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NATO PASS TO A/S HADLEY FOR SECDEF CHENEY

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 03 2015

~~E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR~~
TAGS: PREL, UR, NATO, UK

SUBJECT: FOUR POWER MEETING: U.S. VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS

REF: (A) PARIS 33032 (NOTAL); (B) USNATO 5695; (C) USNATO 5696; (D) USNATO 5716; (E) USNATO 5726

~~(CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: THE USG HAS CONSIDERED THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WEEKEND'S EVENTS IN THE FORMER USSR AND THE FRENCH MESSAGE ON A POSSIBLE FOUR-POWER MEETING. THE US BELIEVES THAT THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE A FULL DISCUSSION AT THE DECEMBER 19 NAC MINISTERIAL OF THE STATUS OF SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES AND OF NEXT STEPS FOR ADDRESSING OUR CONCERNS. WE BELIEVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE FRENCH PROPOSAL SHOULD INVOLVE ALL THE ALLIES. AT THE DECEMBER 20 NACC THE ALLIANCE CAN, CONSISTENT WITH THE ROME SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, PRESS ITS CONCERNS AND DISCUSS HOW THE CONSTITUENT PARTS OF THE FORMER USSR CAN BEST RESPOND TO THEM. EMBASSIES LONDON AND PARIS SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN INFORMING HMG AND GOF OF THE U.S. POSITION ON ADDRESSING SOVIET NUCLEAR SECURITY AND CONTROL QUESTIONS.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 03 SEP 2015 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C. 552a
Declassify: Deny in Full: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-3460

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EMBASSIES SHOULD NOT/NOT LEAVE A COPY OF THE POINTS
BEHIND. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.

SOVIET SITUATION UNCLEAR
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3. THE SITUATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION IS
EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND AND FUTURE
DEVELOPMENTS ARE IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT. THE DECLARATION
OF MINSK HAS USHERED IN A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY BETWEEN
THE RESIDUAL CENTER AND THE REPUBLICS. WE CANNOT SAY WHAT
THE OUTCOME WILL BE, OR HOW LONG THE CURRENT STATE OF
AFFAIRS WILL LAST, OR WHAT THE NATURE OF MORE PERMANENT
ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE. IN SUCH A SITUATION, WE ARE VERY
UNCERTAIN ABOUT WHO WOULD BE THE APPROPRIATE INTERLOCUTORS
AND WHAT THE REACTION WOULD BE WITHIN THE FORMER USSR TO
ANY PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING AT FOUR.

ALLIANCE REACTION
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4. THE PROPOSAL FOR FOUR-POWER MEETINGS ON NUCLEAR ISSUES
HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO DIVIDE NATO. IT IS BEING VIEWED AS AN
EFFORT TO CREATE A NUCLEAR CLUB OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCE AND A
NUCLEAR DIRECTORATE WITHIN IT. THE REACTION OF THE
ITALIANS GERMANS, AND OTHER ALLIES TO PRESS LEAKS ABOUT
MEETINGS OF THE U.S., UK. AND FRANCE IS PROOF OF THIS. AT
A TIME WHEN THE NEED FOR ALLIANCE COHESION IS AS GREAT AS
IT HAS EVER BEEN, AND WHEN THE CHANGES IN THE EAST HAVE
PUT GREAT PRESSURE ON ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, WE DO NOT WANT
TO ADD A DIVISIVE ITEM TO THE ALLIANCE'S AGENDA
LEAST OF ALL ONE THAT CONCERNS NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
POLITICAL ROLES.

OPPORTUNITIES TO GATHER INFORMATION AND TO PRESS OUT CONCERNS
.....

5. IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN
MUCH GREATER INSIGHT INTO DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FORMER USSR
-- INFORMATION THAT IS ESSENTIAL TO MAKING INTELLIGENT
DECISIONS ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE. SECRETARY BAKER WILL
BEGIN A TRIP ACROSS THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. DURING THAT
TRIP HE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS HIS INTERLOCUTORS FOR
INFORMATION ON THEIR PLANS FOR SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES AND
SEEK THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED IN THE
NATO SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET
UNION. WE UNDERSTAND BRITISH AND FRENCH OFFICIALS WILL BE
MAKING SIMILAR JOURNEYS AND, WE FULLY EXPECT, WILL MAKE

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SIMILAR POINTS. OFFICIALS FROM OTHER ALLIES WILL ALSO BE IN THE FORMER USSR AND WE URGE THEM TO INCLUDE NUCLEAR SECURITY AND CONTROL ON THEIR AGENDA. IN SUM WE HAVE MEANS AVAILABLE TO US IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO PRESS HOME OUR CONCERNS AND ELICIT INFORMATION ABOUT POST-SOVIET PLANS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THE NAC MINISTERIAL
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6. GIVEN THE DIRECT IMPACT THE NUCLEAR ISSUE HAS ON THE SECURITY OF ALL ALLIES, AS RECOGNIZED AT THE ROME SUMMIT, THE BEST FORUM FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION IS THE DECEMBER 19 NAC MINISTERIAL. AT THAT TIME ALLIES WILL BE ABLE TO SHARE INSIGHTS FROM THEIR RECENT TRIPS TO THE FORMER USSR, WHAT THEY LEARNED, AND THEIR VIEW OF THE PROSPECTS WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR SECURITY AND CONTROL. THE ALLIANCE CAN ALSO USE THE NAC TO DETERMINE HOW BEST TO PROCEED IN THE FUTURE TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED SECURITY OF FORMER SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONRY. WE WOULD URGE FRANCE TO PUT FORWARD ITS PROPOSAL FOR FULL AND FRANK DISCUSSION AT THE NAC. FOR OUR PART, WE WILL BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE ROME SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION; WE WILL REMAIN OPEN TO IDEAS ON HOW TO MARRY THE FRENCH APPROACH WITH WITH THE EFFORT WE HAVE IN TRAIN.
THE NACC
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7. MOREOVER, THE ROME COMMUNIQUE ON THE SOVIET UNION ALSO PROVIDES A SOLID BASIS FOR FORCEFUL INTERVENTION BY NATO MEMBERS DURING THE DECEMBER 20 NACC. THE NACC PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY NOT JUST FOR NATO TO EXPRESS ITS CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT TO ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF THE CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN STATES AS WELL. THE DISCUSSION AT THE NACC COULD INDEED, SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF MINISTERIAL-LEVEL CONCERN AND INTENT TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

BILATERALS
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8. IF EMBASSY INTERLOCUTORS RAISE THE POSSIBILITY OF TRILATERAL MEETINGS, EMBASSIES SHOULD STATE THAT, IN THE RUN UP TO THE NAC AND NACC THE U.S. WOULD PREFER TO HOLD BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH FRANCE AND THE UK TO CONSULT AND SHARE OUR VIEWS ON HOW TO PROCEED. WE ARE VERY SENSITIVE TO THE REACTION ANY TRILATERAL MEETINGS COULD

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INDUCE AMONG OTHER ALLIES AT THIS TIME, GIVEN REACTIONS TO
PUBLICITY ABOUT THE FIRST MEETING. WE DO NOT EXCLUDE THE
POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE MEETINGS AT THREE TO COORDINATE OUR
APPROACHES.

U.S. STANCE ON THE MITTERRAND PROPOSAL
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9. IF ASKED IF THE U.S. IS DEFINITELY REJECTING THE
MITTERRAND PROPOSAL AND ANY MEETING AT FOUR. EMBASSIES
SHOULD REPLY THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH A MEETING
SHOULD BE HELD AT THIS JUNCTURE, GIVEN THE CHANGING
SITUATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND ADVERSE ALLIED
REACTION, BUT THAT WE ARE NOT REJECTING IT .
ALLIED VIEWS WILL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO BE AN IMPORTANT
CONSIDERATION FOR US IN HOW TO PROCEED. BAKER
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