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USSR APPEARED TO OPEN UP AN OPPORTUNITY. WE INTENDED TO FACILITATE POLITICAL DECISIONS BY THE CENTER AND THE REPUBLICS TO SQUEEZE DOWN FORCES, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ENSURING A CENTRAL CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THESE UNILATERAL US ACTIONS COULD, HOWEVER, TAKE ON A MORE FAR REACHING SIGNIFICANCE IF THEY WERE MATCHED BY THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH MATCHING ACTION HAS NOT A CONDITION, AND THE US HAS NOT INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATION. THE STEPS THE US IS TAKING ARE:

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CORRECTED COPY (PARA 04)

REF: MOSCOW 28677
SUBJECT: UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEU'S CONVERSATIONS WITH PANKIN AND PETROVSKIY

REF: MOSCOW 28671

ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY: IN AN OCTOBER 6 CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PETROVSKIY, UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEU DESCRIBED THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE PRESIDENT'S NUCLEAR INITIATIVE AND URGED THE SOVIETS TO COME UP WITH A PROMPT CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE. LATER THAT DAY BARTHOLOMEU RECEIVED FROM PANKIN A SUMMARY OF THE SOVIET RESPONSE, IMMEDIATELY AFTER GORBACHEV HAD APPROVED IT. (REF). BARTHOLOMEU WELCOMED THE SOVIET RESPONSE AS A SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE STEP BUT SAID THAT ANY CONCLUSIVE US REACTION WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY. END SUMMARY.

MEETING WITH PETROVSKIY

3. UNDER SECRETARY BARTHOLOMEU, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN GORDON, JIM TIZBIE AND EMBASSY CO-TAKER OPENED THE DELEGATION'S VISIT TO MOSCOW BY MEETING WITH FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PETROVSKIY. BARTHOLOMEU BEGAN BY NOTING THAT HE AND HIS DELEGATION OF SENIOR OFFICIALS HAD COME ON A SPECIAL MISSION TO DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S NUCLEAR INITIATIVE AND TO FACILITATE AND ENCOURAGE A PUBLIC FAVORABLE MATCHING RESPONSE FROM THE SOVIET UNION. PETROVSKIY WELCOMED THE US DELEGATION AND STATED THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HAD ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL INTER-AGENCY COMMISSION, HEADED BY PRIME MINISTER SILAYEV, WHICH WAS IN THE FINAL STAGES OF PREPARING A SOVIET RESPONSE.

4. BARTHOLOMEU DESCRIBED THE PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE, POINTING OUT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD BEGUN FROM THE PREMISE THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE FACING A VERY DIFFERENT STRATEGIC UNIVERSE, A FEELING THAT WAS ACCELERATED BY THE FAILED SOVIET COUP OF AUGUST 19. ACCORDINGLY, THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED THAT THE US SHOULD COME UP WITH A FRESH APPROACH, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF SQUEEZING DOWN OUR FORCES, THROUGH UNILATERAL MEASURES IN SOME AREAS AND JOINT ACTIONS IN OTHER AREAS. THIS WAS A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY THAT SHOULD NOT BE MISSED. LOOKING AT THE SITUATION, THE US WAS PREPARED TO TAKE CERTAIN STEPS ON ITS OWN. SPEAKING DIRECTLY, BARTHOLOMEU SAID THAT THE REDUCTION IN CONFRONTATION AND THREATS FROM THE

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ACTION (R.H)
INFO CJCS(1) J8(3) J5(1) SECDEF-R(1)
USDP: SPECIAL HANDLING(13) USDA:PM(1) USDA:AE(1)
USDA:STBSAC(1) ASD:PA(2) USDP:CM(1) USDP:PO(1)
DR(1) DD(1) DI-1(1) DB-AC(1) DC(2) DA-SA(1)
OSC-CI(1) OHS(1) DA-PA(1) VP(1) DIO(1) DB(1) DIA(0)
+OCSA WASHINGTON DC
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+HATS PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC
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--WITHDRAWING AND ELIMINATING GROUND LAUNCHED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THAT IS, NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES AND NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS,

-- WITHDRAWING NAVAL TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SOME COULD BE DESTROYED AND THE REMAINDER STORED IN CENTRAL LOCATIONS.

--BOMBERS HAD BEEN TAKEN OFF ALERT STATUS. MISSILES SUBJECT TO START DESTRUCTION HAD ALSO BEEN TAKEN OFF ALERT. THEIR DESTRUCTION WOULD BE ACCELERATED AFTER START HAS RATIFIED.

--STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS COULD BE CUT BACK. THE MOBILE PEACEKEEPER AND THE MOBILE ELEMENTS OF THE SMALL ICBM PROGRAM WERE BEING TERMINATED.

--THE SRM II PROGRAM WAS BEING CANCELLED.
5. THESE STEPS HAD THEIR OWN LOGIC AND THE US HAD ALREADY BEGUN TO IMPLEMENT THEM. IN ORDER TO INCREASE TRANSPARENCY THE US INTENDED TO PROVIDE AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE. FOR EXAMPLE WE ARE PREPARED TO

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PERIODICALLY PROVIDE REPORTS ON NUMBERS OF WEAPONS WITHDRAWN AND DESTROYED. THIS HAS BEEN DONE OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL VERIFICATION OR COM CONTEXT AS AN EFFORT TO INCREASE TRANSPARENCY. THIS OBJECTIVE WOULD BE FURTHERED IF THE SOVIET UNION WOULD TAKE SIMILAR MEASURES BUT THIS WAS NOT A CONDITION FOR THE US ACTIONS. IN THIS SPIRIT, BARTHOLOMEU SAID THAT HE COULD NOT TELL THE USSR THAT ALL AFFECTED NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE OFF SHIPS AND SUBMARINES WITHIN EIGHT TO NINE MONTHS. WITHIN APPROXIMATELY THREE YEARS ALL AFFECTED GROUND LAUNCHED NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN TO THE US.

6. BARTHOLOMEU NOTED THAT MATCHING SOVIET ACTIONS COULD BE TREMENDOUSLY IMPORTANT. THE PRESIDENT CALLS ON THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW AND DESTROY THEIR NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS AND NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND TYPES OF WEAPONS THAT THE US HAS ALREADY GOTTEN RID OF -- AIR DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR LAND MINES. BARTHOLOMEU ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE SCOPE OF THE US ACTIONS COULD BE SEEN BY THE FACT THAT THE US WAS TAKING ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO NAVAL WEAPONS THAT THE USSR HAD LONG BEEN URGING IT TO DO WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF NAVAL ARMS CONTROL. THIS, THE US WOULD BE REGULARLY FILING A SLCM REPORT. AS IT IS REQUIRED TO DO UNDER START, BUT ALL THE NUMBERS WOULD BE ZERO. SINCE THE SOVIETS DO NOT KEEP THEIR BOMBERS ON ALERT AS THE US DID, A GOOD MATCHING SOVIET STEP WOULD BE TO PULL ALL ITS LAND-MOBILE MISSILES BACK INTO THEIR GARRISONS. THE US HAD NOTICED THIS BEING DONE RECENTLY AND THIS HAD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THE SECURITY OF SUCH MISSILES. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OBUKHOV ASKED WHEN SOVIET MOBILE MISSILES HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN INTO THEIR GARRISONS. WHEN BARTHOLOMEU REPLIED THAT THIS HAD BEEN DURING THE COUP, OBUKHOV REMARKED THAT

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THE US KNEW MORE THAN THE SOVIETS DID.

7. BARTHOLOMEW NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD FOUR OR FIVE STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS. THE US CALLED FOR CUTTING THIS BACK TO ONE, A SINGLE ICB MISSILE. THIS MAKES GOOD STRATEGIC SENSE AND IT ALSO MAKES GOOD ECONOMIC SENSE. IT IS HARD FOR THE USSR TO JUSTIFY FOUR OR FIVE STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS WHEN ITS ECONOMIC SYSTEM WAS IN THE SHAPE IT WAS.

8. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE US WAS ALSO PREPARED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION IN AREAS WHERE IT IS AVAILABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE CURRENT US DESTRUCTION CAPABILITY WAS ABOUT 1,500 TO 2,000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS PER YEAR. THERE WOULD BE A TOTAL OF ABOUT 3,000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESTROYED AS A RESULT OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE BUT THERE IS ALREADY A SIGNIFICANT BACKLOG OF WEAPONS AWAITING DESTRUCTION. IN ANY CASE, THE RATE OF DESTRUCTION WOULD BE DETERMINED SOLELY BY SAFETY AND CAPACITY, THERE WOULD BE NO CALCULATIONS OF MILITARY UTILITY OR PHASING.

9 BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE SECOND CATEGORY OF PROPOSALS INVOLVED JOINT ACTIONS, IN THREE AREAS. WHAT THE US WAS SUGGESTING IN THESE AREAS WAS NOT NEGOTIATIONS BUT DIALOGUE, ON THE SUBJECTS OF SAFE AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE AND DESTRUCTION OF WEAPONS, ON THE SECURITY AND SAFETY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND ON THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. DIALOGUE IN THESE AREAS WOULD BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TECHNICALLY AND WOULD ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY.

10. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THERE WERE TWO AREAS WHERE THE US DID ENVISION NEGOTIATIONS;

--ELIMINATION OF LAND BASED MIRVED ICBMS UNDER START PROCEDURES AND

-- PERMITTING LIMITED ABM SYSTEMS TO DEFEND AGAINST A LIMITED MISSILE ATTACK.

BARTHOLOMEW URGED THE USSR TO VIEW THESE PROPOSALS IN NEW TERMS. ON ABM, FOR EXAMPLE, THE USSR SHOULD BE MORE CONCERNED THAN THE US ABOUT MISSILE PROLIFERATION BECAUSE

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IT WAS CLOSER TO THE POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS.

11. PETROVSKIY THANKED BARTHOLOMEW FOR THE CLARIFICATION. PRESIDENT BUSH'S INITIATIVE HAD RECEIVED AN IMMEDIATE POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YEL'TSIN AND FROM OTHER SOVIET LEADERS. THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE WAS IMPORTANT NOT JUST FOR ITS SUBSTANCE BUT FOR ITS METHODS, THAT IS FOR UNILATERAL MEASURES. PETROVSKIY AGREED WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPANDING DIALOGUE BUT ALSO NOTED THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY IN SOME AREAS. PETROVSKIY DESCRIBED THE NOTION OF UNILATERAL ACTIONS AS A GOOD WAY TO APPROACH NUCLEAR ISSUES IN THE FUTURE. PETROVSKIY SAID THAT THE US COULD GET AN ANSWER SOON, AND THAT THE BARTHOLOMEW VISIT WAS TIMELY. HE SAID HE WAS GOING FROM THE MEETING WITH BARTHOLOMEW TO A MEETING ON THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE.

MEETING WITH PANKIN
12. BARTHOLOMEW, GORDON, STEVE MADLEY, AND EMBASSY NOTETAKER MET WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PANKIN LATER ON OCTOBER 5. THE MEETING WAS DELAYED FOR TWO AND ONE HALF HOURS

BECAUSE PANKIN WAS TOGETHER WITH GORBACHEV AT A MEETING OF THE SOVIET GROUP DEVELOPING A RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. THE BULK OF BARTHOLOMEW'S MEETING WITH PANKIN WAS DEVOTED TO A READING OF AN OUTLINE OF GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE (REFTEL). PANKIN SAID GORBACHEV HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO GIVE IT TO BARTHOLOMEW FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING, PANKIN WELCOMED BARTHOLOMEW AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE USSR ATTACHED TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. PANKIN NOTED THAT THE COMMISSION HEADED BY PRIME MINISTER SILAYEV HAD DEVELOPED A RESPONSE WHICH PANKIN DESCRIBED AS AT LEAST ADEQUATE IN ITS SCOPE TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S INITIATIVE. PANKIN ALSO NOTED THAT (AT BARTHOLOMEW'S SUGGESTION) GORBACHEV WAS TRYING TO CALL PRESIDENT BUSH BEFORE HE DELIVERED HIS SPEECH LATER THAT EVENING.

13. AFTER THE OUTLINE OF THE GORBACHEV RESPONSE HAD BEEN READ, PANKIN AGAIN STRESSED THAT THE USSR HIGHLY EVALUATED THE INITIATIVE OF PRESIDENT BUSH. THE USSR WELCOMED THE CONCEPT OF UNILATERAL MEASURES AND THE NOTION OF JOINT ACTIONS. NEGOTIATIONS IN SOME AREAS, HOWEVER, WERE NOT RULED OUT. PANKIN SAID THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE MET THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE SOVEREIGN REPUBLICS IN THE UNION AND ADDED THAT GORBACHEV HAD DISCUSSED HIS RESPONSE WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YEL'TSIN, WHO AGREED WITH GORBACHEV'S APPROACH.

14. BARTHOLOMEW SAID IT WOULD COME AS NO SURPRISE IF HE STATED THAT IN A MATTER OF THIS IMPORTANCE THE US RESPONSE COULD ONLY COME FROM ONE SOURCE. THAT SAID, HOWEVER, BARTHOLOMEW PERSONALLY RECOGNIZED THE SOVIET STATEMENT AS A SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. BARTHOLOMEW NOTED THAT WHILE HE HAD SOME QUARRELS AND QUESTIONS, THEY COULD BE DISCUSSED THE NEXT DAY. HE WOULD REPORT THE SOVIET RESPONSE IMMEDIATELY TO WASHINGTON. BARTHOLOMEW ADDED THAT HE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED THE EFFORT THAT HAD GONE INTO THIS SOVIET RESPONSE BY PANKIN, BY PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, AND BY PANKIN'S COLLEAGUES. STRAUSS
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