

SPECIAL HANDLING
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~~SECRET SPECAT~~

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9467 EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

ACADEMICS WOULD BE INCLUDED; SOMEONE WOULD REPRESENT RUSSIA; THERE WOULD BE MOD PARTICIPATION; AND, PERHAPS, OTHER AGENCIES WOULD ALSO BE REPRESENTED. OBUKHOV SAID PETROVSKIY WAS PLANNING TO DISCUSS ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES WITH THE U.S. SIDE DURING HIS CURRENT TRIP TO NEW YORK AND, POSSIBLY, WASHINGTON.

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5. LATER IN THE MEETING, MAMEDOV ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. GROUP WOULD INCLUDE ONLY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. EINHORN WAS UNSURE, BUT SPECULATED THAT THE FIRST SESSION WOULD PROBABLY ONLY INCLUDE USG PARTICIPANTS.

~~EXDIS~~

AGENDA
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~~E.O. 12958-DECL-ORR~~

TAGS: PARM, PREL, PGOV, MILIC, UR
SUBJECT: EINHORN MEETING WITH SOVIET DEPUTY FM OBUKHOV
OCTOBER 23, 1991

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.

6. OBUKHOV ASKED U.S. THOUGHTS CONCERNING THE GROUP'S AGENDA. EINHORN SAID THAT, INITIALLY, PARTICIPANTS WOULD GET TO KNOW ONE ANOTHER AND SET THEIR OWN FUTURE AGENDA. THE U.S. ENVISIONED OPENING SURVEYS BY EACH SIDE OF THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, ITS OWN ROLE AND INTERESTS, CHALLENGES AND PERCEIVED THREATS. THOUGH MUCH HAD ALREADY CHANGED RADICALLY, THE SIDES STILL VIEWED EACH OTHER TO SOME EXTENT AS A POTENTIAL SECURITY PROBLEM; THEY SHOULD SHARE THESE PERCEPTIONS. OTHER PERCEIVED CHALLENGES MIGHT INCLUDE THIRD-WORLD DEVELOPMENTS, NEW TECHNOLOGIES, IDEOLOGIES, POLITICAL TRENDS, ETC. EINHORN SAID THE SIDES MIGHT ALSO ANALYZE TOGETHER THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENTS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, AS WELL AS CHANGES IN THE USSR ITSELF, WHICH AFFECTED BOTH SIDES.
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~~SUMMARY~~
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2. THE SOVIET SIDE IS STILL CONSIDERING PARTICIPANTS FOR THE U.S.-SOVIET WORKING GROUP ON THE "FUTURE SECURITY AGENDA," ACCORDING TO DEPUTY FM OBUKHOV. SOVIET HESITATION IN CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE ON FORCE STRUCTURES BEGUN BY OBUKHOV AND ASSISTANT SECDEF HADLEY IN MOSCOW STEMS FROM A PERCEPTION THAT CANDOR IN SUCH TALKS WOULD INEVITABLY DRAW THEM INTO REVEALING THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS THAT LIE BEHIND FORCE-STRUCTURE DECISIONS. SOVIET MFA MECHANISMS FOR INTER-REPUBLIC COORDINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY ARE UP AND RUNNING. TEN WORKING-LEVEL REPUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES AGREED ON OCTOBER 22 THAT CFE AND START RATIFICATION BY THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET SHOULD PROCEED. SOVIET SPECIALISTS APPEAR INTRIGUED BY GPALS, BUT ARE FEARFUL THEY COULDN'T AFFORD IT AND APPREHENSIVE OVER POSSIBLE BREAK-OUT CAPABILITY.

~~EXDIS~~

END SUMMARY.

~~E.O. 12958-DECL-ORR~~

PARTICIPATION IN "FUTURE SECURITY AGENDA" WORKING GROUP
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3. S/P OFFICIAL ROBERT EINHORN OPENED HIS OCTOBER 23 MEETING WITH SOVIET DEPUTY FM OBUKHOV BY EXPLAINING THE GOALS, MODUS OPERANDI, AND PLANNED COMPOSITION OF THE U.S.-SOVIET WORKING GROUP ON THE "FUTURE SECURITY AGENDA." DCH AND POLOFF ALSO ATTENDED THIS MEETING ON THE U.S. SIDE; SOVIET PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED USA & CANADA ADMINISTRATION HEAD GEORGIY MAMEDOV AND STAFFER MIKHAIL BERDENNIKOV.

DISCUSSION SHOULD FLOW FREELY DURING THE ONE-AND-A-HALF TO TWO-DAY MEETING, WITH EVERYONE JOINING IN.

7. EINHORN NOTED THAT GROUP PARTICIPATION MIGHT CHANGE FROM ONE GROUP MEETING TO THE NEXT, DEPENDING ON EACH SESSION'S AGENDA. SPECIALISTS COULD PRESENT BRIEFINGS ON PARTICULAR SUBJECTS AT SOME SESSIONS.

4. OBUKHOV, BEHAVING AS THOUGH HE HIMSELF WERE AT THE CENTER OF THE ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE FUTURE SECURITY AGENDA WORKING GROUP, SAID THAT HE, GORBACHEV ADVISER YAKOVLEV AND FIRST DEPUTY FM PETROVSKIY WERE IN THE PROCESS OF IDENTIFYING THE RIGHT PARTICIPANTS. THE MFA HAD OFFERED PROPOSALS TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, BUT OBUKHOV DID NOT YET KNOW WHAT HAD BEEN DECIDED. YAKOVLEV, AS CHAIRMAN, WOULD HAVE THE LAST WORD. NEVERTHELESS, OBUKHOV SAID, HE EXPECTED THE GROUP WOULD INCLUDE PETROVSKIY; HE AND (MFA USA & CANADA ADMINISTRATION CHIEF) MAMEDOV WOULD BE "INVOLVED;" SOME IMPORTANT

8. OBUKHOV SAID THIS CONCEPT WAS VERY ATTRACTIVE, AND THAT THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO FAVORED OPEN DISCUSSION AND A COMPLETELY SINCERE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, EVEN ATTEMPTING TO COORDINATE VIEWS. EINHORN ADDED THAT THE GROUP MIGHT IDENTIFY PROMISING ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN, THOUGH IT WOULD PASS OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO OTHER FORA. OBUKHOV CALLED IT A "JOINT POLICY PLANNING BUREAU."

HADLEY-OBUKHOV TALKS: INHIBITIONS ON FORCE STRUCTURE DISCUSSIONS
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REVIEW FOR DISTRIBUTION TO CINCS
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9. OBUKHOV ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. SIDE ENVISIONED THAT CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS HE HAD HELD DURING THE RECENT BARTHOLOMEW VISIT WITH ASSISTANT SECDEF HADLEY WOULD BE A PART OF THE GROUP'S AGENDA. EINHORN SAID THE U.S. SIDE HAD FOUND THOSE TALKS VERY PROMISING, BUT SUGGESTED THEY WOULD MORE APPROPRIATELY BE CONTINUED IN ANOTHER FORUM. (AT THIS POINT OBUKHOV LEFT BRIEFLY TO TAKE AN "URGENT" CALL FROM THE MOD, WHICH HE LATER EXPLAINED WAS AN EXPRESSION OF CURIOSITY REGARDING HIS MEETING WITH EINHORN.)

ACTION (R.M)
INFO CJCS(1) J6(3) J5(1) SECDEF-H(1)
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USDA:STNFSAC(1) ASD:PA(2) USDP-CH(1) USDP:PD(1)
DR(1) DD(1) PIO(1) ODB-AC(1) IMM(2) DA-SA(1)
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+OCSA WASHINGTON DC
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10. LATER IN THE MEETING, EINHORN EXPRESSED THE PERSONAL VIEW THAT, RATHER THAN MERELY TRADE PROPOSALS ON ELIMINATION OF MIRVED ICBMS VERSUS NUMERICAL REDUCTIONS, THE SIDES SHOULD SIT DOWN AND DISCUSS STRATEGIC FORCE PLANS. THOUGH NEITHER SIDE COULD FORETELL PRECISELY WHAT

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Authority: EO 12958
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WMS
Date: SEP 28 2015

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ITS FORCE STRUCTURE WOULD BE IN SEVEN YEARS, IT WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE FOR COMPETENT MOD REPRESENTATIVES ON BOTH THE SIDES TO SHARE APPROACHES AND PROBLEMS. SUCH AN EXCHANGE WOULD HAVE FACILITATED START DISCUSSIONS ON NEW TYPES, FOR EXAMPLE. IN THE "NEW ERA" OF CANDOR, A FORCE PLANNING DIALOGUE COULD BE USEFUL AND COULD HELP TO RECONCILE BOTH SIDES' APPROACHES TO FURTHER STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL.

11. MAMEDOV SAID THIS WOULD TAKE COURAGE, BECAUSE IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DISCUSS FORCE STRUCTURE WITHOUT ALSO ADDRESSING THE "SACRED" ISSUE OF OPERATIONAL PLANNING. EVERY STRUCTURE WAS DESIGNED TO DO SOMETHING. IN DISCUSSING THE PERCEIVED THREAT, HOW A SIDE WOULD RESPOND TO IT, WHY A SIDE SAW A NEED FOR A PARTICULAR MISSILE, AND WHAT A SIDE WOULD DO WERE SOMETHING TERRIBLE TO OCCUR, THERE WOULD BE A NEED FOR COMPLETE CANDOR.

EINHORN SAID IT NEED NOT BE AS CATEGORICAL AS THAT -- I.E., EITHER COMPLETE OPENNESS OR NOTHING AT ALL. BARRIERS COULD BE BROKEN DOWN GRADUALLY. THERE WERE THINGS MILITARY OFFICIALS ON BOTH SIDES LEGITIMATELY WOULD NOT WANT TO DISCUSS. BUT THE SIDES SHOULD ENDEAVOR TO PUSH THE LIMITS.

12. MAMEDOV AGREED, BUT AGAIN CITED THE INHIBITIONS AGAINST DISCUSSING THE MOTIVATIONS BEHIND CERTAIN FORCE STRUCTURES. OBUKHOV SAID THIS WAS WHY HE SUPPORTED FURTHER TALKS. OBUKHOV ASKED WHAT FORUM THE U.S. SIDE ENVISIONED FOR SUCH AN EXCHANGE, IF NOT IN THE ROSS-YAKOVLEV TALKS. EINHORN CONFIRMED THAT THE U.S. SIDE DID NOT SEE THIS AS A TOPIC FOR THE "FUTURE SECURITY AGENDA" TALKS, THOUGH HE DID NOT HAVE A CONCRETE PROPOSAL. OBUKHOV SUGGESTED THAT, AT THE MADRID MEETING, SECRETARY BAKER MIGHT PRESENT SOME OF THESE IDEAS TO FM PANKIN SO THEY WOULD BE BETTER UNDERSTOOD. THIS WOULD HELP IN ADDRESSING ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS. HE SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW COULD SEND HIM AN UNOFFICIAL LETTER.

INTER-REPUBLIC POLICY COORDINATION
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~~EXDIS~~

~~E.O. 12958-1, DECL. OADR~~

TAGS: PARM, PREL, PGOV, MNUC, UR
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13. IN RESPONSE TO EINHORN'S QUESTION, OBUKHOV DESCRIBED THE STATUS OF CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SOVIET COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, CHAIRED BY USSR FM PANKIN. HE SAID A SECRETARIAT WAS BEING ESTABLISHED, AS WELL AS A STANDING COMMITTEE OF MOSCOW-BASED REPUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES WHICH WOULD COORDINATE FOREIGN POLICY. OBUKHOV ANTICIPATED THAT THIS PROCESS WOULD EXPAND TO INCLUDE SUBJECT-ORIENTED DEPARTMENTS OF THE CENTER AND REPUBLIC MFAS TO ADDRESS PARTICULAR ISSUES AT THE WORKING LEVEL, PREPARING MAJOR ISSUES FOR DECISION BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE STATE COUNCIL. THERE WAS A NEED FOR A COORDINATING MECHANISM THAT WOULD OPERATE EFFICIENTLY, RATHER THAN SERVE AS A STUMBLING BLOCK TO RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS.

14. OBUKHOV DESCRIBED AN OCTOBER 22 MEETING OF REPUBLIC MFA REPRESENTATIVES, MANY OF WHOM WERE SPECIALISTS FROM REPUBLIC CAPITALS, HELD TO COORDINATE POLICY ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND BILATERAL QUESTIONS OF INTEREST TO THE REPUBLICS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE UPCOMING WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS. THE REPUBLICS' RESPONSE HAD BEEN POSITIVE, AND THEY HAD SET ABOUT ENTHUSIASTICALLY SETTING UP COMMUNICATION NETWORKS AMONGST THEMSELVES SO AS TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS.

15. EINHORN ASKED WHETHER CONSULTATION WITH REPUBLIC MILITARY POLICYMAKERS WAS A PART OF THE PROCESS. THOUGH MAMEDOV, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS "A GOOD QUESTION," OBUKHOV IGNORED IT, GOING ON TO EXPLAIN THAT NOT EVERY DETAIL OF EVERY POLICY COULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE NEW FORUM. OVERALL POLITICAL APPROACHES WOULD BE AGREED, WITH IMPLEMENTATION DELEGATED TO THE CENTRAL MFA. FOR EXAMPLE, DETAILS OF THE START TREATY WERE TOO ENORMOUS FOR REPUBLICS TO HANDLE. MAMEDOV ADDED THAT, IN SECURITY MATTERS, THE NEW FORUM WAS LIKE A SUNDAY SCHOOL; WITHOUT EXPERTISE, REPUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES COULD ONLY REFER QUESTIONS BACK TO THEIR PRESIDENTS. THE RUSSIAN MFA REPRESENTATIVES, FOR EXAMPLE, WERE FORMER JUNIOR STAFFERS FROM THE USSR MFA; THEIR VIEWS WERE OFTEN HALF-BAKED.

ARMS CONTROL RATIFICATION PROCESS
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16. EINHORN ASKED HOW THE SOVIET SIDE PLANNED TO PROCEED FOR CFE AND START TREATY RATIFICATION, GIVEN THE FACT THAT ONLY SEVEN REPUBLICS HAD ATTENDED THIS WEEK'S SUPREME SOVIET SESSION. OBUKHOV POINTED OUT THAT TEN REPUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES HAD ATTENDED THE OCTOBER 22 SESSION AT THE MFA (THE ELEVENTH HAD BEEN ABSENT ONLY FOR TECHNICAL REASONS); ALL, INCLUDING UKRAINE, ARMENIA AND GEORGIA, HAD AGREED THAT RATIFICATION SHOULD PROCEED IN THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET. EINHORN AGAIN ASKED HOW THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WHEN UKRAINE HAD NOT EVEN DECIDED YET ON WHETHER TO SEND A DELEGATION TO THE SUPREME SOVIET. OBUKHOV EVADED, LAMELY CITING AN OCTOBER 22 PUBLIC APPEAL TO UKRAINE BY GORBACHEV AND OTHER REPUBLIC LEADERS, STATING THAT "WE CANNOT IMAGINE THE UNION WITHOUT THE UKRAINE ...". MAMEDOV ADDED THAT THE UKRAINIAN REPRESENTATIVE TO THE OCTOBER 22 MFA MEETING, WHILE CAUTIOUS ON ALL OTHER ISSUES, HAD STATED CLEARLY THAT UKRAINE WOULD FULFILL ALL START OBLIGATIONS, RESOLVING ANY TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES THAT MIGHT ARISE.

17. EINHORN EXPLAINED THAT, AFTER RATIFICATION, IT MUST BE APPARENT THAT START WILL BE IMPLEMENTED AT ALL LEVELS; WE (AND ESPECIALLY OUR SENATE) MUST HAVE CONFIDENCE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT INSPECTION OBLIGATIONS ON REPUBLIC TERRITORIES WOULD BE CARRIED OUT. MAMEDOV CAUTIONED THAT -- AS WITH THE U.S. SENATE -- AMENDMENTS MIGHT ARISE IN THE RATIFICATION PROCESS. THIS WAS ABSOLUTELY LEGITIMATE. IF IT OCCURRED ON THE U.S. SIDE, THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WOULD SAY "WE DID OUR BEST, BUT THEY HAD RESERVATIONS ...". EINHORN NOTED THAT IN THE PAST U.S. BT

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~~EXDIS~~

~~E.O. 12958-1, DECL. OADR~~

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ADMINISTRATIONS HAD MANAGED TO HOLD THE LINE; TREATIES HAD NOT BEEN FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED IN THE RATIFICATION PROCESS. MAMEDOV SAID THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO TRY TO ACHIEVE THIS. OBUKHOV CONCLUDED THAT EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE TO ANALYZE THE RESULTS OF THE RATIFICATION PROCESS AND THEN TAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS REGARDING THE EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATION INSTRUMENTS.

18. EINHORN ASKED WHETHER THE CFE RATIFICATION SCHEDULE, ORIGINALLY SLATED FOR THE ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF THE TREATY'S SIGNING, WAS LIKELY TO SLIP. FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD UKRAINE ASSENT TO THE TREATY PRIOR TO ITS DECEMBER 1 REFERENDUM? OBUKHOV SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY FAVORED COMPLETING RATIFICATION BEFORE NOVEMBER 19. BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THE POINT ABOUT THE UKRAINE. THIS HAD NOT COME UP AT THE OCTOBER 22 MFA CONSULTATIVE MEETING, HE

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Authority: EO 13526
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Date: SEP 28 2015

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SAID. MAMEDOV ADDED THAT OBUKHOV WAS INSERTING MATERIAL INTO GORBACHEV'S MADRID TALKING POINTS ON THIS ISSUE. "THIS IS HOW WE TRY TO INFLUENCE POLICY," HE JOKED. EINHORN SAID THE U.S. SOUGHT EARLY RATIFICATION OF BOTH THE CFE AND START TREATIES WITHOUT CHANGES. GPALS (GLOBAL PROTECTION AGAINST LIMITED STRIKES)
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19. EINHORN SAID THE U.S. SIDE HAD BEEN PLEASED TO SEE PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S EXPRESSION OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER U.S. PROPOSALS REGARDING GPALS. OBUKHOV SAID THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD HAVE TO ASK AND RECEIVE ANSWERS TO MANY QUESTIONS BEFORE IT WOULD BE ABLE TO REACH CONCLUSIONS; AT PRESENT IT WAS "READY TO LISTEN." THE SINCERE SOVIET DESIRE HAD ALWAYS BEEN TO AVOID A NEW RACE IN SPACE, WHICH WOULD BE TREMENDOUSLY RUINOUS FOR STABILITY, NOT TO MENTION ITS COST. HE SAID THE SOVIET SIDE HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THE CHANGES IN THE U.S. POSITION ON THE PURPOSES OF SDI. EINHORN REPLIED THAT THE WORLD HAD ALSO CHANGED.

20. FRANKLY, OBUKHOV CONTINUED, SINCE THE BARTHOLOMEW TALKS EVERYONE HAD BEEN ASKING HIM WHAT GUARANTEES COULD BE PROVIDED THAT A GPALS SYSTEM WOULD REMAIN LIMITED. AS EXPLAINED BY THE U.S. SIDE, THE SYSTEM WAS NOT TO INFLUENCE THE DETERRENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES. BUT WHAT GUARANTEES WOULD THERE BE THAT THIS WAS THE CASE? EINHORN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE QUESTION, WHOSE TECHNICAL ASPECTS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY EXPERTS.

21. OBUKHOV CONTINUED THAT SOVIET SPECIALISTS WERE VERY WORRIED BY THE IDEA OF INTERCEPTORS IN SPACE. MAMEDOV SAID THAT, LIKE THE DOWNLOADING ISSUE, THIS CONCERNED BREAK-OUT CAPABILITY; THE PSYCHOLOGY WAS THE SAME. TODAY FRIENDSHIP PREVAILED BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES; WE HAD GOOD LEADERS. BUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN TWENTY YEARS, IF THERE WERE CHANGES ON THE U.S. OR SOVIET SIDE? WHAT CAPABILITIES WOULD THERE BE FOR UPGRADING THE SYSTEM, PROVIDED THE SOVIET SIDE AGREED TO IT? AND WOULD THE SOVIET SIDE BE ABLE TO AFFORD IT?

22. EINHORN COUNTERED THAT, NEVERTHELESS, THE LIKELIHOOD OF A FIRST STRIKE BY EITHER SIDE HAD NOW BEEN REDUCED VIRTUALLY TO THE VANISHING POINT. BUT BOTH SIDES FACED OTHER THREATS, SOME IN COMMON -- WITH REGARD TO WHICH LIMITED DEFENSES MIGHT BE OF VALUE. SOME UNAVOIDABLE UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE EXPANSION CAPACITY OF THE GPALS SYSTEM MIGHT BE WORTH IT IF ONE WAS OBTAINING PROTECTION FROM A MUCH MORE IMMEDIATE THREAT. THE DISCUSSION SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF A CHANGED THREAT.

23. MAMEDOV ASKED AGAIN WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE ABLE TO AFFORD THE SYSTEM, EVEN IF IT DECIDED IT WANTED TO ACQUIRE IT. OBUKHOV ADDED THAT THE PENTAGON GPALS SLIDES HAD BEEN IMPRESSIVE, BUT -- "OFF THE RECORD" -- ASKED WHETHER THIS LIMITED SYSTEM, DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE U.S., ITS ALLIES, AND THIRD COUNTRIES, COULD ALSO PROTECT THE USSR. EINHORN REPLIED THAT EXPERTS WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS SUCH QUESTIONS AS COVERAGE, COOPERATION,
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~~E.O. 12958: DECL. OADR~~

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AND SO FORTH. OBUKHOV RECALLED THAT U.S. EXPERTS HAD ALREADY FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO REPLY TO SOVIET QUESTIONS ON THE BASIS FOR THE CALCULATION OF THE MAXIMUM CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT 200; MORE EXPLANATION WAS NEEDED. STRAUSS
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MCN=91297/07267 TOR=91297/2233Z TAD=91297/2238Z CDSN=MAU576

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 28 2015

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 28 SEP 2015 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C § 652
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 3449