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PRIORITY P 141823Z SEP 91 ZYUM RUEIMDAB277 2571823 TO DIA WASHDC//DAI-4/DO-1// PRIORITY INFO USINCEMR VATHINGEN GE//ECJ-2// HQSAC OFFUTT AFB NE//544 SIM CC// HQUSAF WASHDC//IN// HQUSAF RAMSTEIN AB GE//IN// USEUCONAIDES VATHINGEN GE UTAS RAMSTEIN AB GE//IN//INOC//IN-CND// USAINTELECTR HEIDELBERG GE CND WASHDC//OP06/OP92//

THE 15 PRESENT AND FORMER REPUBLICS OF THE USSR. HE REPORTED THAT THE PRIMARY AGREEMENT WAS THAT STRATEGIC FORCES AND, SPECIFICALLY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS (BOTH STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL) WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY THE SINGLE APPARATUS AT THE CENTER. THE REPUBLICS WILL BE MUCH MORE INVOLVED IN THE STATUS AND DEPLOYMENT OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES ON THEIR TERRITORY.

3. THE TEN "TALKING POINTS" ON COMMON US-SOVIET INTERESTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

A. STRATEGIC WEAPONS. WHAT WOULD THE US POSITION BE IF ALL START REQUIRED ELIMINATIONS WERE OF WEAPONS DEPLOYED OUTSIDE OF RUSSIA (SPECIFICALLY KAZAKHSTAN AND THE UKRAINE). ALL NEWER MOBILE SYSTEMS WILL BE RETURNED TO RUSSIA. IF THE SOVIETS DROP BELOW START CEILINGS, WOULD THE US CONSIDER SOME RECIPROCAL MEASURES, SUCH AS HALTING DEPLOYMENTS OF NEW MISSILE SYSTEMS FOR THE TRIDENTS AND/OR FREEZING DEPLOYMENT OF B-2'S TO 30?

B. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHILE IT SEEMS THAT FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE SYSTEMS WILL SOON BEGIN, WOULD THE US CONSIDER AN ALTERNATIVE TO A FORMAL TREATY AS AN INTERIM MEASURE? THIS WOULD INCLUDE AN ISSUING OF PARALLEL STATEMENTS BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THEIR INTENT TO WITHDRAW ALL GROUND BASED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM CENTRAL EUROPE. IDEALLY THIS STATEMENT WOULD BE ISSUED WITHIN A FEW MONTHS. THE SOVIET UNION, OF COURSE, IS ALREADY OBLIGATED TO REMOVE ALL WEAPONS FROM THE TERRITORY OF ITS FORMER ALLIES, BUT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD INCLUDE THE UKRAINE AND BELORUSSIA.

C. NUCLEAR WARHEADS. THE USSR NEEDS TECHNICAL COOPERATION MEANS TO INSURE THE SAFETY IN MOVEMENT AND

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COUNTRY: (U) USSR (UR).

SUBJ: VIEWS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS (U)

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 910911.

REQS: (U) T-LEX-2200-01-90.

SOURCE: (U)

STORAGE OF THESE WEAPONS. (HE COMMENTED THAT HIS INFORMATION WAS THAT 15-20 THOUSAND WARHEADS ARE MOVED ANNUALLY IN THE USSR.)

D. THE SOVIET UNION NEEDS ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING MEANS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS.

E. BOTH THE LEADERS OF KAZAKHSTAN AND RUSSIA HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD NOT PERMIT THE TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORY. IF THE SOVIETS MAINTAIN A DE FACTO BAN ON FUTURE TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WOULD THE US CONSIDER REDUCING TESTING FOR NEXT YEAR FROM FIVE EXPLOSIONS TO ONE OR TWO?

F. ARMS TRADE. WOULD THE US BE AGREEABLE TO AN EARLY AGREEMENT LIMITING ARMS TRANSFERS. THIS MAY BE EXTENDED TO APPLY TO TRANSFERS FROM THE CENTER TO INDEPENDENT REPUBLICAN FORCES IN THE SOVIET UNION

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SUMMARY: A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF THE SOVIET'S INSTITUTE OF THE USA AND CANADA ON 11 SEP 91 HOSTED SELECTED MEMBERS OF A DELEGATION IN MOSCOW TO OFFER HIS VIEWS ON CURRENT MILITARY ISSUES IN THE SOVIET UNION AND AREAS FOR SOVIET-AMERICAN COOPERATION.

TEXT:

1. DURING THE VISIT OF SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER TO MOSCOW, DR. SERGEI ((BOGOV)), DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL STUDIES FOR THE INSTITUTE OF THE USA AND CANADA, MET WITH U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIALS ACCOMPANYING THE SECRETARY TO THE SOVIET UNION. BOGOV PROVIDED AN OVERSIGHT ON CURRENT "CENTER"-REPUBLIC RELATIONS AND OFFERED TEN TALKING POINTS ON COMMON US-SOVIET INTERESTS.

2. BOGOV REPORTED THAT HE HAD BEEN A PARTICIPANT IN THE 10-11 SEPTEMBER CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW BETWEEN THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVES OF

- ACTION DAI-4(1) DIA(1) (U,6,7,8,F) INFO CJCS(1) NIDS(1) J5(2) SECDEF-M(1) ASD:PA&E/EP(1) USDP:POISP(1) USDP:OASDCUR(2) USDP:OSAA(1) USDP:TSP(1) USDP:TF(1) USDP:TSD(1) USDP:SEL(1) USDP:NATOPOL(1) O1-1(1) WIS(1) DB(1) DB-1F(1) DI-4B1(1) VP-AS(1) +OCSA WASHINGTON DC +CSAF WASHINGTON DC +CNC WASHINGTON DC +HPCFTGCONGEGNEAEMD +UTAS RAMSTEIN AB GE//IN-CND// +JICPAC HONOLULU HI +NAI INTEL CER SCOTT AFB IL//IN: +BRIT MIL MK BDRFIML GE +CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//M2/M24// +FOSIT ROTA SP +HPC WASHINGTON DC//11G// +USCINCLANT MORTFOLK VA//J2// +SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC +CIA WASHINGTON DC +MARCORINTCEN (QUANTICO VA +SAFE

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Refer to State for review. Declassify subject to the results of State and concurrent CIA review. JDC 17 Oct 13

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5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 424

OSD 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 424

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G. ~~(S)~~ WITHDRAWALS. UNDER THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES SOVIET WITHDRAWALS FROM GERMANY MAY ALL BE REDIRECTED BACK TO RUSSIA. THE SOVIETS NEED A GREAT DEAL OF HELP IN ACCOMPLISHING THIS RELOCATION. WOULD THE US CONSIDER ASSISTING IN SETTING UP JOB TRAINING AND PLACEMENT SERVICES IN THE USSR, IF THE SOVIETS AGREED TO DEMOBILIZE ONE MILLION OF THE RETURNING FORCES?

H. ~~(S)~~ CFE VERIFICATION. WHAT WOULD THE US VIEW BE IN PERMITTING THE RELOCATION OF OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION FROM THE REPUBLICS BACK TO RUSSIAN TERRITORY? WOULD THE US PERMIT THE USE OF GERMAN FACILITIES, SUCH AS WUNSDORF, FOR DESTRUCTION OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT REQUIRED UNDER THE CFE TREATY?

I. ~~(S)~~ CFE ZONES. THE SOVIET UNION WILL REQUIRE SOME RECALCULATION OF THE MAXIMUM HOLDINGS OF TREATY LIMITED EQUIPMENT IN THE LENINGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT. SOME OF THE EQUIPMENT WITHDRAWN FROM THE BALTICS MUST BE RELOCATED INTO THE LENINGRAD MD. THE IMPACT OF RESUBORDINATING KGB UNITS TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IN REGARD TO CFE ARE STILL UNCLEAR. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HAS SAID THEY DO NOT WANT THE KGB TROOPS.

J. ~~(S)~~ FINALLY, DR. ROGOV URGED GREAT CAUTION IN IMPOSING INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS ON THE USSR... SPECIFICALLY THE PROPOSAL TO MONITOR SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD BE INSULTING TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE.

K. ~~(S)~~ ROGOV URGED THAT THE U.S. EXERCISE ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFLUENCE OVER THE SOVIET REPUBLICS TO ASSURE THAT THEY "SIGN UP TO ALL THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS." HE ASKED THAT THE U.S. ENCOURAGE PLEDGES FROM ALL THE NEW GOVERNMENTS TO ABIDE BY ALL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FROM ISSUES OF SECURITY

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5. ~~(S)~~ DR. ROGOV STATED HIS VIEW THAT THE GREATEST CURRENT THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY WAS A SURGE OF NATIONALISM IN THE NON-RUSSIAN AREAS OF THE PRESENT AND FORMER USSR WHICH WOULD DRIVE ALL RUSSIANS BACK TO RUSSIA. THIS WOULD PROVIDE FERTILE GROUND FOR A RUSSIAN NAZI MOVEMENT AND PERHAPS GIVE NATIONALIST EXTREMISTS CONTROL OF THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL.

COMMENTS

1. ~~(S)~~ ROGOV ACCEPTED THIS MEETING WITH U.S. OFFICIALS TO PUSH HIS AGENDA ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. HE IS A POLISHED AND PERSUASIVE SPOKESMAN WITH CONSIDERABLE AND PROBABLY INCREASING INFLUENCE IN THE EMERGING SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

2. ~~(S)~~ HIS VIEWS ARE NOT COORDINATED MINISTRY OF DEFENSE POSITIONS AND HE OFFERS SEVERAL PROVOCATIVE PROPOSALS AS MUCH TO ENHANCE HIS IMAGE IN WESTERN EYES AS TO INFLUENCE ANY ACTUAL U.S.-SOVIET POLICY.

3. ~~(S)~~ GIVEN THE FLUX IN SOVIET SECURITY POLICY, THIS SOURCE OFFERS AS GOOD A VIEW AS WE HAVE FOUND OUTSIDE OF MOD.

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[REDACTED]
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Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 23 MAR 2016 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C. § 552
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