

SPECIAL HANDLING
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COPY NUMBER-----

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INFO SERVICE CENTER
EXCLUSIVE

XVII. 9A

IMMEDIATE
O 171702Z SEP 91
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 049Z

RECOMMEND FULL
RELEASE

ZYUW RUFHFRASO11 260170Z

JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
HATD EC COLLECTIVE

YORK DURING THE UNGA (REF A) COULD BE IN THE NATURE OF
A "3-PLUS-1," POSSIBLY WITH U.S.-UK-FRENCH
CONSULTATIONS TO ESTABLISH A COMMON POSITION PRECEDING
IT. THIS MEETING WOULD BE AN "EPISODE," NOT THE
CREATION OF A CONTINUING PROCESS;

-- WE HAVE ALL BEEN GIVEN ASSURANCES OF ONE KIND OR
ANOTHER FROM THE CENTER AND SOME REPUBLICS (FRENCH
DEFENSE MINISTER JOXE REPORTS RECEIVING SOME DURING HIS
CURRENT VISIT TO MOSCOW) ON THE SAFETY OF THE EX-USSR'S
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT IS NOW TIME TO "MOVE BEYOND WORDS"
AND TO HAVE THE SOVIETS MORE CATEGORICALLY "REPEAT,
CONFIRM AND SUPPLY DETAIL" ON THEIR UNILATERAL AND
BILATERAL UNDERTAKINGS;

5 THE DCM POSED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS TO MOREL: WHAT
IS THE RATIONALE FOR DOING THIS AT FOUR? WHAT OUTCOME
DOES FRANCE SEEK? IF SOME SORT OF AGREED DOCUMENT,
SHOULD IT BE PUBLIC? MOREL REPLIED THAT THE FOUR
EUROPEAN NUCLEAR POWERS CAN BEST HASH OUT THE "NITTY
GRITTY" QUESTIONS OF WEAPONS SAFETY BECAUSE THEY ARE
NUCLEAR PRACTITIONERS. THE U.S. AND FRANCE -- AND
PERHAPS THE UK -- HAVE NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS
AGREEMENTS WITH THE USSR WHICH CAN ALSO SERVE AS POINTS
OF REFERENCE. AS TO OUTCOME, FRANCE WOULD LIKE TO SEE
A SOVIET DECLARATION: THIS COULD BE MADE PUBLIC, THOUGH
MOREL SEEMED NOT TO HAVE TOO CLOSELY CONSIDERED THE

MATTER.

6 MOREL ADDED SOME FURTHER BACKGROUND ON FRENCH
THINKING. HE SAID THE CONCERN WAS NOT SIMPLY THE
SAFETY OF THE WEAPONS THEMSELVES, BUT THE "ENORMOUS
RISK" OF PROLIFERATION POSED BY HAVING NUCLEAR
ENGINEERS CUT LOOSE FROM A MORIBUND SOVIET NUCLEAR
PROGRAM ON THE LOOKOUT FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO SELL THEIR
SERVICES. THE PROPOSAL, TOO, WAS NEVER MEANT TO HAVE
ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE SNF TALKS (CERTAINLY NOT TO
ENCOURAGE THE LONGSTANDING SOVIET DESIRE TO INCLUDE U
AND FRENCH SYSTEMS IN DISARMAMENT TALKS). NOR TO
INTERFERE WITH MULTILATERAL SECURITY FORA.

7. THE DCM RETURNED TO THE ROLE OF THE ALLIES, ASKING
MOREL WHY THE SAME RESULT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED BY,
SAY, INVITING THE APPROPRIATE SOVIET OFFICIAL TO NATO
HEADQUARTERS TO HASH OUT THE PROBLEM. MOREL'S
RESPONSE: THIS IS AN IDEA WE CAN THINK ABOUT "DOWN THE
ROAD." THOUGH HE DID NOT EXPLICITLY SAY SO, HE SEEMED
TO VIEW THE ALLIANCE'S ROLE AS RESTRICTED TO RECEIVING
A BRIEFING FROM THE U.S., UK AND FRANCE ON THE RESULTS
OF THEIR CONVERSATION WITH THE SOVIETS

8 IN A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION SEPTEMBER 12 WITH DCM
UK EMBASSY DCM SAID HIS PERSONAL "GUESS" IS THAT LONDON
WOULD GO ALONG WITH THE IDEA OF A ONE-SHOT DISCUSSION
OF THE SAFETY OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS. TACTICALLY
HE ADDED, IT MAKES LITTLE SENSE TO TAKE THE FRENCH ON
OVER THIS MATTER IN LIGHT OF THE NEGATIVE EFFECT A
REBUKE COULD HAVE ON THE MUCH MORE IMPORTANT
EUROARCHITECTURE DEBATE. FINALLY, THE GERMAN POLITICAL
COUNSELOR TOLD DCM THAT BONN SHARED OUR CONCERN ABOUT
THE PROPOSAL AND CERTAINLY DID NOT LIKE BEING EXCLUDED
FROM ANY DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE. HE DID NOT BELIEVE,
HOWEVER, THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD SLAM THE PROPOSAL

9 COMMENT: AS MOREL'S STRONG REACTION INDICATES, OUR
DEMARCHE HAS HIT ITS MARK IN PARIS. WASHINGTON IS BEST
EQUIPPED TO JUDGE WHETHER A FOUR-POWER MEETING WOULD
ADD TO THE ASSURANCES WE AND OTHERS HAVE FROM THE
SOVIETS ON THE SAFETY OF THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS
NONETHELESS, WE NEED TO KEEP IN MIND THAT MITTERRAND
HAS IDENTIFIED HIMSELF PERSONALLY WITH THIS PROPOSAL
AND THAT TOO DISMISSIVE A REACTION WILL INEVITABLY PLAY
BACK INTO THE EUROARCHITECTURE DEBATE -- PARTICULARLY
IF THE UK AND GERMANY, GIVEN THEIR EC CONCERNS,
SOFT-PEDAL THEIR INSTINCTIVELY NEGATIVE REACTIONS

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ENDIS/INTRODUCES TREAT AS SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

VIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL CSB; USVIENNA FOR CFE

~~TO: 12350, OGC, OADR~~

~~TAGS, PARM, PREL, FR~~

SUBJECT: 4-POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE; MITTERRAND ADVISOR
"DISAPPOINTED" IN NEGATIVE U.S. REACTION

REF: (A) PARIS 24848; (B) STATE 304552;
(C) PARIS 24787; (D) PARIS 24407

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: PRESIDENTIAL DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR PIERRE
MOREL SEPTEMBER 17 TOLD THE DCM THAT MITTERRAND'S
FOUR-POWER NUCLEAR PROPOSAL IS MEANT TO BE A "ONE SHOT"
MEETING CONFINED TO THE ISSUE OF THE SAFETY OF SOVIET
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT WAS NOTHING TO DO WITH SNF OR
NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS. THE GOF, HE SAID, IS
"DISAPPOINTED" WITH THE U.S. RESPONSE. EUROPE'S FOUR
NUCLEAR POWERS ARE BETTER EQUIPPED TO UNDERSTAND AND
GET AT THE NITTY GRITTY OF THE ISSUE; FRANCE WAS HAPPY
TO HAVE ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS AND CONCEDED THE ALLIES
MIGHT HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY "DOWN THE ROAD."

3. MOREL AFFIRMED THAT THE IDEA IS MITTERRAND'S, AND
SAID THE ESSENTIAL POINT IS THAT THE SOVIETS MUST
"CONSOLIDATE" -- AND GIVE NECESSARY DETAIL TO BACK UP
-- THE ASSURANCES THEY HAVE MADE TO DATE. THE UK
EMBASSY DCM REPORTS THAT PM MAJOR SEEMED "RELAXED" ON
THE MATTER, AND SURMISED THAT HMG WILL LIKELY "GO
ALONG" WITH THE FRENCH PROPOSAL TO PREVENT NEGATIVE
SPILLOVER INTO THE EUROARCHITECTURE DEBATE. THE FRG
EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR SAID BONN SHARES THE U.S.'S
CONCERN, AND DOES NOT LIKE BEING EXCLUDED, BUT WILL
LIKELY HOLD BACK FROM SLAMMING THE PROPOSAL.
END SUMMARY.

4. DCM SEPTEMBER 17 QUESTIONED ELYSEE DIPLOMATIC
ADVISOR PIERRE MOREL ABOUT PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S
SEPTEMBER 11 CALL FOR A FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE ON
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MOREL SAID THE IDEA CAME "FROM THE
PRESIDENT." HE ALSO MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS-

-- THE GOF WAS "DISAPPOINTED" IN THE "NEGATIVE"
U.S. REACTION TO THE PROPOSAL -- A PROPOSAL MEANT ONLY
TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SAFETY. THE U.S. WAS "TOO HASTY" IN INSTISTING THIS
MUST BE DISCUSSED ONLY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE;

-- THE PROPOSED FOUR-WAY MINISTERIAL MEETING IN NEW

***** FOR JS *****
REVIEW FOR DISTRIBUTION TO EIMCS
SUBMIT JCS-DSS FORM 30 IF REQUIRED

ACTION INFO CJS(1) JS(3) NMCC/ODD(1) J4(1) JS(1)
SECDEF-N(1) SDIO(7) USOP-REGAL-ARMEDTNG(13)
USDA-PBL(1) ASD-PA(2) ASD-PARE/EP(3) USOP-CH(1)
USDF:PD(1)
+OCSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+HQS PENTAGON WASH DC

MCN=91260/06709 TOR=91260-2006Z TAD=91260/2009Z CDSN=MAUG85

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Chief, Records & DeClass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 29 2015

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CURLEY
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Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 29 MAR 2015 Authority: EO 13526 U.S.C. § 552
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 3538

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*****EXDLS*****

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