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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 18, 2002

Summary of Conclusions for
NSC Meeting on Regional Strategies

DATE: Tuesday, September 10, 2002
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 7:30 - 8:30 am

PARTICIPANTS:

- The Vice President
- Colin Powell, Secretary of State
- Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
- Andrew Card, Chief of Staff
- Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor
- Alberto Gonzales, Assistant to the President and White House Counsel
- Steve Hadley, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor
- Lewis Libby, Assistant to the President, Chief of Staff to the Vice President and Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
- George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence
- General Richard Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- General Franks, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command

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Date: AUG 26 2016

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The President agreed with his NSC Principals that the United States should seek international support for its position on Iraq. This would include an effort to obtain a new Security Council resolution.

- The President emphasized that the United States had a lot of leverage in achieving an acceptable Security Council resolution since the alternate is for the United States to go to war. The United States negotiators at the United Nations should use this leverage to get the most favorable resolution possible. The United States should first seek a Security Council resolution declaring the Iraqi regime in material breach of its resolutions, with authorization of "all necessary means" to enforce those resolutions and no inspections. If unable to achieve this, the second position would be material breach plus a demand for a declaration or disclosure statement that would test whether

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Iraq intends to comply. As a last position, at the end of the chain, the President would be willing to accept including a tough inspections regime in the resolution.

- The discussion elaborated on what became the two fallback positions. The President outlined an approach that would put the burden on Saddam Hussein. The Security Council would demand the Iraqi regime make full disclosure of its inventory of weapons of mass destruction ("WMD") and make disclosures under other Security Council resolutions as well. If the Iraqi regime does not respond or fails to make full disclosure, Saddam Hussein will be shown to be a liar. If the Iraqi regime does provide a response and it is accurate and complete, the regime will have admitted its prior violation of UN Security Council resolutions. The regime must then destroy the weapons of mass destruction it has declared and accept a tough inspections regime. The President indicated that the United States and United Kingdom inspectors needed to be included as part of any regime.
- The President directed his NSC Principals to refocus on enhancing security in Afghanistan and energize efforts in the Middle East to carry out the terms of his June 24 speech.
- The timelines given the Iraqi regime for compliance with any resolution should be short.

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