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1 st Review Date: <u>10/31/11</u>	Determination: [Circle Number(s)] 1. Classification Retained 2. Upgraded/Downgraded To: _____ 3. Contains No DOE Classified Info 4. Coordinate With: _____ 5. Declassified 6. Classified Info Bracketed 7. Other (Specify): <u>5 pages</u>
G. Ostfick <u>60</u> HR-60 Reviewer Authority: DC, M, DD _____ Derived From: _____ Declassify On: _____	
2 nd Review Date: <u>10/21/12</u>	
<u>5</u> G. Ostfick <u>60</u> HR-60 Reviewer Authority: <u>DD</u>	

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XVII.9e
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Agenda

SSD Working Group, 13 December 1991
S/DEL Conference Room, Room 2422A

1. Discussion of possible concrete transparency measures for SSD: a) to build confidence between republics, b) to facilitate U.S. assistance. ACDA. DOE Briefing.
2. Contingency Q&As on Nunn-Lugar and U.S. assistance policy. OSD.
3. Instructions. ACDA/OSD.
4. Other items.

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Reasons:

- Accountability of dollars spent by U.S.
- National security considerations (knowledge of readiness/disposition of Soviet nuclear weapons)
- Satisfy the Republics' concerns

Measures:

I. Discussions to hold

what is meant by: disable, disenable, dismantlement, demilitarize, elimination, etc.

need for visits to assess assistance required for transport of their warheads

transportation of warheads to storage/dismantlement facilities - mode, safety/security of warheads during transport, packaging of warheads during transport, capacity/time of movement

security/emergency response during transportation of warheads from field site to storage site - from storage to dismantlement facility - from dismantlement facility to final storage site;

how dismantlement takes place - where, capacity, safety/security/environmental aspects, are new facilities/equipment/technical support needed;

disposition of parts following dismantlement (especially the pits) - how stored, where, safety/security;

II. Visits

familiarization visits to storage and dismantlement facilities

visits to storage/dismantlement facilities to observe the initiation of dismantlement

routine visits to field sites/loading docks/predis-storage and final storage sites/dismantlement facilities to inventory and authenticate information provided

visits to dismantlement/storage facilities to observe completion of dismantlement and disposition

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III. Accountability (declarations)

total number of warheads in stockpile to be dismantled

types of warheads and number by type to be dismantled

locations of warheads to be dismantled

amount of fissile material in warheads to be dismantled (either total or by warhead or by type)

dismantlement facilities - how many, location of, capacity per day

storage facilities - how many, location, capacity, security

schedules for the dismantlement process to include but not limited to such items as shipment from field to storage site; storage to dismantlement facility; dismantlement facility to storage/destruction site; numbers/types of warheads per shipment

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SSD Working Group: Draft Instructions for Moscow

Subject: Instructions for Working Group on Safety, Security and Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons

Ref: A. State 399680

1. ~~Secret~~ - Entire Text.
2. The next meeting of the U.S.-Soviet Working Group on Safety, Security, and Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons is scheduled for Moscow, Dec. 20 to Dec. 23. Instructions for U.S. side follow below.
3. General Objectives: Main goals of meeting are to:
 - seek responses to questions posed in U.S. non-paper, ref. A., and, more generally, obtain more specifics of central plans and procedures for, and republican concerns, conditions, and involvement in, safe and secure implementation of unilateral and START-related withdrawal and elimination;
 - through these responses and through other questioning, seek clarification of the need for and proposed character of any U.S. assistance on safety, security and dismantlement that may be sought by central, republican, or commonwealth entities.
 - support later U.S. decisions as to the character, content, and conditions of any such U.S. assistance.
4. U.S. side should not:
 - express any commitment of the U.S. to any specific program of assistance; however, the U.S. side may repeat the general readiness of the U.S. to provide such assistance where feasible and useful and may explore without commitment possible specific forms of assistance that would respond to acknowledged deficiencies in central or republic capabilities;
 - state any specific conditions that would apply to any future program of assistance; however, the U.S. side should make clear that a decision to undertake such future programs would require, inter alia, satisfactory arrangements to make sure that such assistance was needed, and applied efficiently and effectively.

5. Transparency Issues:

--The U.S. side should make clear that the U.S. does not envision any verification regime of the sort appropriate to bilateral arms control agreements.

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--At the same time, the U.S. side may make clear, as appropriate, that any U.S. program of assistance will require arrangements to make sure that such assistance is being effectively used.

--Moreover, the U.S. side may make clear, without initiating discussion of the subject, that the U.S. would consider how it could assist central-republican joint arrangements for notification, confirmation, or joint implementation of withdrawal and elimination, if requested to do so.

6. Involvement of Other Parties:

--The U.S. side should not initiate discussion of question of involvement of other parties in withdrawal and elimination of Soviet nuclear weapons. If the other side does so, the U.S. side may hear them out, but should make clear that this is a policy question not appropriate to the SSD working group meeting.

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Date: MAY 27 2015

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Date: 27 MAY 2015 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C § 552
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Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 3552