

REQUIRED

~~SECRET SPECAT~~

COPY NUMBER

REVIEWED AND RETURNED TO
RELEASED IN PART 1.4(D)

JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER
+++EXCLUSIVE+++

Xull.9a #48

CS
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TR1
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IMMEDIATE
O 241417Z OCT 91
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9406

ZYUW RUEHMOA0544 2971417

EVERYTHING HE CAN TO DEMONSTRATE HE'S A NATIONAL HERO."

~~SECRET SPECAT~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 30544

~~EXDIS~~ DECAPTIONED

~~E.O. 12958: DECL. OADR~~

TAGS: PREL, NMUC, PARM, UR, US
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] IS WORRIED ABOUT UKRAINE, BUT FEELS
/----- KRAVCHUK MAY BACK OFF AFTER THE REFERENDUM

DOS
1.4(D)

1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)~~

2. SUMMARY. THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT'S OCTOBER 22 DECISION TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF A PLAN TO ESTABLISH A STANDING UKRAINIAN ARMY (SEPTEL) AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BASED IN UKRAINE WAS THE MAJOR THEME OF POLICY PLANNING STAFF MEMBER EINHORN'S OCTOBER 23 MEETING WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHO WILL BE A MEMBER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE MID-EAST PEACE CONFERENCE, SAYS THE UKRAINE'S ACTION IS A SPECIFIC VIOLATION OF UNDERTAKINGS MADE TO [REDACTED] AND RSFSR VICE PRESIDENT RUTSKOY IN KIEV. [REDACTED] IS WORRIED ABOUT THE UKRAINE AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, BUT FEELS KRAVCHUK IS GRANDSTANDING AND MAY BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO REASON AFTER THE DECEMBER 1 REFERENDUM.

3. PERSONALLY, [REDACTED] FEELS THE UKRAINIANS' ASPIRATIONS TO BE INVOLVED IN NUCLEAR ISSUES COULD BE ADDRESSED BY MEASURES SUCH AS ESTABLISHING A CONSULTATIVE GROUP, SIMILAR TO NATO'S NPG, OF THE FOUR REPUBLICS ON WHOSE TERRITORY ICBM'S ARE STATIONED. ON START/CFE RATIFICATION, AND IF UKRAINIAN REPRESENTATIVES DO NOT JOIN THE SUPREME SOVIET, [REDACTED] RECOMMENDS PROCEEDING IN EARNEST ONLY AFTER DECEMBER 1. HE SUGGESTS PUTTING THE ONUS ON THE UKRAINIANS THROUGH U.S. AND WEST EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO THEM, WITH U.S. SENATE ACTION PRECEDING A PUBLIC INVITATION TO THE UKRAINIANS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CENTER'S RATIFICATION OF THE TREATIES. END SUMMARY.

4. UKRAINE'S CONTROL OF FORCES. [REDACTED] SAID THE /----- UKRAINE'S ACTION EXPLICITLY VIOLATES UNDERTAKINGS WHICH HE AND RUTSKOY WERE GIVEN IN KIEV, SPECIFICALLY THAT THE UKRAINE AGREED TO REFRAIN FROM ANY UNILATERAL ACT WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. [REDACTED] SAID THE ACTUAL SITUATION REMAINS TO BE UNCLARIFIED BUT IT APPEARS THAT THE UKRAINIANS ARE IN PROCESS OF NAMING LOCAL ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, AND STRATEGIC ROCKET COMMANDERS. (COMMENT: WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION THIS IS HAPPENING.) [REDACTED] BELIEVES THAT KRAVCHUK, IN THE RUNUP TO DECEMBER 1, IS "DOING

5. EINHORN REVIEWED THE U.S. MESSAGE TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED: THAT ANY SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DISPOSITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND EVEN THEIR USE IS THE BUSINESS OF THE CENTER AND REPUBLICS TO WORK OUT AMONG THEMSELVES, BUT WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT NO REPUBLIC HAVE INDEPENDENT COMMAND AUTHORITY OR CONTROL. THIS WOULD MEAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR OVERALL STABILITY IN THE REGION AS WELL AS FOR THE REPUBLICS' ECONOMIES. [REDACTED] SAID "WE ARE NO LESS CONCERNED," AND SUGGESTED THAT ESTABLISHING AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE FOUR REPUBLICS, ALONG LINES OF NATO'S NPG, WOULD BE ONE WAY OF ACCOMMODATING THE UKRAINIANS' CONCERNS WITHOUT GIVING THEM SUCH INDEPENDENT CONTROL. ALSO, THE UKRAINIANS COULD PARTICIPATE IN A STATE COUNCIL WORKING GROUP ON NUCLEAR DEFENSE, AS WELL AS IN THE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION PARLIAMENT. ASKED IF ANY DISCUSSIONS REGARDING NUCLEAR ARRANGEMENTS WERE ALREADY GOING ON AMONG THE REPUBLICS, AS UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ZLENKO HAD INTIMATED IN WASHINGTON THERE MIGHT BE, [REDACTED] AFFIRMED THERE ARE NO NEGOTIATIONS. EINHORN NOTED THAT RUTSKOY SAID IN A RECENT INTERVIEW WITH "DIE WELT" THAT GORBACHEV AND YEL'TSIN HAD AGREED TO DUAL NUCLEAR CONTROL. [REDACTED] SAID THIS IS CORRECT -- GORBACHEV HAD ASSENTED THE DAY AFTER RETURNING FROM THE CRIMEA -- BUT IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT RUTSKOY WAS TAKING ABOUT IT IN PUBLIC. THIS INVITED BROADER BT

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COMPLICATIONS WHEN A PRIVATE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE SUFFICED.

6. UKRAINIAN MOTIVES. ASKED TO COMMENT ON THE /----- EVOLUTION OF THE UKRAINIANS' INTEREST IN A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE AND JOINING NPT, FOLLOWED BY REFUSAL TO TRANSFER "THEIR" WEAPONS TO RUSSIA, POSTPONEMENT OF AN NWFZ, AND INSISTENCE ON A ROLE IN THE DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS, [REDACTED] ANSWERED FULL-BORE:

-- THE UKRAINE HAS NO TRADITIONS AS AN ESTABLISHED STATE AND NEVER HAD CLEAR BORDERS. ITS CURRENT "ABSOLUTELY ARTIFICIAL" BORDERS WERE MADE WORSE BY ADDITIONS TO ITS TERRITORY IN KHRUSHCHEV'S TIME.

-- MOST OF THE CURRENT UKRAINIAN LEADERSHIP IS "ABSOLUTELY IGNORANT." THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS "LIMITED," AND THEY HAVE A "LOVE/HATE RELATIONSHIP WITH GREAT POWERS."

-- THEY CHANGED THEIR APPROACH WHEN THEY REALIZED THAT UKRAINE'S GREAT POWER STATUS WOULD DEPEND ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- KRAVCHUK AND ZLENKO ARE "CLEVER," HOWEVER, AND MAY BE REASONABLE AFTER DECEMBER 1.

7. START/CFE RATIFICATION. [REDACTED] SAID IT WOULD BE /----- "BIG" -- "FOR US AND FOR YOU" -- TO BEGIN THE RATIFICATION PROCESS WITHOUT UKRAINIAN PARTICIPATION. HE SUGGESTED A FALLBACK POSITION TO A NORMAL UKRAINIAN DELEGATION JOINING THE SUPREME SOVIET: THAT A SPECIAL UKRAINIAN DELEGATION COME TO MOSCOW, PERHAPS AS

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REVIEW FOR DISTRIBUTION TO CINCS
SUBMIT JCS-DSS FORM 30 IF REQUIRED

Classification Extended on:
03/06/2014 ~ Class: SECRET ~
Authority: DSCG 11-1 ~
Declassify on: 10/24/2016

ACTION

INFO CJC5(1) J6(1) J5(1) SECDEF-W
USDP: SPECIAL HANDLING(1) USDA: P&L(1) USDA: AE(1)
USDA: SYNFSAC(1) ASD: PA(2) USDP: CH(1) USDP: PD(1)
DP(1) DD(1) PIO(1) ODB-AC(1) IMM(2) DA: SA(1)
OSC-CI(1) MWS(1) DA-PA(1) DI(1) DIO(1) ODB(1) DIA(0)
+OCSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+NATS PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC
+NARS PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC
+USMAR SHAPE BE//SURVEY//

REVIEW AUTHORITY:
Martin McLean, Senior
Reviewer

MCN=91297/05746 TOR=91297/1810Z TAD=91297/1816Z CDSN=MAU657

~~SECRET SPECAT~~

PAGE 1 OF 2
241417Z OCT 91
03 SECT MSG

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 23 2016

13-M-3447

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+++EXCLUSIVE+++

OBSERVERS, FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF PARTICIPATING IN THE COUNCIL OF REPUBLICS' VOTES ON START/CFE. ASKED ABOUT TIMING, [REDACTED] SAID THE SPECIAL DELEGATION WAS HIS OWN IDEA, BUT THAT NOTHING MUCH COULD BE DONE BEFORE THE DECEMBER 1 REFERENDUM. AFTER THAT, START/CFE RATIFICATION WOULD BE AN "EXCELLENT TEST CASE" OF UKRAINIAN POLICY.

8. [REDACTED] SUGGESTED BRINGING PRESSURE ON THE UKRAINIANS THROUGH APPROACHES BY THE U.S. AND WESTERN COUNTRIES, THEN MOVING TO A RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN DIALOGUE. HE SUGGESTED ANOTHER SCENARIO FOR PUTTING THE ONUS ON THE UKRAINIANS: THE U.S. SENATE WOULD RATIFY, AFTER WHICH THE U.S., WESTERN COUNTRIES, AND RUSSIA WOULD APPEAL TO THE UKRAINIANS TO JOIN IN SUPPORT FOR RATIFICATION. IF THEY FAILED TO DO SO, THE CURRENT SUPREME SOVIET WOULD PROCEED WITH RATIFICATION AND THE UKRAINIANS COULD BE PUBLICLY CRITICIZED.

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9. INTRA-REPUBLICAN CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.

[REDACTED] SAID BETTER ARRANGEMENTS ARE CLEARLY NECESSARY: HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT GORBACHEV HAD SPOKEN WITH YEL'TSIN BEFORE RESPONDING TO THE PRESIDENT'S NUCLEAR INITIATIVE, BUT NOTED THAT YEL'TSIN STILL "NEEDS EDUCATING" ON THE ISSUES AND THAT REAL CONSULTATIONS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE AT LOWER LEVELS. THERE REMAINS A PROBLEM IN GORBACHEV'S WANTING TO DO THINGS WITHOUT MEANINGFUL CONSULTATIONS. AND YEL'TSIN IS BEING PUBLICLY CRITICIZED FOR LACK OF A CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 23 MAR 2016 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C. § 552
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(6)
MDR: 13 -M- 3447

10. MIRV'S. EINHORN NOTED THAT, IN A STATEMENT ISSUED FOLLOWING GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE, KOZYREV HAD SAID THE RSFSR WANTED TO MAKE DEEPER CUTS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. DID THIS MEAN MIRVED ICBM'S? [REDACTED] SAID HE PERSONALLY SUPPORTS ACTIVITY IN SEEKING MIRV REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, THE U.S. "SHOULD DO SOMETHING TO MAKE OUR POSITION MORE FLEXIBLE. YOU SHOULD DO SOMETHING, TOO."

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: **MAR 23 2016**

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E.O. 12356: ~~DECL:OADR~~
TAGS: PREL, MNUC, PARM, UR, SU
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] IS WORRIED ABOUT UKRAINE, BUT FEELS [REDACTED] KRAVCHUK MAY BACK OFF AFTER THE REFERENDUM

11. "FUTURE SECURITY AGENDA" TALKS. THE TALKS, IN WHICH [REDACTED] IS A PUTATIVE PARTICIPANT, WERE A THREAD THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION. [REDACTED] ENDORSED THEM AS A VEHICLE FOR INFLUENCING THE UKRAINIANS AND OTHER REPUBLICS. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT BYELORUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN WOULD BE OFFENDED IF OTHER REPUBLICS WERE INVITED AND THEY WERE NOT, ALTHOUGH HE ACCEPTED THAT REPUBLICS NOT INVITED TO THE FIRST SESSION COULD BE INVITED LATER. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT SOVIET FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PETROVSKIY WOULD NOT INSPIRE CONFIDENCE IN SECURING GOOD REPUBLICAN REPRESENTATION. ALTERNATIVELY, [REDACTED] SAW MERIT IN NOT INVITING UKRAINE TO THE FIRST SESSION, WHICH WILL BE HELD BEFORE THE DECEMBER 1 REFERENDUM. HE RECOMMENDED NAZARBAYEV'S FRIEND SULEJMENOV (PHON) AS A POTENTIAL KAZAKH INVITEE. BROADLY, [REDACTED] EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN THAT HIS FRIEND YAKOVLEV MIGHT BE CONFUSING "APPROPRIATE" REPRESENTATION AT THE TALKS WITH "COMFORTABLE" REPRESENTATION: THE GOAL SHOULD BE TO SEEK "REPRESENTATIVE REPRESENTATION" STRAUSS

BT