

Doc #21

~~FOUO~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ATTACHMENT

November 22, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gen. Myers Response to Afghanistan Funding

What do you propose we do with this memo from Dick Myers that responds to my memo to him?

Please get back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/15/04 SecDef Memo to CJCS re: Afghanistan Funding
11/9/04 CJCS Memo to SecDef re: GOA Funding

DHR:as
112204-6

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: APR 21 2016

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. § 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 21 APR 2016 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: Deny in Full:
Declassify in Part:
Reason: 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)
MDR: 14 -M- 3876

AFGHANISTAN 22 Nov 04

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ATTACHMENT

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14-M-3876

OSD 78518-04

9 Nov 04

~~FOUO~~

September 15, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace

858

CC: Doug Feith
Lt. Gen Sharp
Tina Jonas
VADM Willard

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: APR 21 2016

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Funding

Please take a close look at the costs of funding ongoing and future security operations in Afghanistan. Clearly, there will be increasing pressure to reduce overall costs and to control such funding through the normal budget process.

We need to be sure that:

- Any security projects we put in place (ANA, Police, infrastructure) can be sustained by the Afghans in the long run.
- We create a force, both in size and infrastructure, which is appropriate to Afghanistan, reflecting its economy and circumstances, as opposed to creating something along American lines and standards.
- The interagency must be supportive of this process, to include fully and correctly staffing the Embassy, cooperating with us on funding, and agreeing with our approach.

Please come back to me with some thoughts on this as part of a larger Afghan Security Strategy soon.

Thanks.

DRR:ms
091504-4

.....
Please respond by 30 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

DR 11/22
Sir,
Response attached.
V/ Lt Col Lemmel
u/10

OSD 78518-04
~~*OSD 17919-04*~~
A-28-2

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04 11/22



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0000

GN-2171-04
9 November 2004

INFO MEMO


FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *11/7*

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: APR 21 2016

SUBJECT: Government of Afghanistan (GOA) Funding (U)

- (U) Issue. "Please take a close look at the costs of funding ongoing and future security operations in Afghanistan. Clearly, there will be increasing pressure to reduce overall costs and to control such funding through the normal budget process... Please come back to me with some thoughts on this as part of a larger Afghan Security Strategy soon." (TAB A)
- (U) Conclusion. The Department of Defense should proceed with plans to assist Afghans in developing the "right" size forces; engage with the Interagency to develop a strategy for funding Afghan assistance programs, to include international assistance; and develop a strategy for Afghan self-sustainment in the long term beginning in 2015.



COORDINATION: (U) TAB C

JS 1.4(d)

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; 703-695-5618

OSD 78518-04

TBA SD	X
OPMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	<i>M 11/7</i>

Classified By: ~~LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, DJS~~
Reason: ~~1.4(b)~~
Declassify On: 30 September 2014

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DSD 78518-04

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Date: APR 21 2016

TAB B

29 October 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Costs of Ongoing and Future Security Force Development and Sustainment in Afghanistan (U)

1. (U) Purpose. What are the prospects for building an affordable Afghan security apparatus capable enough to allow drawdown of US forces without running the risk of Afghanistan again becoming a failed state?
2. (U) Key Points
 - (U) Costs of funding ongoing and future security operations in Afghanistan are a significant burden on the US Treasury. The US government (USG) desires to build security programs that can be sustained long term and are appropriate in size and economic scope.
 - (U) Afghan security threats are rooted in 20+ years of war, lawlessness and extremism. These threats are well entrenched and will prove difficult to fully control or eradicate into the next decade. To ensure Afghanistan does not become a failed state and/or a haven for terrorists or an extremist Islamic regime, the size and subsequent costs of sustaining Afghan security forces will likely exceed its ability to pay for such forces for at least 10 years.
 - (U) The international community should plan to provide significant financial assistance to the Afghans to achieve force levels and capabilities sufficient enough to counter persistent threats (terrorism, extremism, narcotics, criminal enterprises, recalcitrant former militia commanders) without the assistance of coalition troops.
 - ~~(FOUO)~~ It may be prudent to view such assistance as an investment and/or insurance policy to protect US strategic interests in Afghanistan and the region, while facilitating the drawdown of US forces, eventually resulting in savings of \$6.2B annually.
 - (U) In the most expensive scenario, Afghan security forces will require subsidies of approximately \$680M after FY09, with assistance slowly tapering off thereafter, as the Afghan economy and revenues grow in a safe and secure environment. This assistance will help sustain basic

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Army and police forces (national, border, highway, counternarcotics and customs/counterterrorist) with the minimum amenities necessary to attract and retain honest and disciplined forces loyal to the government.

• (U) Key Assumptions

- (U) The desire of bad actors to satisfy their appetite for power and money as well as the ideological objectives of anti-governmental forces will not fully dissipate, resulting in low-level insurgency and narco-trafficking into the next decade.
- (U) US interests will remain unchanged in South Asia over the next 10 years. The development of professional Afghan security forces is the primary driver for drawing down US forces in Afghanistan.
- (U) A thorough analysis of endstate size and composition of Afghan forces will include considerations such as anticipated scope of security threats, geography and terrain considerations as well as economic realities.
- (U) The threat of armed invasion by neighboring states remains low and Afghan security forces are sized for internal threats.
- (U) Thirty percent of government revenue is a reasonable Afghan contribution for security forces without endangering other critical government functions.
- (U) Some form of US military presence will remain in Afghanistan after Afghan security forces are fully developed as part of regular security assistance programs.
- (U) Afghan inflation will average 10 percent or less through 2012.
- (U) The drug trade will not seriously detract from Government of Afghanistan (GOA) progress in achieving stability and economic prosperity.
- (U) Afghan internal threats will diminish over time to a level that the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) can handle without kinetic assistance from coalition forces.

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- (U) Right-sizing the Army and Police Forces
 - ~~(C)~~ ANA and ANP facilities and equipment are currently assessed as appropriate for the threat and designed to Afghan specifications.
 - (U) USCENTCOM and the Afghan government validated end strength requirements of 70K for the ANA. The GOA and Combined Forces Coalition-Afghanistan have agreed on an ANP strength of 77K as a tentative goal. However, the GOA has requested a professional international police assessment occur in the near term to develop a validated requirement.
 - (U) ANA strength includes Ministry of Defense (MOD) (3K), support and command institutions (24K), four regional commands (30K) and Central Corps reserve (13K). ANA composition is still under discussion with the MOD, but it is anticipated the force will be light infantry focused with counter-insurgency and counterterrorist capabilities.
 - (U) Basic ANP strength is computed from a threat-based assessment of a 1 to 300 ratio of police forces to civilians based on a 22M-estimated population. Final ANP strength figures are still under discussion with the Afghan government, but should not deviate substantially from 77,000.
- (U) Cost of Threat-Based Force
 - (U) Afghan National Army: Estimated cost to build and sustain the ANA is ~ \$7.0B adjusted for 10 percent annual inflation through FY12.
 - (U) Most capital and training costs are complete by FY08 (\$4.5B.)
 - (U) FY09-FY12 costs are \$2.7B, or \$675M annually to pay and feed troops, operational costs and sustain reconstitution of equipment and infrastructure.
 - (U) Afghan National Police: FY07-FY12 costs are estimated at \$275M annually to pay forces and sustain reconstitution of equipment and infrastructure following the expenditure of initial capital costs before FY07 (includes national, highway, border and counternarcotics police).


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- (U) Total recurring costs for ANA and ANP for FY09 and beyond: \$950M, which could consume all Afghan government revenues through FY12 if the GOA was required to fund the entire cost.
 - (U) This constitutes an unmanageable burden on the GOA by undermining other government investment critical to sustaining the state.
 - (U) Between FY12-FY15, requirements for international assistance will taper off as the Afghan revenue stream continues to grow and more revenue is devoted to security.
- (U) Decision Points
 - (U) Size forces to Afghan economic realities, but assume greater risk of increasing coalition forces, coalition forces having to remain longer or returning later to repel re-emerging threats.
 - (U) Size forces to anticipated threats at greater financial cost and reduce GOA risks by increased USG supplements to the GOA recurrent budget. Expedite drawdown of coalition forces and reduce risk of re-emerging threat requiring US intervention.
- (U) Analysis
 - (U) US costs for the Afghanistan portion of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM are \$6.2B annually, or \$517M a month.
 - (U) The annual cost of sustaining 70K ANA and 77K ANP between FY09-FY12 is \$950M. Anticipated Afghan revenues are \$900M annually during this period (Source: Afghan Ministry of Finance: *Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward*.) Notionally, if 30 percent of revenue (\$270M) was dedicated to security forces, a shortfall of \$680M remains.
 - 
 - (U) USG funding of Afghan security assistance results in significant monetary savings, relieves overstretched forces and provides strategic agility for the USG to react to other threats around the world.

JS 1.4 (d)

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JS 1.4(d)

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Tab B


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TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
OSD (NESA)		5 October 2004
OSD (SO/LIC)		14 October 2004
OSD (C)		14 October 2004
USCENTCOM		13 October 2004

OSD
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

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Date: APR 21 2016

Tab C

UNCLASSIFIED

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

08/03/05

Print Date: 3/1/2005

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC ATTACHMENT: OSD 17919-04
OSD CONTROL: OSD 78518-04 DOC 11/22/2004 DATE: 3/1/2005 SIGNATURE CASE:
FROM: RUMSFELD TO: DEPSEC USIP
SUBJECT: GEN MYERS RESPONSE TO AFGHANISTAN FUNDING
KEYWORDS: SNOW FLAKE
COMMENTS: CAN - NO RELEASE WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL - RCVD VIA ESCD JB 030205
FN: AFGHANISTAN SEC OCN 112204-6

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:
AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:
SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION
PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 1
SUSPENSE STATUS

PACKAGE VIEW:
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FRONT OFFICE DOC
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5 U.S. 352(6)(6)

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