

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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3

Memo For SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Lest you think I may be exaggerating what a "mess" NATO is, here's a memo from Gen Jones to Don Rumsfeld six months ago which is still ~~under the same heading as the memo you were given which solved the NATO problem~~ on at least three tours in Europe, the last as CINCUSAFE.

Since Dave Jones concedes that his diagnosis of the problem is better than his proposed solutions, I also attach a brief chit I did for your transition team which goes further. My reason for raising this issue now is that you may act on DoD reorganization before I address the NATO aspect in my action proposals.

-- You raise this with the reorganizers

-- This problem is under control

*RWK*  
R. W. KOMER

*RWK - 2/5*  
Jones has, as you say, a good eye for the problems I can't really accept years in solution, but see the need to have (full time) or very senior, but officials ~~reduction~~ on a few functional problems: Strategic weapons NATO, shipbuilding, etc. The problem is ability to put them in order.

*cc: I. Kester*

Office of the Secretary of Defense *S.U.S.C. § 552*  
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13 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: NATO and Multilateralism

This memo is the requested follow-up to our discussion on the disconnect between policy and practice in the NATO arena. The disconnect is by no means confined to the Department of Defense, nor even the U.S. Government, but I believe the U.S. Defense community can play a larger role in influencing better NATO integration, in-house and Alliance-wide.

Many of the disconnect symptoms derive from a unilateralism which, to a greater or lesser extent, colors the conduct of all sovereign nations. Governments may typically act in what appears to be the national interest, but when such interests are too narrowly defined, broader interests can be sacrificed for the sake of short term advantage. In many NATO nations, we see abundant evidence that the tail of domestic political and economic expediency wags the dog of Alliance solidarity, multilateralism, and interoperability. For example:

- defense budgets: driven almost exclusively by domestic political constraints; NATO a reluctant afterthought.

- force structure: same story, with the additional complication of "a little bit of everything" thrown in.

- weapons development: fragmented, uncoordinated, duplicative, often competitive. Vehicles using different fuels, guns with different ammunition, incompatible aircraft armament, etc. Standardization, if considered at all, worked after the fact rather than at inception; the U.S. is as guilty as anyone in this regard.

- communications: worse than weapons; analog vs digital; enormous economic and manpower resources tied up in national-only systems which overlap each other (and NATO comm) without the redeeming advantage of redundancy; national and NATO towers stand side-by-side on many German hilltops.

- command and control: myriad systems, designed in national and/or service vacuums; speak different "languages," can't be netted except manually or with costly buffering; some individual improvements but basic problem persists.

- intelligence: as with command/control/communications, substantial resources concentrated with national-only orientation although no Ally capable of national-only defense.

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In many instances, the U.S. is the most tenacious practitioner of the "go-it-alone" school, and with understandable reason: worldwide interests and commitments have necessarily produced a national security apparatus organized, trained, and conditioned to support unilateral action at any level of conflict, wherever required.

As I see it, the problem with this apparatus is that it does its job too well. The system emphasizes U.S. global stand-alone capabilities whereas, in a sub-nuclear European context, unilateral U.S. action makes no sense. Moreover, it would do us little good to "win" the U.S. piece of a NATO war by holding the U.S. front if the line caves elsewhere in the Central Region. Yet we tend to devote more energy to the question of how to further strengthen the strongest, heaviest links in the defense chain rather than how to firm up the weakest. *Amer!*

An ironic illustration of this pervasive "blinders-on" perspective in Washington is the recent GAO report which criticized the Army for shortages of equipment, munitions, trained manpower, etc. The underlying implication of these findings--that NATO is weakened by marginal shortages in U.S. forces--is first cousin to the unilateralism which afflicts much of our own planning and misses the broader "weak link" point.

We certainly should continue pursuing our efforts to insure that our own manning and stockage objectives are logical and consistent and then to fulfill them. But we should do so within the context that, in absolute terms, our forces are in good shape and in relative terms, we're like a 280 pound tackle in a 150 pound average line. For example, although the U.S. considered itself short of HAWK missiles (and was, based on the air threat), my experience in Europe was that, by the second or third day of an exercise, 2 ATAF would be requesting redistribution of HAWK resources from the 4 ATAF area. In fact, we found that the U.S. stocks accounted for about 80% of the air delivered munitions in Europe, even though we had less than 25% of the tactical aircraft (about 50% with augmentation). My Army counterpart reported comparable ratios with ground force munitions. Yet, I'd say that 90% of our staff effort and attention focuses on U.S. requirements and only 10% on the broader imbalance. We should not reverse those ratios, but clearly a more balanced institutional approach to the bigger issues is called for.

Fortunately, Gen Haig and his senior officers in Europe have a keen appreciation for these broader issues. Many intelligent, innovative people on both sides of the Atlantic are working these problems hard and striving to overcome or

work around the impediments to improved integration. The fact that we do as well as we do is a tribute to a generation of dedicated internationalists. Many solid improvements have been made, including the formation of AAFCE and the introduction of U.S. ground forces into NORTHAG. Issues such as rationalization and standardization have been isolated and are being worked, albeit slowly. As yet, however, we have not evolved a mechanism for dealing with equally important and perhaps more fundamental problems.

For example, all of NATO is afflicted by different individual interpretations of our nominally common MC 14/3 strategy. The philosophical division over what deters and how flexible should be our response spills over into a whole range of practical policy issues. The Europeans believe visible force structure and a low nuclear threshold deter best. Consequently, when facing decisions on resource allocation, they tend to opt for thinly supported numbers and apparent capability rather than smaller numbers with hard punch and staying power.

Our view, of course, is far different. We believe recognized determination and good capability to sustain a firm defensive campaign are the best insurance against aggression.

Another related disconnect is our divergent threat assessment, particularly in terms of probable warning time. The U.S. has unilaterally promulgated its national estimate of 23 days warning, whereas most of NATO expects no more than a couple of days. (At issue here is not whether 23 days is wrong, for good intelligence and perceptive analysis may indeed provide that much time or more. What is wrong, in my view, is that once this figure becomes enshrined in our planning, the whole DOD program and the success of our strategy for Europe tend to revolve around that figure. What NATO needs is the flexibility to defend with little or no warning, along with the capability to take advantage of whatever warning is available. This doesn't necessarily imply big increases in forces, but might well suggest changes in deployments, equipment, stocks, and logistics schedules.)


Pursuing these and other conflicting conceptions produces many anomalies. The bottom line from the standpoint of readiness is illustrated by the different WRM objectives mentioned earlier: the U.S. working to keep its forces reinforced and supported through the 90th day of a NATO war and beyond, while some of our Allies (on whom the overall success of the defense depends every bit as heavily as on U.S. forces) would fold logistically by the 10th day or earlier.

evaluation of suitability/interface with NATO's requirements. In all cases (but particularly with requirements primarily NATO related) we should examine European systems in development or production which might satisfy our needs. If so, we should consider European procurement, joint development, or co-production as serious alternatives. Because of global mission needs we may occasionally have to proceed with unique and/or incompatible systems, but if so, it is better to do so as a conscious choice, rather than inadvertently contributing to the interoperability problem.

It would also be beneficial to both OSD and the military to have better focal points in Europe for integrating US-NATO activities. There are already myriad committees working pieces of the problem, composed of military, civilian, U.S., and European representatives in various combinations. However, these bodies lack the cohesiveness which might be afforded by, for example, elevating the status and responsibility of the DEFREP to U.S. Mission NATO (perhaps to the equivalent of Deputy Chief of Mission level). In his broadened role the DEFREP could be invaluable as the integrator of the various U.S. defense initiatives as they interface with NATO programs--and vice versa. In the longer term, the NATO orientation of US Forces in Europe, would be greatly strengthened by collocating EUCOM and SHAPE Headquarters.

Finally, it has been my experience that the Alliance does best, in terms of working mutual problems jointly and equitably, when operating through the NATO Infrastructure system (NADGE and TAB VEE shelters are two significant examples). Although the system is cumbersome and imperfect, the "output" has exhibited a far better degree of standardization and consistency than most other NATO programs. Perhaps now is the time to re-examine the Infrastructure system for possible broadened scope and wider participation in major system development.

I sense a growing recognition everywhere that the day of lip-service solutions is past. The Warsaw Pact forces grow more formidable yearly, many major NATO and Allied systems are due for replacement or modernization in the 1980s, and the climate for more integrated action is better than it has been in years. As the Alliance leader, we ought to seize this opportunity to strengthen the favorable currents of change by demonstrating in word and action that we take seriously the "two way street" nature of our professed multilateralism.

  
DAVID C. JONES, General, USAF  
Chief of Staff

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 23 2015

There is still another fundamental problem, linked to both unilateralism and divergent strategic interpretations, which has similar troublesome implications. The Allies, including the U.S., are content with total reliance on one another to defend the assigned geographic pieces of the front, but have been incapable of meaningful progress toward mutual reliance for logistics and other support. Whether this causes or results from lack of standardization is a "chicken and egg" argument. None of these problems I have sketched can be treated in isolation; they call for corrective action across the board.

In my view, the solution is a gradual process of education, change, and initiative. Although these problems do not lend themselves to a single bold stroke solution, the rework of NSSM 3 currently underway presents a timely opportunity to correct many overarching problems at the highest policy guidance level. We ought to exploit this opportunity to insure that the old unilateralism will not be perpetuated in the new strategy options being developed.

To this end, I believe it is necessary to better clarify, define, and centralize responsibility for NATO defense affairs within the Pentagon. We can thereby get our own house in order as well as create the mechanism for encouraging constructive change in other departments and in Europe. I agree that more teeth should be put into ISA's role as the OSD kingpin on NATO-related activities in the building. Within this strengthened charter, ISA might take the lead in coordinating a high level reexamination of the defense related aspects of NATO, warts and all. Composed mainly of people in the building, with some help from U.S. authorities in Europe, this could be expected to identify many of the fundamental problems (including some we may cause ourselves), which have not yet been surfaced by the vertically organized, functional bureaucracy. With a clearer in-house version of our own "sins of omission and commission" and corrective action visibly underway where appropriate, we will then be in a stronger and more credible position to wade into the areas involving Allied shortcomings.

Among other techniques for sharpening the NATO focus within DOD might be an extension of the current practice for improving FMS; for example, periodic breakfast meetings, attended by appropriate principals, to deal with both broad and specific issues, report progress, and signal continuing high-level interest.

Somehow, we also have to get a handle on better coordination of weapons system development. Perhaps at the phase of formalizing requirements at early DSARC's we need to institute a specific

HOW TO REORGANIZE DoD TO GET ADEQUATE FOCUS ON NATO PROBLEM

Why This Is Essential

Despite the fact that the bulk of our GPF (thus the largest single chunk of DoD budget) are primarily sized and configured for the NATO scenario, DoD has never organized itself to give commensurate emphasis to NATO-related issues in its real-life decision process. In fact, the present system produces almost the opposite result. Though SecDefts personally pay a lot of attention to NATO issues (at least two ministerial meetings a year and lots of visitors), these issues then almost invariably get submerged in basically US-oriented decision processes. As a result NATO aspects usually get raised too late or too diffidently to affect real life decisions as much as they should. In effect, the Pentagon machine ignores NATO considerations in 90% of what it really does.

Thus each SecDef finds that the bold words he utters to his fellow ministers, and the directives he issues, get lost in the vast Pentagon bureaucracy. If revamping NATO's feeble conventional posture is high on the new SecDef's agenda, he must find better institutional means of getting adequate follow through.

What Can Be Done?

The trouble is that the NATO problem area cuts across just about every Pentagon activity. Almost every ASD, and most elements of each service, have pieces of the action. So NATO is everybody's business and no one's. A separate ASD for NATO wouldn't solve the problem, because too many other offices have legitimate interests.

While ISA has traditionally had the con on NATO affairs, this made more sense back when NATO was regarded as essentially a politico-military problem. But the crying need today is for a broadly rationalized NATO defense posture (with more combined R&D, joint weapons development/procurement, interoperable equipment, doctrine, tactics, etc.). This emerging requirement has grown far beyond ISA's ability to manage alone.

Even if his ISA shop were greatly strengthened (which it should be), ASD/ISA is only on the same level with the other ASDs. He can't really order around these autonomous feudal dukedoms. Above all, ISA can't beat up DDRE (which needs it most).

Schlesinger first tried to solve this problem by having his own Special Assistant (Bob Murray), with a small staff, drive the Pentagon toward NATO. It worked for a while, but was so widely resented by the ASDs and services that Jim abandoned it after a year. At present, there is only a DoD Rationalized Steering Group really chaired by a two-star ISA office director, who does splendid work but simply lacks the clout to force NATO-oriented needs down anyone's throat.

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2

### The Optimum Solution

1. Given the way NATO issues cut across everyone's bow, a high-powered NATO rationalization task force is probably the best way to pull all the dukedoms together. Make relevant ASDs and service secretaries sit on it (on the DSARC model) in order to bring their departments into line.

2. To put enough steam behind a Task Force, have it chaired by a Deputy Secretary of Defense as one of his major functions (again on the DSARC model). Since the senior Deputy already has a full time job with programming, the new second Deputy is the logical man. This also ties in well with the Fitzhugh Panel proposal that he be the operational deputy dealing with NSC, JCS, State, etc.

3. Give DepSecDef and his Steering Group a strong charter from SecDef himself, which clearly spells out what he expects. At a minimum this charter should make the Deputy responsible for supervising NATO-related matters, and the channel to SecDef on them. It also should require that NATO aspects be taken into account in all relevant R&D (DSARC) and programming decisions, and charge the DepSecDef with monitoring this.

4. Give DepSecDef his own modest staff of bright operators (half military) to prepare the papers and do the indispensable follow-through. Without such full-time eyes and ears, he'll never be able to keep abreast of what's going on, much less guide it. To head the staff, find a bright able civilian of stature and give him a three star deputy.

5. First job of new Task Force should be to draw up a NATO-wide action program as basis for a major US initiative at May 1977 NATO meeting.

Let ISA, P&E, ISL, DDRE, etc. continue to do what they're doing now (ISA for example, would continue to handle day-to-day NATO actions) in addition to supporting the new Task Force. In sum, this proposal would add an expediting level with real clout above them as the best way of making sure that the NATO angle gets ground in throughout the Pentagon machine.

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