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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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NATIONAL MILITARY INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
POLICY COMMITTEE (NDPC)

25 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS, NDPC

SUBJECT: Policy Statements - AIM-9M and HARM

National Disclosure Policy Committee Policy Statements, PS-1/85 and PS-2/85, concerning subject missile systems are forwarded for inclusion in NDP-1. The Policy Statements are effective immediately and will be included in the next revision of NDP-1. It is, therefore, requested that appropriate dissemination within your agencies be made.

L. Britt Snider

L. Britt Snider
Chairman

Enclosures 2

- 1 - PS-1/85 (~~SECRET/NOFORN~~)
- 2 - PS-2/85 (~~SECRET~~)

cc:
 Director, DSAA
 NSA (Attn: Mr. Levin)
 OUSDRE/IP&T (Attn: Mr. Sullivan)

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APR 18 2016

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PS-1/85

FOREIGN DISCLOSURES CONCERNING THE AIM-9M AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE (U)

(U) OBJECTIVE. To promulgate guidelines on the disclosure of information to foreign governments concerning the AIM-9M air-to-missile.

(U) BACKGROUND

a. (U) The AIM-9M represents a significant improvement over the AIM-9L which was the first infrared (IR) missile to have an all aspect target acquisition capability. Significant improvements embodied in the AIM-9M include improved IR counter-countermeasures (IRCCM) capability; better background discrimination; and enhanced reliability and maintainability.

b. (U) Sensitive technologies in the AIM-9M [redacted] seeker which is key to its counter-countermeasures (CCM) capability [redacted] the manufacturing techniques and design of the seeker and gyro assemblies; the Active Optical Target Detector (AOTD), and the high energy reduced smoke rocket motor. However, it is the [redacted] feature, and reduced smoke motor that distinguish the AIM-9M from the AIM-9L.

(U) DISCUSSION

a. (U) CCM Capability. An effective and commonly used means to defeat an IR missile is the use of flares to draw the missile away from the target. The AIM-9M CCM seeker with its multicolor reticle can discriminate between flares, which are predominantly monochromatic sources, and the target aircraft which emits as a multicolor source. The seeker and associated circuitry can therefore discriminate size and spectral content of an IR source; it will reject a single color source and remain locked on the multicolor target. The seeker can also discriminate and reject fast rise time sources. The sudden appearance of a source, such as a flare (or flares), would represent a fast rise time, more intense source to which previous IR missile seekers would be drawn. This CCM feature will defeat the deployment of several flares of various predominant colors that might be used to overcome the multicolor reticle. The missile also has a very narrow tracking field of view so that the flare scan will move off the reticle rapidly. Finally, the tracking system in the AIM-9M has a memory feature

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3.3(b)(4)

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that will enable it to discriminate between the target, for which the tracking solution has been established, and a low rise time, multicolor source that might be deployed to counter the other two CCM discriminants.

b. ~~(S)~~ Reduced Smoke Motor. The reduced smoke motor used in the AIM-9M is the solid propellant MARK 36 MOD 9. It already has been determined that the United States has achieved a commanding lead over the rest of world in the production of solid propellant rocket motors of this type. In view of the significant tactical and strategic advantages associated with such motors, it also has been determined that their foreign sale and/or production based upon U.S. technology and know-how must be closely controlled (see NDPC Policy Statement 4/84).

(U) DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS

a. ~~(S)~~ The AIM-9M has been approved for sale only to Canada and Australia. These sales were based on overriding U.S. strategic interests, i.e., neither government possessed a comparable air-to-air missile in inventory quantities; Canada is an active participant in the defense of North America; Australia has made similar contributions.

b. ~~(S)~~ Most other key allies have the AIM-9L or would likely be approved for purchase of the AIM-9L (e.g., NATO, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Sweden). The AIM-9L is effective against adversaries who possess inferior pilot skills, [redacted] in air-to-air engagements, or they simultaneously conduct engagements in afterburner without [redacted]. Any of these tactical miscalculations would render an adversary's evasive measures ineffective and result in an AIM-9L kill. Moreover, the AIM-9L, which is far superior to most foreign missiles, will still be available for selected Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases through the mid to late 1990's. *40 man.*

c. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Several countries have produced IR air-to-air missiles (e.g., Soviet improved AA-2; Israeli Shafrir III/Python 3; French Magic 2); however, the Intelligence Community estimates that these missiles, while some may have a fairly good CCM capability, more closely approximate the AIM-9L. They agree that the full spectrum CCM capability of the U.S. AIM-9M appears to be unique.

d. ~~(S)~~ AIM-9M CCM circuits and other sensitive components can be reverse engineered by a technically competent country within approximately three to five years (one year to analyze, one year to build, and one to three years to produce). Acquisition of AIM-9M technology by a potential adversary would have a serious adverse impact on U.S. capabilities.

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e. ~~(S)~~ The AIM-9M is just now entering the inventories of the U.S. Navy and Air Force. Product improvements to the AIM-9M are planned, but funds have not been allocated by Congress. It is, therefore, projected that the AIM-9M will be the primary U.S. air-to-air IR missile through the 1990's.

(U) GUIDELINES FOR DISCLOSURE

a. ~~(S)~~ Release of the AIM-9M will be limited to Canada and Australia until product improvements are funded and developed and the improved missiles are produced in sufficient quantities to meet U.S. Navy and Air Force requirements.

b. (U) Exceptions to this policy may be authorized on a case-by-case basis in accordance with established NDP-1 procedures. Requests for exception to policy shall be supported by a JCS and Intelligence Community assessment of the military need for the AIM-9M by the proposed recipient country.

L. Britt Snider

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Chairman

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25 April 1985

PS-2/85

FOREIGN RELEASE OF THE HIGH SPEED ANTI-RADIATION MISSILE (HARM) (U)

(U) OBJECTIVE. To establish guidelines concerning the disclosure of information to foreign governments on the HARM.

(S) BACKGROUND. The HARM is a highly sophisticated anti-radiation missile designed for use on U.S. Navy and Air Force aircraft to suppress enemy radar controlled air defenses. The Soviets, British, and French are producing anti-radiation missiles which have certain characteristics (e.g., warhead size, range and flight profile) that may be equal to or better than HARM. However, in terms of frequency band coverage, flexibility of employment and speed at impact, the HARM is believed to be far superior to Soviet and to most free world anti-radiation missiles.

(U) DISCUSSION

a. (S) Flexibility. The HARM can be preprogrammed, programmed in the aircraft cockpit, and has an autonomous capability to search for enemy threat emitter signals. It performs those functions over a [redacted] than previous anti-radiation missiles. It also can [redacted] over the [redacted]. Moreover, the missile can react in a self defense mode to [redacted] warning receiver, [redacted]. Once launched, the HARM has an in-flight [redacted]

b. (C) The HARM has a terminal velocity (Mach 2+) that is greater than any known Soviet anti-radiation missile. This high velocity makes it difficult to counter in its terminal phase.

(U) DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS

a. (S) Reverse engineering of the HARM by a potential adversary would reveal design and engineering technology necessary to develop an anti-radiation missile capable of defeating state-of-the-art U.S. radar-controlled missile systems. Only the British are believed to be capable at this time of developing a similar missile.

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1.4(a), (b), (c)
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b. ~~(S)~~ The HARM seeker is programmed with [redacted]
By testing HARM [redacted]
capabilities can be analyzed. Once these capabilities are determined, a potential adversary may be able to determine U.S. intelligence collection capabilities (see NDPC Policy Statement 1/83) and also employ countermeasures to defeat [redacted]

c. ~~(S)~~ It is estimated that the United States has a four-to-five year technological lead over other anti-radiation missile producing countries in the areas of continuous band width coverage capability and signal processing circuitry. It is assessed that it would take a technically competent country at least that long to develop a similar capability. Possession of the HARM could shorten the lead time significantly.

(U) DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES

a. ~~(S)~~ Prior to 1990, sale of the HARM will be limited to the NATO nations integrated into the NATO military structure, Australia, and Japan. Coproduction may be approved on a case-by-case basis for these countries, less the guidance section receiver assembly and laser target detector. All requirements for sale and coproduction will be handled in accordance with the criteria, conditions, and established eligibility levels in NDP-1. Moreover, disclosures of parametric data shall be in accordance with NDPC Policy Statement 1/83.

b. (U) Exceptions to the above policy may be authorized on a case-by-case basis in accordance with established NDP-1 procedures.

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