

DOJ ES

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IMMEDIATE
O 080420Z DEC 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5650
INFO SLEDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4817
USMISSION USHATO 5400
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 4955
ZYUW RUEHCAA9680 3420421
JCS WASHDC 6050
USDEL NST GENEVA 5320
DOE WASHDC

BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM COURTNEY, DR. ROBERT BARKER, AND DR. JAMES TURNER, TO MOSCOW FOR MEETINGS WITH SOVIET COUNTERPARTS.

-- IN THE NOVEMBER 25-27 WORKING GROUP SESSIONS, THE U.S. SIDE UNDERTOOK TO PROVIDE IN ADVANCE OF THE NEXT MEETING A LIST OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THE U.S. WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS. WE ARE NOW PROVIDING THESE QUESTIONS IN THIS NON-PAPER.

-- THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT, FOR THE NEXT SSD WORKING GROUP MEETING TO BE AS PRODUCTIVE AS POSSIBLE, THE SOVIET SSD REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS POSED IN THE U.S. NON-PAPER. THE U.S. URGES THE SOVIET SIDE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO COMPLETE SUCH PREPARATIONS SO THAT A PRODUCTIVE TWO-TO-THREE DAY MEETING COULD OCCUR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY THIS MONTH. IF THE SOVIET SIDE IS PREPARED TO HOLD SUCH A MEETING THIS MONTH, WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK OUT AN ACCEPTABLE DATE PROVIDED THAT IT IS NO LATER THAN DECEMBER 20.

-- WE REQUEST THAT THE SOVIET SIDE INFORM US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF WHEN IT WILL BE READY TO HOLD THE MEETING.

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SAFETY, SECURITY AND DISMANTLEMENT

THE UNITED STATES APPRECIATES THAT THE SOVIET UNION PLACES A HIGH PRIORITY ON THE ACHIEVEMENT, IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME, OF THE OBJECTIVES IN PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS ELIMINATION PROGRAM, AND ASSUMES THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL REPRIORITIZE ITS OWN DEFENSE BUDGET TO CARRY THIS OUT. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE U.S. IS INTERESTED IN LEARNING HOW IT MIGHT HELP THE SOVIET UNION PROMPTLY TO DISABLE AND EXPEDITIOUSLY TO DISMANTLE, IN A SAFE AND SECURE MANNER, THOSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV STATED WOULD BE ELIMINATED. IN ORDER TO CONSIDER WHETHER AND HOW THE U.S. MIGHT BEST RENDER ASSISTANCE, WE NEED TO UNDERSTAND BETTER HOW SUCH ASSISTANCE COULD STRENGTHEN CURRENT SOVIET PLANS FOR DISABLEMENT AND DISMANTLEMENT. GEN-LT ZELENTSOV, AT OUR REQUEST, AGREED TO BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 399880

GENEVA AND VIENNA FOR ARMS CONTROL DELEGATIONS

~~SECRET~~ DECL OADR

TAGS: PARM, PRL, UR, US
SUBJECT: U.S. PROPOSAL FOR NEXT MEETING OF THE U.S.-SOVIET WORKING GROUP ON SAFETY, SECURITY AND DISMANTLEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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3. AS APPROPRIATE, EMBASSY SHOULD ALSO INFORM RSFSR, UKRAINIAN, BELORUSSIAN AND KAZAKH OFFICIALS OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL AND PROVIDE THEM WITH A COPY OF THE U.S. NON-PAPER. (FYI -- REPUBLIC PARTICIPANTS IN THE BARTHOLOMEW-OBUKHOV MEETINGS NOVEMBER 25-27 INCLUDED: DULAT ORAZBEKOVICH KIANYNSHEV, AN ADVISER TO THE KAZAKH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN MOSCOW, VALERIY PAVLOVICH KUCHINSKIY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, SERGEY NIKOLAYEVICH MARTYNOV, DEPUTY BELARUS PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN, AND GELIY VIKTOROVICH BATEWIN, RSFSR FOREIGN MINISTRY. BATEWIN AND KUCHINSKIY DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE SSD WORKING GROUP (END FYI). END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.

4. TALKING POINTS

-- DURING THE NOVEMBER 25-27 BARTHOLOMEW-OBUKHOV MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON, THE SIDES BEGAN DISCUSSION OF SAFETY, SECURITY, AND DISMANTLEMENT (SSD) OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS PART OF THESE MEETINGS, THERE WERE TWO WORKING GROUP SESSIONS INVOLVING TECHNICAL EXPERTS WHO BEGAN EXPLORING DETAILS OF THESE ISSUES.

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JOINT STAFF
ACTION

INFO CJCS(1) J3(4) WIDS(1) J7(6) J5(2) (U.G.7.8)
QUAL CONTROL(1) J5:START-J(1) J5:SOVCEN-J(1)
J5:PLANN-J(1) J5:POLICY-J(1) SAC LO(1) USSOCOMMO(1)
SHAPE LMO(2) J5:MUC-CHM-J(1) J5:CONVING-J(1)
JCE-J(1) J5-NATO-J(1) J8:FDI-J(1) J8:PMAD-J(1)
SLEDEF-N(1) DARPA(1) SDIO(8) USDA:IP(2) ASD:PA(1)
USDP:PDISP(1) USDP:DASDIUR(2) USDP:DSAA(1)
USDP:SO&S(1) USDP:ESN(1) USDP:PPEAP(1) USDP:START(1)
USDP:SEC(1) USDP:TNE(1) USDP:NPP(1) USDP:TSD(1)
USDP:EX ECOM(1) USDP:EUR POL(1) USDP:SEE(1)
USDP:NATOPOL(1) DIO-WE(1) DIO-SPRD(1)
+USCUCOM AIDES VAHINGEN GE
+USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
+MAC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
+USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JUN 05 2015

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GENEVA AND VIENNA FOR ARMS CONTROL DELEGATIONS

PREPARE A LIST OF ITEMS FOR POSSIBLE U.S. ASSISTANCE. SOVIET EFFORTS IN THE AREAS ADDRESSED BELOW WILL BE IMPORTANT IN HELPING THE U.S. TO DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE NATURE OF ANY U.S. SUPPORT.

ELIMINATION PROGRAM

-- SINCE RAPID DISABLEMENT AND EXPEDITIOUS DISMANTLEMENT IS ESPECIALLY DESIRABLE FOR THOSE WEAPONS THAT COULD BE MOST EASILY CARRIED BY A SMALL NUMBER OF TERRORISTS -- FOR EXAMPLE, NUCLEAR ARTILLERY AND MINES -- HOW CAN THIS BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED?

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MCN=91342/00560

TOR=91342/05212

TAD=91342/05262

CDSN=MAK110

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FACILITIES?

- WILL WEAPONS BE STORED IN A DISABLED STATE AT EACH OF THE PRECEDING FACILITIES?
- WHEN IN THE PROCESS WILL MAP1 ASSUME ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WEAPONS FROM THE MOO?
- WHEN IN THE PROCESS WILL MAP1 RECEIVE PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE WEAPONS?
- WHAT ARE THE BOTTLENECKS TO MEETING EACH OF THE ABOVE STEPS MORE QUICKLY?
- WHAT LEVELS OF EFFORT ARE YOU EXPENDING IN THESE AREAS?
- WHAT SPECIFIC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE OR SUPPORT EQUIPMENT COULD THE U.S. PROVIDE TO ACCELERATE EACH STEP OF YOUR PLAN?
- WHAT SPECIFIC ASSISTANCE COULD THE U.S. PROVIDE TO IMPROVE THE SAFETY, SECURITY, OR CONTROL OF THIS PROCESS?
- HOW COULD THE U.S. HELP LOCAL AND CENTRALIZED EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION PREPARE BETTER FOR POSSIBLE NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS OR EMERGENCIES DURING DISABLEMENT, STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND DISMANTLEMENT?
- WOULD TECHNICAL CONSULTATION IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS BE USEFUL: ACCIDENT PREVENTION, MITIGATION, RECOVERY, HANDLING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE (RADIOLOGICAL) AND OTHER WASTES, AND DISPOSAL CAPABILITIES?
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AS STATED IN THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT WEAPONS INTENDED FOR ELIMINATION SHOULD BE DISABLED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GEN-LY ZELENTSOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THESE WEAPONS CAN IMMEDIATELY BE DISABLED BY LOCAL MILITARY UNITS AT MILITARY FACILITIES BY ONE OR MORE METHODS. THE SIDES ALSO AGREED THAT SUCH DISABLEMENT WOULD HELP PREVENT A NUCLEAR YIELD IF THE WEAPONS WERE TO FALL INTO THE HANDS OF TERRORISTS.

-- UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD THE CRITICAL COMPONENTS, ONCE REMOVED, BE TRANSFERRED IMMEDIATELY TO MAP1 FOR DESTRUCTION?

-- WOULD IT BE USEFUL FOR THE U.S. TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO ENSURE THAT SEPARATED COMPONENTS ARE

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GENEVA AND VIENNA FOR ARMS CONTROL DELEGATIONS

DESTROYED OR DISPOSED OF WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT PERSONNEL EXPOSURE, NEGATIVE PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTS, OR OTHER UNDESIRABLE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES?

CONTAINERS

IN THE DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, THE SOVIET SIDE INDICATED THAT ADDITIONAL CONTAINERS WILL BE NEEDED FOR WEAPONS TRANSPORT AND FOR LONG-TERM STORAGE OF DISMANTLED WEAPON COMPONENTS THAT CONTAIN PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM.

-- WHAT LEVELS OF EFFORT ARE YOU EXPENDING IN THESE AREAS?

- ARE THERE MEASURES THAT WILL AVOID THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL CONTAINERS?
- COULD THE U.S. ASSIST IN THIS REGARD?
- WOULD MORE CONTAINERS FOR THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES FACILITATE ACCELERATION OF YOUR CURRENT PLANS FOR DISABLEMENT, CONSOLIDATION, STORAGE, AND DISMANTLEMENT:
 - CONTAINERS FOR TRANSPORTING WEAPONS?
 - CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OF WEAPONS?
 - CONTAINERS FOR TRANSPORTING DISMANTLED WEAPONS COMPONENTS?
 - CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OF DISMANTLED WEAPONS COMPONENTS?
 - CONTAINERS FOR TRANSPORTATION OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS FROM DISABLED WEAPONS?
 - CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS FROM DISABLED WEAPONS?
- IF MORE CONTAINERS OF EACH TYPE WERE AVAILABLE, WHAT IMPACT WOULD THIS HAVE IN ACCELERATING EACH STEP OF THE PLAN?

-- WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DATE OF AVAILABILITY OF A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL CONTAINERS AND THE ACCELERATION OF THE PLAN?

-- WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ACCELERATE CONTAINER PRODUCTION IN THE USSR?

-- WHAT ARE THE ESTIMATED COSTS FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF EACH TYPE OF THE CONTAINERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE?

STORAGE AND DISMANTLEMENT FACILITIES

-- ARE THERE SUFFICIENT STORAGE AND DISMANTLEMENT FACILITIES TO SUPPORT YOUR PLAN?

-- WHAT LEVELS OF EFFORT ARE YOU EXPENDING IN THIS AREA?

-- ARE ADDITIONAL FACILITIES NECESSARY TO ACCELERATE YOUR PLAN? IF SO, HOW MANY? WHAT SIZE AND WHERE?

-- WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADDITIONAL STORAGE AND DISMANTLEMENT CAPABILITIES AND THE ACCELERATION OF THE PLAN?

-- WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ACCELERATE THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW, OR MODIFICATION OF EXISTING, STORAGE AND DISMANTLING FACILITIES?

-- WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DATE OF AVAILABILITY OF ADDITIONAL FACILITIES AND THE ACCELERATION OF THE PLAN?

-- WHAT ARE THE ESTIMATED COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FACILITIES OR MODIFICATION OF EXISTING FACILITIES?

TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES

IN THE DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, THE SOVIET SIDE INDICATED THAT ADDITIONAL LAND TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES ARE NECESSARY.

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 STATE 399080

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Authority: EO 13526
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Date: JUN 05 2015

MCN=91342/00560

TOR=91342/05217

TAD=91342/05262

CDSN=MAK110

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JOINT STAFF
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GENEVA AND VIENNA FOR ARMS CONTROL DELEGATIONS

- WHAT LEVELS OF EFFORT ARE YOU EXPENDING IN THESE AREAS?
- ARE THERE MEASURES THAT WILL AVOID THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL LAND TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES?
- COULD THE U.S. ASSIST IN THIS REGARD?
- WOULD MORE TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES AND HANDLING EQUIPMENT (FOR EXAMPLE, FORK LIFTS) FOR THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES FACILITATE ACCELERATION OF YOUR CURRENT PLANS FOR DISABLEMENT, CONSOLIDATION, STORAGE, AND DISMANTLEMENT:
 - TRANSPORTERS FOR WEAPONS?
 - TRANSPORTERS FOR CRITICAL COMPONENTS?
- IF MORE TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES OF EACH TYPE WERE AVAILABLE, WHAT IMPACT WOULD THIS HAVE IN ACCELERATING EACH STEP OF THE PLAN?
- WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DATE OF AVAILABILITY OF A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL VEHICLES AND THE ACCELERATION OF THE PLAN?
- WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ACCELERATE VEHICLE PRODUCTION IN THE USSR?
- WHAT ARE THE ESTIMATED COSTS FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF EACH TYPE OF THE VEHICLES IDENTIFIED ABOVE?
- IF ADDITIONAL VEHICLES ARE REQUIRED FROM THE U.S., WHAT ARE THEIR TYPES AND SPECIFICATIONS (FOR EXAMPLES: TRUCKS, TRAILERS, RAIL CARS, LOCOMOTIVE; AND THEIR SPECIFICATION FOR STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS, RADIATION SHIELDING WEIGHT AND WEIGHT-DISTRIBUTION LIMITS, GAUGE/COUPLING REQUIREMENTS (RAIL), DIMENSION LIMITATIONS, EXPECTED ROAD CONDITIONS, AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS).
END TEXT OF NON-PAPER BAKER BT

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USDP:EV ECON(3) USDP:EUR POL(1) USDP:SEE(1)
USDP:NATOPOL(1) DIO-ME(1) DIO-SPRO(1)
+USFUCOM AIDL VAIHINGEN GI
+USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
+MAC INTEL CEN SCOT7 AFB IL//IN//
+USCINCCUR VAIHINGEN GI

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 STATE 399880

GENEVA AND VIENNA FOR ARMS CONTROL DELEGATIONS

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-- ARE THERE MEASURES THAT WILL AVOID THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL CONTAINERS?

-- COULD THE U.S. ASSIST IN THIS REGARD?

-- WOULD MORE CONTAINERS FOR THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES FACILITATE ACCELERATION OF YOUR CURRENT PLANS FOR DISABLEMENT, CONSOLIDATION, STORAGE, AND DISMANTLEMENT:

- CONTAINERS FOR TRANSPORTING WEAPONS?

- CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OF WEAPONS?

- CONTAINERS FOR TRANSPORTING DISMANTLED WEAPONS COMPONENTS?

- CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OF DISMANTLED WEAPONS COMPONENTS?

- CONTAINERS FOR TRANSPORTATION OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS FROM DISABLED WEAPONS?

- CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS FROM DISABLED WEAPONS?

-- IF MORE CONTAINERS OF EACH TYPE WERE AVAILABLE, WHAT IMPACT WOULD THIS HAVE IN ACCELERATING EACH STEP OF THE PLAN?

-- WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DATE OF AVAILABILITY OF A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL CONTAINERS AND THE ACCELERATION OF THE PLAN?

-- WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ACCELERATE CONTAINER PRODUCTION IN THE USSR?

-- WHAT ARE THE ESTIMATED COSTS FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF EACH TYPL OF THE CONTAINERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE?

STORAGE AND DISMANTLEMENT FACILITIES

-- ARE THERE SUFFICIENT STORAGE AND DISMANTLEMENT FACILITIES TO SUPPORT YOUR PLAN?

-- WHAT LEVELS OF EFFORT ARE YOU EXPENDING IN THIS AREA?

-- ARE ADDITIONAL FACILITIES NECESSARY TO ACCELERATE YOUR PLAN? IF SO, HOW MANY? WHAT SIZE AND WHERE?

-- WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADDITIONAL STORAGE AND DISMANTLEMENT CAPABILITIES AND THE ACCELERATION OF THE PLAN?

-- WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ACCELERATE THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW, OR MODIFICATION OF EXISTING, STORAGE AND DISMANTLING FACILITIES?

-- WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DATE OF AVAILABILITY OF ADDITIONAL FACILITIES AND THE ACCELERATION OF THE PLAN?

-- WHAT ARE THE ESTIMATED COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FACILITIES OR MODIFICATION OF EXISTING FACILITIES?

TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES

IN THE DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, THE SOVIET SIDE INDICATED THAT ADDITIONAL LAND TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES ARE NECESSARY.

BT

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GENEVA AND VIENNA FOR ARMS CONTROL DELEGATIONS

- WHAT LEVELS OF EFFORT ARE YOU EXPENDING IN THESE AREAS?
- ARE THERE MEASURES THAT WILL AVOID THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL LAND TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES?
- COULD THE U.S. ASSIST IN THIS REGARD?
- WOULD MORE TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES AND HANDLING EQUIPMENT (FOR EXAMPLE, FORK LIFTS) FOR THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES FACILITATE ACCELERATION OF YOUR CURRENT PLANS FOR DISABLEMENT, CONSOLIDATION, STORAGE, AND DISMANTLEMENT:
 - TRANSPORTERS FOR WEAPONS?
 - TRANSPORTERS FOR CRITICAL COMPONENTS?
- IF MORE TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES OF EACH TYPE WERE AVAILABLE, WHAT IMPACT WOULD THIS HAVE IN ACCELERATING EACH STEP OF THE PLAN?
- WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DATE OF AVAILABILITY OF A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL VEHICLES AND THE ACCELERATION OF THE PLAN?
- WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ACCELERATE VEHICLE PRODUCTION IN THE USSR?
- WHAT ARE THE ESTIMATED COSTS FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF EACH TYPE OF THE VEHICLES IDENTIFIED ABOVE?
- IF ADDITIONAL VEHICLES ARE REQUIRED FROM THE U.S., WHAT ARE THEIR TYPES AND SPECIFICATIONS (FOR EXAMPLES: TRUCKS, TRAILERS, RAIL CARS, LOCOMOTIVE; AND THEIR SPECIFICATION FOR STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS, RADIATION SHIELDING WEIGHT AND WEIGHT-DISTRIBUTION LIMITS, GAUGE/COUPLING REQUIREMENTS (RAIL), DIMENSION LIMITATIONS, EXPECTED ROAD CONDITIONS, AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS).
END TEXT OF NON-PAPER BAKER BT

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