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GENEVA FOR NST DELEGATION

~~SECRET~~ TAGS: PARM, PREL, UR
SUBJECT: BARTHOLOMEW VISIT TO MOSCOW: FOLLOW-UP

~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY
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2. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OBUKHOV REPORTED IN VERY POSITIVE TERMS TO FOREIGN MINISTER PANKIN ON THE RECENT BARTHOLOMEW CONSULTATIONS, CHARACTERIZING THEM AS THE START OF A "NEW ERA," ACCORDING TO AN OBUKHOV STAFFER. IN AN OCTOBER 10 MEETING WITH POLOFF, THE STAFFER PRESSED FOR DECISIONS ON NEXT STEPS IN THE U.S.-SOVIET ARMS REDUCTION DIALOGUE, INCLUDING A SUMMIT. HE SAID THE SOVIET MILITARY WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTIES DISCUSSING POST-START FORCE STRUCTURES DUE TO THE MANY UNCERTAIN FACTORS LIKELY TO INTERVENE OVER THE NEXT SEVEN YEARS, BUT THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE MIGHT USE CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURES AS A JUMPING-OFF POINT. THE STAFFER SAID THE GAPS SYSTEM, AS DESCRIBED BY U.S. DELEGATION MEMBERS IN MOSCOW, WAS NOT VIEWED BY THE SOVIETS AS CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE ABM TREATY, AND WAS BEING STUDIED HERE WITH INTEREST. HE SAID THE REPUBLICS' ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL DELIBERATIONS WAS PASSIVE AT PRESENT, BUT LIKELY TO GROW AS GREATER EXPERTISE WAS DEVELOPED.

END SUMMARY.
OBUKHOV: "NEW ERA"
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3. IN RESPONSE TO POLOFF'S REQUEST FOR TEXT OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OBUKHOV'S OCTOBER 8 PRESS CONFERENCE REMARKS ON THE BARTHOLOMEW TALKS (UNAVAILABLE DUE TO MFA'S FAILURE TO PRODUCE A TRANSCRIPT), ON OCTOBER 10 USA & CANADA ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL MICHAEL BERDENNIKOV SAID THAT OBUKHOV'S REPORT TO FOREIGN MINISTER PANKIN HAD PORTRAYED THE SESSIONS IN A POSITIVE LIGHT. OBUKHOV HAD FELT THE CONSULTATIONS WERE VERY GOOD AND CONSTRUCTIVE, THAT A NEW ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN CREATED, THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO HAGGLING OVER OLD ISSUES, AND THAT A "NEW ERA" HAD BEGUN. THOUGH THE SOVIETS DO NOT FEEL THAT COMPLETE CLARITY HAS BEEN ACHIEVED REGARDING ALL ELEMENTS OF THE NEW RELATIONSHIP IN THE PROCESS OF BEING BORN, THERE IS A DEFINITE PERCEPTION THAT WE ARE IN A NEW STAGE.

NEXT STEPS, ISSUES PENDING

+++++ FOR J5 +++++
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4. BERDENNIKOV URGED THAT SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER PANKIN, AT THEIR NEXT MEETING, SET A DATE FOR THE NEXT BARTHOLOMEW-OBUKHOV CONSULTATION. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS AWAITING A U.S. REPLY ON NEXT STEPS: WHEN, WHERE AND HOW THE DIALOGUE WOULD CONTINUE. HE SOUGHT CONFIRMATION THAT THE GROUP WOULD MEET ALTERNATELY IN CAPITALS. BERDENNIKOV SAID IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO RE-ENGAGE BEFORE DECEMBER. GIVEN THE NEED FOR INTERAGENCY PREPARATIONS, HE ESTIMATED THE SIDES HAD ABOUT A MONTH'S LEEMAY.

5. POLOFF ASKED WHAT ISSUES BERDENNIKOV SAW AS NEEDING RESOLUTION. HE REPLIED THAT THE BARTHOLOMEW-OBUKHOV GROUP WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT ISSUES REQUIRED MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION, AND IN WHAT FORA THIS SHOULD TAKE PLACE. HE CITED NUCLEAR SAFETY ISSUES AS ONE EXAMPLE. REGARDING TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES (TNF), BERDENNIKOV THOUGHT DIALOGUE WOULD CONTINUE ON AN AD HOC BASIS, VIA DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. THE SOVIET SIDE WAS AWAITING A U.S. REPLY REGARDING THE REMOVAL OF AIR-DELIVERED TNF TO CENTRAL STORAGE AREAS; NO UNILATERAL SOVIET MOVES WERE PLANNED IN THIS AREA.

6. REGARDING STRATEGIC FORCES, BERDENNIKOV SAID THE SOVIETS WERE WAITING FOR A U.S. REPLY ON FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER START RATIFICATION; HE SAID NO DEFINITIVE U.S. STATEMENT HAD BEEN HEARD. POLOFF POINTED OUT THAT A COMMITMENT MADE AT PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL WAS PRETTY DEFINITIVE, STATING THAT THE U.S. COMMITMENT REMAINED IN FORCE. BERDENNIKOV NEVERTHELESS APPEALED FOR BT

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AN EXPLICIT U.S. AFFIRMATION THAT THE STRATEGIC STABILITY CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE HELD, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF GORBACHEV'S NEW PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTIONS DOWN TO ROUGHLY 3000 WARHEADS (FYI: GORBACHEV'S ACTUAL WORDS WERE "ROUGHLY BY HALF." END FYI).

DIALOGUE ON FORCE STRUCTURES
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7. POLOFF ASKED HOW BERDENNIKOV FORESAW CONTINUATION OF THE U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE ON POST-START FORCE STRUCTURES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS. BERDENNIKOV SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE A PART OF THE "START-II" TALKS. PRIOR TO START RATIFICATION, HE THOUGHT THE OBUKHOV-BARTHOLOMEW CHANNEL WOULD BE THE CHIEF FORUM FOR DIALOGUE. REGARDING THE DISCUSSION BEGUN IN MOSCOW BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HADLEY AND GENERAL LADYGIN ON FORCE STRUCTURES, BERDENNIKOV SAID HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT, GIVEN THE CURRENT STATE OF FLUX, THE SOVIET MILITARY WOULD FIND IT HARD TO BE SPECIFIC AT THIS JUNCTURE REGARDING WHAT THE CONFIGURATION OF SOVIET FORCES MIGHT BE AT THE END OF SEVEN YEARS. APART FROM THEIR USUAL DIFFICULTIES WITH REVEALING THEIR PLANS, THERE WAS AN ADDITIONAL COMPLICATING FACTOR: THE LIKELIHOOD THAT REDUCTIONS WOULD BE ACCELERATED BY UNILATERAL MOVES AND AGREEMENTS REACHED IN START-II BEFORE THE COMPLETION OF THE SEVEN-YEAR PERIOD. A NEW TREATY MIGHT EVEN COME INTO FORCE BEFORE START-II REDUCTIONS WERE COMPLETED.

8. BERDENNIKOV COMMENTED FURTHER THAT LADYGIN SEEMED TO APPROACH THIS ISSUE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF NUMBERS, WHEREAS HADLEY WAS TAKING A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH WHOSE MATERIAL FOUNDATION COULD BE DEBATED. ASW AND AIR DEFENSES ALSO NEEDED TO BE FACTORED IN TO THE ANALYSIS. THIS HAD BEEN TOUCHED UPON BRIEFLY IN THE MOSCOW SESSIONS, BUT THERE WAS A NEED FOR MORE IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION. BERDENNIKOV THOUGHT THE SIDES SHOULD BEGIN BY DISCUSSING THE FORCES THEY HAVE NOW, RATHER THAN WHAT FORCES THEY MIGHT HAVE AT THE END OF SEVEN YEARS.

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STRATEGIC DEFENSES
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9. POLOFF ASKED BERDENNIKOV'S VIEW ON NEXT STEPS IN THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE AREA. BERDENNIKOV THOUGHT THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE GENEVA TALKS NOW IN PROGRESS, DISCUSSIONS WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY AT A HIGHER POLITICAL LEVEL. HE DID NOT THINK THIS ISSUE COULD BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF START-II, BECAUSE THE SCALE OF STRATEGIC DEFENSES WAS LINKED TO OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL. OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE COMPONENTS OF A SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY COULD ONLY BE CALCULATED ON THIS BASIS SO AS NOT TO UNDERMINE DETERRENCE. MOREOVER, BERDENNIKOV SAID, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER A DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY WAS ACTUALLY NECESSARY. THIS WAS BEING DISCUSSED; THE SOVIET SIDE WAS INTERESTED, AND WANTED TO UNDERSTAND THE LOGIC OF THE ISSUE. IT DID NOT WANT TO SCRAP THE ABM TREATY. BERDENNIKOV SAID THE SOVIETS THOUGHT THAT THE GPALS SYSTEM, AS DESCRIBED IN U.S. BRIEFINGS DURING THE BARTHOLOMEW VISIT, WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE ABM TREATY -- I.E., THE FUNDAMENTAL PROHIBITION AGAINST CREATION OF A TERRITORIAL DEFENSE. SPECIFIC TREATY LIMITS WOULD HAVE TO BE ALTERED, HOWEVER. HE SAID THE SOVIET SIDE WAS EXAMINING THIS ISSUE WITH INTEREST AND TRYING TO UNDERSTAND ITS IMPLICATIONS. ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE QUESTION WAS THE LACK OF RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY, HE SAID; IT WOULD BE HARD FOR GORBACHEV TO SEEK FUNDING FOR SUCH A SYSTEM.

JOINT EARLY WARNING
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10. BERDENNIKOV SAID THAT "AT SOME STAGE" DISCUSSION OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR JOINT EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE, BUT NOT NECESSARILY AT PRESENT. IT HAD ONLY RECENTLY BEEN RAISED. IF THERE WAS INTEREST, DEEP TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY. "UNOFFICIALLY," BERDENNIKOV RECALLED THAT IN CONVERSATIONS WITH U.S. SPECIALISTS DURING A VISIT TO MORAD, HE HAD RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT DESPITE POSSIBLE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES THE U.S. SIDE HAD NO

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TECHNICAL NEED FOR JOINT EARLY WARNING, SINCE ITS MISSILE LAUNCH DETECTION CAPABILITY WAS ALREADY SO GOOD THAT IT COULD DETECT SCUD LAUNCHES IN AFGHANISTAN.

ROLE OF REPUBLICS
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11. IN RESPONSE TO POLOFF'S QUESTION, BERDENNIKOV SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE REPUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES HAD TAKEN NO PART IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE BARTHOLOMEW MEETINGS, IN THE FUTURE HE EXPECTED THERE WOULD BE A NEED FOR COORDINATION WITH THE REPUBLICS ON SOME ISSUES. HE SAID HE THOUGHT GORBACHEV HAD DISCUSSED HIS INITIATIVE IN ADVANCE WITH LEADERS OF THE KEY REPUBLICS, BUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO PRIOR CONSULTATION AT THE WORKING LEVEL, SIMPLY BECAUSE THE REPUBLICS DID NOT HAVE PEOPLE QUALIFIED TO CONTRIBUTE. ONLY THE RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN REPRESENTATIVES HAD ANY PRIOR ARMS CONTROL EXPERIENCE AT ALL.

12. BERDENNIKOV SAID THERE WAS A "CLEAR UNDERSTANDING" THAT THE CENTER WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN ARMS TALKS; HE THOUGHT THIS HAD BEEN AGREED AT A FAIRLY HIGH LEVEL. HE SAID THE REPUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES' PRESENCE WAS WELCOME, EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE NOT YET ABLE TO PLAY MUCH OF A ROLE; THEIR INCLUSION IN THE DELEGATION WAS REASSURING TO THEIR HOME GOVERNMENTS.

13. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION THE SAME DAY, MFA ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION (ALDA) OFFICIAL

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KORTUNOV SAID THE REPUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES HAD ESSENTIALLY BEEN PRESENT AT THE BARTHOLOMEW TALKS AS "GUESTS," BUT THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PROPOSAL THAT ORIGINATED IN ALDA, THE COUNCIL OF REPUBLIC FOREIGN MINISTERS WAS ACQUIRING SIGNIFICANT NEW POWERS. UNDER FOREIGN MINISTER PANKIN'S CHAIRMANSHIP, IT WOULD HAVE TO APPROVE CERTAIN POLICIES AND AMBASSADORIAL APPOINTMENTS. UNDER ITS AUSPICES, SENIOR OFFICIALS WERE WORKING OUT SOVIET POSITIONS. KORTUNOV ALSO NOTED THAT THE "RYZHOV COMMISSION" (ESTABLISHED UNDER THE OLD SUPREME SOVIET AS AN AD HOC COMMISSION TO DISCUSS BROAD SECURITY ISSUES, DISBANDED BY LUK'YANOV, AND NOW RESUSCITATED AT GORBACHEV'S REQUEST) WAS HOLDING FREQUENT MEETINGS WITH BROAD PARTICIPATION BY REPUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS SECURITY ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE REPUBLICS.

14. EMBASSY COMMENT: DESPITE THESE MFA STAFFERS' ANODYNE DESCRIPTION OF THE STATE OF PLAY VIS-A-VIS THE REPUBLICS, OUR SENSE IS THAT REPUBLIC-CENTER ROLES ARE FAR FROM SORTED OUT. KRAVCHUK'S RECENT POLITICAL GRANDSTANDING ON SECURITY ISSUES MAY BE ONLY THE TIP OF AN ICEBERG. WE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT MFA'S BID FOR A COORDINATING ROLE WILL BE ACCEPTED BY ALL. IN FACT, ITS PATRONIZING APPROACH TOWARD SOME REPUBLICS MAY PROVE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IN THE LONG RUN.

ROLE OF ACADEMY OF SCIENCES REPRESENTATIVE
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14. POLOFF NOTED THE PRESENCE IN THE SOVIET DELEGATION OF USA AND CANADA INSTITUTE SCHOLAR ROGOV, AND ASKED WHETHER HIS PROPOSALS REPRESENTED THE VIEWS OF THE SOVIET SIDE. BERDENNIKOV SAID THAT ROGOV HAD TAKEN NO PART IN SOVIET GOVERNMENT PREPARATIONS FOR THE TALKS. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION THE SAME DAY, KORTUNOV TOLD POLOFF THAT ROGOV'S IDEAS DEFINITELY WERE NOT OFFICIAL POSITIONS.

PRESSURE FOR A SUMMIT
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15. AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING, BERDENNIKOV PRESSED REGARDING A POSSIBLE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT. POLOFF ASKED AT WHAT POINT IN THE NEWLY EVOLVING PROCESS THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD VIEW A SUMMIT AS APPROPRIATE. BERDENNIKOV EXPLAINED THAT THE SIDES WERE NOW AT A POLITICAL THRESHOLD BETWEEN DETERRENCE (WHICH STILL EXISTS IN MILITARY TERMS) AND "MUTUAL SECURITY." HE THOUGHT THE SIDES SHOULD BUILD ON THIS, FIND SOME WAY TO EXPRESS IT AT A HIGH LEVEL. THE NEW ERA INVOLVED RESTRUCTURING OF FORCES, RE-THINKING THE TWO COUNTRIES' ROLES IN THE WORLD AND THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ALL THIS WAS VERY

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SUBSTANTIAL AND IMPORTANT IN A CONCEPTUAL SENSE. IF THE SIDES REACHED A NEW UNDERSTANDING, THIS COULD BE THE BASIS FOR A PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL DOCUMENT, EXPRESSING THE NEW CONCEPTS MUCH AS AS NATO HAD EXPRESSED ITS NEW STRATEGY. BERDENNIKOV THOUGHT THAT WORKING OUT THE CONCEPTS FOR THIS NEW SECURITY FRAMEWORK MIGHT BE A THEME FOR DISCUSSION IN THE STABILITY CONSULTATIONS. STRAUSS BT

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