

DOS
RECOMMEND PARTIAL
RELEASE B1,1.4(D), REGARDING
STATE DEPARTMENT EQUITIES

DOS
~~SECRET NOFORN~~

RETURNED TO ORIGINATING AGENCY -- DOD

47

BACKGROUND PAPER
ON
RELEASE OF AMRAAM TO ISRAEL (U) **DECLASSIFIED IN FULL**

Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 23 2016

SUBJECT

(U) The Government of Israel (GOI) wishes to acquire AMRAAM as soon as possible after it is fielded by the USAF.

BACKGROUND

(U) AMRAAM is not releasable to the GOI at this time. GOI has requested the release of AMRAAM software, anticipating future release of the missile.

DISCUSSION

- (U) GOI made formal request for release of AMRAAM software in a 27 Mar 89 letter from the Israeli Air Attache to AF/PRI and in an 18 Apr letter from the GOI/Ministry of Defense to DSAA.
 - (U) Both requests were denied and the GOI was informed that AMRAAM software would be made available at the same time as the missile.
- ~~(S/AF)~~ Current release policy authorizes AMRAAM for NATO, (except Greece) Australia, Japan, and Korea.
 - (U) Israel not authorized release.
- (U) Release of AMRAAM software was addressed by MGen Ben-Nun, IAF Commander, during his 5 Oct 89 visits with CSAF and AF/PR.
 - (U) AMRAAM software will not be in IAF production F-16s (PEACE MARBLE III) scheduled to begin delivery in May 91.
 - (U) IAF had proposed including software (in a disabled mode) in these aircraft to save money and speed their effort to field AMRAAM once it is released to them.
 - (U) They claimed that if software is released with the missile its development/integration could take several years, cost more, and delay fielding.
 - (U) This assertion can be misleading because it is no longer possible to include AMRAAM software in IAF production aircraft and there will be some time delay and expense in any event.

RELEASABILITY - This paper is not releasable to the GOI.

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Lt Col Galante/PRIB/54310/
6Jun90/AMRAAM.BP

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~~Declassify on: OADR~~

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- (U) AF/PRIP has investigated the option of a limited release of software until a new AMRAAM release policy is approved which includes Israel.
- (U) A near-term solution to the problem is not expected due to the long lead time involved in developing and fielding software updates.
- (U) During the May 90 Air Staff visit of BGen Rom, IAF Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, it was stated that the IAF would no longer seek just the release of AMRAAM software but press for full release of the missile.
- (U) At the Peace Marble Program Management Review, the IAF stated that decisions on future aircraft buys and upgrades to existing aircraft (F-15 MSIP) would be predicated on release of AMRAAM.

CONCLUSION

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RECOMMENDATION

(U) Continue dialogue while working toward an AMRAAM release policy for Israel.

DOS
1.4(d)

OSD 3.3(b)(6)

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