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 FROM William F. Sittmann (Name) JK (Phone Number) _____ (Room No.)
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Nonproliferation Initiative
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TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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Defense <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz	Under Secretary of Defense for Pd	
JCS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Admiral David Jeremiah	Vice Chmn, JCS	
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ENERGY	Ms. Linda Stuntz	Acting Deputy Secretary of Energy	

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(6/3)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KARL JACKSON
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW
Under Secretary of State for
International Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR PAUL WOLFOWITZ
Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy

ADMIRAL DAVID E. JEREMIAH
Vice Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff


ADMIRAL WILLIAM STUDEMAN
Deputy Director for Central
Intelligence Agency

MS. LINDA STUNTZ
Acting Deputy Secretary of Energy

MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD
Associate Director for National
Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: A Nonproliferation Initiative (S)

Attached for final agency clearance is the draft NSD, revised to reflect the outcome of the Deputies Meeting of June 1 and subsequent inputs from your staff. Please convey final comments and/or clearance to me by COB, Friday, June 5. (S)


Jonathan T. Howe
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment
Tab A Draft NSD

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[DRAFT NSD]

The potential spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a continuing threat to U.S. national security interests. We must seek to minimize the spread of these capabilities and to prevent the use of such weapons. Where such capabilities and weapons do exist, we should encourage their abandonment. (C)

Background

Much has been done in recent years to reduce the dangers of proliferation. The accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of South Africa, China, other new parties and, imminently, France, will bring nearly universal membership to that agreement. Argentina and Brazil adopted full-scope IAEA safeguards and are moving toward bringing the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force. Membership in multilateral export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, MTCR, and Australia Group, has broadened. Export control lists in these regimes have been updated and strengthened. Countries such as Argentina, Israel, and Russia now seek to join the MTCR, while China has agreed to observe its guidelines and parameters. North Korea has ratified an IAEA safeguards agreement at long last, and recently agreed with South Korea to declare the Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons and related facilities. (C)

The United States has played a leading role in these and other developments. Under the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, the United States substantially strengthened its own nonproliferation export controls, including penalties for U.S. citizens who engage in proliferant activities abroad. The Nuclear Suppliers Group, MTCR, and Australia Group have followed our lead in adopting tougher nonproliferation export controls. Under the Middle East Arms Control Initiative, the United States launched a process among the five leading conventional arms suppliers -- the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China -- to establish guidelines of restraint for transfers to that troubled region. The special regime created to dismantle Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is unprecedented. (C)

Dangers ahead

Yet dangers remain. On the demand side, in key areas -- North Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf -- countries still seek possession of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them. These developments suggest that the underlying motivations to acquire these weapons persist. Many governments in these regions still see them as an avenue to prestige and influence. In others there is a belief that missiles or weapons of mass destruction make strategic sense.

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Strong advocates of nuclear weapons exist in several countries.

(S)

On the supply side, countries of longstanding concern as developers of these weapons are now beginning to emerge as suppliers of related technologies. North Korea is the leading example, but there are several sources of concern on the supply side of proliferation. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent Eastern European states increase possible sources of supply of these weapons or related technology, especially if the democratic and economic reforms in these countries should falter. (S)

These dangers require a strengthening of existing mechanisms, including multilateral export controls and other measures under the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. This strengthening must ensure that changes within COCOM do not undermine our collective nonproliferation efforts. Indeed, as expressed in recent U.S. proposals to COCOM, it is time to consider more fundamental changes in COCOM to symbolize our willingness to move from an adversarial to a cooperative basis for relations, while providing a forum to address new strategic threats, such as proliferation. (S)

Global nonproliferation norms have played a vital role in discouraging the spread of weapons of mass destruction. They underpin -- and legitimize -- our regional and bilateral nonproliferation efforts. Nevertheless, efforts to apply these norms universally inevitably conflict with efforts to achieve other important and, at times, urgent regional and bilateral objectives with governments. In some cases, rigid insistence on global norms may undermine our national security, including our nonproliferation objectives. We therefore need to strike a balance, relying on global norms where possible and tailored approaches where necessary. (S)

U.S. Policy

U.S. nonproliferation policy will be guided by the following principles: (S)

First, the United States will build on existing global norms against proliferation and, where possible, strengthen and broaden them. To be truly effective, nonproliferation export controls need maximum multilateral support, including through the establishment of common standards of enforcement by licensing and customs authorities. These standards should seek to ensure that items licensed to one destination are not retransferred to another to assist in developing weapons of mass destruction or missiles. Common standards of enforcement will not only enhance our nonproliferation efforts, but also support the competitiveness of U.S. industry. We should also encourage recipient nations to share information with suppliers on diversion of exports to proliferation-related purposes. (S)

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Second, the United States will focus its efforts on those areas where the dangers of proliferation remain acute, such as the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Korean peninsula. Special regimes have begun to play a key role in advancing our nonproliferation objectives in such sensitive regions; we must build on that experience. Also, as potential suppliers, the former Soviet Union and Eastern European states also present new and potentially serious proliferation risks. In all of these areas, the problems are too difficult to be solved by generalized global norms alone. We must therefore supplement those norms with tailor-made approaches -- the special inspection regime for Iraq, the Middle East arms control initiative, confidence-building measures such as those proposed for India and Pakistan, and the proposed bilateral inspection regime between the Koreas. We should also rely on our alliances to discourage development of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems.

Third, U.S. nonproliferation policy will seek the broadest possible multilateral support. Since the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an international problem, its treatment requires international cooperation. That means America must remain engaged in the world, supporting its friends, opposing those who threaten our interests. We must be prepared as members of the international community to step in when crises arise, by imposing inspections by a body like the UN Special Commission or sanctions by the UN Security Council. That does not mean that the United States will never take unilateral actions. Indeed, the record shows that U.S. leadership has at times provided a beachhead from which to build multilateral consensus, as in the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, the Middle East Arms Control Initiative, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Fourth, the United States will address the proliferation issue in its totality, taking into account the underlying motivations and security rationales leading to acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, the supply of and demand for related materials and technology, and the entire range of military, political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, security assistance, and other options available to advance U.S. goals. This broad-gauged approach has already shown positive results in Korea, and will reinforce U.S. pursuit of the first three principles.

Global Norms

1. Chemical Weapons Convention. The conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention this year remains one of our major objectives, and we intend to take all necessary steps to see that objective is met. The United States seeks universal adherence to the Convention, and calls on all nations to commit to become original signatories.
2. NPT and Tlatelolco. The United States will seek the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and universal regional adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1993.

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- 3. International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States will work with its allies to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In order to support strengthened IAEA inspection procedures and to meet the increased burdens on the IAEA safeguards budget occasioned by the new safeguards requirements for Argentina, Brazil, North Korea, South Africa, states of the former Soviet Union, and others, the United States will support needed increases in the safeguards budget. (C)
- 4. Biological Weapons Convention. The United States will continue to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by seeking universal adherence and increased support of the confidence-building measures agreed by the parties at the 1991 Review Conference. (C)

Regional Efforts

- 5. Targeted Approaches. Where necessary, the United States will work with the countries involved as well as other interested states to develop approaches tailored to the requirements of the particular region, as in Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East. These regional efforts shall take economic, security, and political factors into account in seeking comprehensive measures to restrain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In addition to relying on existing security relationships, options to be considered include confidence-building measures, inspection regimes, "free zones" for or freezes on particular capabilities, materials, or weapon systems, and other measures. (C)

- 6. Strategy for Former Soviet Union (FSU). To minimize the risk of the spread of militarily-useful technologies from the former Soviet Union, U.S. policy will contain the following elements: (C)

- Encourage implementation of all relevant international agreements, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Biological Weapons Convention. (C)
- Assist FSU authorities in developing procedures for internal accounting of -- and physical protection against theft or diversion for -- materials and equipment related to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and the missiles that deliver them. (C)
- Assist FSU authorities in establishing and implementing effective export controls, including appropriate laws and regulations, as well as education of exporters and customs and enforcement officials. (C)
- Efforts to ensure that nuclear-weapon material extracted from dismantled warheads remains under proper controls, and is dealt with in a safe and secure manner. (C)

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- Creation of opportunities for weapons scientists and engineers to redirect their talents to peaceful endeavors. (C)

- 7. FSU: Conversion of Biological Warfare Facilities. The United States shall consider requests for assistance -- which could include technical expertise, credit guarantees, or limited direct assistance -- from U.S. companies establishing joint ventures in former Russian biological weapon facilities to produce vaccines and other pharmaceutical products. Any such assistance would be conditioned on satisfactory declaration by the Russian Federation of all its biological weapon activities and undertaking to cease all such activities as is required by the Biological Weapons Convention. (S)

Multilateral Actions: Assistance, Penalties, Controls

- 8. Compliance with international nonproliferation norms. The United States should make clear to potential proliferators and suppliers that their relationship with the United States across the board will be affected by their performance on nonproliferation issues and conformity to key international nonproliferation norms. (S)
- 9. Support for special inspections and weapon destruction efforts. The United States will examine, in consultation with its allies, establishment of multilateral funding efforts to ensure adequate support for special inspection regimes for countries engaged in proliferation-related activities and to help states destroy chemical or biological weapons and the missiles that deliver them. (S)
- 10. Enhance effectiveness of existing nonproliferation export control regimes. The United States will propose that all members of nonproliferation export control regimes adopt common standards of export control and enforcement, including universal agreement that no exporting country will approve a proposed export that another has denied on nonproliferation grounds without first consulting with that other country. This "no undercut" rule already applies in the MTCR and NSG guidelines. The rule should be applied within all nonproliferation export control regimes, and should extend across regimes (i.e. if one government denies an export on nuclear grounds another should not approve it for missile-related purposes without consulting with the first government). In addition, the United States will seek universal adoption of domestic laws and regulations analogous to the U.S. Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (e.g., proscriptions against citizens assisting WMD projects, "safety-net" controls for nonlisted items). (S)
- 11. International Sanctions. The United States will propose that serious violations of international nonproliferation

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norms -- such as the transfer of any weapon of mass destruction, detonation of a nuclear device, confirmed use of chemical or biological weapons, transfer of critical WMD facilities -- be subjected to appropriate international sanctions. To implement this proposal, the United States will consult in the first instance with its friends and allies on steps including multilateral agreements on extradition, immigration restrictions against known proliferators, inspections, United Nations Security Council embargoes and/or other sanctions. (S)

Nuclear Materials

12. Cessation of fissile material production. The United States shall accept the Russian proposal to cease production of weapon-grade plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes, and seek multilateral support for that action. This proposal is informed by recent efforts under my Middle East arms control initiative to freeze acquisition, production, or transfer of fissile materials to that region and by the agreement of December 1991 between North and South Korea calling for a ban on plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment on the Korean peninsula. This cessation will not extend to other nuclear materials such as tritium or plutonium-238, nor will it impinge upon longstanding U.S. support for the United Kingdom strategic deterrent. (S)
13. Restraint in supply and acquisition of fissile materials. The United States will seek the support of nuclear suppliers and recipients in discouraging or avoiding the production or acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear materials (enriched uranium or separated plutonium) in regions of tension, as reflected in the July 1991 Paris Communique and the May 1992 Interim Guidelines Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction agreed by the five major suppliers under the Middle East arms control initiative and the December 1991 nonnuclear principles agreed by North and South Korea. (S)

Negative and Positive Security Assurances

14. Nuclear Negative Security Assurance. The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT or to any comparable internationally-binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices so long as it is in compliance with these internationally binding obligations. (C)
15. Chemical and Biological Negative Security Assurances. The United States has formally forsworn the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, against any state, effective when the Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force, and proposes that all states follow suit. By the terms of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the United States has also formally forsworn the use of biological weapons for any

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reason, including retaliation, against any state, and proposes that all states follow suit. (e)

16. Nuclear Positive Security Assurance. The United States affirms its intention, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or a comparable instrument in compliance with these treaty obligations that is a victim of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. (e)
17. Biological Positive Security Assurance. The United States affirms its intention, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any State party to the Biological Weapons Convention in compliance with its convention obligations that is a victim of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which biological weapons are used. (e)
18. Chemical Positive Security Assurance. The United States declares its intention to extend the corresponding positive security assurance when the Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force to any State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention in compliance with its convention obligations that is a victim of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which chemical weapons are used. (e)
19. Multilateral Security Assurances. The United States will seek agreement of all other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and other states where appropriate, to provide the same negative and positive security assurances as are set forth above. (C)

Intelligence

20. Enhanced Liaison Activities. The Intelligence Community shall enhance its nonproliferation-related liaison activities with Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Security Services around the world. (S)
21. Strengthen Support for Multilateral Institutions. The Intelligence Community, in consultation with other U.S. agencies, will strengthen its intelligence and analytical support to international nonproliferation regimes, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. (S)
22. Openness. The Intelligence Community shall undertake to ensure, with due attention to protection of intelligence sources and methods, that necessary information is made publicly available. (C)

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23. Collection Review. The Director of Central Intelligence shall undertake a zero-based review of Intelligence Community technical and other collection capabilities against proliferation targets and undertake all necessary improvements. (S)
24. Training Initiative. The Director of Central Intelligence shall undertake a major training initiative across all agencies of the Intelligence Community to enhance expertise and enlarge the pool of experienced, well-trained officers available for the nonproliferation mission. (S)

Implementation

25. Report by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agency and department heads, shall report to me within sixty days on the steps taken to implement this Memorandum, with special emphasis on regional efforts, multilateral actions (including Item 19), and nuclear materials. (C)

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