leaders expected or were fully prepared to cope with." The paper defined FEC's major objectives as inducing "the people and elites of the captive nations" to seek (1) freedom from Soviet control over their internal and external affairs, in the latter case to the extent that it could be brought about "by neutralization on the Austrian or Finnish model," with the resulting withdrawal of these nations from the Warsaw Pact, and (2) freedom to form "non-military regional agreements or federations and eventually, either directly or through regional units, to negotiate entry into all-European non-military organizations or into an all-European federation or confederation."[202] No mention was made of encouraging violence on a small-scale or even widespread passive resistance.

(U) OSD 1.4(c)

Another reason for doubting that the CIA tried to incite violence in Eastern Europe is that the agency still had little means to do so [redacted] CIA 1.4(c)

Yet a myth has arisen, perhaps derived in part from communist propaganda about the Kersten amendment, that the CIA was training thousands of East European émigrés in the West during the 1950s to invade their homelands and overthrow the communist regimes. The notion gained credibility when retired CIA official James Angleton in 1976

told a reporter that this had been the case. Many scholarly accounts subsequently swallowed the story. One, based on further information apparently supplied by Angleton, claimed that the Poznań riots were viewed as ushering in a wave of national uprisings in Eastern Europe with the support of a CIA operation called RedSox/Red Cap.. That summer and fall, so the story went, the CIA carried out plans for uprisings in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. "Red Sox/Red Cap groups, like latter-day Trojan Horse forces," one account declared, "were inserted into those nations' capitals and plans were made final for the 'freedom fighters' to throw off the evil yoke of communism."[204] In fact, Red Sox and Red Cap were two separate programs that focused on the Soviet Union. Neither had anything to do with training paramilitary groups to overthrow East European governments.[205] (U)

Despite Republican campaign rhetoric in 1952 and Democratic efforts to make it seem more bellicose than it was, the Eisenhower administration did not pursue a more aggressive policy than Truman's toward the East European satellites. Former Secretary of State Acheson, for one, believed that the policies of the two administrations did not essentially differ--only the words did. British Ambassador Roger Makins recalled that Eisenhower entered office apparently committed to a policy of liberating the satellites. Following a relaxation of tension, the liberation policy "soon appeared almost indistinguishable from that of 'containment.'" George Kennan said much the same thing, but gave it a personal twist. He considered Foster Dulles, in effect, a "closet" version of himself, though he did not use that word. If the two men "disagreed on what should be said publicly on such matters as liberation of the Eastern European countries," Kennan

felt they did not differ "on what should be done practically." Dulles "knew that he would have no choice but to follow my line." Beyond the practical constraints, he thought that "there was great intimacy of thought" between them, that 'we understood each other better" than anyone else did. Dulles differed with him publicly, in Kennan's view, because he was concerned about how Republicans in the Senate viewed him and went too far in his public comments to please them.[206] (U)

Though the administration's ambivalent public rhetoric has drawn the most scrutiny, there was also a fuzziness in the language of its and the Truman administration's internal deliberations. What exactly was meant by statements, with the 1944 Warsaw uprising often in mind, that the United States should not support "premature" or "abortive" uprisings? Were only successful uprisings to be supported, or were the words merely a way to describe a do-nothing policy? Two months into the Eisenhower administration, a PSB staff member expressed concern that such talk meant the latter, what he derisively called "dynamic passivity."[207] Perhaps the closest anyone came to defining "premature" was when Eisenhower, in discussing the possibility of aiding the East German insurgents in June 1953, observed that upheavals within the Soviet empire would have to spread and also occur in China or the Soviet Union before the United States would actively intervene.

The heyday of CIA activity in Eastern Europe did not come during the Eisenhower administration, but in the period 1949-52. By 1952 a scaling back of the agency's efforts had already begun. If Eisenhower's policy proved less aggressive than Truman's, it was in large part because of the relaxed international climate fostered by Stalin's death, the Austrian treaty, the Geneva summit, and Khrushchev's secret speech.

Truman likely would have responded to these events in much the same way as Eisenhower did. (U)

Throughout both administrations official policy looked with disfavor on the direct promotion of violence that might lead to bloodbaths. Eisenhower seemed particularly anxious to avoid this. Privately, however, such key figures as the Dulles brothers and C. D. Jackson expressed the opinion that a little bloodshed creating martyrs to Soviet repression would be a good thing. (U)

Disappointed by the poor results achieved in stirring satellite unrest, the Eisenhower administration felt limited, as Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover explained in March 1956, to "'playing for the breaks' and doing our best to maintain the morale of the populations of the satellite states."[208] By the summer and early fall of 1956 the policy of improvising and muddling through had proved, on the face of it, almost successful, though the degree to which its statements and actions influenced events within those countries is debatable.

It is striking that the administration, having concluded that organized resistance had virtually been eliminated, ignored the possibility of another large-scale uprising, despite concerns expressed by high CIA officials and others that lack of planning for that eventuality would leave the United States unprepared, as it had been in June 1953, to take advantage of new opportunities to loosen Soviet control over the satellites. This is indeed what happened in the fall of 1956 when the pot boiled over more than expected and Hungarians incredibly by their own force of arms almost managed to overthrow their communist regime. (U)

1. Hershberg, *James B. Conant*, 660 (U).

2. For the internal debates within the Truman administration, see Corke, *US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy*, and Callanan, *Covert Action in the Cold War*, 15-69 (U).

3. The best treatement of Jackson's service as Eisenhower's Special Assistant is Brands, *Cold Warriors*, 117-37 (U). Cook in "First Comes the Lie," (U), and *Declassified Eisenhower* (U), and Evica in *A Certain Arrogance*, 164-87 (U), exaggerate Jackson's influence. While disagreeing in certain respects with Cook's analysis, Ingimundarson ("Containing the Offensive") generally accepts her portrayal of Jackson's part in shaping policy toward Germany (U). See also O'Gorman, "The One Word the Kremlin Fears," (U); and Stern, "Propaganda in the Employ of Democracy" (U).

4. Kovrig, *Myth of Liberation*, and his updated, *Of Walls and Bridges* (U), were pioneer efforts. See also Borhi, "Rollback, Liberation, Containment or Inaction?" (U); Hixson, *Parting the Curtain* (U); Tudda, *Truth Is Our Weapon* (U); Grose, *Operation Rollback* (U); Lucas, *Freedom's War* (U); Krebs, *Dueling Visions* (U); and Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin* (U).

5. For example, see Ivie, "Eisenhower as Cold Warrior" (U); Osgood, *Total Cold War* (U), and Chernus, *Apocalypse Management* (U).

6. NSC 58/2, "United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe," 8 Dec 49, *FRUS 1949*, 5:42-44, 50 (U).

7. Karelekas, "History of the Central Intelligence Agency," 41-43 (U); Warner, ed, *CIA under Harry Truman*, xxv (U); memo Joyce for Matthews, 31 Dec 52, *FRUS 1950-55: Intelligence Community*, 387-92 (quote) (U).

8. Regarding the campaign and particularly the debate over policy toward Eastern Europe, see Divine, *Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections,1952-1960*, 122-29, and Kovrig, *Myth of Liberation*, 106-20 (U).

9. Princeton mtg verbatim transcript, 10 May 52, 3-4, 30 (Jackson quotes), atchd to ltr Galantiere to Jackson, 6 Jun 52, Doc. CK3100249445, *DDRS* (U).

10. Rostow, *Europe After Stalin*, 39-41 (U); Morgan comments, mins PSB Staff mtg, 12 May 52, Doc. CK31000059628, *DDRS* (U); Princeton mtg verbatim transcript, afternoon session, 10 May 52, Doc. CK3100249335, ibid (U); draft summary of Princeton mtg, atchd to ltr Galantiere to Jackson, 9 Jun 52, 15, Doc. CK3100249445, ibid (quote) (U). For the final text of the group's suggested statement, see Rostow, *Europe After Stalin*, 134-35 (U).

11. In April 1952 Jackson wrote to an Eisenhower aide at NATO complaining about the failings of U.S. psychological warfare planning and that he intended to gather a group to develop "a Plan for the USA based on the assumption that Psychwar can be successful." He learned that his letter had been shown to Eisenhower, who had expressed the wish to receive a copy of whatever plan the group developed (ltrs Jackson to Biddle, 17 Mar 52, and Biddle to Jackson, 17 Apr 52: fldr Biddle, Anthony J. Drexel & Mrs., box 35, Jackson Papers, DDEL) (U).

12. "A Policy of Boldness," *Life*, 19 May 52, 146-60, passim (U). According to a picture caption (148), Dulles wrote the article a fortnight before publication.

13. Dulles, *War or Peace*, 242 (U).

14. Republican Party platform, 10 Jul 52, and Democratic Party platform, 24 Jul 52: *New York Times*, 11, 25 Jul 52, respectively (U).

15. Section 101 (a) (1) of P.L. 165, Mutual Security Act of 1951, 10 Oct 51 (65 Stat. 373). The act, as further amended, is in *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950-55*, 2:3059-86 (U). Regarding Soviet bloc reaction to the Kersten amendment, see Mastny, *Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, 119-20 (U).

16. *New York Times*, 14 Aug 52; ltr Stevenson to Truman, 23 Aug 52, quoted in Greene, *The Crusade*, 188 (U); desp 402 Washington to For Off, 21 Aug 52, FO 462/6, Confidential Print: United States of America, NAK (U).

17. *New York Times*, 26 Aug 52 (U).

18. Harriman and Dulles delivered addresses on successive days at the annual convention in Buffalo of the American Political Science Association. Summaries of their remarks are ibid, 27, 28 Aug 52 (U).

19. Stevenson, quoted in desp 903 Saving Washington to For Off, FO 462/6, Foreign Office Confidential Print: United States of America, NAK (U); Hamtramck address, 1 Sep 52, *Major Campaign Speeches*, 53-56 (U); Grand Rapids address, 1 Sep 52, Johnson, ed, *Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson*, 4:65-68 (quote, 66) (U); San Francisco address, 9 Sep 52, ibid, 82 (U). For the text of Truman's speech at Parkersburg, West Virginia, on 2 September, see *New York Times*, 3 Sep 52 (U).

20. *New York Times*, 7 Sep 52 (U); Hartford address, 18 Sep 52, Johnson, ed, *Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson*, 4:97 (U).

21. Adams, *Firsthand Report*, 88 (U); Sosnkowski memo of conv with Eisenhower, 30 Oct 52, Sosnkowski, *Materiały Historyczne*, 372-73 (U); *New York Times*, 6, 9 Nov 52 (U).

22. Ibid, 16 Jan 53 (U); SFRC, *Hearing: Nomination of John Foster Dulles*, 15 Jan 53, 13-18, 24-27 (U); interv Livingston Merchant by Philip Crowl, 13 Mar-17 Apr 55, 33-34, JFDOHP, PU (U); interv Robert Bowie by Richard Challener, 10 Aug 64, 47: ibid (U); Eisenhower diary entry, 14 May 53, Galambos et al, eds, *Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, 14:224 (U).

23. Paper, "Summary of a Report from the Central Intelligence Agency," 1 Aug 52, Annex D to PSB D-30, *FRUS, 1950-55: Intelligence Community*, 315 (U); memrcd, Morgan, 10 Jul 52, Doc. CK3100311219, *DDRS* (U); Mickelson, *America's Other Voice*, 86 (U). Lindsay's report of 17 September 1952 to the DCI on his European trip has not been found. It is referred to and summarized in memos to the Chief, P & P, from Helms of 18 September and from Hulick of 6 Octobe[redacted] Supported by Helms and Barnes, Lindsay put his ideas into a long paper entitled, "A Program for the Development of New Cold War Instruments," dated 3 March 1953, that he submitted to Dulles under cover of a memo of 23 April 1953 (ibid)[redacted] A sanitized text of Lindsay's 3 March paper is Doc. CK3100527646, *DDRS* (U). CIA 1.4(c)

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24. Lukes, "Rudolf Slánský Affair," 160-87 (U). [redacted] See also McDermott, "'Polyphony of Voices'?" 847-48 (U). [redacted]

25. Polish Press Agency communiqué, 28 Dec 52, in Polish People's Republic, *Documents on the Hostile Policy of the United States Government*, 204-40 (U); Rositzke, *CIA's Secret Operations*, 170 (U); Grose, *Rollback*, 176-79 (U); Aldrich, *Hidden Hand*, 164-67 (U); Bagley, *Spy Wars*, 118-29. See also CIA study, [redacted] Regarding WiN's operations and contacts with the British in the early postwar period, see Dorril, *MI6*, 249-63 (U). CIA 1.4(c) OSD 1.4(c)

26. [redacted]

27. Little, if anything, has been written about covert operations conducted independently against Albania by Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia. Regarding the

Anglo-American efforts, the fullest treatment is Bethell, *Betrayed* (U). See also Aldrich, *Hidden Hand*, 160-65 (U); Winks, *Cloak and Gown*, 394-403 (U); Prados, *Safe for Democracy*, 58-64 (U); Grose, *Rollback*, 154-63; Verrier, *Through the Looking Glass*, 66-77 (U); Powers, *Man Who Kept the Secrets*, 44-45 (U); and Felix [McCargar], *Short Course in the Secret War*, 280-87 (U). Some secondary accounts border on fantasy. For example, Moseley claims without citing a source that the British and the Americans in April 1950 infiltrated an army of 500 Albanian émigrés from across the Greek border, of which 200 were killed upon arrival and another 120 captured and executed (*Dulles*, 278) (U). For the insistence that the operation was a probe, see interview of James McCargar by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 18 Apr 95, 24, FAOHC (U).

28. For British-Albanian relations during and shortly after World War II, see Dorril, *MI6*, 354-65 (U). For the U.S.-Albanian fruitless negotiations, see Peters, "Albania: US Position on Recognition," (U) and Costa, *Albania*, 111-28 (U).

29. [redacted] The CIA operation was codenamed BGFIEND, the British operation VALUABLE. (U) CIA 1.4(c)

30. Jeffery, *Secret History of MI6*, 712-14 (U); [redacted] extract, rcd of mtg between Acheson and Bevin, 14 Sep 49, FO 371/78218, Foreign Office: General Correspondence, NAK (U). OSD 1.4(c)

31. Bethell, *Betrayed*, 71-87 (U); Pearson, *Albania as Dictatorship and Democracy*, 374-78 (U). Jeffery (*Secret History of MI6*, 715) states that 29 men, not 20, were

put ashore and that one group of five was killed and another group reported missing.

32. [redacted]

33. ORE 71-49, "Current Situation in Albania," 15 Dec 49, 1, CIA website (U). See also ltr King (Belgrade Embassy) to Rumbold (For Off), 5 May 50, and draft ltr Rumbold to King, nd: FO 371/87508, Foreign Office: General Correspondence, NAK (U).

34. Bethell, *Betrayed*, 168-70 (U).

35. [redacted] note, Albanian Foreign Ministry to UN General Assembly President, 19 Nov 51, FO 371/95027, Foreign Office: General Correspondence, NAK (U). CIA 1.4(c)

36. NIE-42, "The Current Situation in Albania with Particular Reference to Greek, Yugoslav and Italian Interests," 20 Nov 51, fldr NIE 42-51, box 3, Entry 1373, NIEs, SEs, and SNIEs, RG 59, NACP (U). An excised text is on the CIA website.

37. Bethell, *Betrayed*, 175-76 (U). OSD 1.4(c)

38. [redacted]

39. [redacted]

40. NIE 42/1, "Yugoslav Intentions Toward Albania," 20 Oct 52, fldr NIE 42/1-52, box 3, Entry 1373, NIEs, SEs, and SNIEs, RG 59, NACP (U); SE-34, "Consequences of an Attempt to Overthrow the Present Regime in Albania," 30 Dec 52, fldr SE-34, box 2, ibid (U). Partially declassified copies of the estimates are on the CIA website (U). CIA 1.4(c)

41. Dorril, *MI6*, 399-400 (U).

42. [redacted]

43. [redacted] Tomek, "On the Cold War Front," 5 (U). Tomek's study furnished the basic materials for a November 2009 exhibition in Prague organized jointly by the U.S. Embassy and the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes [redacted]

44. [redacted] OSD 1.4(c)

45. Memo Erskine for DepSecDef, 6 Jul 53, with atchd draft memo for ServSecs et al, fldr Chrono, box 13, Special Operations Files, Acc 63A-1575, RG 330, WNRC

[redacted] CIA 1.4(c) OSD 1.4(c)

46. PSB D-24, "Program of Psychological Preparation for Stalin's Passing from Power," 1 Nov 52, *FRUS 1952-54*, 8:1059-60 (U). See also Stevens' memo for Morgan, 21 January 1953, transmitting State's suggestions for instructions for U.S. official output in the period immediately following Stalin's death (ibid, 1071-73) (U).

47. Memo Jackson for Pres, 2 Apr 53, fldr Eisenhower, Dwight D. Correspondence 1953 (2), box 50, Jackson Papers, DDEL (U). Regarding the prolonged drafting of the speech, see Hughes, *Ordeal of Power*, 100-15 (U), and his diary entries for the period 5 March-18 April in box 5, Hughes Papers, PU (U). See also Rostow, *Europe After Stalin*, 38-60, 102-10 (U).

48. Rostow's supporting thinking for 1st draft of msg to Soviet Government and Russian peoples, 6 Mar 53, Rostow, *Europe After Stalin*, 89 (U).

49. Memo Nitze for SecState, 2 Apr 53, fldr Pres.'s Speech, Apr. 1953 (1), box 1, Draft Correspondence and Speech series, John Foster Dulles Papers, DDEL (U).

50. Diary entries, 11 and 12 Apr 53, fldr Diary 1953-1957, box 5, Hughes Papers, PU (U).

51. Address, "The Chance for Peace," 16 Apr 53, *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1953*, 179-88 (quotes, 185, 187) (U).

52. Address, "The First 90 Days," 18 Apr 53, Department of State *Bulletin*, 27 Apr 53, 603-08 (U); Gardner, "Poisoned Apples," 85-86 (U); diary entry, 3 Jun 53, Sulzberger, *Long Row of Candles*, 877 (U).

53. PSB D-40, "Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death" 23 Apr 53, Doc. CK3100141169, *DDRS* (U).

54. Chronological account of Dulles's background talk, not for attribution, at Overseas Writers' luncheon, 3 Apr 53, CIA-RDP-00058R00010051-3, 4, 7, CREST, NACP (U).

55. [redacted] OSD 1.4(c) CIA 1.4(c)

56. Mickelsen, *America's Other Voice*, 86 (U); Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom*, 56 (U); Special Guidance No. 8, 16 Apr 53, CIA website (U).

57. Regarding the VFC and its predecessors, see Brands, "A Cold War Foreign Legion?" (U); Carruthers, "Between Camps" (U); and Carafano, "Mobilizing Europe's Stateless" (U).

58. Ltr Erskine to Anders, 30 Jul 54, fldr Chrono, box 13, Special Operations Files, Acc 63A-1575, WNRC (C), ltrs Erskine to Allen Dulles, 10 Jan 55 (U) and 24 May 55 (C), both in fldr Chrono, box 12, ibid.

59. PSB D-31, "A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program with Particular Reference to Cold War Operations under NSC 10/5," 26 Nov 52, *FRUS: Intelligence Community, 1950-55*, 379 (U).

60. [redacted]

61. [redacted]

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62. In early May strikes by workers in tobacco factories in southern Bulgaria led to rioting that governmental negotiations with the strikers quickly defused. See Kramer, "Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle," Pt 1:15-17 (U), and a report on the disturbance in Plovdiv, 7 May 53 (Ostermann, *Uprising in East Germany 1953*, 86-89) (U).

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63. McDermott, "Popular Resistance in Communist Czechoslovakia," 291-92, 296-97 (U); Ulc, "Pilsen," 47 (U); Smula, "Party and Proletariat," 168-69 (U); RFE rpt, 8 Sep 53 (Ostermann, ed, *Uprising in East Germany*, 130) (U); Kramer, "Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle," Pt 1:17-22 (U). See also the report from British Ambassador Kermode in Prague to Prime Minister Churchill, 23 Jun 53, FO 470/7, Foreign Office: Confidential Print: Czechoslovakia, NAK (U) [redacted]

[redacted] CIA 1.4(c) OSD 1.4(c)

64. Office of Evaluation and Review, "Daily Intelligence Abstracts No. 25," 9 Jun 53, fldr PSB 350.5 [Intelligence Abstracts] (3), box 25, PSB Central FilesDDEL (U).

65. English translations of early German accounts of the uprising include Baring, *Uprising in East Germany* (U); Brant, *East German Rising* (U); and Hildebrandt, *Explosion* (U). For a review of works that appeared at the time of the 50th anniversary, see Sperber, "17 June 1953: Revisiting a German Revolution" (U). See Stebbe, "The SED. German Communism and the June 1953 Uprising," for a review of other recent literature (U).

66. HICOG, "Daily Radio Digest," No. 121 (covering Soviet and Soviet-controlled German-language broadcasts of 24 June), fldr RIAS Official Reports, box 1, Ewing Collection, Marshall Library (U). See also the report prepared by Rutgers University's Department of Sociology "Soviet Reporting on the East German Uprisings" (U). East German spy chief Markus Wolf recalled that one of his agents inside the U.S. military mission reported that Allen and Eleanor Dulles came to the city just before the uprising. (Wolf, *Man Without a Face*, 63 (U)) As an enclosure to a letter of 27 June, Allen Dulles sent his brother and sister transcripts of various European radio broadcasts repeating the claim that he, along with Eleanor, had been in Berlin during the uprisings. In the letter, he said, "You may be amused at the radio broadcasts—Communist and other—with regard to family matters and Berlin." (fldr Berlin June 12-23, 1953, box 31, Eleanor

Lansing Dulles Papers, DDEL) (U).

[redacted]

67. See the statement by Chairman of the Polish delegation at the UN General Assembly Wierblowski, 20 Oct 51, detailing the origins of the alleged "Plan X," in *Documents on the Hostile Policy of the United States Government*, 197-99 (U).

68. Telcon Dulles and Wisner, 12 Jun 54, Microfilm Reel 2, *Dulles/Herter Telephone Conversations* (U). OSD 1.4(c) CIA 1.4(c)

69. PSB D-21, "A National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Germany," 9 Oct 52, *FRUS 1952-54*, 7:370-80 (1st quote, 375) (U). A more complete, but still sanitized, text is Doc. CK3100140576, *DDRS* (2d quote, 9-10) (U).

70. [redacted]

71.

72. The Soviet Commandant in Berlin, General Vassiliy Chuikov, complained about the activities of these organizations in a letter to U.S. High Commissioner Walter Donnelly, 1 October 1952 (Department of State *Bulletin*, 1 Dec 52, 861-62 (U)) Donnelly's reply of 1 December rejected Chuikov's charges as "baseless and a travesty of the facts. (*American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents 1950-55*, 1742-

44 (U). [redacted] Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey, *Battleground Berlin*, 107-08 (U); and Smith, *Kidnap City*, 98-106 (U).

73. [redacted] CIA 1.4(c) OSD 1.4(c)

74. Interv Ewing by Brewster Chamberlin and Jurgen Wetzel, 18 May 81, 38-40, box 1, Ewing Collection, Marshall Library (U). An extract of the interview, in German, is in Spittmann and Fricke, *17. Juni 1953*, 212-15 (U).

75. Fischer, *Two Days that Shook the Soviet World*, 15 (U); Ostermann, "The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback," 14 (U). For a brief survey of the published literature on RIAS's role in the uprising, see Schlosser, "Berlin Radio War," 198-99, n 2 (U).

76. Jackson said that nobody foresaw the uprising, "neither G-2, nor CIA, nor Mayor Reuter, nor his incredible intelligence service in Berlin." (Address, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 8 Oct 53, 14, War College Lectures, USAMHI) (U).

77. Office of Current Intelligence, "Survey of Unrest in Eastern Europe," 13 Jun 53, CIA-RDP91T01172R0002003100019-7, CREST, NACP (U).

78. RFE Guidance No. 12, "The Change of Communist Line in Eastern Germany," 11 Jun 52, and unsigned paper, "Analysis of Soviet Policy and Current Developments in Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia," 12 Jun 53, atchd to ltr Caesar to Jackson, 15 Jun 53, fldr RFE, box 5, Jackson Papers, DDEL (U). Caesar

mentioned that Jackson saw the two papers at a meeting with RFE staff on 13 June. He said that the results of the meeting were "terrific" and that RFE was "hard at work this morning implementing your decisions." (U) See also the quoted extracts from Phenix memo, 18 Jun 53, in Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom*, 56-57 (U).

79. Interv with Gerard Gert by G. Lewis Schmidt, 30 Dec 88, 2, FAOHC (U); Hildebrandt, *Explosion*, 49 (U); Browne, "History and Programming Policies of RIAS," 282-87 (U); Schlosser, "Berlin Radio War," 209 (U).

80. Rpt Sokolovskii, Semyonov, and Yudin, 24 Jun 53, in Ostermann, *Uprising in East Germany*, 259 (U); Baring, *Uprising in East Germany*, 39 (U); Smith, *Germany Beyond the Wall*, 225 (U); ltr Rose to Johnston, 23 Jun 53, FO 371/103842, Foreign Office: General Correspondence, NAK (U). Regarding the activities of the West German organizations at the time of the uprising, see Rexin, "Zur Rolle Westdeutschlands und West Berlin am 16/17. Juni 1953," 84-91 (U), and Hagen, *DDR—Juni '53*, 87-88 (U).

81. Fischer, *Two Days that Shook the Soviet World*, 15 (U); Pactor, 'Unintended Consequences," 5 (U). Other studies of RIAS's role include Browne, "History and Programming Policies of RIAS," 283-95 (U); and Knabe, *17. Juni 1953*, 124-30 (U).

82. Schlosser, "Berlin Radio War," 217-22 (U); Ewing interview, 47-49, cited in n 74 (U); interv Karl Mautner by Thomas Dunnigan, 12 May 93, 8, FAOHC (U). Hulick was the Chief of the Political Division, Eastern Element, HICOG, Berlin,

and later became the Deputy Operations Coordinator in the Office of the Under Secretary of State, March 1954-August 1956 (*FRUS 1952-54*, 7:xvi; *FRUS 1950-55: Intelligence Community*, xxvi (U)).

83. Brant, *East German Rising*, 67 (U); Ostermann, *Uprising in East Germany*, 14 (U); O'Donnell, "I Led a Riot Against the Reds," 28-29, 92 (U); Fischer, *Two Days that Shook the Soviet World*, 14-16, 21, 22, 25-27 (U).

84. *New York Times*, 8 Oct, 12 Nov 52 (U); Browne, "History and Programming Policies of RIAS," 90 (U); memo Connors for Smith, 28 May 53, *FRUS 1952-54*, 7:1576-78 (U); rpt to Pres by Cmte on International Info Activities, 30 Jun 53, *FRUS 1952-54*, 2:1828-29 (U); Dale, "'Like Wildfire'?" 115, n 39 (U); Hildebrandt, *Explosion*, 75 (U); memo, "East Germany," 6 Jul 54, 6-8, Doc. CK3100523615, *DDRS* (U).

85. Gert interv, 2, cited in n 79 (U); Dulles, *Chances of a Lifetime*, 253 (U)

86. Interv Ewing, 53, 67, cited in n 74 (U); interv Klaus Bolling, *Berliner Zeitung*, 14 Jun 03 (U); interv Gert, 2, cited in n 79 (U).

87. Ltr Olver to Hope, 19 Jun 53, FO 371/103842, Foreign Office: General Correspondence, NAK (U). Commenting on the letter, the Office of the United Kingdom High Commissioner for Germany did "not consider that the mild encouragement which may have been given to the East Berlin demonstrators, once the demonstration had started, bears any comparison with the grotesque accusations of Western provocation." (ltr Chancery Wahnerheide to Central Dept, For Off, 23 Jun 53, ibid) (U).

88. *New York Times*, 22 Jun 53 (U); telcon McCloy and Dulles, 23 Jun 53, 11:10 am, Microfilm Reel I, *Dulles/Herter Telephone Conversations* (U); *New York Times*, 27 Jun 53; ltr Stone to Ewing, 21 Jul 53, fldr RIAS Gordon Ewing Letters, box 1, Ewing Collection, Marshall Library (U).

89. Interv Cecil Lyon by John Bovey, 26 Oct 88, 17, FAOHC (U); interv Karl Mautner , 8, cited in n 82 (U).

90. For example, see NSC 132/1, "United States Policy and Courses of Action to Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action Against Berlin," 12 Jun 52, and notes of 4th mtg, Ad Hoc Berlin Cmte, 30 Jun 52: *FRUS 1952-54*, 7:1261-69, 1275-77 (U); and PSB D-21/2, "National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Berlin," 3 Feb 53, Doc. CK3100140396, *DDRS* (U).

91. Berlin Command, "Historical Report, 1 Jan 1953 to 30 Jun 1954," encl/w memo McLaughlin to CINCEUR, 1 Dec 54, 81, box 325, U.S. Army Berlin Collection, USAMHI (U); interv Conant by Gordon Craig, 11 Jul 64, 21, JFDOHP, PU (U); interv Lyon, 17, cited in n 89 (U).

92. Interv Martha Mautner by Thomas Dunnigan, 7 Nov 95, 5, FAOHC (U), interv Conant, 21-22, cited in n 91 (U). For the British response to the uprising, see Larres, "Preserving Law and Order" (U).

93. Verbatim mins, 6th and 7th (Extraordinary) Commandants mtgs, 17 Jun, 11:15 am and 5:01 pm (FO 1112/60, Allied Kommandatura: Directives, Minutes and Papers, NAK) (U).

94. Verbatim min 6th (Extraordinary) mtg, 17 Jun 53, cited in n 93 (U); tel 1670 Berlin to State, 17 Jun 53, in Ostermann, ed, *Uprising in East Germany*, 194-95 (U).

95. Financial Appendix, NSC 5404/1, 1 Dec 53, *FRUS 1952-54,* 7:1394 (U); Berlin Command, "Historical Report," 91, cited in n 86 (U).

96. Interv Ewing, 53, cited in n 74 (U); min B. E. [?] to Strang, 17 Jun 53, FO 371/103849, Foreign Office: General Correspondence, NAK (U).

97. Tel 119 Berlin to For Off, 18 Jun 53, FO 371/103839, Foreign Office: General Correspondence, NAK (U); tel 128 Berlin to For Off, 19 Jun 53, FO 371/103840, ibid (U); NIE 12.4-54, "Probable Developments in East Germany Through 1955," 22 Jan 54, 3, CIA website (U)..

98. Tels 559 and 564 Wahnerheide (Ward) to For Off, 20 and 22 Jun 53, ibid (U).

99. Powers, Man Who Kept the Secrets, 46 (U).

100. Stockton, *Flawed Patriot*, 46-47 (U).

101. Extract, working paper, Eastern Affairs Division, Berlin Element, HICOG, 25 Jun 53, *FRUS 1952-54*, 7:1594-95 (U). The printed extract of the working paper, sent to State as an attachment to a despatch of 10 August, omits 16 pages of background and discussion. The author was unable to locate the full text of the working paper, the dispatch, or any of its attachments in the cited decimal file in RG 59 at NACP.

102. News conf, 17 Jun 53, 10:30 am, *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1953*, 440 (U) ; desp 540 Washington to FO, 20 Jun 53, FO 462/7, Foreign Office Confidential Print: United States of America, NAK (U).

103. Memo Straus for Phillips, 17 Jun 53, fldr Germany, box 3, Jackson Records, DDEL (U).

104. Memo of informal PSB mtg, 17 Jun 53, fldr PSB 337 Minutes, box 24, PSB Central Files, NSC Staff Papers, DDEL (U); entry, 17 Jun 53, fldr Log-1953 (2), box 68, Jackson Papers, DDEL (U); Powers, *Man Who Kept the Secrets*, 46 (U).

105. Memo of disc, 150th NSC mtg, 18 Jun 53, Doc. CK3100504727, *DDRS* (U). Extracts are in *FRUS 1952-54*, 7:1586-90 (U), and more fully in Ostermann, ed, *Uprising in East Germany*, 225-31 (U). See also log entry, 18 Jun 53, fldr Log-1953 (2), box 68, Jackson Papers, DDEL (U).

106. Draft rpt (PSB D-45), "Interim U.S. Psychological Strategy Plan for Exploitation of Unrest in Satellite Europe," 22 Jun 1953, Doc. CK 3100099744, *DDRS* (U); address, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 8 Oct 53, cited in n 76 (U); mins, PSB staff mtg, 22 Jun 53, fldr PSB 337 Staff Meetings (1), box 24, PSB Central Files, NSC Staff Papers, DDEL (U); log entry, 22 Jun 53, fldr Log-1953 (2), box 68, Jackson Papers, DDEL (U).

107. Log entry, 25 Jun 53, ibid (U). Sanitized texts of the memo of the NSC discussion of the satellite issue at its 25 June meeting are in *FRUS 1952-54*, 8:65-69 (U), and Ostermann, ed, *Uprising in East Germany*, 329-31 (U). Briefing notes for Allen Dulles's use at the meeting are Doc. CIA-RDP80R01443R000100240001-5,

CREST, NACP (U). For NSC 158, "United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States," 29 June 1953, see Ostermann, ed, *Uprising in East Germany*, 332-34 (U). A heavily excised text of the PSB's longer report (PSB D-45), "Interim U.S. Psychological Strategy Plan for Exploitation of Unrest in Satellite Europe," which the PSB approved at its informal meeting on 1 July, is Doc. CK3100088772, *DDRS* (U).

108. NSC 158, 29 Jun 53, cited in n 107 (U).

109. Memo Enyart for Morgan, 23 Jun 53, fldr PSB 091.4 Eastern Europe (1), box 15, PSB Central Files, NSC Staff Papers, DDEL (U).

110. News conf, 30 Jun 53, American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950-1955, 2:1745-46 (U).

111. News conf, 1 Jul 53, *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1953*, 463, 468-69 (U).

112. Entry, 13 Jul 56, fldr Diary 1953-1957, box 5, Hughes Papers, PU (U).

113. "Notes on Visit to Camp Sheltering Demonstrators of June 16 and 17," 20 Jun 53, fldr Germany and Berlin 1951-1953, box 12, Eleanor Lansing Dulles Papers, DDEL (U).

114. Tel 4 State to Prague, repeated to Warsaw, Budapest, and Bucharest, 6 Jul 53, *FRUS 1952-54*, 8:69 (U). For the responses, dated between 7 and 9 Jul 53, see ibid, 70-74 (U)

115. Diaryntry, 10 Jul 53, fldr Diary 1953-1957, box 5, Hughes Papers, PU (U).

116. For the food relief program, see Ingimundarson, "The Eisenhower Administration, the Adenauer Government, and the Political Uses of thee East German Uprising in 1953," 394-409 (U).

117. Memo, "Czechoslovakia—Guidance No. 10," 30 Jun 53, summarized and quoted in Holt, *Radio Free Europe*, 147-49 (U); paper, Walker, "PROSPERO: Preliminary Report," 21 Jul 53, w/atchd banknote and leaflet texts, fldr Balloons, box 2, Jackson Records, DDEL (U); Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom*, 63-64 (U); Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*, 51-52 (U).

118. Memo Barnes for Chief Ops (DD/P), 5 Aug 53, [redacted]

119. Memo Helms for Dep Dir (Plans), 6 Aug 53; memo Wisner for DDI, 8 Aug 53: ibid [redacted] CIA 1.4(c) OSD 1.4(c)

120. Memo Thurston for Merchant, 11 Sep 53, fldr Chiefs of Mission Meeting, Vienna, Sept. 1953, box 32, Entry 1274, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Files, RG 59, NACP (U); memo Bross for DCI, 2 Oct 53 [redacted]

121. Memo Godel for DepSecDef, 29 Jun 53, fldr Chrono, box 13, Special Operations Files, Acc 63A-1575, WNRC ~~(S)~~.

122. Paper, "A Report to the National Security Council by Task Force 'C' of Project Solarium on a Course of Action Which the United States Might Presently or in the Future Undertake with Respect to the Soviet Power Bloc--*Alternative 'C'*," (SOL-

TF/C-1), 158-59, fldr Project Solarium TFC (5), box 9, Subject Subseries, NSC Files, DDEL (S).

123. Kennan and Goodpaster comments, 27 Feb 88, Pickett, ed, *George F. Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhower's New Look*, 20, 24; log entry, 16 Jul 53, fldr Log-1953 (2), box 68, Jackson Papers, DDEL (U). A good treatment of the Solarium exercise is Immerman, *John Foster Dulles*, 60-74 (U).

124. Allen Dulles remarks, memo of disc, 157th NSC mtg, 30 Jul 53, *FRUS 1952-54*, 2:435-36 (U).

125. Address, 8 Oct 53, cited in n 76 (U).

126. Memo Jackson for Smith, 16 Nov 53 (copies to Cutler and Staats), fldr Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe and US Policy Towards (3), box 7, Special Staff File Series, NSC Staff Papers, DDEL (U). Jackson also apparently sent a copy to Allen Dulles.

127. Draft memo (Hirsch, Taquey, Comstock), Jackson for OCB, 3 Nov 53, atched to memo Hirsch for Jackson, 3 Nov 53, Doc. CK3100317730, *DDRS* (U). The saga of the five Czechs is related in Masin, *Gauntlet* (U).

128. Memo Jackson for Smith and Allen Dulles, 13 Jan 54, Doc. CK3100276589, *DDRS* (U).

129. Ltr Jackson to Dibella, 4 May 54, fldr Di-Misc, box 46, Jackson Papers, DDEL (U).

CIA 1.4(c)

130. Memo Jackson for Pres, 22 Feb 54, *FRUS 1952-54*, 7:1215-20 (quote, 1220) (U); memo Jackson for Wisner, 27 Feb 53, Doc. CK3100069979, *DDRS* (U); memo Jackson for Smith, 15 Mar 54, Doc. CK3100193054, ibid (U).

131. [redacted]

132. [redacted]

133. [redacted]

OSD 1.4(c)

134. Thomas, *Very Best Men*, 87-88 (quote, 88) (U).

135. [redacted]

memo of disc, 157th NSC mtg 30 Jul 53, *FRUS 1952-54*, 2:439 (U).

136. Memo Godel for Erskine, 30 Jul 53, fldr Chrono, box 13, OSO Records, Acc 63A-1575, RG 330, WNRC; memo for PSB members, "Excision," 11 Aug 53, atchd to memo Erskine for SecDef, 11Aug 53, ibid. [redacted]

137. [redacted] The JSSC member was Major Gen. Elmer J. Rogers, USAF, in a conversation with Baker and General Jesmond Balmer on 19 August.

138. Quoted in memo Wisner for DCI, 4 Mar 54, ibid (C).

139. Memcon Baker w/Thurston, 4 Sep 53, ibid (C). OSD 1.4(c)

140. [redacted] CIA 1.4(c)

141. Memo Jackson for Pres, 1 Mar 54, fldr Cutler, General Robert, box 45, Jackson Papers, DDEL (U); log entry, 8 Mar 54, fldr Log-1954 (2), box 68, ibid (U). A sanitized version of the 1 March memo is Doc. CK3100111989, *DDRS* (U).

142. [redacted] NIE 10-55, "Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc," 12 Apr 55, 8, CIA website (U); memo Bishop, 4 Jan 55, fldr Soviet Satellites 1955, box 30, Entry 1586, OCB Files, RG 59, NACP (U). English-language translations of Tirana radio coverage of the indictment, trial proceedings, and sentencing, 4-13 April 1954, are in FO 371/71263, Foreign Office: General Correspondence, NAK (U). Out of the government for nearly a year and apparently unaware of the decision to abandon the Albania operation,

Jackson continued to push for it, referring to resolution of the Trieste dispute in October 1954 and asking, "What stands in the way of initiating proper talks with Yugoslavia, Great Britain, Italy, and Greece, or any combination of these four, to get going on this operation, which would have a more resounding impact in 1955 than in any previous year." He also raised a broader question: "What are we prepared to do if the tension in the satellites were to reach a critical mass and blow this year? Maybe Allen knows the answer. But I am not so sure." (Memo, "Operation Kremlin Kracks," 16 Feb 55, atchd to ltr Jackson to Rockefeller and Dulles, 17 Feb 55, Doc. CK3100497636, *DDRS*) (U).

143. NSC 174, "United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe" 11 Dec 53, printed in full in Ostermann, ed, *Uprising in East Germany, 1953*, 392-413 (U). An excised version is in *FRUS, 1952-54*, 8:110-27 (quote, 126).

144. Koons paper, "Satellites," 30 Nov 53, fldr Soviet Satellites in E. Eur. & US Policy (3), box 7, NSC Special Staff Series, DDEL [redacted].

145. Memo of disc, 177th NSC mtg, 23 Dec 53, *FRUS 1952-54*, 8:127-28 (U).

146. Memo Wisner for DCI, 8 Jan 54, *FRUS: Intelligence Community, 1950-55*: 469-71 (U).

147. Memo Bross for DCI, 13 Jan 54, app to CIA paper [redacted]

CIA 1.4(c) OSD 1.4(c)

148. Cook, *Declassified Eisenhower*, 122 (1st quote) (U); Brands, *Cold Warriors*, 117 2d quote) (U).

149. Memo, "Operation Kremlin Kracks," 16 Feb 55, cited in n 149 (U).

150. OCB Wrkng Grp papers, "List of Agreed Courses of Action for Period 7/1/54-12/31/54 to Implement NSC 174," and "Additional Actions to Implement NSC 174 Which Have Not Been Accepted by the Working Group,"25 Aug 54, atchd to memos Staats for OCB, 20 Aug and 7 Sep 54. fldr Soviet Satellites 1953 & 1954, box 31, Entry 1586, OCB Files, RG 59, NACP (U). The paper listing the agreed courses of action, without the attachment, is in *FRUS 1950-55: Intelligence Community,* 31-39 (U).

151. Memo Delaney for Stevens (EE, State), 24 Jan 55, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:10-11 (U). Delaney did not say specifically that his response reflected CIA input, but the language suggests this was the case.

152. NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy," 7 Jan 55, FRUS 1955-57, 19:24-38 (quote, 31) (U).)

153. NSC 5505/1, "Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities," 31 Jan 55, Doc. CK3100129330, *DDRS* (quotes, 11-12) (U). NSC 5505/1 consisted of three parts: (1) a statement of policy, (2) a summary of the report by the special committee on exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite vulnerabilities (Milliken Committee), and (3) a memo of 6 January from the JCS Adviser to the NSC Planning Board (Gerhart) to the Board describing his and JCS objections to the Milliken Committee Report. A sanitized text of the statement of policy, with excisions, is in *FRUS 1955-57*, 24:20-22 (U).

154. Ibid, 3-4 (U)

155. Draft, "Outline Plan of Operations on NSC 174 with Respect to Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe," 1 Jul 55, Doc. CK3100018292, *DDRS* (U).

156. Interv Charles Bohlen by Philip Crowl, 23 Jun 64, 25-26, JFDOHP (U).

157. NSC 5524/1, "Basic U.S. Policy in Relation to Four-Power Negotiations," 11 Jul 55, *FRUS 1955-57*, 5:295 (U); memo Dulles for Eisenhower, 18 Jun 55, *FRUS 1955-57*, 5:240 (U); address, 25 Aug 55, 17-19, cited in n 157).

158. Testimony, 25 Jul 55, *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 1955, 7:734-35. When the heretofore closed transcript of the hearings was published in 1975, the committee chairman, John Sparkman (D, Alabama), criticized Dulles for his 'wildly optimistic" prediction that the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe would collapse within five years (ibid, vi) (U)

159. Statement, White House press sec, 30 Dec 55, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1956*, 450-51 (U).

160. OCB Progress Rpt on NSC 174, "United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe," 29 Feb 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:126 (U).

161. Allen Dulles's address in Los Angeles, "Purge of Stalinism," 13 Apr 56, in which he surveyed recent developments in the Soviet Union in the wake of the party congress, is CIA-RDP70-00058R000100250065-2, CREST, NACP (U).

162. Memo of disc, 289th NSC mtg, 28 Jun 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 24:121 (U); Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars*, 162 (U). In a subsequent interview, Cline altered his recollection [redacted]

SECRET

CDA 1.4(c)
OSD 1.4(C)

[redacted]

CIA 1.4(c)

163. Memo Katek for DDP, 2 Aug 56, [redacted]

OSD 1.4(c)

164. Toranska, *"Them,"* 56 (U); interv Stefan Staszewski by Toranska, nd, ibid, 174 (U); interv Flora Lewis, interviewer not identified, 7 Jan 96, "Cold War Interviews: Episode 7," National Security Archive website (U); ltr Moore to Allen Dulles, 1 May 56, Digital Series, Allen Dulles Papers, PU (U); Estabrook memo of talk w/Barber, 26 Aug 57, fldr Willard F. Barber, box 1, Estabrook Papers, JFKL (U); Melman and Raviv, "Journalist's Connections," 219-25 (U); tel 2582 Moscow to State, 17 May 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 24:103-04 (U); tel 2558, Moscow to State, 14 May 56, ibid, 103, n 2 (quote) (U).

165. [redacted]

166.

SECRET

[redacted]

CIA 1.4(c) OSD 1.4(c)

167. Tel 1339 State to Moscow, 31 May 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 24:107-08 (U); Wisner notes, 1 Jun 56, [redacted] National Committee for a Free Europe [redacted] Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars*, 163-64 (U); For Off paper, "Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' to the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 24-25, 1956," FO 418/97, Confidential Print: Russia and Soviet Union, NAK (U).

168. Kemp-Welch, "Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' and Polish Politics," 182 (U).

169. Tel 430 Budapest to State, 24 May 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:168-70 (quote 169) (U).

170. Diary entry, 3 May 56, Micunovič, *Moscow Diary*, 42-45 (U).

171. Paper, Tims and Klosson, "Soviet Control of the Eastern European Satellites," 7 Jun 56, fldr OCB Subcommittee on Soviet Problems III, box 29, Entry 1274, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Files, RG 59, NACP (U).

172. Paper, Senior Research Staff on International Communism, "The 20th CPSU Congress in Retrospect: Its Principal Issues and Possible Effects on International Communism" (CIA/SRS-1), 13 Jun 56, 10, 16-17, CIA website (U).

173. Address, San Francisco, 21 Jun 56, Department of State *Bulletin*, 2 Jul 56, 3-7 (quotes, 4, 7) (U).

174. Statement, 26 Jun 56, *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee* (Historical Series), 84th Cong, 2nd Sess, 8:501, 503, 510-11 (U).

175. Reston, "The 'Victory' of Dulles," *New York Times*, 28 Jun 56 (U).

176. News conf, 27 Jun 56, Department of State *Bulletin*, 9 Jul 56, 47-53 (quotes, 47, 50) (U).

177. Reston, cited in n 165; memcon Dulles and Pres, 13 Jul 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 24:127-28 (quote, 128) (U).

178. Interv Richard Johnson by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 30 Jan 91, 15-16, FAOHC (U).

179. Summaries of the Poznań events are in Korboński, *Warsaw in Exile*, 110-24; Lewis, *A Case History of Hope*, 139-50 (U); and Matthews, *Tinderbox*, 87-137 (U).

180. Estabrook memo of talk with Barber, 26 Aug 57, cited in n 164 (U).

181. CIA, "Current Intelligence Weekly Summary," 5 Jul 56, pt 1:4, CREST, NACP (U); *New York Times*, 1 Jul 56 (U); msg 131 Warsaw to For Off, 3 Jul 56, FO 417/53, Confidential Print: Poland, NAK. [Citation for casualties and torture]

182. Telcon, 28 Jun 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:181; notes (Howe), 29 Jun 56, fldr Minutes, Dec. 9, 1955-July 30, 1956, box 6, Entry 1609, Secretary's Staff Meetings, RG 59, NACP (U).

183. Department of State *Bulletin*, 23 Jul 56, 151-52 (U): statement Actg Chief News Div, 29 Jun 56, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1956*, 503 (U); *New York Times*, 1, 4 Jul 56 (U).

184. RFE rpt, nd, atchd to memo Egan (Dir, RFE) for Shepardson, 6 Jul 56, fldr Free Europe Committee 1956 (5), box 54, Jackson Papers, DDEL (U).

185. Notes (Howe), 2 Jul 56, fldr Minutes Dec, 9-1955-July 30, 1956, box 6, Entry 1609, Secretary's Staff Meetings, RG 59, NACP (U); memo (Comstock), 22nd Spec Cmte mtg, 2 Jul 56, fldr OCB 000.1 USSR (File #2) (1), box 1, Central File Series, OCB Records, DDEL (U); rcd of actions, OCB mtg, 6 Jul 56, ibid (U).

186. Notes on OCB mtg, 3 Jul 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:189 (U); memo of 23rd Spec Cmte mtg, 5 Jul 56, fldr OCB 000.1 USSR (File #2) (1), box 1, Central File Series, OCB Records, DDEL (U).

187. Memo of 27th Spec Cmte mtg, 16 Jul 56, fldr OCB 000.1 USSR (File #2) (1), box 1, Central File Series, OCB Records, DDEL (U); memo Wilcox to ActySecState, 6 Jul 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:197-98 and 198, n 1 (U).

188. Pravda, 1 Jul 56, in Zinner, ed, National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe, 136 (U); New York Times, 3 Jul 56 (U).

189. Atlantic City Press, 2 Jul 56 (U).

190. News conf, 11 Jul 56, Department of State *Bulletin*, 23 Jul 56, 150 (U).

191. Diary entries, 14, 15 Jul 56, Micunovič, *Moscow Diary*, 86-89 (U).

192. See NSC 5607, "Statement of Policy on East-West Exchanges," 29 Jun 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 24:243-46 (U); an memo Steering Committee of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy to the Council Chairman, 13 Jul 56, ibid, 10:377-80 (U). For Eisenhower's and Dulles's comments supporting the provision of surplus agricultural products to Soviet bloc countries, see the editorial note quoting the

disc at the 277th NSC meeting, 27 Feb 56 (ibid, 25:118-19 (U)) and memo of disc, 281st NSC mtg, 5 Apr 56, ibid, 10:330 (U).

193. *New York Times*, 30 Jun 56 (U).

194. OCB paper, "Suggestions for United States Action in the Event of Recurrence of Mass Uprisings in the Soviet Zone of Germany," undated but probably May 1955, *FRUS 1955-57*, 26: 533-37; OCB paper, "Progress Report on United States Policy Relating to East Germany (NSC 174)," 17 May 56, ibid, 556-57 (U).

195. Memo Elbrick to SecState, 10 Jul 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:211 (U); NSC 5608, "U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe," consisted of a draft statement of policy, dated 3 July, and a staff study circulated separately and dated 6 July. A partial text of the draft statement of policy is in *FRUS 1955-57*, 25: 190-94; the complete text is Doc. CK3100286602, *DDRS* (U). The complete text of the staff study is in Békés, Byrne, and Rainer, eds, *1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 119-28 (U); a partial text is in *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:198-209 (U).

196. Smith briefing paper, "Item 1 – U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe (NSC 5608)," 11 Jul 56, fldr Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe and US Policy Towards (2), box 7, Special Staff File Series, NSC Staff Papers, DDEL (U); memo of disc, 290th NSC mtg, 12 Jul 56, fldr 290th NSC Meeting, box 8, NSC Series, Whitman File, DDEL (U). A substantially excised text is in *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:212-16 (U). A more complete, but still partial version, is in Békés, Byrne, and Rainer, eds, *1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 129-35 (U).

197. NSC 5608/1, "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe," 18 Jul 56, including the appendix, is ibid, 152-56 (U). As printed, the appendix contains an error in paragraph 2. The word "nationalists" should read "nationalism".

198. Stenographic notes, conv between Dulles and M [Max Millikin], 21 Jul 56, 6-7, Doc. CIA-RDP80R01731R000800210007-8, CREST, NACP (U).

199. Memo of disc, 296th NSC mtg, 6 Sep 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 26:560-62 (U); "Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy Toward East Germany" (Supplement to NSC 160/1), 12 Sep 56, ibid, 563-67 (U). Several lines of the special annex are not printed in *FRUS*. For the full text, see Doc. CK3100102417, *DDRS* (U). The statement of policy did not replace the existing paper (NSC 160/1), which covered Germany in general, only those sections pertaining to East Germany. NSC 160/1, "United States Position with Respect to Germany," 17 Aug 53, is in *FRUS 1952-54*, 7, pt 1:510-20 (U).

200. Several documents mention the CIA plan, not completed and approved until August, but the author has not found a copy [redacted] (Memrcd Helms, 6 Sep 56, 6 Sep 56 [redacted] CIA 1.4(c) OSD 1.4(c)

201. Memo Wisner for DDI, 16 Jun 56, fldr 12.4 NSC Papers 1956, box 48, ibid [redacted]

202. Memo Meyer (Chief, International Organizations Division, CIA) to DepDir (Plans), 15 Aug 56, w/atchd paper, "Agreed Policy Governing Free Europe Committee Operations," 7 Aug 56 [redacted] CIA 1.4(c)

203. Memo Helms for Chief (FI), 5 Oct 56 [redacted] De Silva, *Sub Rosa*, 87 (U); Gati, *Failed Illusions*, 5,73, 93 (U). OSD 1.4(c)

204. *Washington Post*, 1 Dec 76 (U); Corson, *Armies of Ignorance*, 369 (U); see also Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 287 (U).

205. The Redsox program involved the illegal infiltration of agents into the Soviet Union. The results were disappointing, and it was replaced in the mid-fifties by a program codenamed Redskin that utilized legal travelers to collect information. Begun in 1951, Redcap monitored Soviet officials abroad and encouraged them to defect. (rpt Kirkpatrick, 31 Aug 51, *FRUS, 1950-1955: Intelligence Community*, 203, n 2. (U)) Regarding Redcap activities in Berlin, see Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey, *Battleground Berlin*, 238-52 (U)

206. Diary entry, 14 Oct 54, Sulzberger, *Last of the Giants*, 95-98 (quote, 98) (U); desp 29 Makins to Lloyd, 27 Nov 56, FO 462/10, Foreign Office: Confidential Print, United States of America, NAK (U); interv George Kennan by Richard Challener, 3 Mar 67, 39-41, JFDOHP, PU (U).

207. Memo O'Connor for Morgan, 24 Mar 53, fldr PSB 091.4 Eastern Europe (1), box 15, PSB Central Files, DDEL (U).

208. Memo of disc, 280th NSC mtg, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:128 (U).

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