

~~SECRET DRAFT~~16 October 91 ^{SH}XVII.9F
20BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING INITIATIVE-

(U) On September 27, 1991, President Bush stated, "To foster cooperation, the United States soon will propose additional initiatives in the area of ballistic missile early warning."

(U) President Gorbachev said in his October 5 speech, "We propose to the U.S. side also to examine the possibility of creating joint warning systems against a surprise nuclear missile strike containing ground and space based elements."

I. Purpose of Paper

~~(S)~~ The purpose of this scope paper is to establish a USG work plan to assess options for an early warning initiative in the context of moving forward on the deployment of defenses to protect against limited ballistic missile attacks.

~~(S)~~ This paper does not deal with the sharing of GPALS sensor information with allies and friends. The USG, in briefing allies on GPALS, has said that we would be willing to share information of this kind with allies. The USG is likely to be willing to share more and better information with allies, and sooner, than with the Soviets.

II. Work Plan

~~(S)~~ The work plan which follows is time-phased, both with regard to the deadlines for internal USG work and with regard to the sequence for unfolding discussions and near- and far-term options with the Soviets:

- Soviet Early Warning Capabilities/Limits - IC - 30 October
 - .. Include assessment of what U.S. is willing to tell Soviets about what we know regarding their capabilities and limits
- U.S. Early Warning Capabilities/Limits - Joint Staff (with USSpaceCom) - 30 October
 - .. Include assessment of what U.S. is willing to tell Soviets about our capabilities and limits
- Agenda for discussions with Soviets - OSD/ISP/SDP (with Joint Staff and others) - 7 November
- Options - OSD/ISP/SDP (with Joint Staff and others) - 7 November (can involve: information (providing Soviets with various levels of information only); expert advice on improving Soviet early warning capabilities (short of hardware or software; in such areas as maintenance and logistics, production, algorithm development, processing); joint operations; and/or hardware/software assistance (actual transfer of technology)).

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.. Near-term Options
(Given current U.S./Soviet capabilities)

- ... Assess options in light of:
- contribution to objective of encouraging deployment of defenses
 - degree of information or technology disclosure required
 - degree of U.S. direct control of systems generating information, processing of information, transmission of information
 - bounds on information (such as limits on origin/destination of launch event; detail of information;
 - impact on present operational practices
 - other advantages/disadvantages

.. Far-term Options

III. Fora/ Interface

76) Building on U.S.-Soviet/Republic leaders discussions in Moscow October 5-8, in which missile defenses and early warning were discussed in tandem, the group which handles the early warning initiative should be able to relate the two issues. Follow-on U.S./Soviet discussions on early warning should be conducted in an Experts Working Group on Missile Defense and Early Warning. This Experts Working Group could be under the auspices of the Bartholomew-Obukhov talks or the Stability Talks lead by State/Policy Planning. The Experts Group on the U.S. side would be headed by OASD/ISP with a deputy from the Joint Staff and Principal Experts from State, ACDA and U.S. Space Command. Staff experts from OSD, SDIO, the Joint Staff and the military services would be called in as necessary. The scope of discussions for the Experts Group would include the "how and why" of limited defense deployments (not negotiations) as well as the way in which early warning plays in defenses.

IV. Allied Equities

75) In assessing options, we will need to keep in mind certain allied/friendly equities:

- A. U.K.
- Independent deterrent force; concern about EW of their launches/contribution to Soviet assessment of UK forces
 - Launches of others: Would they get as much info as Soviets?
- B. France
- Independent deterrent force; concern about EW of their launches/contribution to Soviet assessment of French forces
 - Launches of others: Would they get as much info as Soviets?

JS 1.4(b), (d)

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V. Implementation after Approval [TBD]

JS 1.4(b),(d)

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Reason: 1.4(b),(d)
MDR: 13 -M- 3469

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