

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMUNICATIONS,
COMMAND, CONTROL AND INTELLIGENCE)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS
AND LOGISTICS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND
RESERVE AFFAIRS)
DIRECTOR FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: NATO Action Program

I broadly endorse Ambassador Komer's impressive NATO action program and request all concerned DoD elements to take it as providing general guidelines for our NATO-oriented activities. Among other things, it provides a sound basis for proposing to the NATO Defense Planning Committee a major long-term defense program exercise along the lines indicated.

Please provide me with any comments you may have on the report by 20 April 1977. I am particularly interested in practical recommendations on how to proceed to carry out the proposals made.

Meanwhile Ambassador Komer will stay on through May at my request to assist me in appropriate follow through. He, working with the Assistant Secretary ISA, will personally supervise the measures necessary to launch the DPC initiatives called for, and establish adequate follow through machinery for the U.S. inputs.

Harold Brown

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NATO Action Program
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Report to the Secretary of Defense

ACTION PROGRAM FOR REVAMPING NATO'S DEFENSE POSTURE

Here is my brief overall report on the kind of action program which will enable you to get a firm handle on what to do about NATO deterrence/defense--not only the US contribution but, even more important, that of our Allies. It seeks to provide you as Secretary with a broad "systems architecture" for the comprehensive long term effort required if NATO is to maintain a credible deterrence/defense posture at politically acceptable cost. It will be supplemented by a series of Tabs elaborating the supporting arguments and making specific action proposals (some of these you have already seen and acted upon).

Given the magnitude and complexity of this 15-nation problem, it requires a comparably multi-faceted, multi-year approach. I don't pretend to have covered all the important issues involved. Rather I've sought to provide a coherent framework for tackling these problems, plus specific guidelines for dealing with certain key priority areas (management by exception, if you will).

Nor does my report confine itself to initiatives the US might launch at the forthcoming SAC Summit and DPC meetings, important as these are. Rather it sets these within the context of the much larger and longer term collegial effort that is needed to achieve our purposes.

Such an effort must encompass not only better focussed multilateral planning and a higher degree of Allied cooperation but better NATO machinery for getting the requisite performance. While NATO has always been long on statements of good intentions, all too often they have not been carried out in practice. Hence the thrust of my report is quite programmatic. But it is in my judgement quite consistent with emerging national policy in PRMs 9 and 10, and other places. Indeed I see my report as complementing these by providing a practical blueprint for how DoD can best carry out such national policy objectives.

I. WHY A MAJOR US INITIATIVE IS URGENT

I start from the premise that a credible NATO deterrent/defense posture remains central to our own security interests. Moreover, as PRM #9 says, there is no need to review NATO's basic flexible response/forward defense strategy. Indeed doing so could even be counter-productive. Hence I see the key issue as rather how to generate a posture adequate to carry out this strategy--in an era of nuclear parity.

Nor do I see much need to dwell on the Warsaw Pact "threat." The hard evidence is more than sufficient to show evolving WP capabilities, especially for short warning unreinforced attack. Opinions may differ about the seriousness of this buildup, but few would disagree that NATO must address this issue to reestablish decisive political argument both in the US and Europe.

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our NATO's problems are not just the growth in WP capabilities. It arises even more from NATO's own internal weaknesses and lack of cohesion. Despite roughly equal NATO/WP active manpower and resource inputs, NATO's actual defense posture is far weaker and more fragmented than such comparable inputs would suggest. A large part of the problem lies in our higher manpower costs, it results even more from NATO's failure to allocate defense inputs optimally toward creating the flexible response capability its own strategy calls for, in particular an adequate conventional leg to its deterrent Triad. Nor, though the Alliance itself is premised upon pursuit of a coalition strategy, has NATO ever developed a coalition posture to mesh effectively its disparate national forces. Waste and duplication abound. Hence, as NATO's own assessments amply bring out, its forces lack sufficient readiness, flexibility, WRM, C³, interoperability and timely reinforcement capability to offer high confidence defense.

The NATO commanders and other NATO bodies are currently working these problems (to cite their efforts where germane), and gradually achieving some constructive results. But by themselves they can only propose solutions for a classic alliance of sovereign states like NATO, only the nations themselves can generate the needed collective effort. The Allies are groping toward means for greater "Alliance Cooperation," especially given the persistence of sharp fiscal constraints at a time of escalating costs. But, despite the hopeful rhetoric and much activity, not much concrete will happen in timely fashion without a major added push to build on these beginnings.

1. US initiative and consistent US leadership are indispensable to this end. Throughout NATO's history the Allies have looked to the US lead. Generally only US initiatives have succeeded in moving NATO. This remains a fact of life. Therefore, if a revamping of NATO's defense posture is high on our agenda, we ourselves must initiate it and push it home.

This May's IPD is the time to launch this effort, to set the tone which the Allies are awaiting from a new US administration. Moreover, since the US itself has been the ally most guilty of the go-it-alone syndrome, we now must prove -- by deeds as well as words -- that we really believe in collective defense. We can't let our suspicious Allies continue to believe that all our talk is really just a cover for US arms sales (they see us as inflexibly pursuing our own economic interests with IR-7, AVALON, F-15, PATRIOT and the like).

A final reason why a new US initiative is essential is that NATO's traditional "business as usual" approach has proved demonstrably inadequate to pull together Allied efforts sufficiently to meet perceived needs at acceptable cost. It suffers from the sin of incrementalism. Ministers periodically approve guidance saying all the right words. Force goals are liberally presented. But performance usually falls short. Clearly something more is needed. Experience suggests that only some kind of concerted and carefully orchestrated long term program,

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starting now, will serve to galvanize our common efforts. Since this will only happen under US sponsorship, it is a made to order initiative for a new US administration dedicated to strengthening the Alliance.

II. THE NEED OF THIS ACTION PROGRAM NEEDED

The issue then becomes one of what kind of US action program is best calculated to achieve the desired results. Here we must also learn from experience. NATO has agreed to many long term defense programs, but few have been carried through to fruition. The last such exercise, AD-70, is a good case in point. It was too vague and unspecific; priorities were loose; not was there much attention to follow-through. Largely for these reasons its impact was diluted. To avoid these pitfalls this time, any new US proposal for another long term program should be framed around the following guidelines.

a. It must focus squarely on how to bring our Allies along with us in a truly balanced effort. Indeed, the crux of the problem is far more the Allies than the US. Their forces (even the FRG's) are in far less satisfactory shape than ours. Post-Vietnam, we have done more to improve our own capabilities than any of them. One result is a growing imbalance between the technology US forces and less well-equipped Allies. For example, CENTAG (where our forces are located) is in much better shape than NORCEAG. We have more and better equipment, far more W3, a far larger combat support structure. But this imbalance could be an invitation to disaster: we would lose Europe just as surely if the Allies collapsed, even if our forces held.

Thus it would be a fatal blow if the US focused primarily on jacking up its own NATO contribution without devoting comparable effort to galvanizing the Allies to do the same. Nor can we afford to risk that as the US increased its share other Allies would slack off. And it would be politically impossible to sell our Congress and electorate on the US alone doing most of the job. But the traditional ways of using the leverage from our own inputs to generate parallel Allied performance have not been terribly effective. We must find better ways to put clear focus on Allied shortfalls and provide incentives for performance.

b. It must stress AFFORDABILITY. Except in event of a sharp rise in tensions, parliaments are quite unlikely to fund big increases in defense budgets to rectify NATO deficiencies. As USNATO recently reported, we can "expect a tough struggle even to maintain existing real levels of defense spending." Hence there is no point in seeking massive and-ous not realistically in sight. In fact this could be counterproductive. So the Allies must be forced to face up to the fact that if they won't increase real defense spending, they must find ways to use such resources as are available to such better effect.

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Since we must stress and greater "Alliance Cooperation." If large budget increases are not in the cards, the only viable alternative is to overcome the historic waste and inefficiencies inherent in NATO's duplicatory and poorly coordinated national defense establishments. Since interdependence has become a fact of NATO life, we should build on it, not ignore it. Creating some sort of balanced coalition posture out of the present individually balanced national postures is the only way anyone has come up with yet to get credible deterrence/denial in the 60's at a critically acceptable cost. Such rationalization of NATO's defense posture, of leading to increased efficiencies, less overlap and duplication, and elimination of marginal national inputs, would enable NATO to meet many needs via tradeoffs and reprogramming rather than additions.

1. To these ends, any new plan must be far more programmatic than previous NATO plans. Broad goals can give a sense of direction, but are simply an inadequate substitute to the concrete measures required. So are the traditional basic calls for across-the-board percentage increases in overall defense outlays. To get the desired real life impact, any new plan must be as specific as possible about what each Ally is expected to chip in, with proposed time phasing. These inputs must be packaged in such a manner as to facilitate monitoring of performance.

2. It must call for a tougher choice among priorities, and reprogramming where essential. If affordability is the key criterion, and an Ally can't provide everything the NATO commanders want, the latter must tell us more precisely what is needed most. Given resources constraints, NATO must focus on the most things first -- buying primarily those capabilities we just can't do without, if necessary at the expense of lower priority efforts. If these last also must be more clearly identified in the planning process, and resources explicitly proposed.

3. The plan must give first priority to initial counter-air defense. Again, that is simply a matter of first things first, given the affordability problem. Obviously, as the ERI's draft points out we must worry about sustainability. But until the allies can perceive a high confidence initial defense capability, they will be dead to this US concern.

4. The plan must include relevant machinery for implementation. Since NATO's present machinery and procedures are not up to the task of framing and carrying out the proposed action program, strengthening them is indispensable to its success. The US must insist that this aspect be included. Above all, plans must be devised for consistent ministerial-level follow through to forestall another "paper" exercise.

5. The plan must stress qualitative superiority. Since NATO's combat forces will probably remain much smaller than those of the WP, we must find compensatory "force multipliers" to give us qualitative superiority. Advanced technology offers many possibilities which should be systematically exploited on a collective basis (especially since sophisticated systems are so costly that only via cooperative funding can the allies

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field. The most important element, but often cited lower priority of preserving qualitative superiority, such as better training, should also be emphasized. Many studies suggest that training rather than equipment is often the most important variable in force effectiveness.

Finally, NATO's long term plan must be consistent with its MBRF needs, and vice versa. These are really two sides of the same coin in terms of mutually reinforcing the common aim of stable deterrence. What follows is consistent with NATO's current MBRF position.

It thus is a tall order. While I'm convinced that it is feasible to carry out a program along the above lines over time, there is no blinking at the enormous difficulties facing such an effort. It confronts the most political and institutional obstacles which have so far frustrated effective expansion for 27 years will take a consistent long term effort, on a scale never attempted before. The broad Allied consensus required will be particularly hard to reach on practical cooperative measures many of which will inevitably be at the expense of cherished national programs. We Americans will find it hard to overcome our own generational prejudices. Even though we are a special case in that we have global commitments beyond those of any other Ally, we too could go a lot further toward rationalizing our own NATO contribution along the above lines -- and using this as a lever to bring along our Allies. Moreover, despite all the difficulties, what viable alternative do we have?

And, as noted previously, NATO as a whole is groping in these directions even in the call for greater Alliance Cooperation mandated in its own innovative ministerial Guidance. But a more concrete long term defense program is vital to flesh out this guidance and provide concrete prescriptions for collective action. The rest of this report is devoted mainly to how to provide the necessary impetus -- in programmatic terms.

III. KEY ELEMENTS OF A CREDIBLE NATO DETERRENCE/DEFENSE POSTURE

This section of my report briefly cites what key priority programs seem essential to any such posture for the Eighties. It covers both what the US should do and what we should ask from our Allies, particularly those in the crucial Center Region. I have not sought to include everything I deem important, but what in my view is indispensable. I have framed them largely around RAND's three Rs (Readiness, Reinforcement, Rationalization) which should help enhance their salability.

1. Greater Readiness, especially against short-warning attack. Fortunately, NATO's goal is not so much for more forces as for better managed, better equipped, more compatible and ready forces. Clearly one of its major priorities must be readiness to deter and, if necessary, cope with a short warning attack without much of the prior mobilization we have previously relied on. The US and FRG are programming along these lines, but this is not enough if other key allied sectors lag far behind.

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We also promote a NORTHAG improvement program aimed chiefly at getting US and Benelux forces up to snuff. We could hinge program on improvements to NATO's to their performance.

2. Alert procedures and alert procedures also need overhaul to meet short warning contingencies. This is especially important to the US since we may need to use Allied reception facilities for US reinforcements if we would be made available under present procedures. More critical use of key reservists may be essential. And key parts of the system need to be exercised at least occasionally (this happens rarely except in CPX's). Civil emergency planning in NATO needs overhaul to deal with the need for more rapid transition from peace to war footing than exists today.

3. Maintenance of active combat forces too far away from MDR positions for forward basing (which Senator Nunn has agitated). The FRG and Dutch are planning some corrections, but large-scale near-term reassignment would cost billions which probably could be better spent on higher priority needs. A more cost-effective alternative would be higher peacetime readiness, so that M-day forces could reach their MDR positions earlier. Moving more ammunition to forward storage sites (FSS), being done via the NATO Infrastructure Program, will facilitate quicker movement to MDR positions by easing ammo uploading and resupply delays. Now this program should be expedited.

4. Increase Density of Anti-Air Systems. While NATO's deficiencies are legion, the best way to get sufficient concerted action on them is to pick out a few of the most critical and mount a special effort. One such is anti-air, which has long been identified (in AD-70 and basic Issues) and is especially important to deterring or halting armored blitzkrieg. Currently programmed US holdings per division will be far higher than those of any other Ally (including FRG). Let's use this as a lever to get Allied add-ons, by designing a proposed anti-air package, including air munitions, with each nation's share clearly identified. NATO-sponsored studies show that it would cost only about 3% of NATO's 10-year defense outlay at present levels, and using available technology, to deny the WR the prospect of quick blitzkrieg victory in the Center Region, chiefly via proliferating ATGMs in APCs and helicopters, air munitions, and antiairable mines, along with new tanks now programmed.

5. Reduce W/M Levels. Another top readiness priority must be to overcome what Sen Haig calls "one of our most serious deficiencies in ACF today." There is no point in arguing about sustainability as long as alert war plans in some respects still lack enough W/M to fight more than a few days. (Especially in new improved munitions with much higher effectiveness) If anything calls for special remedial action this ranks high. But we must be careful that the new NATO consumption standards resulting from Europe war experience not be so high as to be a disincentive. Consider set sights lower and build up in phases.

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... many other important measures could be taken to enhance the readiness of NATO forces. Since good training is such a cost-effective force multiplier, a great deal could be done to exploit the veritable revolution in training techniques and devices. Much more could be done to improve the increasing utilization of Western Europe by more planning and training for military operations in built up areas (MOBA). Optimum use of built-up areas - perhaps supplemented by barrier systems, could do much to slow down the blitzkrieg-type attack favored by the Soviets.

All these issues are examined and recommendations made in Part A.

Quicker Reinforcement and More Allied Reserves.

This is also essential to deter or cope with short warning attacks on even one after 30 days. Again, it should be a joint enterprise with our allies, but we find them slacking off because the Americans are coming more quickly. Moreover, rapid reinforcement would enhance deterrence if they were available prior to D-day, besides being a needed hedge in case MBFR results in US withdrawals from Europe.

1. Options for Quicker US Reinforcement. We can and should be able to deploy 10% of tactical air and some ground forces to Europe within 48 hours, as a crisis hedge. But even forces arriving as late as 1405 or even 1430 would still be in time to help meet an initial blitzkrieg thrust. Since we can't predict in advance the likely degree of prior WP reinforcement, hence the likely warning time we'd have, your directive that we program reinforcements against a spectrum of contingencies from 48 hours notice on will help fine up our programming.

As a program we should start for a 1960 goal of getting at least one division equivalent and 39 tactical air squadrons to Europe within 48 hours, and have more divisions and 90 tactical air squadrons there by 1415 at the latest. This is ambitious but quite feasible, especially if we enhance readiness, cut back preparation and rally-up time, streamline unit structures to optimize initial defense capabilities, and perhaps restructure POMCUS (maybe emphasizing outside and oversize items). The optimum air component POMCUS/AMA airlift/seaift to meet this program goal will require further analysis.

2. But we also need a lot more help from our allies to make this defense reinforcement possible. We should spell this out in programmatic terms and aggressively insist on such goals for this as quo as: (a) better coordination and facilities; (b) more collocated operating bases; (c) more joint operations as well as air mobility; (d) more host nation support (HNS) on an assured wartime basis; and (e) carefully worked out NATO-blessed peacetime agreements to assure that all this is firmly available in timely fashion when we need it - this is a job for NATO. All this is cheap at the price - it involves mostly wartime allocation of Allied assets.

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3. The plan should hinge its quicker reinforcement on jointed European air assets forward too. We should call for presently scattered British, Canadian, French and Belgian reinforcements to be deployed in packages pending the part of a NORAD improvement program.

4. Inter-theater needs are plans and programs for the use of European inter-theater and even inter-theater airlift to supplement ours. NATO plans including Allied shipping, why not Allied civil aircraft as well? SHAPE and other NATO authorities are actively working to pool Allied airlift assets. Perhaps a European C-130 should be set up on the US model for inter-theater use, or like Canadian forces like their ready air-transportable brigade, to lift European resupply from COMUS, and maybe even to supplement our own lift of US forces. All this should be done in the context of a combined NATO framework, with everyone contributing to the effort.

5. Beyond this most Allies have large unstructured reserve pools which could be used to provide reserve combat forces for sustainability but which are lacking. At present the US is the only ally with reserve divisions in its structure (except for one bunch); in fact if a war lasted past D+20 we'd be providing literally half the total divisions in the Center Region. SHAPE is addressing the reserve problem in a study due July 1957. We should back its hand by urging greater integration of reserves (they are mostly at present under national command, not earmarked to NATO), into NATO planning and programming. But we must also carefully avoid worrying Allies that we contemplate an extended conventional conflict for which they are not prepared. Nor should we reserve resources at expense of highest priority or initial readiness (e.g. Allies lack even WRM for first 30 days).

These issues are addressed and recommendations made in the report.

6. Inter-Allied cooperation through Greater Alliance Cooperation.

Along with the other needs cited in this report we must take up to the task of making though NATO persists a coalition strategy, its national contingents are far from adequately postured to fight together effectively in coalition war. Unfortunately the Soviet dominated and largely committed to forces seem far better prepared to do so. The NATO Commanders are alert to this problem and trying to address it, but few concrete results have emerged as yet. Hence this too must be a major thrust for the future.

A few key points need to be more widely recognized. First, rationalization of military assets as such on grounds of efficiency and effectiveness is of cost-saving. SACRU's stress on the need for greater flexibility in the use of Allied forces (through more reserves) is a major cost in itself. Greater inter-Allied cooperation may not yield higher budget divisions for long time, but it will assure greater cost-effectiveness for our outlays.

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Second, such rationalization entails a lot more than standardization or even just R&D and procurement! Important as these are, they are likely to be the easiest to achieve and to take the longest time. So easy are no paradoxes. Indeed, interoperability is more feasible over the long run than standardization and an important halfway house. More combined logistics, communications, training, exercising, etc. can also provide early dividends, as can greater harmonization of doctrine, tactics, procedures and force structures.

Third, in accord with the basic guideline that we must get the allies to do more we should not let our own desire for greater defense cooperation be an excuse for not getting on the way of encouraging greater cooperation among the Europeans themselves. General principles don't tell us whether or not we should do anything which pulls the Europeans closer together to further our own interest, except where we can make an overwhelming case that it is far less costly and more efficient for the US to participate itself.


Fourth, we should encourage rationalization of European R&D and defense industry efforts, not just for ourselves, in order to make Europe more competitive in essential progress to any larger Atlantic rationalization. We must be very sensitive to European suspicions we seek to dominate the arms trade. This means inter alia supporting the European program group which also serves the important purpose of tying Europe closer to the US.

It may seem to be for more of a "two way street" in reciprocal arms purchases, but it is imperative if we are ever to get compatibility in practice. We must find better ways of convincing our own reluctant services, congress, and industry (as well as those of our allies) that the practical advantages of compatibility among alliance forces often far outweigh modern differences in technical equipment characteristics. And the only way we'll ever convince anyone that we're serious is to find ways to speed up the development of more ideas. I will propose some of them in 1964.

And on the two-way street it is also defensible on straight commercial grounds. Given our enormously greater R&D effort and industrial base, we will naturally spend Europe far more than we buy. Right now we are trying to sell what improved Hawk, more F-105, PATRIOT, MASHOON, etc. etc. etc. But for Roland version, and the like. To protect this large export potential and overcome deep European suspicions that standardization means "they American" to us, we simply must be free-traders in defense equipment and (and change restrictive laws and regulations on both sides of the Atlantic).

We must also overcome those inhibitions about technology transfer which are often based on commercial protectionism and valid security considerations (in fact some of the latter are valid at times, but not paid for us, of this technology in the name of the common

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defense so should use it as such. No-cost or at most low-cost cross licensing should be a main policy, not least to upgrade the quality of Allied weapons and correct the dangerous technological imbalance between us and our Allies.

More specialization is essential to an optimum collective posture. Although such efforts to use this concept to reduce their own defense burden have given us a dirty name, it does make military and economic sense. Smaller Allies waste resources by attempting to maintain full spectrum national forces. Some functions (e.g. air reconnaissance, some air should be assumed by the larger powers (as we do in strategic nuclear field) or funded collectively by the Alliance (like C³) so that all can reap the economies of scale.

As for one thing we need to NATO-ize our posture more, to encourage the Allies to, except to do so too. We are cast as the leaders in NATO, and have the greatest leverage, so we must take the lead here too. Since the US has until recently been the greatest exponent of the "go-it-alone" syndrome in NATO, we have a lot of suspicion to overcome. While CSF, JCS, the services and the relevant CINCs are now working the problem far more than is visible in any other Allied capital (or even all the rest put together), we still have a long way to go.

As recommendations as to the kind of multi-phased action program you should effect along these lines appear at Tab G and numerous other places in this report. Besides buying European, cross-licensing, greater technology release. They include:

1. Lifting restrictions on offshore purchases.
2. Changing the NATO STANAG on reciprocal low-cost training and increasing greater US participation in allied training programs. A two-way street is needed here too.
3. NATO-izing our European command structure by collocation of US and NATO Hqs. Several good options exist.
4. Starting Stage 2 cross-licensing (airing) of NATO aircraft, which in turn requires a common family of air munitions.

D. REVAMPING NATO'S MARITIME POSTURE

I need hardly go into the "growing Soviet naval threat" to justify arguing that NATO's maritime posture needs revamping too. The difficulty lies in deciding what is feasible within likely present constraints. Meeting presently framed naval requirements has been and remains so expensive as to be a non-starter.

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The US Navy must cut the cost to fit the cloth. Perhaps we must reduce the number of command and control projection in the NATO context. Naturally the US provides both. But what if NATO can't afford both? How do we reduce the projection capability less and less feasible in an increasingly high intensity NATO conflict environment? Can and need we plan to risk high cost ships like carriers in low payoff situations? While our US Navy must posture for many non-NATO contingencies, its contribution to early defense in the NATO scenario needs to be considered.

This issue also cuts across that of fast sealift, which SACRANT urges to be more fully analyzed. While fast sealift could not meet earliest deployment needs (and is unnecessary if there is adequate POLCUS), it should be thoroughly explored for later deployments and initial resupply. To this end we should press NATO to make selected Allied shipping available on D-day instead of on D-day as at present.

Has NATO yet managed to pull together its impressive total maritime assets into the more effective collective naval posture which a fortability dictates. Since our Navy so dominates the NATO naval picture, we should have the leverage to get more done along these lines. This may, among other things, more release of high technology and more US support of allied naval force postures, especially for closing off crucial "choke points" like the Dardanelles and Baltic exits.

Lastly, we must find better ways to use the highly ready US Marine more optimally in the NATO scenario, especially in the crucial early period. Since we're going to retain a strong USMC, let's plan to use this asset from the outset, not just reserve it for later contingencies.

Further details and recommendations on the above issues are at Tab C.

Functional Areas

Aside from all the above, there are several high priority functional areas where special remedial action is urgently needed, and which are well suited to collegial action. Indeed I doubt that we can ever get the Allies up to snuff on them unless they are addressed collegially. The following list is by no means exhaustive, but it's the most I believe NATO must be gotten to tackle seriously in the near future, even as part of a long term defense plan. Moreover, these issues are already being worked in NATO right now, so may be ripe for a further push.

One issue, for instance, is rightly one of SACRANT's and SACRANT's top priorities (SACRANT is working up a G plan), because it is so central to the Allied joint land employment of NATO's disparate nations.

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forces in coalition war. They must all be tied together via effective command, C3, battle management, and even target acquisition systems. So C3 could be a great force multiplier. But a common systems architecture is important to guide national programs. However, advanced C3 systems are so financially expensive that only via a common (and probably commonly funded) program could most allies afford them. This leads to a near ideal area for collective action (see Tab E for details and recommendations).

2. Interoperable Tactical Communications. This subject involves, perhaps, the most critical to effective and flexible coalition operations, is the ability to communicate (so much so that it can be taken as a given) based on the costs of the air alone, many tactical radios cannot operate on the same frequencies, and there is no common secure tactical voice. Worse yet, no less than seven different new largely incompatible national systems (including our own TRI-TAC) are coming on line, with continuing new development until the 1990s at the earliest. This is a very problematic area (see Tab E).

3. Intelligence Support. Here is another logical area for collective action, especially since it is being worked by the UK and Spain right now. It is also one of the few areas where NATO has a good record of common approaches (e.g. SIGINT, the UK and FRAX bases (and co-production) and eventually new assets as a new force integrator and multiplier). Since future systems like IMPACT will be very expensive, we need a common family of SIMs and tools for affordability's sake alone (this would also help solve the current intelligence gathering problem). Common C3 and adequate programing language (e.g. common FOR) are part of the problem. My proposals are at Tab F.

4. Intelligence Warfare. Another key area which is highly susceptible to combined NATO planning/programming. The US may be ahead technologically, but the WP is way ahead on NATO operationally and we are highly vulnerable. Indeed only the USA has a respectable current capability, and the allies may never get one unless we take the lead via NATO. My proposals are at Tab G.

5. Supporting Airborne Logistics Cooperation. Here we see such a delicate balance between traditional national responsibility and multinational measures to secure quick response and adequate flexibility. NATO must have sufficient logistics in personnel and other assets rapidly enough to NATO logistics in wartime, especially in case of short warning attack. The US has been way out in front on this issue, because of our need for more combat strength forward and the gradual attrition of our peacetime 1941 strength. We should be the greatest beneficiary of the proposals in Tab H (which you have already approved).

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...the planning of logistics must also address the
 critical... even persistent allied shortages, we
 convinced that the only way to remedy these is via some form of commonly
 funded NATO stockpile, perhaps for a common family of modern munitions.
 We've always resisted this lest it give poorer Allies a free ride and
 reduce their incentive to build up their own stocks. But minimum essential
 WRM stocks are so crucial as to require changing DoD policy in my view
 (Congress has always resisted and would have to be brought around too).
 But there should be ways of meeting the free-ride problem, such as
 putting the stockpile under firm SACBUR control and making it available
 to all... financing such a WRM stockpile via some kind of cost-
 sharing formula like that for NATO infrastructure could provide the
 necessary incentive for participation.

...Technical Warfare (TW), Modernization. Given
 persistent allied shortfalls... of modernization, such
 modernization is an indispensable corollary to modernizing our
 conventional capability. Moreover, we want to modernize in any case to
 (a) achieve greater stability and survivability; (b) reduce obsolete
 weapon systems and unneeded warheads like Nike; (c) save manpower; and
 (d) firmly orient forward dual purpose systems like nuclear capable
 aircraft... I know the
 issue... I agree it is really an old one.

10. ...ACTUALLY DONE--PROPOSALS FOR INTERMEDIATE IN

...of the above is new. Practically all of it has been addressed
 before... SACBUR has been particu-
 larly... ...authorities acting collegially can
 put forth... necessary results.

...actually... we face
 up to the real problem, which is that we simply cannot get the indispens-
 able... machinery. This is not really designed for this purpose.

...give the Joint Defense Committee... a
 basis... While they say all the right
 things... the general... to
 across... by specific global
 percentages... but they all too often
 ignored... to give a sense of direction,
 they... to the concrete measures needed.

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... are ... national ...

... attitudes ...

"One perhaps the most important new thrust of this report is ...


... Program's Long Range Plan to Flesh Out Its ...

... NATO planning system is ...

... key priority ...

Director of ...
Assistant ...
Chief ...
Deputy ...

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program packages to enable sufficient visibility and efficient program management. Where possible define national inputs, programs, funding and time phasing, and cite tradeoffs. They might vary widely in scope, but should be designed to be consistent with the intent of the overall program. They should be agreed guidelines in each package which would greatly facilitate the search for interoperability and synchronization. They would provide a means of stacking up proposed programs and their related inputs, so that we could use this as a means of developing a set of related commitments from our allies. At least one or two such program packages would greatly facilitate showing the value of our program and how they can be combined to provide a meaningful program.

Each of these program packages should be assigned to a specific JCSO program area. The program flow-through cannot be left to umbrella committees like the JAB, or JWG, or the Joint Matter to any committee. It is essential that we get at least a thousand more joint program packages in the change. There should be a central committee which would be responsible for monitoring and reporting. The very same program should be brought to bear the better. Each program should be assigned to a program manager who should be responsible to the JCSO for the program.

Each of the JCSO programs that as part of the comprehensive program packages should be revised in at least the following program areas:

- 1. Joint Air Support and Logistics Program Package perhaps this is too big to be digested, in which case it could be broken down into such packages as antiarmor, JRM, training, exercises, etc. (see Tab A).
- 2. Joint Air Support and Reinforcement Package. This would provide a framework for getting reciprocal allied actions parallel to our own (see Tab B).
- 3. A JCSO program package. This plan should build on existing programs wherever possible, but propose funding, including reprogramming of national assets where needed (see Tab E).
- 4. JCSO Joint Communication Program Package. Perhaps designed by JCSO, with a specific program manager (not a committee) to run it (see Tab K).
- 5. Joint Air Support Program Package. (see Tab D)
- 6. Joint Air Support (see Tab G).

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1. WRH Stockpile Program Package, designed by a civilian and military working group, with the ASVG for Defense Support as overall program manager, and SHAPE as program manager for the WRH stockpile (see Tab B).

2. ARMY Modernization Program Package, with DoD in effect as program manager and the Army as primary contact (see Tab I).

It would seem that some of these packages should be split up or structured differently. Moreover, some might take longer to develop than the year allowed for the "long term defense plan" exercise; however, a year should be more than long enough to at least assess feasibility and develop preliminary program proposals.

Other Essential Institutional Changes.

These changes fit readily into the program package format, but they are nonetheless equally important to energizing NATO.

Underpinning for Coordinated Planning/Programming of R&D and Procurement. Clearly this is vital to long term standardization and uniform cost control. The present NATO system is inadequate, though the national arrangements themselves are hard. We need something better than the present ad hoc case-by-case patching together when someone wants to sell a new system. Since many new systems are so expensive that NATO will not be able to fund them adequately on a multilateral basis (e.g. financial transfer), we must find better means of doing so.

A useful step is the NATO study now underway on a Periodic Armaments Plan or Review. Perhaps to harmonize national plans over the next 10-15 years. This study should take the opportunities for standardization, interoperability, joint R&D, and production sharing. But it is only a first step. We want to see the law on dividing the R&D and procurement costs especially. NATO II may have the credit. This is basically a four-nation problem, since the US/UK/FRG/France produce 85%-90% of NATO equipment. Many are working in this area (GERMANY, FRG, CANAD, etc.). NATO II has to keep the solution in view to reduce wasteful duplication.

Since we are to discuss the effect of schemes for more closely linking single source procurement, we should try and develop some kind of NATO-wide source list for major items, giving each nation's get their share (and the right to be approached), rather than holding the books to each other. We also need a NATO-wide policy on low cost/no cost cross-licensing, agreed procedures for better technology exchange, and better procedures for developing agreed military requirements as the basis for standardizing procurement via strengthening the military

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... in more detail in Tab 11.

... A high level SAC ad hoc committee very successful highlighted some key aspects (though reactions to their efforts were mixed). ... Institutionalize some such ... high level forums, and reporting to Ministers.

... legislative machinery is another imperative -- ... highly beneficial to the US ...

... the national planning system should eventually be expanded to cover ... enable collective focus on all national ...

... needs better means of determining real priorities and ...

... funding mechanisms are vital to common programs. ... infrastructure, ...

... military machinery for ...

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Date: Jul 13 1976

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... at I ... at ... NATO channels yet.

Disruptive ... Effective French Contribution ... Regardless of whether France formally rejoins the NATO team, is still high ... military channels. ... Since France is a ... of ...


... pro ... quiet enterprise ... RM ... suggested ... personally assure that this French matter is being presented ...

... Basis ... NATO ... system ... study the effects of new technology on tactics and force structure. We are already ...


... the new technology efforts in the ... we should lay out a ... advanced technology might be employed to help ...

DE ... Au ... Ch ... Da

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Operational planning and execution of intelligence activities have long been a major concern of the intelligence community. I am confident that while we are at the beginning of a new era of technical analysis, we still have a long way to go in analytically studying the operational capabilities. While there are a few people working these matters and their past work has been of some value, too many have been diverted to other things. The resources are devoted to other things. The operational planning and execution of intelligence activities really do not really get done.



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 with ...

... don't have ... but if you agree they
 are ... and ...
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V. ...

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updating and... offer a... Therefore, I urge capitalizing on the... (and... NATO... defense plan... plan should comprise... during the exercise to introduce a number of our major initiatives under the name of...

As... already underway and... for such... exercise, and the... potential... short between now and the... a great deal of prompt action is required to assure that all the... will submit shortly as...

I am also... with IFA and others... fellow... at least in principle. I quite agree with Secretary Vance's... economically... impact... programming.

V... IN INITIIVES PACKAGE... 10 30 1971

It... that you need to do... document, define... and commensurate with the... budget invested in it.

It provides you with a coherent "systems architecture"-can orchestrated set of short and longer term guidelines for the multi-year effort...


It translates these guidelines into a set of digestible program packages...

It... the changes in NATO and... indispensable to... and avoid...

It provides a... the kind of productive... needed...

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Date: JUL 10 1971



... of sending this message to important educational persons in showing both the new team and the old bureaucracy what must inevitably be done as soon as possible, sooner or later if not now.

Last of all, GOOD LUCK! It was mine to propose but yours to dispose. My proposals are admittedly ambitious, and will inevitably get whittled down, not just here in Washington but even more in NATO's 15-nation paper mill. But my intuitive feeling is that starting out big is the best way to stimulate so important a process, and that even halting performance in many aspects would be eminently worthwhile. In the last analysis, the need for a more credible NATO deterrent/defense posture is so central to our security interests that we can hardly afford not to try the most promising route. It's been a privilege to help devise one.

R. W. Komper

R. W. KOMPER
Special Consultant to Secretary
of Defense on NATO Affairs

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass. Div., DHS
Date: JUL 13 2018

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#18
#13

8 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Komer Report on NATO Action Program

Here is my basic NATO report, submitted without the Tabs (I'll keep submitting these piecemeal) because the advance consultation process for the Summit is already getting underway. Hence I want to send you to decide now on at least the broad outlines of your proposed DFC initiative, so that you can get the President and others to foreknow it at the Summit. Moreover, if you decide to circulate this report outside the building, I think it preferable to do so only in this generalized form, leaving off Tabs which deal with mostly DoD's own operational business.

However, my package goes far beyond just a set of proposals for you to try out on the Allies in May. It also encompasses the kind of overall action program I recommend DoD pursue vis-a-vis NATO over the next 4-5 years. It is designed to get you (1) out ahead of DoD in telling us what to do; (2) out ahead of State and NSC with the kind of program they'll practically have to endorse; (3) out ahead of NATO so that the US can lead effectively; and (4) out ahead of those in Congress who say do more about NATO (e.g. Mir/Bartlett).

I have touched base widely on OSD, JCS, the Services, USNATO and SPAF, and have picked up many of their ideas. However, I have neither sought nor received any concurrences on what is at this point my personal report to you.

This whole exercise is proving more of a task than I anticipated, because (as you've seen) I decided that attacking it much more programatically than originally envisaged would have far greater impact. Thanks to you it is certainly doing so. My detailed Recommendations will be in the Tab as I'll keep sending you. Meanwhile, I suggest the following options re this basic report:

1. Use it as a starting point for projecting what you want to do about NATO and have the staff or ISA to take the lead in carrying it out, with appropriate work to the key Ministerial and to planning to make sure that such can be easily modified if you choose lesser alternative

2. Use it as above, but merely request OSD, JCS and Services to use it as a starting point for the NATO-oriented program.

*... in the lead position on so doing that out
... could you and Dave Mcguffey get together on
... and several other items to consider*

Page dated 1/1/67 to be unclassified
Reviewed by: CDR, RCD, WPS
IAW E.O. 13526, 13526-2, 13526-3
Date: 11/2/02



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with respect to the recent background. (Even if you do
not have a formal background, the material has been a success
in your mind as well as mine. It has already helped
to the DFC and the DFC has been
independently of the pragmatic considerations outlined
above. It is an educational effort to which I will leave
you to decide.

As we have talked you suggested I also help you with a
project which was necessary. If you like the product, I'll be happy
to let you know. I will use a process that we call us not

... task force to work up the format and talking
paper for you to launch the long term defense program, quick fixes, and
inst...

... necessary prior consulta-
tion of the... probably including an advance
notice of the... DFC.

*operational
as desirable to
if you prefer to
pitching
never fear*

... and give you my
views on the... before I leave.

... board and maybe give some on general terms about what you intend.

5. Accompany you to May DFC or even precede you for some added
politicizing with allies.

R.W.K.
R. W. Koser

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Reviewed Chief RDD, WHS
AWW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: JUL 13 2018

N.B. If you decide to talk out in DFC along the lines I mentioned, it's
important that you always say at Summit how US favors long term defense
plan, etc. I'm working with Henry Owen to get this in Carter speech. Hence
if you decide to read this report to President, let's use this as occasion
to all in applying to agree to do so

Prepare cover memo: _____ No

LIST OF ITEMS TO BE REPORT

- Tab 1. Services Package -- includes anti-armor
- Tab 2. Quicker Reinforcement Package -- US and Allied
- Tab 3. Rationalization Package -- Standardization/Interoperability/
Flexibility/Specialization/Joint
Procurement. Multilateral machinery
for R&D and Procurement Rationalization.

X 1596

- Tab 4. Baseline Package
- Tab 5. US and Allied Communications Package

see 3124 (10/19/70) p 10

Tab F. Air Defense Package

311 Ecm

not actually see 3124
Tab G. Electronic Warfare (EW) Package

X-0980

Tab H. Logistics Package -- including War Reserve Exemptions.

Tab I. Top Modernization Package

see X 1129

Tab J. Proposed US DPC for Major NATO Long Term Defense Program
Exercise 1977 (AL 80), focus on priorities.

X 1143

Tab K. Procurement and Planning, Programming and Follow-through
Machinery

Tab L. Possible Short Term Initiatives for DPC (Quick Fixes)

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Chief, Records & Declass. Div, WHS
Date: JUL 13 2016

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
CHIEF OF STAFF, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND,
CONTROL AND INTELLIGENCE)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS AND
SERVICES)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE
AFFAIRS)
INSTITUTE FOR TRAINING AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: NATO Action Program

I broadly endorse Ambassador Kerner's proposed NATO action program and request all concerned OSD elements to regard it as providing useful general guidelines for our NATO-oriented activities. Among other things, it provides a sound basis for proposing to the NATO Defense Planning Committee a major long-term defense program exercise along the lines indicated.

Please provide me with any comments you may have on the report. I am particularly interested in your recommendations on how to proceed to carry out the proposals made. Ambassador Kerner will stay on through my at my request to assist in the appropriate process follow through. To this end I wish him to chair an ad hoc task force which will report to me by *memo* *passed through the (SAs) for his concurrence.*

for example
2. Attach
NATO Action Program
(attach)

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JUL 15 2016

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C/Sec RDL, FSD, WES
Date: 13 Jul 2016 Authority: EO 13526
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Reason: 3-3(b)(1)(5)
MDR: 15-M-2213