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S/S #

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FROM: JTimbie T 4404 7208
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION TALKING POINTS

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	John Gordon	395-3330	386
DOE	Victor Alessi	586-2102	4B014
DOD/ISP	Stephen Hadley	695-0943	4E838
JCS	General Shalikaskvili	695-4605	2E868
CIA	Douglas MacEachin		

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: ASAP

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Attached are the current drafts of:

- o Points on securing nuclear weapons.
- o Points on START follow-on.
- o The section on security issues in the Secretary's "core points" that will be drawn upon to make up the points for individual meetings.

S.T.


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December 12, 1991

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Initiative on security of nuclear weapons

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- o A number of steps can be taken to rapidly enhance the security of nuclear weapons.
- o 
- o Physical protection of sites where nuclear weapons are stored needs to be maintained at a high level. We look to you to sort out roles and responsibilities, and consider improvements to security and consolidation of weapons in sites that are most secure. We are prepared to discuss this with you as well and provide technical assistance.
- o We are also prepared to assist in the development of a plan for eliminating in a safe, environmentally sound, and transparent manner the nuclear weapons covered by Gorbachev's October 5 statement and by the START treaty, including priorities, schedule, sites where dismantling will be carried out, and transportation plans.
- o We are prepared to share our experience in the establishment of emergency response teams for contingencies such as the loss of control of a weapon or an accident involving a weapon, and work with you on the establishment of similar teams of your own.
- o We hope that operational strategic nuclear forces that are to be eliminated to meet the START levels will be taken off alert and deactivated, by removing and disabling warheads and removing missiles from their launchers. This is something President Bush proposed in his September 27 initiative, and something the US is already doing with respect to its own strategic forces.
- o We know you share with us a sense of both the importance and the urgency of these matters, and we look forward to hearing your ideas.
- o Under Secretary Bartholomew and his team can follow up in Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, and Alma Ata the week of January 13 to engage further with senior political and technical authorities on these issues. We are also working with your people to schedule a meeting of technical experts, and to help prepare for a useful meeting we have provided authorities in Moscow and shared with your people a list of questions.
- o Finally, as you develop your plans for security and elimination of nuclear weapons, we think it would be useful to hold a meeting of senior officials of all concerned -- republics, military authorities, and US officials -- to discuss your plans and how the US can be of assistance in implementing them. Setting a date for this meeting can be one of the outcomes of the discussions with Under Secretary Bartholomew in January.

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December 11, 1986

START follow-on

- o I would like to discuss two issues concerning strategic nuclear forces:
 - How START can help realize the desire of Ukraine and Belarus to become nuclear free, and
 - The proposals of both sides for further steps beyond START.
- o On the first, it is for you to decide what forces to eliminate to implement START. If you decide that an early objective is to eliminate the ICBMs in Ukraine and Belarus, the existing START treaty provides a basis for doing that, even without further reductions. All of the ICBMs in Ukraine and Belarus (about 1300 warheads) can be eliminated as part of the START reductions; in this case missiles with another 3200 warheads would be eliminated in Russia and Kazakhstan. As you know, President Bush called for accelerated dismantling of those ICBMs scheduled for elimination under START, and we are doing that.
- o With regard to steps beyond START, President Gorbachev has proposed further reductions in the overall levels of the forces of both sides. President Bush has proposed eliminating those systems we view as the most destabilizing -- multiple-warhead ICBMs. But elimination of MIRVed ICBMs can be accomplished in the context of moving to lower force levels on both sides.
- o Some on your side have asked for additional restrictions on US submarine-launched ballistic missiles, since MIRVed ICBMs play a larger role in Soviet forces than in US forces.
- o We are prepared to take a substantial step to meet your concern. If it will help you to agree to eliminate MIRVed ICBMs we are prepared to limit the number of high-yield warheads deployed on our Trident force to fewer than we plan.
- o Under this approach, all SS-18, SS-19, and SS-24 ICBMs in Russia would be eliminated, as would all SS-18 ICBMs in Kazakhstan and all SS-19 and SS-24 ICBMs in Ukraine. These missiles carry several thousand nuclear warheads. In addition, all SS-17 ICBMs would be downloaded or eliminated.
- o The approach I have outlined today would enhance stability, build on START to further reduce strategic forces on both sides, and eliminate a number of expensive and unnecessary Soviet military programs.
- o Urge you to give it serious consideration; want to follow up on this promptly, during the meetings of your officials with Bartholomew in January.

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- 3 -

- However, there are also some disturbing aspects:
 - It does not contain mechanisms for the democratic processes of parliamentary consideration and approval.
 - It is not clear how the Commonwealth would generate the political consensus for proceeding, on a collaborative basis, with such key economic matters as control of budgetary deficits, monetary emission and bank credit, all of which are vital to a successful macroeconomic stabilization program.
 - It also appears to lack any plans for institutions and capability to engage effectively with the international community in both the economic and security spheres such as debt and arms control obligations.
- Regardless of what basis is chosen to order the relationship among the republics, there are a number of considerations that must be taken into account.
 - For instance, there cannot be a moment's uncertainty about strategic nuclear weapons and who controls them. They must not become an object of political quarrelling.
 - As long as the Soviet military retains its identity, it will also need a unified command structure that is responsible to civilian authority.
 - The Soviet diplomatic infrastructure (experienced diplomats, Embassies abroad) is another valuable asset that would be difficult to build again from scratch.

SECURITY

- It is critically important to maintain all Soviet nuclear weapons -- regardless of where they are located -- under safe, secure and unified control. This is without prejudice to the political relationships among republics.
- We do not want any proliferation of independent nuclear states, and we welcome the clearly stated intentions of republics such as Ukraine and Belarus to become nuclear free.
- It is in everyone's interest to take prudent steps to enhance the security of nuclear weapons in this period of rapid transition and change.
- In addition, the implementation of Gorbachev's October 5 commitments and of START will result in the dismantling of thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons.

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- 4 -

- There have already been some initial discussions between Under Secretary Bartholomew and his team and a team including representatives of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan on the safety, security and dismantling of thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons.
- [NOT FOR KYRGYSTAN] We have some ideas which I will begin to outline today, and which you can follow up with Under Secretary Bartholomew and his team in January, where the U.S. is prepared to be of assistance in enhancing the safety and security of nuclear weapons and facilitating dismantling.
- Both the START and CFE treaties must be ratified and implemented as quickly as possible.

-- We welcome the commitments of all concerned to bring into force and implement these two treaties, which will establish the essential framework for strategic stability and European security well into the next century.

- For CFE to be viable, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine need to be full participants; we made that clear to the Senate as part of our ratification process. With full independence they should become states-party to the CFE treaty. We strongly urge that all republics in the area of application participate.
 - START reduction and inspection obligations cover weapons and facilities on the territory of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. START is a bilateral treaty, and it may be that the Commonwealth can be the appropriate entity to assume the Soviet Union's obligations under START. But we will look to all these four republics to ensure that the obligations are fulfilled.
 - [NOT FOR KYRGYZSTAN] We are prepared to discuss this with you in detail in the Bartholomew talks in January.
 - Another area in which I believe we can find common cause in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical and biological.
- We all need to make sure that the rapidly deteriorating economic situation will not result in any unauthorized exports of weapons, technology or know-how.
- We are prepared to help you design and implement effective export controls to prevent this from happening.

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MAR 21 2016