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COPY NUMBER-----
XVII. 9d (p. 2) Sally
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IMMEDIATE
O 100846Z DEC 91
FM AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1716

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SPECAT SECTION 01 OF 03 FRANKFURT 15679

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM A/S NILES

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NOTE BY DO/CC UPGRADE TO ~~ENDIS~~ PER MR. PERRY S/S-O

~~EO 12800~~ ~~DECL:ORUR~~

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UR
SUBJECT: MY TALKS IN KIEV
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WITH MY COLLEAGUES LARRY MAPPER AND BOB EINHORN, AND ACCOMPANIED BY OUR KIEV CONSUL GENERAL JON GUNDERSON, I CONCLUDED THREE DAYS OF TALKS IN KIEV MONDAY AFTERNOON, DECEMBER 9. I WILL BE BACK IN THE DEPARTMENT LATE ON TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10, AND WILL BE AVAILABLE TO BRIEF YOU THEN. IN THE MEANTIME, I WANT TO GIVE YOU A RELATIVELY BRIEF SUMMARY OF OUR DISCUSSIONS AND SOME THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS. WE ARE SENDING A SEPARATE MESSAGE WITH SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR WILL TAFT TO USE IN THE WEDNESDAY MAC AND JIM COLLINS TO USE WITH RUSSIAN AND CENTER OFFICIALS.

3. TO BEING WITH, I BELIEVE THAT THE DECISION TO SEND ME TO KIEV WAS A WISE ONE. (INCIDENTALLY, OUR EXAMPLE IS BEING PICKED UP BY OTHERS. THUS FAR THE FRG AND CANADA HAVE SENT REPRESENTATIVES AND THE UK AND DUTCH, FOR THE EC, ARE SAID TO BE ON THE WAY.) BY THIS APPROACH, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONTROL THE PACE AND SET THE AGENDA OF OUR DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP WITH UKRAINE, AS WELL AS MAXIMIZING OUR LEVERAGE OVER UKRAINE.

4. THE ATMOSPHERICS OF MY VISIT WERE EXCELLENT AND WILL BE EVEN BETTER FOR YOURS. THE UKRAINIANS ARE SO ANXIOUS TO PUT THEIR BEST FOOT FORWARD THAT IT IS ALMOST EMBARRASSING. ON SATURDAY, DECEMBER 7, WE HAD EIGHT CONSECUTIVE HOURS OF MEETINGS, BEGINNING WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AND MOVING TO PRIME MINISTER FOKIN, FOREIGN MINISTER ZLENKO AND DEFENSE MINISTER MOROZOV. SUNDAY WAS SPENT WITH PARLIAMENTARIANS AND FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS, AND WE CONCLUDED ON MONDAY WITH MEETINGS WITH FOKIN, ZLENKO, MOROZOV AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS KRAVCHENKO.

5. ON ALL ISSUES DISCUSSED WE FOUND THE UKRAINIANS ANXIOUS TO ACCOMMODATE OUR CONCERNS. THEY READILY ADMIT A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE IN ALMOST ALL AREAS AND ARE KEEN ON OUR SENDING EXPERT DELEGATIONS TO KIEV

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REVIEW FOR DISTRIBUTION TO CINCS
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EXCY FOR VP PER MAWROCKI/11DEC

ACTION (R.M)
INFO CJCS(1) J8(3) J5(1) SECDEF-N(1)
USDP:SPECINT:MMB:RMB(13) USDA:PHL(1) USDA:AE(1)
USDA:STWFSAC(1) ASD:PA(2) USDP:CH(1) USDP:PD(1)
DR(1) PIO(1) ODB-AC(1) DM(2) DA-SA(1) OSC-CI(1)
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TO BRING THEM UP TO SPEED. IN THIS HIGHLY FORMATIVE STAGE, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY, WITH PRIORITY ATTENTION IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION. IN ORDER TO EASE THE BURDEN ON OUR HOSTS AND OUR EXCELLENT, BUT HANDPRESSED STAFF IN KIEV, WE SHOULD STAGE THESE VISITS TO AVOID OVERLAPS. WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER AN INFORMAL DIVISION OF LABOR WITH OUR NATO ALLIES, SOME OF WHOM WOULD PROBABLY BE INTERESTED IN DOING THE SAME.

6. THE ONLY POINT WHERE I ENCOUNTERED AN ABSOLUTELY FIRM, UNYIELDING UKRAINIAN POSITION CONCERNED THE FUTURE OF A CENTER AND THE ROLE OF GORBACHEV. EVEN BEFORE THE DECEMBER 8 MEETING IN MINSK, WE FOUND A UNIFORM VIEW THAT THE CENTER NO LONGER EXISTED. THUS, THERE WAS NO RECEPTIVITY WHEN I ENCOURAGED THE UKRAINIANS TO PARTICIPATE IN SUPREME SOVIET SESSIONS TO RATIFY CFE AND START. IN TALKS DECEMBER 9 WITH FOKIN AND ZLENKO, THEY STRESSED THE HISTORIC CHARACTER OF THE MINSK DECISIONS AND THEIR IRREVOCABLE CHARACTER. FOKIN, WHO WAS AT MINSK AND READ TO ME FROM THE SIGNED COPY OF THE AGREEMENT (BUT DECLINED TO GIVE ME A COPY) PUT PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE FACT THAT THE NEW "COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES" WILL HAVE NO CENTER AND NO PRESIDENT.

7. RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES IS CLEARLY AT THE TOP OF THE UKRAINIAN AGENDA. HOWEVER, THE UKRAINIAN LEADERS BELIEVE THAT OUR RECOGNITION IS INEVITABLE AND PUT NO PRESSURE ON ME, NOR WILL THEY ON YOU. THEY WILL REMAIN CALM ON THIS POINT UNLESS THEY SEE OUR ACTION GOING BEYOND THE JANUARY 29-30 CSCE PRAGUE MINISTERIAL, WHICH I BELIEVE THEY HAVE PICKED AS THEIR DEBUT ON THE WORLD STAGE.

8. ON THE BASIS OF MY TALKS IN KIEV, I BELIEVE THE UKRAINIANS EITHER HAVE OR SOON WILL SATISFY YOUR FIVE POINTS, AND ARE PREPARED TO BE RESPONSIBLE ON NUCLEAR ISSUES. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT WE MOVE AHEAD ON RECOGNITION, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE IN CLOSE COMPANY WITH BT

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~~EO 12800~~ ~~DECL:ORUR~~

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UR
SUBJECT: MY TALKS IN KIEV
OUR KEY ALLIES. YOU COULD USE THE DECEMBER 19 MAC TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON TIMING AND MODALITIES. IN MY VIEW, INDEPENDENCE, RECOGNIZED BY THE KEY COUNTRIES, IS AN ESSENTIAL PRECONDITION FOR THE UKRAINIANS TO SIT DOWN AND WORK OUT A SENSIBLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OTHER REPUBLICS. THE MINSK AGREEMENT WAS THE FIRST STEP IN THIS PROCESS, BUT MUCH WORK REMAINS. LOOKING FURTHER AHEAD, ONE APPROACH YOU MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER IS AN INVITATION TO ZLENKO AND DEPRIN MOROZOV TO VISIT WASHINGTON IN MID-JANUARY. THEY COULD MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT AND PARTICIPATE IN A CEREMONY MARKING RECOGNITION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THIS WOULD ALSO ENABLE US TO GET MOROZOV, A MOST IMPRESSIVE GUY, TOGETHER WITH SECDEF AND GENERAL POWELL.

9. ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, I FOUND THE UKRAINIANS READY TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US. THEY WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY USSR SUPREME SOVIET ACTION ON CFE AND START, BUT THEY ARE PREPARED TO DO WHATEVER OUR LAWYERS ASK, ASIDE FROM GOING TO MOSCOW, TO BRING THE TREATIES INTO FORCE, AND APPLY THEM ON UKRAINIAN TERRITORY. WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO WORK THIS OUT IN A WAY THAT SATISFIES THE

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SENATE, BUT I RECOMMEND EARLY CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THEIR LAWYERS AND OURS. THEY CLEARLY HAVE NO FIRM PLANS ON THE SIZE OF THEIR ARMED FORCES, AND THE DECLARED FIGURE OVER 400,000 HAS NO CURRENT RELEVANCE. MOROZOV IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF RELEASED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL, AND HE WILL KEEP SOME OF THEM IN UNIFORM TO AVOID THROWING THEM ON THE STREET.

10. ON NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL, THE UKRAINIANS TOLD US THAT THE OLD CENTRAL CONTROL REMAINED INTACT, ALTHOUGH ZLENKO ADMITTED DURING OUR FINAL MEETING, DECEMBER 9 THAT IN THE WAKE OF THE MINSK MEETING HE COULD NOT DESCRIBE EXACTLY HOW THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY AND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND WOULD NOW WORK IN PRACTICE TO ENSURE UNIFIED COMMAND AND CONTROL. I URGED THAT HE AND KRAYCHUK BE ABLE TO DESCRIBE HOW THIS SYSTEM WORKS TO YOU ON DECEMBER 17. AGAINST THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE EXISTING SYSTEM WILL COLLAPSE, THE UKRAINIANS HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH RUSSIA, BELARUS AND KAZAKHSTAN TO ESTABLISH A NEW COLLECTIVE CONTROL THAT WOULD NOT GIVE THEM DIRECT CONTROL OVER THE WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORY BUT WOULD GIVE THEM "POLITICAL" CONTROL OVER THEIR NON-USE. THIS SHOULD BE WORKABLE, BUT IT DOES RAISE SOME QUESTIONS.

11. DEFENSE MINISTER MOROZOV TOLD US HE HAD AGREED WITH UNION DEFMIN SHAPOSHNIKOV TO RETURN ALL RPT ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS TO RUSSIA FOR DISMANTLEMENT, WITH UKRAINIAN PARTICIPATION, BY MID-1992. HE HOPES TO ACCELERATE THE REMOVAL REQUIRED BY START OF THE 130 SS-19'S FROM SEVEN TO FIVE YEARS AND HE HOPES THAT SOME SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES WILL LEAD TO THE EARLY REMOVAL OF THE SS-24'S. I BELIEVE THAT ONE REASON THE UKRAINIANS ARE SO KEEN TO GET RID OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ASAP IS THAT DOING SO WOULD REMOVE YET ANOTHER REASON FOR "CENTRAL" INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR AFFAIRS. THEY TOLD US THAT THEY WERE READY TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF ADHERENCE TO THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE IMMEDIATELY, AND WE WERE ABLE TO ANSWER MOST OF THEIR QUESTIONS ON THIS POINT.

12. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, RESPECT FOR MINORITIES AND SANCTITY OF FRONTIERS, WE RECEIVED ALL THE RIGHT ANSWERS. THE UKRAINIANS ARE GETTING THEIR LAWS AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES RIGHT, ALTHOUGH THIS WILL TAKE SOME TIME. HOWEVER, OLD HABITS DIE HARD, AND FROM KRAYCHUK ON DOWN, WE ARE DEALING WITH A GROUP OF COMMUNIST APPARATCHIKI WHO HAVE CHANGED THEIR COATS ON THE RUN. WE WILL HAVE TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON, INCLUDING A VISIT BY DICK SCHIFTER (WHICH THEY SAID THEY WOULD WELCOME) TO ENSURE THAT THIS CONTINUES IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. I RAISED JEWISH EMIGRATION WITH ZLENKO AND HE CHEERFULLY ACCEPTED A LIST OF REFUSNIKS THAT I HAD OBTAINED FROM THE COUNCIL ON SOVIET JEWRY.

13. ONE EMOTIONAL POINT, WHICH I FEEL SURE WILL COME UP WITH YOU, IS THE ROMANIAN CLAIM TO THE BUKOVINA AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WESTERN UKRAINE. ZLENKO SAID HE HAD CANCELLED A VISIT TO BUCHAREST AND REFUSED THE ROMANIAN BT

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TAGS: PREL PGOV, UR
SUBJECT: MY TALKS IN KIEV
OFFER OF RECOGNITION, OVER THIS ISSUE. I TOLD HIM THAT WE INSISTED ON THE CSCE PRINCIPLE THAT FRONTIERS CAN ONLY BE CHANGED BY PEACEFUL, CONSENSUAL MEANS, WHICH SEEMED TO SATISFY ZLENKO.

14. DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC ISSUES WENT SOMEWHAT LESS WELL. I STRESSED THE NEED FOR UKRAINE TO JOIN THE OTHER EIGHT REPUBLICS THAT HAVE ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY FOR THE USSR'S DEBT, INSISTING THAT UKRAINE'S FUTURE CREDIT WORTHINESS WAS AT STAKE. FOKIN SAID THEY COULD AGREE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, WITH SOME BODY, "PERHAPS THE VNESHKONOMBANK (VEB), PERHAPS LOCATED IN MOSCOW," TO SERVE AS THE PAYING AGENT BUT WITHOUT THE POWER TO TAKE ON NEW DEBT. HE ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THE REPUBLICS HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO AGREE ON VOTING RIGHTS AND PROCEDURES ON THIS PAYING AGENT. THE MAJOR PROBLEM HERE IS ANY FORM OF "UNION," A CONCEPT THAT STICKS IN UKRAINIAN THROATS.

15. ON ECONOMIC REFORM, THE UKRAINIANS ARE VERY SENSITIVE TO CLAIMS THAT THEY ARE LAGGING BEHIND RUSSIA, WHICH THEY ARE. THEY CLAIM THAT RUSSIA IS ABOUT TO JUMP OFF A CLIFF DUE TO THE LACK OF PREPARATION FOR THE REFORMS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER 10. ON DECEMBER 9, FOKIN TOLD ME THAT HE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN MINSK IN PERSUADING YELTSIN TO POSTPONE THE REFORM AT LEAST UNTIL JANUARY 1, 1992. FROM HIS COMMENTS, I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE UKRAINIANS ARE PREPARED IN A SENSE TO BRIBE THE RUSSIANS TO HOLD OFF A BIT LONGER BY SENDING SOME ADDITIONAL FOOD SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA, DESPITE THE FACT THAT UKRAINE IS RUNNING VERY LOW ITSELF. THERE IS MUCH RESENTMENT IN KIEV OVER THE FACT THAT UKRAINE REALLY HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO TAG ALONG IF RUSSIA EMBARKS ON A SERIOUS REFORM OR FACE CHAOS. THEY BELIEVE CHAOS, OF A DIFFERENT SORT, WILL RESULT FROM THE RUSSIAN REFORMS. EXPORT AND CURRENCY CONTROLS AGAINST RUSSIA WOULD BE THE OTHER ALTERNATIVE SHOULD UKRAINE NOT GO ALONG WITH THE RUSSIAN REFORM, A COURSE OF ACTION FOKIN AGREED WOULD BE "SUICIDAL."

16. WE DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE TIME TO THE PROBLEMS OF CONTROLS OVER SENSITIVE EXPORTS. THE UKRAINIANS FRANKLY ADMITTED THAT THEY SEE THE DANGER BUT HAVE NO IDEA HOW TO DEAL WITH IT. THEY WILL WELCOME OUR ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE.

17. IN MY SECOND MEETING WITH FOKIN, HE CAME FORWARD WITH AN EMOTIONAL APPEAL FOR ASSISTANCE. HE SAID HE "HOPES THE UNITED STATES AND ITS FRIENDS WILL HELP US AT THIS CRITICAL TIME AND NOT LET THIS NEW COMMONWEALTH, WHICH IS VERY MUCH IN YOUR INTEREST, DIE." HE GAVE ME A LIST OF ITEMS URGENTLY NEEDED IN THE UKRAINE TO STAVE OFF HUNGER THIS WINTER, PREVENT DISTRESS SLAUGHTER OF LIVESTOCK AND PREPARE FOR THE 1992 HARVEST. I BELIEVE THE UKRAINIANS NEED AND DESERVE WESTERN HELP. WITH THE RIGHT POLICIES, WHICH I BELIEVE WE CAN PERSUADE THEM TO ADOPT, A LOT OF HELP AND NO LITTLE LUCK, THEY HAVE A CHANCE. WE NEED TO CONSIDER ON AN URGENT BASIS HOW WE CAN MOVE AHEAD WITH MFI AND HOW SOME OF THE \$1.25 BILLION IN ADDITIONAL CCC CREDIT GUARANTEES MADE AVAILABLE BY THE PRESIDENT CAN GO TO UKRAINE IN THE WAKE OF THE MINSK AGREEMENT. I MAY BE WRONG, BUT AFTER MY TALKS IN KIEV I BELIEVE THAT THE RECENT UNDERSTANDINGS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES REACHED WITH CENTRAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHETHER HEADED BY GORBACHEV, SILAYEV OR SOMEONE ELSE, WILL HAVE TO BE REDONE WITH THE REPUBLICS. NILES. SHOSTAL
BT

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 27 2015

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHIS

Date: 27 May 2015 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C § 552
Declassify: Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 73-M-3556

MCN=91344/03173 TOR=91344/12082 TAD=91345/2008Z CDSN=MAU997