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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:

MAR 21 2016

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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D SH GC LHM
1820

MESSAGE NO 074444 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 8

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(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Draft points for next week's meetings

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
DOD/ISP	<u>Stephen Hadley</u>	695-0943	4B-838
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FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

OSD 3.3(b)(2)

REMARKS: ASAP

Cys: PD
NF+ACP
SDS+VP
CF+ACP
ENP
ISA
LD

S/S Officer: [Signature]

Department of Energy Declassification Review

1st Review Date: 11/1/13 Authority: DC DD Determination: (Circle Number(s))
 1. Classification Retained
 2. Classification Changed To:
 3. Contains No DOE Classified Info
 4. Coordinate With:
 5. Declassified
 6. Classified Info Bracketed
 7. Other (Specify)

2nd Review Date: 11/4/13 Authority: [Signature]

13-M-7499
DOC # 100

Attached are draft points for next week's meetings, except for the subjects that are still being worked (experts discussions, force structures, defenses, and single collective control). Please get me any comments by COB Thursday.

J.T.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAR 21 2016

November 19, 1991

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Points for November 25-26 Bartholomew/Obukhov

- o Welcome to Washington. Special welcome to the members of your team who represent the republics of Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan. Your presence reflects the positive developments in the former Soviet Union, and we welcome your participation.
- o We regard this as the continuation of the exchanges we began in Moscow in early October. Our primary task is to facilitate the implementation of the commitments made by President Bush on September 27 and President Gorbachev on October 5.
- o We have an agreed agenda that includes both further discussion of the issues we discussed in Moscow, and non-proliferation. My proposal is that we begin now with the issues related to implementation of the President's initiative. Today's meeting can run until about 6:30. We can continue tomorrow morning beginning at 9:00.
- o Tomorrow afternoon we could turn to non-proliferation. Wednesday you and I can keep free; perhaps smaller groups could continue their discussions.

Information on US withdrawal and elimination

- o On September 27, President Bush announced a number of US unilateral initiatives, including elimination of our entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons, and withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from ships and attack submarines, as well as nuclear weapons associated with land-based naval aircraft.
- o In Moscow I provided preliminary information on our plans to implement these unilateral steps. Today I would like to give you a status report, and I look forward to hearing information from you on your plans to implement the steps announced by President Gorbachev on October 5.
- o Based on plans drawn up by our military commanders, we now project that: (refer to handout charts)
 - Nuclear artillery shells will be withdrawn to US territory by September 1992.
 - LANCE missile nuclear warheads will be withdrawn to US territory by December 1993.
 - Nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from surface ships and attack submarines to US territory by June 1992.

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- Nuclear weapons associated with land-based naval aircraft will be withdrawn to US territory by September 1992.
- Dismantling of these warheads will begin _____ and will be completed by _____.
- o Concerning the changes that President Bush made in our strategic programs:
 - All of our strategic nuclear bombers have been removed from alert.
 - All of our Minuteman II ICBMs -- the ICBMs to be eliminated under START -- have been removed from alert.
 - The Strategic Air Command is currently developing timetables for accelerating Minuteman II reductions (removal of the missiles and warheads and elimination of the silos) once START is ratified.
 - The Peacekeeper rail garrison program, the mobile portion of the small ICBM program, and the follow-on short-range attack missile (SRAM II) program were terminated immediately after the President's September 27 speech.
 - The US is finalizing plans for a new Strategic Command to consolidate control of all US strategic forces.
 - We estimate that the new command will commence operation on June 1, 1992, and be fully operational by December 31, 1992.
- o As for the elimination of nuclear weapons:
 - Warheads to be eliminated will first be transported from their deployed locations to military operated storage sites within US territory. We have adequate capacity to store these weapons.
 - Once in these storage facilities, weapons will formally be "retired" (which is to say they will be administratively removed from the operational stockpile). Because the dismantlement facility at the Department of Energy's Pantex plant does not have sufficient storage capacity, we expect these retired weapons to remain in military storage facilities awaiting their turn to be transported to Pantex (Amarillo, Texas) for dismantlement.

- We are currently developing a transportation and dismantlement plan to manage the movement of weapons to be eliminated from storage in the continental US to Pantex.
- While planning continues, the Department of Energy is moving quickly to increase Pantex's capacity for weapons dismantlement by building new facilities, purchasing necessary equipment, and training personnel to carry out dismantlement procedures.
- o We will provide additional information on our progress at future meetings.
- o I look forward to hearing your report on the progress of the Soviet side in carrying out the steps announced by President Gorbachev.

Experts discussions of safe elimination of nuclear weapons, improving nuclear weapons safety and security, and strengthening nuclear command and control

- o President Bush proposed that experts discuss three areas:
 - Safe and environmentally responsible storage, transportation, dismantling, and destruction of nuclear warheads.
 - Physical security and safety of nuclear weapons and how this might be enhanced.
 - Nuclear command and control arrangements, and how these might be improved to provide more protection against unauthorized or accidental use.
- o President Gorbachev included similar discussions in his initiative.
- o Propose that you and I begin the discussion of each of these issues today. At a certain point we can agree to have a smaller group continue the discussion.
- o Before we finish these meetings tomorrow, we can discuss how best to continue to pursue these discussions.

(Points to be provided)

Strategic nuclear force structure and modernization plans

- o In Moscow we began discussion of strategic nuclear force structures and modernization plans.
- o Our thinking is that such a candid discussion can lead to a shared view of how to improve stability, and will facilitate subsequent discussion of the US proposal to eliminate MIRVed ICBMs and the Soviet proposal to further reduce the levels.
- o Again propose that you and I begin to address this subject, and at a certain point we can ask others to continue in a smaller group.

(Points to be provided)

Defenses and sharing of early warning information

- o The US welcomed President Gorbachev's agreement to discuss the US proposal to permit deployment of limited non-nuclear defenses against limited ballistic missile threats.

(Points to be provided)

Impact of changes in the Soviet Union on CFE, START, and INF

- o The US proposed this agenda item primarily to give you an opportunity to address the effect of the changes in the former union on these agreements.
- o As for the INF treaty, which is in force, we would be interested in hearing your views on how best to implement our rights to inspect former INF facilities located in the Baltics.
- o As for the CFE treaty, as you know the US Senate last week voted overwhelmingly to consent to ratification. The way is now open for the US to ratify this historic agreement very soon.
- o We note the swift agreement in Vienna on the treatment of Soviet forces in the Baltics. This shows that we can work together to resolve issues brought on by the changes in the Soviet Union.
- o The emergence of the republics of Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia poses much more serious issues for the ratification and implementation of CFE. Secretary Baker and I in our testimony before the Senate assured the Senators that to preserve the integrity of the treaty it almost certainly would be necessary for Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia to participate fully in CFE.

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- o We have also sent to the Senate the START treaty, and urged prompt ratification. We expect the Senate will begin action early next year.
- o Again, to preserve the integrity of START it will be necessary that Russia, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan participate fully.
- o The US believes that the CFE and START treaties continue to be vital to the security of both our countries, and we urge the Soviet side to ratify and implement them as soon as possible.
- o We would welcome your views on the ratification and implementation of CFE and START given the changes that have taken place in the former Soviet Union.

Contingency responses

Q. What is your response to Gorbachev's proposal to cease production of weapons-grade fissionable material?

-- As President Bush said in his letter to Gorbachev, this issue will require more detailed study.

Q. What is your response to Gorbachev's proposal to withdraw from combat units on frontal (tactical) aviation, on the basis of reciprocity, all nuclear weapons (gravity bombs and air launched missiles) and place them in centralized storage bases?

-- As President Bush said in his letter to Gorbachev, this issue will require more detailed study and consultations.

-- Last month NATO has announced its decision to reduce significantly the number of air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons in its stockpile.

-- Urge you to substantially reduce the number of Soviet air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons as well.

Q. What is your response to Gorbachev's proposal to eliminate fully, on the basis of reciprocity, all tactical nuclear weapons of naval forces?

-- The US plans to eliminate about half of the nuclear weapons withdrawn from our naval forces, and store the remainder in central locations.

-- As I told you in Moscow, the US has concluded that global stability is best served if the US maintains the option of deploying naval tactical nuclear weapons.

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- This requirement is not particularly directed at the Soviet Union. This capability is especially important in light of the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The availability of tactical naval weapons provides a credible deterrent against such weapons.

Q. What is your response to Gorbachev's proposal for a joint declaration of all nuclear powers on no first use of nuclear weapons?

- The US prefers the doctrine of "No use of force" to settle international disputes. If all sides eschew the use of military force, the question of nuclear weapons does not arise.
- The NATO alliance affirmed this doctrine in the London Declaration, when it said "we will never in any circumstances be the first to use force."
- I note that the London declaration also made clear that in a transformed Europe, nuclear forces will be "truly weapons of last resort."

Q. Does the United States intend to take action in response to the one-year moratorium on nuclear testing announced by Gorbachev?

- The US will continue to test as required for its security to ensure the reliability, safety, security, and survivability of the US nuclear deterrent.
- Nuclear deterrence continues to play a critical role in US national security strategy. The President has proposed dramatic cuts in the numbers and kinds of nuclear weapons. His initiative will reduce the size and nature of US nuclear deployments world-wide and take advantage of the recent dramatic changes in the former Soviet Union. This could have some impact on nuclear testing.
- As we undertake this initiative to reduce our nuclear deterrent to make it smaller and to enhance stability we must ensure that it remains credible.

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Q. When will the United States be prepared to begin negotiations on the "next step" in nuclear testing?

- The US remains committed to a step-by-step process, and to further negotiations on nuclear testing.
- The US tests only as required for its security to ensure the reliability, safety, security, and survivability of the US nuclear deterrent. The President's initiative will reduce the nuclear deterrent and enhance stability. This could have some impact on nuclear testing.
- With respect to our current efforts, our Presidents have agreed to the need for a dialog on the safety, security, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. For the present, we should focus our efforts on these areas of cooperation.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
AUTHORITY: 1.1.1 FOR
OHR: 1.1.1 FOR & DeClass OIR: 1.1.1 FOR
Date: **MAR 21 2016**

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS ^{5 USC 8512}
Date: 21 MAR 2016 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(2)
MDR: 13 -M- 3499

~~SECRET~~