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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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JCSM-41-77
15 February 1977

*P. Aldridge 2/12
This seems to
be perhaps a
little 'give' to
the Hollingsworth
memo in this paper*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: European Capabilities Enhancement (U)

1. (U) On 30 June 1976, LTG James F. Hollingsworth, US Army, completed a report entitled "An Assessment of the Conventional Warfighting Capability and Potential of the US Army in Central Europe." On 13 July 1976, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were briefed on LTG Hollingsworth's assessment. The report rendered by LTG Hollingsworth offered more than 90 recommendations; however, the Chief of Staff, US Army, selected five issues which he felt warranted the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. They are contained in Appendix A.

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff examined these issues, and their principal conclusions are:

a. Warning Time. It is estimated that the Soviets would seek to optimize their advantage in force ratio prior to attack. It is not clear at what point the Soviets believe they would achieve their optimal advantage, but it is the estimate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it would occur no later than 14 days after the beginning of Warsaw Pact mobilization. Within the context of NATO's Central Region, a 7/14-day mobilization assumption could be used for force planning and programming. However, this examination has not validated this assumption within the context of worldwide defense planning and programming. Consequently, a 7/14-day mobilization assumption, as applied worldwide, should be evaluated.

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Date: SEP 09 2015

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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b. Initial Fifteen Days of War. There is a strong requirement to stop a large-scale Warsaw Pact attack without major loss of friendly territory in the initial 15-30 days of war. However, the requirement also exists to be able to continue the conflict and successfully defend for as long as the Soviet Union and its allies are capable of fighting. While it does not appear appropriate to identify a specific constraint within the 180-day period, logistic planning guidance should recognize that there may be as much as 30 days of high intensity conflict at the onset of hostilities.

c. Northern Army Group, Europe, Corps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the insufficiency of immediately available ground forces in the Central Region and support the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), in his initiatives to correct the situation. Sufficient divisions will be in the active force structure by end FY 1980 to meet the additional requirement for an Allied Forces, Central Europe, reserve corps. However, without pre-positioning of material configured to unit set and improvement in strategic lift, the corps could not be deployed to Europe by M+30. Notwithstanding these factors, a NATO common solution is required.

d. Forward Defense. It is in the best interest of the United States for NATO to adopt a coherent concept of defense and force dispositions that has the capacity for a swift, violent reaction to any violation of NATO territory with inherent capability to defend successfully against a Warsaw Pact attack as near as tactically feasible to the inter-German boundary (IGB) in the Central Region. Whatever decision is reached, it must be a NATO decision not a unilateral US decision.

e. Assessment of US Forces South of the Alps. A requirement exists for a US Army headquarters south of the Alps to control US Army units throughout the Southern Region because of the geography and distance from Headquarters, US Army Forces, Europe.

A more detailed discussion of the conclusions is contained in Appendix B.

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3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. Warning Time

(1) The Department of Defense, in connection with ongoing National Security Council studies, undertake a detailed evaluation of the validity and implications of a 7/14-day mobilization assumption as the basis for Defense force planning and programming.

(2) Collective Alliance efforts be vigorously pursued to find ways to increase the warning time before a Warsaw Pact attack.

b. The Initial Fifteen Days of War

(1) Logistic support planning for at least 180 days be retained in the Defense Guidance.*

(2) The first 30-day operational stockage-planning factors be based on consumption rates for a very intense conflict.

(3) War reserve stockage policy be designed to satisfy anticipated combat demands fully through 6 months of a NATO war. Stockage objectives should continue to be based on the assumption that combat continues for 90 days at intense rates and an additional 90 days at sustained rates. Furthermore, planning considerations must include provisions for assessing production wartime requirements beyond D+180.

c. Northern Army Group, Europe, Corps

(1) The requirement for a corps-sized reserve be supported. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that this issue be addressed at the NATO Spring Ministerial meeting (May 1977) to seek a common NATO solution to recognized inadequacies in Northern Army Group, Europe.

(2) In the interim period, through 1980, the United States continue to maintain the additional US Army forces in the "Other Forces for NATO" category. In no event, however, should these forces be "earmarked" until agreement is reached on a satisfactory Alliance solution.

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(3) The Strategic Mobility Enhancement Programs be continued.

d. Forward Defense. NATO consider adopting the concept of a forward defense along defensible terrain at, or as near as possible to, the IGB in the Central Region. To the extent possible within programmed resources of the United States and NATO allies, the United States continue to support USCINCEUR/SACEUR efforts to achieve a NATO concept of defense well forward along the IGB in the Central Region.

e. Assessment of US Forces South of the Alps

(1) The current US Army Southern Europe Task Force (USASETAF) organization continue essentially unchanged in structure but with economies in size where possible.

(2) The forward strategic logistic support base in USASETAF be retained in support of NATO contingency plans in Allied Forces, Southern Europe, and, with the concurrence of the Italian Government, as an alternate support base for US unilateral, non-NATO contingencies.

4. ~~(5)~~ The above conclusions and recommendations were arrived at with the full consideration that the Hollingsworth report dealt with the US Army participation in a possible conflict in the Central Region; it did not attempt to address the joint or combined aspects of the defense of NATO Europe or the total strategic or resource implications which relate thereto. While this assessment, of itself, should not serve as a basis for JCS recommendations to modify strategy or force planning, it will be useful in the subsequent development of JCS-recommended strategy and force posture within existing planning, programming, and budgeting system and Alliance planning procedures.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Philip D. Shutler
PHILIP D. SHUTLER
Major General, USMC
Vice Director, Joint Staff

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Attachments

Reference:

* Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, 9 November 1976,
"Defense Guidance"

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