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MINISTER OBUKHOV, MET TWICE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PANKIN, AND HAD MEETINGS AS WELL WITH FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, ALEXANDER YAKOVLEV, RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF LOBOV AND WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM FOUR REPUBLICS (RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BYELORUSSIA, AND KAZAKHSTAN).

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INITIAL SOVIET ATTITUDES

EO 12958 DECLASS. AUTHORITY: PARM PREL. US, UR  
SUBJECT: DEBRIEF FOR MAC ON BARTHOLOMEW MOSCOW CONSULTATIONS

-- IN THE UNDER SECRETARY'S FIRST MEETING WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PETROVSKIY, BEFORE GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT, THE SOVIETS APPEARED TO BE EXPECTING THE U.S. TO LINK THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE TO SOVIET ACTIONS.

REF: (A) MOSCOW 28677 (B) MOSCOW 28680 (C) MOSCOW 28712 (D) MOSCOW 28720 (E) STATE 338871

-- BARTHOLOMEW MADE CLEAR THAT THE U.S. INTENDED TO FULFILL THOSE PORTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE WHICH WERE UNILATERAL WHETHER THE SOVIETS FOLLOWED SUIT OR NOT.

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY. MISSION MAY DRAW FROM THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN BRIEFING THE OCTOBER 23 MAC ON U/S BARTHOLOMEW'S OCTOBER 4-8 TRIP TO MOSCOW. END SUMMARY.
3. BEGIN TALKING POINTS

-- IT TOOK DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE U.S. TEAM FOR THE SOVIETS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE U.S. SIDE WAS NOT THERE TO NEGOTIATE, OR SEEK AGREEMENTS, OR SET CONDITIONS. BUT, AS THE MEETINGS CONTINUED, THE SOVIETS DID APPEAR TO INTERNALIZE THIS.

OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY

DIFFERENCES PLAYED DOWN

-- IT BECAME CLEAR IN U/S BARTHOLOMEW'S CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW THAT THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE MARKS A WATERSHED IN THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

-- FOLLOWING GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE, BARTHOLOMEW EXPLAINED TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE DO HAVE DIFFERENCES IN SOME AREAS WITH THEIR PROPOSAL.

-- GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE, WHILE STILL UNDER EVALUATION, INDICATES IN MANY WAYS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE PASSED INTO A

-- THE SOVIETS DID NOT PRESS ON THESE AREAS AND AGREED THAT THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON THE POSITIVE AREAS OF AGREEMENT.

NEW AND NON-IDEOLOGICAL ERA IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

O FOR EXAMPLE BARTHOLOMEW TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT THE ELIMINATION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF GROUND-LAUNCHED SWF WARHEADS IS A CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENT WHICH MAKES THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISPUTE OVER NO-FIRST-USE (NFU) PALE INTO INSIGNIFICANCE. THEREFORE, IT WAS BETTER NOT TO ENGAGE ON THAT QUESTION, AND THE SOVIETS DID NOT PURSUE IT FURTHER.

- THE NATURE OF BARTHOLOMEW'S DISCUSSIONS WAS DRAMATICALLY DIFFERENT FROM ANY HE HAD HELD EVEN AS RECENTLY AS A FEW MONTHS AGO. THIS WAS TRUE EVEN WHEN HIS INTERLOCUTORS WERE FACES FROM THE PRE-GORBACHEV ERA.

-- HOWEVER IN THE NUCLEAR TESTING AREA RUSSIAN REPUBLIC AUTHORITIES DID SAY THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO GO FURTHER THAN THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL FOR A ONE YEAR MORATORIUM ON TESTING DURING WHICH THE U.S. AND USSR WOULD DISCUSS A CTBT.

-- IT IS CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE HAS SERVED A CATALYTIC ROLE IN BOTH CRYSTALLIZING AND SPEEDING UP DECISIONS WHICH WERE ALREADY UNDERWAY ON SECURITY QUESTIONS, SUCH AS SHRINKING THE SIZE OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES.

-- THEY SAID THEY HAD SOUGHT A UNILATERAL SOVIET DECISION TO END NUCLEAR TESTING.

SCHEDULE

-- U/S BARTHOLOMEW MET FOR TEN HOURS WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN

JOINT STAFF ACTION (U.6.7.N)

INFO CJCS(1); J3:NMCC(1) J3(4) NIDS(1) J4(7)  
 J5(2) J5:CBB-J(1) J5:START-J(1) J5:SOVCEN-J(1)  
 USRMCLC(1) SHAPE LNO(2) J5-CT&S-J(1) J5:CONVNEG-J(1)  
 J33:CMOG-J(1) SECDEF-N(1) DARPA(1) SDIO(8)  
 USDP:FILE(1) ASD:RA(2) USDA:P&L(1) USDA:ADMIN(1)  
 USDA:IP(2) USDA:STNF(1) ASD:PA(1) ASD:PA&E/EP(1)  
 OASD:C3I-INT(1) USDP:PDISP(1) USDP:DASDEUR(2)  
 USDP:DSAA(1) USDP:FMRA(1) USDP:TSPD(1) USDP:SD&S(1)  
 USDP:ESW(1) USDP:START(1) USDP:VP(1) USDP:SFP(1)  
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 USDP:NPP(1) USDP:MN(1) USDP:CF&ACP(2)  
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 USDP:NATOPOL(1) USDP:DSDS&VP(1) DAT-7(1) DIO-WE(1)  
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 +OCSA WASHINGTON DC  
 +CNO WASHINGTON DC  
 +CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
 +NATS PENTAGON WASH DC  
 +DNA WASHINGTON DC//OPAC/OPNA//  
 +FTD WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH//SCIR//  
 +CDRPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF-POG-SB//  
 +SAFE

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O THEIR REASONS FOR THIS WERE LARGE: POLITICAL -- NOT WANTING TO HAVE THE SOLE SITE IN THE SOVIET UNION (NOVAYA ZEMLYA) FOR NUCLEAR TESTING LOCATED IN RUSSIA -- AND ENVIRONMENTAL.

O THE RUSSIANS ALSO SAID THEY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED GREATER PROPOSED CUTS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

NEED FOR MORE INFORMATION

-- THERE ARE STILL AREAS WHERE MORE CLARIFICATION IS NEEDED.

O FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS DID NOT MAKE CLEAR WHAT SOVIET STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS WOULD REMAIN AFTER THE CUTS GORBACHEV ANNOUNCED ARE MADE.

-- THE SOVIET LACK OF CLARITY MAY NOT BE MOTIVATED BY COYNNESS, BUT BECAUSE THEY SIMPLY HAD NOT HAD TIME TO FIGURE OUT MANY DETAILS.

-- PRESIDENT BUSH, THE SOVIETS POINTED OUT, HAD HAD SIX

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WEEKS SINCE THE AUGUST COUP TO FORMULATE HIS INITIATIVE. THE SOVIETS HAD ONLY HAD A FEW DAYS SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT.

## UNILATERAL STEPS

-- BOTH SIDES ARE NOW COMMITTED TO A NUMBER OF UNILATERAL STEPS, PARTICULARLY ON TACTICAL AND NAVAL WEAPONS, WHICH WILL INVOLVE NO NEGOTIATION OR VERIFICATION MEASURES.

-- THE SOVIETS APPEARED VERY WORRIED ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO DESTROY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A TIMELY WAY. THEY WERE APPARENTLY CONCERNED THAT, BECAUSE THEY HAVE MORE WEAPONS AND LESS EFFECTIVE DESTRUCTION FACILITIES, THEY WOULD LAG BEHIND US IN THE DESTRUCTION PROCESS.

- UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. TOO, WOULD HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL BACKLOG OF WEAPONS TO DESTROY.

O WE PLAN TO DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIETS METHODS OF SAFE, ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE DISMANTLEMENT AND DESTRUCTION.

-- THE SOVIETS PROPOSED THAT WE BOTH AGREE ON PROCEDURES AND TIMETABLES. WE REFUSED THIS SUGGESTION, NOTING THAT AS THE PROPOSALS ARE FOR UNILATERAL ACTION, IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO SEEK TO CONFORM OUR PROCEDURES AND TIMETABLES.

## INFORMATION EXCHANGE

-- WHILE THE U.S. IS NOT CONSIDERING VERIFICATION OR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES BARTHOLOMEW TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE WILL PROVIDE A WIDE VARIETY OF INFORMATION ON OUR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY.

O AS AN EXAMPLE HE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM NAVAL VESSELS IN 8-9 MONTHS.

O FURTHER HE SAID THAT GROUND-LAUNCHED SNF WARHEADS SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE U.S. WITHIN THE NEXT THREE YEARS.

-- THE U.S. WILL PROVIDE MUCH MORE INFORMATION IN THIS VEIN SUCH AS WHEN WITHDRAWALS BEGIN, WHAT THE STATUS OF THE PROCESS IS WHEN IT ENDS, WHEN AND WHAT DISMANTLEMENTS WOULD TAKE PLACE, ETC.

-- BARTHOLOMEW TOLD THE SOVIETS IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR THEM TO DO THE SAME, BUT THAT THE U.S. INTENDS TO PROVIDE THIS SORT OF INFORMATION REGARDLESS.

## DESTRUCTION, SECURITY, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

-- GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE PICKED UP ON TWO PARTS OF OUR THREE PART PROPOSAL FOR DISCUSSION OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION ON SAFE STORAGE, TRANSPORT AND DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS; PHYSICAL SECURITY AND SAFETY; AND NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL.

- THE SOVIETS DID NOT PROPOSE DISCUSSION SPECIFICALLY ON COMMAND AND CONTROL.

-- THIS COULD SIMPLY REFLECT A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING ON THEIR PART OF THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THESE THREE SUBJECTS

-- WE WILL EXPLORE THIS FURTHER WITH THEM, AND WE CONTINUE TO PLAN TO DISCUSS ALL THREE SUBJECTS WITH THEM.

## ABM TREATY/GPALS

-- ONE OF THE MOST POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE SOVIETS' RESPONSE WAS THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES, INCLUDING GPALS

-- THE U.S. BRIEFING ON GPALS LED TO AN ANALYTIC AND INFORMATIVE EXCHANGE, NOT, AS PREVIOUSLY, POLEMICAL DENUNCIATIONS BY THE SOVIETS.

-- THE SOVIETS ASKED A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT QUESTIONS, SUCH AS HOW GPALS CAPABILITIES WOULD BE LIMITED, THAT DEMONSTRATE NEW SOVIET THINKING.

## STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS

-- WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT BOTH SIDES ARE NOW CALLING FOR FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC FORCES.

O SOVIET PROPOSALS ON STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS -- 50 PERCENT CUTS IN THE START NUMBERS -- SHOW THE SERIOUSNESS WHICH THEY ATTACH TO THIS PROCESS.

-- THE U.S. HAS A CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCE WITH THE SOVIETS ON THIS. WHILE BOTH PROPOSALS WOULD LEAD TO REDUCTIONS OUR PROPOSAL IS BASED ON QUALITATIVE REDUCTIONS IN FORCES (NO LAND-BASED MIRVED ICBMS), AS OPPOSED TO THE SOVIETS' NUMERICAL APPROACH

-- AS WITH GPALS, THE WHOLE DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC ISSUES WAS ANALYTIC RATHER THAN POLEMICAL.

-- CLEARLY, FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON POST-START FORCE STRUCTURES WILL BE REQUIRED.

## ADNW

-- THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR RECIPROCAL WITHDRAWALS OF AIR-DELIVERED NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ADNW) FROM THEIR OPERATIONAL UNITS AND STORAGE IN CENTRAL SITES IS INTERESTING AND DEMONSTRATES THE NON-PROPAGANDISTIC NATURE OF THE SOVIET RESPONSE IN THAT IT DID NOT CALL FOR ADNW WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE.

-- BARTHOLOMEW SEVERAL TIMES TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AT THIS PROPOSAL IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS, IN PARTICULAR OUR NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE. A POINT THE SOVIETS DID NOT CONTEST.

-- THE U.S. IS NOW STUDYING THIS PROPOSAL.

-- FOR OUR PART, IT IS ESSENTIAL, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT NATO RETAIN AN EFFECTIVE, AIR-DELIVERED NUCLEAR DETERRENT.

O DOING SO REQUIRES CONTINUED SHARING OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS DETERRENT.

O IN PARTICULAR, WE WILL NOT ACCEPT PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD PLACE ALL OF NATO'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ANY SINGLE COUNTRY, NOR WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THEIR WITHDRAWAL TO THE U.S.

## CTBT

-- BARTHOLOMEW TOLD THE SOVIETS THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM WAS FAMILIAR AND THE ENVISAGED CTBT IS A PROBLEM.

O TESTING IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND RELIABILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- WE BELIEVE THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP SAW THIS ISSUE ENTIRELY IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS.

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- THE FORCED CLOSING OF THE SEMIPALATINSK TEST SITE IN KAZAKHSTAN LEAVES ONLY NOVAYA ZEMLYA IN RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIANS DO NOT WANT TO BE ISOLATED.

O DESPITE RUSSIAN PRESSURE, THERE WAS CLEARLY AN ELEMENT ON THE SOVIET TASK FORCE WHICH ARGUED THAT NUCLEAR TESTING COULD NOT BE ENTIRELY HALTED ON A UNILATERAL BASIS -- THUS, THE SOVIETS PROPOSED A ONE YEAR MORATORIUM ON TESTING FOR THE SIDES TO EXPLORE FURTHER LIMITS.

-- IN RESPONDING TO THIS ELEMENT OF THE SOVIET PACKAGE, BARTHOLOMEW POINTED OUT THE NEED TO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND RELIABILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE BASIS FOR OUR NEED TO CONTINUE TESTING.

NFU  
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- WE WANT TO DEFLECT THE NFU PROPOSAL AS A COMPLICATED POLITICAL/PHILOSOPHICAL IDEA NOT WORTH WASTING TIME OR ENERGY ON. THE U.S., RATHER, WOULD STICK WITH ITS NO-FIRST-USE-OF-MILITARY-FORCE-OF-ANY-KIND POLICY. THE SOVIETS, IN FACT, EXPRESSED SOME INTEREST IN THIS POLICY.

O FOR EXAMPLE, THEY ASKED FOR CITATIONS OF AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENTS OF THE U.S. APPROACH.

NUCLEAR CONTROL  
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-- BARTHOLOMEW MET SEPARATELY WITH THE FOUR REPUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES (WHO ATTENDED ALL THE SESSIONS OF THE BARTHOLOMEW/OBUKHOV GROUP) TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF CONTROL OVER SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- HE TOLD THEM THAT IT WAS NOT OUR PLACE TO INTERFERE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CENTER-REPUBLIC RELATIONS BUT THAT THE U.S. DID HAVE A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN THE CONTROL OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BOTH BECAUSE OF OUR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY AND COMMITMENTS AND BECAUSE OF THE IMPACT THIS WOULD HAVE ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

-- HE STRESSED TO THEM THAT THE U.S. POLICY WAS THAT ONLY

ONE NUCLEAR POWER CENTER SHOULD EMERGE FROM THE OLD SOVIET UNION -- THE U.S. IS OPPOSED TO THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR POWERS.

O THIS STATEMENT, HOWEVER, WAS NOT MEANT TO PREJUDICE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REPUBLICS AND THE NEW UNION.

-- BARTHOLOMEW EXPLAINED THAT U.S. OPPOSITION TO PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR STATES IS DIFFERENT FROM THE REPUBLICS HAVING A SAY ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORY.

-- HE CONCLUDED WITH AN EXPLICIT WARNING -- ANY REPUBLIC WHICH THOUGHT IT MIGHT GAIN BARGAINING LEVERAGE THROUGH POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS WRONG. THE REALITY WOULD BE THE REVERSE.

-- BARTHOLOMEW LATER RECEIVED A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE UKRAINIAN REPRESENTATIVE.

REPUBLIC-CENTER RELATIONS  
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-- REPUBLIC PARTICIPATION SHOWS CLEARLY WHAT A NEW WORLD THIS IS FOR THE SOVIETS.

-- OBUKHOV WAS NOT SURE HOW TO INCORPORATE REPUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES INTO HIS DELEGATION NOR OF HOW MUCH TO ENCOURAGE THEIR PARTICIPATION.

-- IT BECAME APPARENT IN THESE MEETINGS THAT THE WEST NOW

HAS ENORMOUS AUTHORITY IN THE SOVIET UNION.

-- IN THE PROCESS OF TURNING FROM AN ADVERSARIAL TO AN AMICABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR, THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE AND OTHER STEPS TAKEN BY THE U.S. HAVE MADE A GREAT CONTRIBUTION.

U.K. OR FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES  
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-- U.K. AND FRENCH FORCES WERE ONLY RAISED IN GORBACHEV'S SPEECH. IN OUR VIEW THE SOVIETS SAID THE MINIMUM THAT COULD BE EXPECTED, GIVEN THEIR PAST POSITIONS.

-- TO REINFORCE OUR CONTINUED REJECTION OF ANY INCLUSION OF ALLIED NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS, BARTHOLOMEW TOLD PANKIN HOW MUCH WE APPRECIATED THE FACT

THAT THEY HAD NOT REVERTED TO THE ABRASIVE POLICIES OF THE PAST OR SUGGESTED ANY KIND OF LINKAGE TO PARTICIPATION BY U.S. ALLIES IN THEIR PROPOSAL BUT HAD SIMPLY STATED THAT OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD DO WHAT THEY CAN. EAGLEBURGER BT

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