

REQUIRED

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USSR

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~~C.O. 12350 DECL. OADR~~

TAGS: PARM, PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: BARTHOLOMEW-OBUKHOV MEETING: FIRST SESSION,
OCTOBER 7

DEPUTY MINISTER OBUKHOV
GEOGIY MAMEDOV, MFA
YURIY NAZARKIN, MFA
GEN. OMELICHEV
GEN. LADYGIN
SERGEY ROGOV, USA AND CANADA INSTITUTE
G. M. YEVSTAF'YEV, MFA
ANDREY KOLOSOVSKIY, RFSR DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
VLADIMIR BELASHEV, UKRAINIAN MFA
ANDREY SAMNIKOV, BELORUSSIAN MFA
RUSTEM KURMANGUZHIN, KAZAKH PERMANENT REPRESENTATION

1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~

NUCLEAR SECURITY DIALOGUE

SUMMARY:

2. BARTHOLOMEW/OBUKHOV GROUP MET OCTOBER 7 AT THE MFA. THEY AGREED THERE SHOULD BE A CONTINUING DIALOGUE ON NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND NUCLEAR SECURITY, AND DISCUSSED SOME OF THE ELEMENTS. AFTER BARTHOLOMEW MET SEPARATELY WITH PANKIN, HE DEPARTED FOR ANOTHER MEETING AND THE SESSION CONTINUED WITH HADLEY HEADING THE U.S. SIDE. THE SOVIETS PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON PLANS FOR A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND FOR THE ENTIRE SOVIET "TRIAD," AND COMBINING STRATEGIC-RELATED COMPONENTS (E.G., SRF, NAVAL MISSILES, WARNING SYSTEMS, AND MOSCOM ABM SYSTEM) IN ONE MILITARY COMMAND. OBUKHOV RAISED NUCLEAR TESTING, AND HADLEY EXPLAINED WHY THE U.S. BELIEVED IT NEEDED TO CONTINUE A MODEST BUT EFFECTIVE TESTING PROGRAM. THE SOVIETS PROVIDED REVISED FIGURES ON ICBMS GOING OFF ALERT, WHICH INVOLVED AN ADDITIONAL 60 WARHEADS. OBUKHOV ALSO RAISED NO FIRST USE, AND HADLEY INDICATED WE FOUND OUR APPROACH OF RESORTING TO MILITARY FORCE ONLY IN DEFENSIVE SITUATIONS EVEN MORE COMPELLING IN THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. HE SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON NOT PRODUCING FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS. THE U.S. SIDE PRESENTED A BRIEFING ON GPALS, WITH THE SOVIET SIDE'S INITIAL QUESTIONS FOCUSING PRIMARILY ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE. FURTHER QUESTIONS WERE POSTPONED TO AN AFTERNOON MEETING. END SUMMARY

4. BARTHOLOMEW BEGAN BY STATING THAT IN THE VERY CONCRETE RESPONSE PRESIDENT GORBACHEV MADE TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S INITIATIVE, THERE WAS ONE BLANK: A RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR A DIALOGUE ON NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION. OBUKHOV RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS AN IDENTITY OF VIEWS ON THE NEED TO BEGIN A SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SIDES ON SUCH ISSUES AS SAFE AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND METHODS OF TRANSPORTING AND HANDLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BT

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1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~

AND INCREASING NUCLEAR SAFETY.

5. OBUKHOV NOTED THAT GORBACHEV'S SPEECH HAD AN IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL POINT ON ENHANCING COMMAND AND CONTROL. THE USSR WOULD PUT ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER A SINGLE COMMAND, AND ALL STRATEGIC DEFENSES IN ONE MILITARY SERVICE. THE SOVIET FEELING WAS THAT THIS WAS A QUITE ALL-ENCOMPASSING, EXHAUSTIVE RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN SIDE. BUT SINCE BARTHOLOMEW HAD DRAWN ATTENTION TO COMMAND AND CONTROL, HE ASKED FOR A MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION OF WHAT THE U.S. HAD IN MIND.

6. BARTHOLOMEW SAID HE WAS REFERRING TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S SPEECH WHERE HE SAID WE SHOULD DISCUSS COMMAND AND CONTROL AND DISCUSS HOW IT MIGHT BE IMPROVED TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL OR UNAUTHORIZED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

7. GEN. SHALIKASHVILI ADDED THAT WE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO DISCUSS THE AREA OF PHYSICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS TO INSURE THAT AN UNAUTHORIZED INDIVIDUAL COULD NOT IN EFFECT CAUSE A SYSTEM TO BE LAUNCHED. OR, PROCEDURES THAT ARE BUILT INTO SYSTEMS TO ENSURE THAT THROUGH ACCIDENTAL OR WILLFUL ACTS IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO LAUNCH A SYSTEM. SHALIKASHVILI ADDED THAT THE U.S. WAS VERY MINDFUL THAT WE DO NOT SUGGEST AN INTRUSIVE DISCUSSION INTO THE SPECIFICS OF EACH OTHER'S SYSTEMS THAT WE DO NOT INTEND. BARTHOLOMEW ADDED THAT EVEN IN THIS NEW ERA WE HAVE TO KEEP SOME SECRETS. BUT NOT MANY.

8. HE ALSO ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD ASKED GEN. SHALIKASHVILI TO SPEAK TO THIS SUBJECT, THE U.S. SAW IT AS A CIVIL-MILITARY QUESTION, GIVEN THE TIGHT CIVILIAN

PARTICIPATION:

3. U.S.:

UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW
JOHN GORDON, NSC
STEVEN HADLEY, OSD
LT. GEN. JOHN SHALIKASHVILI, JCS
VICTOR ALESSI, DOE
DOUG MCEACHIN, ACIS
REED HAMMER, ACDA

+++++ FOR J5 +++++
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ACTION

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USDA: STNFSAC(1) ASD: PA(2) USDP-CH(1) USDP: PD(1)
DR(1) DO(1) DI-1(1) DB-AC(1) IMM(2) DA-SA(1)
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CONTROL OF THE MILITARY. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OUR SOCIETY. AT THE TOP, IS THE CIVIL AUTHORITY OF OUR NATION. IN A DIALOGUE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SHOW HOW THIS WORKS.

9. OBUKHOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET SYSTEM ENSURES RELIABILITY IN THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND GUARANTEES THAT IT CANNOT BE USED IN AN UNAUTHORIZED FASHION. AMONG THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE TWO SYSTEMS IS THAT IN THE USSR THE SUPREME COMMANDER IS THE PRESIDENT OF THE USSR, A CIVILIAN.

10. OBUKHOV SAID HE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THIS SUBJECT BE DEALT WITH IN A MEANINGFUL WAY, AND SUGGESTED THAT DURING BARTHOLOMEW'S MEETING WITH GEN. SHAPOSHNIKOV HE DEVELOP THIS THEME IN MORE DETAIL, SO IT COULD SERVE AS A STARTING POINT FOR A MORE SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE.

11. SERGEY ROGOV NOTED THAT THREE MONTHS AGO HE WAS THE GUEST OF GEN. BUTLER AT SAC IN OMAHA, WHO SAID THAT SAC WOULD BE REDUCED IN SIZE BY A CERTAIN NUMBER OF DIVISIONS. DID THE U.S. SAY THAT THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD BE UNDER SAC? SECOND, DID THE AMERICANS HAVE PLANS TO PUT PALS ON SLBMs? THIRD, TACTICAL WEAPONS WILL BE DESTROYED OR STORED. DID THE U.S. HAVE IN MIND THAT TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL ALSO FALL UNDER SAC?

12. BARTHOLOMEW SUGGESTED THAT THIS SET OF QUESTIONS FIT UNDER THE NEXT ITEM HE WANTED TO DISCUSS: THIS QUESTION OF COMMAND STRUCTURE. GEN. SHALIKASHVILI ADDED THAT THE THREE QUESTIONS WERE EXCELLENT EXAMPLES OF SUBJECTS THAT COULD BE FOLLOWED UP IN THE COMMAND AND CONTROL DISCUSSIONS. WE COULD GIVE A SHORT ANSWER, BUT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO APPROACH IT IN MORE DETAIL IN FOLLOW ON DISCUSSIONS SO THEY COULD GET THE ATTENTION THEY DESERVE.

13. BARTHOLOMEW THEN TURNED TO MR. HAMMER, WHO SAID THAT IN PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT, THE FIFTH POINT, HE SPOKE ABOUT RECYCLING OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DEVICES. COULD THE SOVIET SIDE TELL US ABOUT ITS BT

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~~S.O. 12060. DECL. OADR~~

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1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~

THINKING ON THE PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION AND DISMANTLEMENT OF NUCLEAR DEVICES? CONTINUING, HE SAID THAT THE TERM "ENHANCED NUCLEAR SECURITY" WAS TOUCHED ON HERE AND IN PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S REMARKS, AND ASKED WHETHER THE PROPOSED DISCUSSION ON WAYS TO ENHANCE THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED?

14. OBUKHOV RESPONDED THAT THE USSR WAS IN FAVOR OF EXCHANGE OF EXPERTISE IN THIS AREA, AND IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE RAISED IN THAT SECTION OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS.

15. THERE WAS THEN AN EXCHANGE ON THE MEANING OF THE TERM "RECYCLING" IN GORBACHEV'S SPEECH. THE SOVIETS MADE CLEAR THAT THE TERM WAS BROAD, THAT IT INVOLVED DOING SOMETHING DIFFERENT WITH THE MATERIAL, BUT THAT THEY COULD OFFER NO SPECIFICS ON THEIR PLANS.

BARTHOLOMEW-PANKIN MEETING

16. OBUKHOV AND BARTHOLOMEW THEN LEFT FOR A MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PANKIN (REPORTED SEPTEL).

BARTHOLOMEW THEN LEFT FOR A MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADEZ, AND WHEN THE GROUP RECONVENED AFTER OBUKHOV'S RETURN, ASD HADLEY WAS IN THE CHAIR ON THE U.S. SIDE.

17. OBUKHOV BEGAN BY REPORTING ON THE BARTHOLOMEW-PANKIN MEETING, TERMING IT AN IMPORTANT AND INTERESTING DISCUSSION. THEY DISCUSSED THE RESULTS OF WHAT WE HAD ACHIEVED, AND THE SIMILARITY OF VIEWS ON ISSUES. THE MINISTER CONVEYED THE BEST WISHES OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, WHO IS CLOSELY MONITORING THE CONVERSATIONS, AND WAS PLEASED WITH THE REACTION OF PRESIDENT BUSH TO HIS STATEMENT.
NUCLEAR WEAPON COMMAND STRUCTURE

18. HADLEY THEN REFERRED TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S SPEECH, WHERE HE PROPOSED TO STREAMLINE COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES. NOW, THE NAVY COMMAND SUBMARINES, WHILE THE AIR FORCE COMMANDS BOMBERS AND LAND-BASED MISSILES. THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED TO CONSOLIDATE OPERATIONAL COMMAND UNDER A SINGLE COMMANDER, WHO WOULD BE CALLED THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMANDER. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV SAID IN HIS ADDRESS: "WE WILL UNITE UNDER A SINGLE COMMAND ALL NUCLEAR FORCES. WE WILL PLACE STRATEGIC DEFENSES IN ONE SERVICE." HADLEY ASKED WHAT SPECIFIC FORCES WOULD BE PART OF THE NEW COMMAND, AND WHAT DID IT MEAN TO INCLUDE STRATEGIC DEFENSES IN A SINGLE MILITARY SERVICE?

19. OBUKHOV SAID THAT THEY ALSO HAVE THEIR SYSTEM OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER MILITARY FORCES, BUT HE WOULD WILL ASK HIS MILITARY COLLEAGUES TO COMMENT. GEN. OMElichev SAID THAT THE TERM "SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" MEANT INCLUDING THE ENTIRE TRIAD, INCLUDING THE SRF, STRATEGIC ARMS ON SUBMARINES, AND HEAVY BOMBERS. REGARDING THE SECOND PART, INCLUDING STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS IN ONE MILITARY SERVICE, THIS MEANT THAT IN THE COURSE OF ONGOING MILITARY REFORM, SRF AND NAVAL MISSILES WOULD BE IN ONE SERVICE, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE LAND AND SPACE WARNING SYSTEMS. IN ADDITION, THAT MILITARY SERVICE WOULD INCLUDE THE MOSCOW ABM SYSTEM.

20. HADLEY ASKED WHETHER AIR DEFENSE ASSETS -- FIGHTER-INTERCEPTORS -- WOULD BE INCLUDED? GEN. LADYGIN SAID THAT HE HAD TO EMPHASIZE WHAT GEN. OMElichev SAID, THAT THIS WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF ONGOING MILITARY REFORM. THIS REFORM WAS IN THE MOST ACTIVE STAGE OF PREPARATION. IT MAY BE THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME CHANGES IN THE COURSE OF PREPARING DRAFTS BEFORE THEY WERE PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT, AND THEN TO THE SUPREME SOVIET. OVER THE LONG HAUL, AND IN THE FINAL VERSION, THERE COULD BE SOME CHANGES COMPARED BT

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TO WHAT OMElichev SAID AND HE WAS GOING TO SAY. REGARDING FIGHTER-INTERCEPTORS WHICH ARE PART OF THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM, MOST PROBABLY THEY WOULD NOT BE PART OF THE NEW SERVICE. BUT THE FINAL DECISION WOULD BE REACHED IN THE FUTURE.

21. HADLEY SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN A VERY USEFUL EXCHANGE, AND IT WAS A SUBJECT THAT COULD BE PURSUED IN THE CONSULTATIONS WE HAD TALKED ABOUT ESTABLISHING.

NUCLEAR TESTING

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22. OBUKHOV THEN TURNED TO AN ISSUE HE SAID HAD BEEN RAISED WITH BARTHOLOMEW AND PANKIN, OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET SIDE: A ONE-YEAR MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING. SOVIET EXPERTS COULD MAKE A VERY CONVINCING CASE FOR A CTB, WHICH COULD HELP MOVE THE WORLD TOWARD THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MINISTER PANKIN HAD ALREADY RAISED THIS WITH AMB. BARTHOLOMEW.

23. HE CONTINUED BY CLAIMING TO LET THE U.S. SIDE IN ON "ONE SECRET." THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT HAD VOICED CRITICISM OF THE MFA ON THIS ISSUE, AND WAS VERY STRONGLY PUSHING TO END NUCLEAR TESTING.

24. HADLEY RESPONDED BY SAYING HE HAD NOTHING NEW ON THIS SUBJECT. THE U.S. UNDERSTOOD THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM, AND UNDERSTOOD QUESTIONS THAT COULD BE RAISED ABOUT THESE PROGRAMS. WE HAD TRIED TO BE VERY RESPONSIVE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS IN OUR OWN TESTING PROGRAM, AND KNEW THE USSR DID ALSO. WE HAD BEEN TALKING A GOOD BIT OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SAFETY AND SECURITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE U.S. POSITION WAS THAT BECAUSE OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, AS LONG AS WE RELY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS PART OF OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE A MODEST BUT EFFECTIVE TESTING PROGRAM WILL BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE FORCES. ALTHOUGH THE TERMINATION OF SOME NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAMS WILL ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR TESTING OF SOME WEAPONS, IT WON'T ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR TESTING. OUR TESTING PROGRAM IS ALREADY AT LOW LEVELS HISTORICALLY, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO CONTINUE TESTING TO ENSURE A MODERATE AND EFFECTIVE DETERRENT FORCE.

25. OBUKHOV SAID THAT WE NEED TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE ON THIS IMPORTANT THEME. THERE WERE MANY AUTHORITATIVE EXPERTS, INCLUDING IN THE USSR, WHO BELIEVE THAT ENDING NUCLEAR TESTING IS AN ACHIEVABLE GOAL EVEN IF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTINUE TO EXIST. THE IDEA OF STOPPING NUCLEAR TESTS IS BASED ON THE IDEA OF ACCELERATING THE PROCESS OF THE "DISARMAMENT RACE," WHICH IS A LOFTY OBJECTIVE. WE WANT TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT OF HARMFUL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR TESTING TO HUMANKIND. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOVIET PUBLIC WAS INCREASINGLY IN FAVOR OF STOPPING NUCLEAR TESTING, AND THAT THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP WAS ALREADY MORE VOCAL ON THIS ISSUE. THEIR POSITION WAS EVEN MORE ASSERTIVE THAN THAT OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES, BUT EVEN THE CENTRAL LEADERSHIP, THE PRESIDENT, HAD MADE THE SOVIET POSITION CLEAR. THE MORATORIUM SPOKE FOR ITSELF AND HE ASKED THE U.S. SIDE TO HEED THIS APPEAL.

SOVIET ICBMS GOING OFF ALERT: NEW FIGURES

26. OBUKHOV THEN TURNED THE FLOOR OVER TO GEN. LADYGIN, WHO SAID THAT IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST OF THE U.S. SIDE, AND IN THE NEW SPIRIT, HE HAD A NEW BREAKDOWN OF THE 503 ICBMS THAT THEY HAD PROVIDED TO THE U.S. SIDE THAT WOULD BE TAKEN OFF ALERT. THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARMED FORCES HAD DECIDED TO GO EVEN FURTHER THAN WE HAD DISCUSSED THE DAY BEFORE. THE USSR HAD DECIDED TO ADJUST THE NUMBER BT

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BY INCREASING THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS THAT WOULD BE

TAKEN OFF ALERT ALONG WITH THE MISSILES.

THE USSR WAS TAKING OFF OF ALERT:

- 326 RS-10
- 40 RS-12
- 37 RS-16 (INSTEAD OF 47)
- 90 RS-18
- 10 RS-20 (ADDED)

27. AS A RESULT, THE NUMBER TAKEN OFF ALERT WOULD BE INCREASED BY AN ADDITIONAL 60 WARHEADS. HE ASKED IF THAT WAS GOOD NEWS, AND HADLEY SAID IT WAS INDEED. LADYGIN CONFIRMED THAT THESE WOULD REPLACE THE FIGURES THEY HAD GIVEN THE U.S. THE DAY BEFORE.

NO FIRST USE

28. OBUKHOV TURNED THE DISCUSSION TO GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL TO END THE PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS PRODUCTION, AND HIS APPEAL TO ALL NUCLEAR POWERS TO DECLARE THEY WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS WAS A PRINCIPLE THE SOVIET UNION HAD HAD FOR SOME TIME.

29. HADLEY POINTED OUT THAT THE QUESTION OF NO FIRST USE WAS NOT A NEW ISSUE. IT WAS TRUE THAT WE FOUND OURSELVES IN A NEW SITUATION, AND LOOKING AT OLD IDEAS IN A NEW LIGHT, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. BUT, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE NEW SITUATION MAKES EVEN MORE COMPELLING OUR APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE THAN THE ONE THE SOVIETS HAD SUGGESTED. AS THE SOVIET SIDE WAS AWARE, THE U.S. HAD PLEDGED NOT TO USE ANY MILITARY FORCE EXCEPT IN DEFENSIVE SITUATIONS, AND WE BELIEVED THAT WAS THE BETTER COURSE.

FISSIONABLE MATERIAL

30. AS TO THE PROPOSAL ON FISSIONABLE MATERIALS, HADLEY SAID THAT WAS NOT A NEW IDEA, BUT THAT THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO LOOK AT IT WITH NEW EYES, IN LIGHT OF THE NEW SITUATION, SINCE IT HAD BEEN RAISED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW HOW WE WOULD COME OUT, AND DID NOT WANT TO SUGGEST WE WOULD COME OUT FAVORABLE OR UNFAVORABLE, BUT ONLY THAT WE WILL TAKE ANOTHER LOOK.

31. ROGOV SAID THAT THE DOCTRINE HADLEY HAD MENTIONED WAS IN NATO DOCUMENTS. THE U.S. WAS OF COURSE A MEMBER OF NATO, BUT NATO FUNCTIONED IN A PARTICULAR AREA. HE DID NOT RECALL WHERE THIS HAS BEEN MENTIONED IN U.S. DOCUMENTS. WHERE AND WHEN DID THE U.S. ASSUME THIS OBLIGATION?

32. HADLEY SAID HE HAD EXPECTED HIS RESPONSE TO BE SO UNSURPRISING, HAD NOT INTENDED TO ESTABLISH ANY NEW POLICY, AND THEREFORE HAD NOT EXPECTED THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE A CITATION. HE OFFERED TO PROVIDE SOME SPECIFIC TIMES AND OCCASIONS WHERE WE HAD SO PLEDGED. OBUKHOV THEN INVITED THE U.S. TO PRESENT ITS BRIEFING ON GPALS.

GPALS

33. HADLEY MADE SOME INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS. THE ISSUE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE WAS AN OLD ONE. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE COULD PUT THOSE DISCUSSIONS ASIDE AND LOOK AT THE MATERIAL THAT MR. GRAHAM WOULD PRESENT WITH NEW EYES. IT REFLECTED NEW THINKING BY US, AND AN APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE WHICH HAD LESS TO DO WITH THE USSR, AND MORE TO DO WITH THE

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1. (~~ENTIRE-TEXT~~)

THREAT FROM OTHERS. OBUKHOV INTERJECTED THAT HE DID NOT WANT THE U.S. TO FORGET THE ABM TREATY. HADLEY SAID WE HAD IT IN MIND, AND CONTINUED THAT THE PURPOSE WAS NOT TO DEBATE THE ABM TREATY, BUT TO PRESENT U.S. THINKING ON WHY THIS WAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

34. THE U.S. THEN TURNED OVER COPIES OF THE BRIEFING MATERIALS, AND MR. GRAHAM BEGAN THE PRESENTATION. HE BEGAN WITH A CHART DESCRIBING THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AT THE TIME SDI WAS FIRST RAISED. IN THE 1980S THERE WAS AN ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, WHICH DROVE STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENTS. THE INITIAL SDI SYSTEM CONCEPT INVOLVED VERY LARGE NUMBERS OF ELEMENTS SINCE THEY WERE DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF ATTACKING WEAPONS. IN THE 1990S, THERE WAS A VERY DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENT. THE IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS WAS REFLECTED IN REDUCED U.S. AND SOVIET MILITARY FORCES, BUT WE SAW THE NUMBERS OF SOPHISTICATED FORCES ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD RISING.

35. THE U.S. HAD ADOPTED A NEW DEFENSIVE STRATEGY BASED NOT ON GLOBAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR, BUT WITH THIRD COUNTRIES AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS. WE HAD CHANGED THE SDI FOCUS TO GPALS, AS ANNOUNCED BY THE PRESIDENT IN JANUARY, AND THE NEW ENVIRONMENT WAS ALSO REFLECTED IN THE PRESIDENT'S NUCLEAR INITIATIVE A FEW WEEKS AGO.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

36. THE NEXT CHART FOCUSED ON THE PROGRAM OBJECTIVES: PROTECTION AGAINST LIMITED MISSILE ATTACK AGAINST DEPLOYED FORCES, THE NATIONAL TERRITORY, AND AGAINST FRIENDS AND ALLIES. BECAUSE IT WAS NOT DESIGNED TO DETER MASSIVE ATTACKS, IT WILL NOT UNDERMINE EXISTING DETERRENTS. THIS MEANS IT WILL NOT UNDERMINE SOVIET DETERRENCE CAPABILITY.

GROWING BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT

37. THE NEXT CHART FOCUSED ON THE GROWING THREAT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION. ACCORDING TO U.S. ASSESSMENTS, 15 COUNTRIES HAVE BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY, AND WE EXPECT THIS NUMBER TO GROW TO 20 BY THE YEAR 2000. IN ADDITION TO MISSILES, WE ARE ALSO SEEING THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL). WE ALSO SEE THE SPREAD OF ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS WHICH ALSO POSE A THREAT.

38. OBUKHOV ASKED WHAT ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS MEANT. GRAHAM RESPONDED THAT THESE WERE ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, VERY ACCURATE BUT NOT NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL OR CHEMICAL. HE CONTINUED THAT THE U.S. BELIEVED THAT THE CONCERN ABOUT PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES WAS SHARED BY BOTH SIDES, AS WELL AS ABOUT POLITICAL INSTABILITY. ONE AREA OF CONCERN IS COMMAND AND CONTROL, NOT JUST OURS, BUT OTHER COUNTRIES THAT HAVE THESE ADVANCED CAPABILITIES. AS A RESULT OF THIRD WORLD INSTABILITY, REGIONAL CONFLICTS CAN OCCUR WHERE THESE VERY SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS ARE USED AGAINST OUR OWN FORCES. FOR EXAMPLE, SCUDS WERE IRAQ'S MOST DANGEROUS WEAPON, CERTAINLY FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF

VIEW, DURING DESERT STORM.

THREATS TO THE USSR AND THE U.S. BOTH

39. THE NEXT CHART WAS AN EFFORT TO PUT ON A GRAPH A REPRESENTATIVE LOOK AT THE GROWING BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT WITH DIFFERENT COLORED CIRCLES REPRESENTING CURRENT BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY, AND PROJECTED BY

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1. (~~ENTIRE-TEXT~~)

BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY -- PROGRAMS THAT ARE UNDERWAY. OBUKHOV INTERRUPTED TO NOTE THAT THERE WAS NORTH KOREA AND TWO OTHER SMALL CIRCLES, AND ASKED WHAT THEY WERE. GRAHAM SAID THEY REPRESENTED PAKISTAN AND INDIA.

40. OTHER CIRCLES REPRESENTED A PROJECTION OF MISSILE CAPABILITIES BASED ON SPACE LAUNCH PROJECTS THAT ARE UNDERWAY, SINCE THE U.S. SAW THESE TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES AS VERY SIMILAR.

41. GRAHAM EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS A PROBLEM WHICH AFFECTED ALL OF US. U.S. FORCES AND OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES WERE UNDER THREAT TODAY. SOVIET TERRITORY, REPUBLIC TERRITORY, WAS UNDER THREAT. U.S. TERRITORY WILL BE INCREASINGLY UNDER THREAT IN THE FUTURE. HADLEY ADDED THAT WAS WHY WE SAY THIS IS A COMMON PROBLEM, AND IN SOME WAYS MORE FOR THE USSR THAN FOR THE U.S. OBUKHOV SAID THAT WAS WHY HE HAD BEEN INTERESTED IN THE CIRCLES.

42. GRAHAM CONTINUED WITH THE NEXT CHART, WHICH WAS MORE INTENTIONS THAN CAPABILITIES. WE HAVE SEEN BALLISTIC MISSILES AS A HIGHLY VALUED WEAPON IN THE THIRD WORLD. THIRD WORLD LEADERS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE DETERRED FROM USING THESE MISSILES. WE SAW HUNDREDS LAUNCHED IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND IN AFGHANISTAN, 86 IN DESERT STORM, AND IN 1986 LIBYA USED TWO AGAINST AMERICAN INSTALLATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (THEY MISSED). IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR BOTH SIDES HAD MISSILES AND IT DID NOT SEEM TO DETER THEIR USE. WE ARE ALSO SEEING THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, BUT TO DATE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN USED ON BALLISTIC MISSILES.

43. FINALLY, WE SEE THE PROLIFERATION THREAT GROWING: NUMBER, RANGE, ACCURACY, AND IMPROVED PAYLOADS.

ADDRESSING THE THREAT

44. TURNING TO THE NEXT SLIDE, GRAHAM SAID THE U.S. HAD TAKEN A NUMBER OF PATHS IN THE PAST TO ADDRESS THE PROLIFERATION THREAT. WE HAD SOUGHT TO PREVENT THEIR USE THROUGH THE THREAT OF DETERRENCE THROUGH RETALIATIONS, BUT IN THE THIRD WORLD WE WILL HAVE TO THINK ABOUT OTHER DETERRENT STRATEGIES. WE HAVE PURSUED COUNTEROFFENSE CAPABILITIES, BUT THE GULF WAR SHOWED HOW DIFFICULT THIS IS. FINALLY, WE HAD USED MISSILE DEFENSE -- IN THIS CASE WITH THE LIMITED PATRIOT SYSTEM. WE WILL NEED MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS IN THE FUTURE.

GPALS ARCHITECTURE

45. HE THEN MOVED TO THE NEXT SLIDE ABOUT ELEMENTS IN

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