

*Intell -  
Turner's Case*

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DCI ANALYSIS FOR THE PRESIDENT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REORGANIZATION

1. In considering the alternatives for reorganization of the Intelligence Community, I support placing the present Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), [redacted] under the line control of the Director of Central Intelligence. In addition, I believe some functional integration of major collection systems operated by these entities is desirable. For reasons well developed in the basic PRM 11 itself, departmental analysis units (Defense Intelligence Agency) and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)) should remain basically independent of DCI control. These centers provide dissenting views and independent intelligence judgments. The analytic process is strengthened by such competition, and there is no serious argument to consolidate departmental analysis units with those under my authority today. Further, I do not believe the DCI should control those intelligence collection activities now under the control of DoD that are primarily tactical in nature. My reasoning in support of these positions is set forth below.

2. From outside, the Intelligence Community looks more cohesive and manageable than it does to those more familiar with its actual operation. Before taking this job, I had not realized that the ability of the DCI to weld together diverse agencies and functional collection systems is so closely linked to a collegial, "management by committee," process and the corresponding requirement for broad Community consensus. It is not that the Intelligence Community functions so poorly, but rather that it does not work as well as it might. I reached this conclusion shortly after I began to match my present authorities against my responsibilities. I believe my job includes responsibilities in these areas:

- Advisor to you and the NSC.
- Executive direction of the Central Intelligence Agency.
- Production of national intelligence for civilian and military needs, including crisis reporting.
- The conduct of covert action when directed.

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--Coordination of clandestine and counterintelligence activities outside the US.

--Control of intelligence-related liaison with foreign governments.

3. By virtue of my line control over CIA, I can meet these responsibilities and carry out my primary duty to you as your foreign intelligence advisor. I do not have the same confidence in my ability to carry out these additional responsibilities which I also hold:

--Protecting intelligence sources and methods.

--Ensuring that intelligence activities are conducted in a manner compatible with our democratic system and policy objectives.

--Reviewing Intelligence Community programs and budgets and evaluating the effectiveness of those programs.

--Acting as the principal spokesman of the Intelligence Community before Congress.

--Ensuring responsiveness of Community collection systems.

4. The reasons I estimate that I lack adequate authority in these six areas are:

a. In protecting intelligence sources and methods, my authority is limited to CIA, and the authority is itself weak.

b. In ensuring that intelligence activities are conducted in a manner compatible with policy directives and our democratic system, my authority is effective only over CIA. At present the DCI has authority only to be assured that Inspectors General of the non-CIA elements of the Intelligence Community are doing their work. He does not even have access to their reports.

c. Executive Order 11905 and the establishment of the Policy Review Committee gave the DCI added budgetary influence in another collegial forum over elements of the Community not under his line control. But these improvements still fell short, in my view, of providing the authority that is essential to meet the responsibilities of the office. Budgetary authority has limitations as a management tool, particularly if line command authority is retained by another whose unit has a different primary mission. Beyond this, in overall evaluation of the effort

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of the non-CIA elements of the Community, the DCI simply cannot gain adequate access to data to permit a reasonable evaluation.

d. As long as the principal management of major portions of the National Foreign Intelligence Budget is lodged with the Secretary of Defense, there is no possibility that the DCI can speak effectively for the Community before Congress.

e. In directing Community collection assets, I have the authority to "task" but can guarantee only that CIA will respond. Elsewhere in the Community, responsiveness to tasking is directly related to the existence of consensus regarding the collection "trade-offs" required in most targeting of national systems. My direction to DoD collection assets must, at least tacitly, have DoD concurrence. For example, if I should decide that the needs of national intelligence require more economic reporting and less military reporting from NSA, I can issue collection guidance or requirements to "task" collection systems to increase their economic reporting. No one will question my right to issue collection guidance. In the last analysis, if the Director, NSA, and the Secretary of Defense agree with me, the necessary adjustments will be made. If they do not agree, the collection ratio between military and economic coverage might remain unchanged. At this point, I might appeal to you to ask Defense to honor my request to collect more economic intelligence. Since such a question is not likely to be brought to you for decision, I would then have to try to use my present limited budget powers over the Community. It is, however, difficult to find an effective place within NSA to use that budget power to cause a shift from military to economic reporting. The same collection and processing systems serve both reporting categories. There is nothing to veto, no unit to deprive of funds. The choice often is to cripple NSA's ability to collect intelligence at all or to accept the practice of selectively responding to my collection guidance. All the tools available to me today can prove ineffective in bringing collection activities into line with national intelligence needs.

5. In considering fundamental changes in the existing Community structure, we must have clearly in mind what we hope to improve by making such changes. PRM 11 sets forth the important criteria:

—The Community must be structured and managed so as to provide responsive intelligence support to numerous consumers at many levels.

- US intelligence must be timely and responsive. It must meet today's needs, and it must be responsive to needs not yet fully appreciated by consumers.
- US intelligence must be candid, accurate, and analytically penetrating and unbiased by policy preference.
- Intelligence, particularly expensive intelligence collection and processing programs, must be cost effective.
- Our intelligence system must be able to share data and judgment, and, on major issues, to collaborate in disciplined agreement or disagreement.
- US intelligence must be able to support the conduct of war with minimum disruption.
- US intelligence must be organized to minimize any potential of subverting constitutional principles and basic individual rights. Its activities must be demonstrably consistent with US legal and political standards.

These criteria constitute benchmarks which we can use to measure the soundness of arguments for changes in the present structure. I believe my proposed changes satisfy these benchmarks.

6. There have been several recent reviews of the management structure of the Intelligence Community. Prior efforts, and the present PRM 11, have all identified four basic sets of possible changes:

First, we could abandon the effort to develop a capability for central management of the Intelligence Community, based on an assessment that there is no acceptable way to give one individual authority to manage the bulk of the Intelligence Community. Thus a sensible approach would be to return to the arrangements which applied before an effort was made to give the DCI a budget role in the Intelligence Community. This would be an admission that only Congress can cope with the managerial and budgetary issues which arise within the Community. I believe this approach is inconsistent with your public position to seek improvements in the operation of our programs through reorganization where desirable.

Second, we can consider improvements which do not alter present lines of authority, i.e., minor adjustments in the existing

Executive Order 11905. PRM 11 identifies possible improvements of this type, and Secretary Brown supports this basic approach. This might smooth somewhat the existing unsatisfactory arrangement, but as explained above, I believe this will only marginally, if at all, improve the performance and responsiveness of the intelligence process.

Third, we could consider giving statutory authority over the Community budget or a large part of it to the DCI. This is a position which has been advanced by OMB staff. However, giving the DCI statutory authority over budgets outside CIA without also giving him line authority would mean that the Directors of the NSA, the NRO, [redacted] would have two bosses: one to whom they reported on management and policy issues, and one to whom they responded on budget matters. We should recall that President Johnson tried this mechanism in the early 1960s with the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) program. The concept was that funds would be appropriated to OEO but that responsibility for program operations would generally remain with other existing departments. In fact OEO was only rarely able to get those departments to focus on the programs OEO thought most important. More importantly, this approach cannot give me the tools I believe are necessary to solve two important problems: the need to develop a unified tasking mechanism to give coherence and priority to our expensive collection programs, and the need to resolve pervasive and long-standing strife within the Community over access by analytical elements to timely and complete data from collectors.

The fourth basic choice, which I support, involves consideration of whether line authority should be given to one individual for management of the bulk of the Intelligence Community. Line authority is sometimes an elusive concept. Fundamentally, however, it includes the ability to give direction and ensure that it is carried out; to control the management of personnel and funds; and to have access to any information available within the organization. The principal argument against this solution, if the DCI is given line authority, is that the vital interests of DoD in intelligence might be neglected. The presumption behind this concern, that a DCI would naturally favor other consumers to the detriment of DoD, is not bound to be the case. In fact, the DoD might find greater responsiveness from national intelligence assets under such conditions. Today the DCI's mechanisms instinctively assume that the Secretary of Defense's line authority over NSA, NRP, [redacted] will protect his equities.

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Placing clear responsibility upon the DCI for fulfilling the Secretary of Defense's requirements, I believe, would result in closer attention to DoD requirements than occurs in the present competitive atmosphere.

7. If we should place national intelligence collection components within a unified organization, five other steps would require our immediate attention:

a. A National Intelligence Tasking Center jointly manned by civilian and military personnel should be provided to task all national intelligence collection systems. It would also be responsible for ensuring that the resulting intelligence flow would be routed immediately to relevant components and commands. The Tasking Center would normally be under my direct authority. However, suitable arrangements could be worked out under which the Secretary of Defense could assume this responsibility in time of crisis or war if you so directed. Thus a smooth transition from peace to war would be ensured since the mechanism would not change, just the direction of it.

b. A high-level consumer committee is needed to identify priority national intelligence needs, subject to your approval. I recommend that a policy level group including the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Treasury, the Attorney General, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the DCI be established for this purpose. There is agreement within the NSC on the desirability, in principle, of this step.

c. While I have argued above against the present "management by committee" of the budget process, it is essential that the principal users of the intelligence product have an opportunity to compare proposed programs with their needs. Representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Advisor, and others as appropriate, should participate in a formal review of the intelligence budget. This review should be structured to allow full debate and discussion.

d. An immediate effort should be undertaken to review issues relating to the flow of information within the Intelligence Community, especially between producers and consumers, to ensure that present problems are eliminated, consistent with sound security practices, and that related new problems do not develop.

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e. Finally, we would need to establish a strong Inspector General corps, responsible for policing all intelligence activities under DCI authority, with unrestricted access to all parts of the new organization.

8. Perhaps the essence of the debate is whether centralizing authority under the DCI would jeopardize the legitimate needs of DoD, especially military commanders, for intelligence. There are two additional types of safeguards against such a possibility:

a. Tactical intelligence collection assets would remain under DoD control. The integration of national assets with them would, in all probability be more effectively achieved under a clearly defined responsibility than under the present divided and competitive situation.

b. There are numerous institutional hedges against neglect of DoD interests: the Secretary of Defense is a Cabinet Officer; the DoD has strong support in the Congress; all long-term budgetary decisions are subject to intense and varied scrutiny in our system of government; and short-term, crisis type decisions concerning military matters will continue to receive obvious and natural priority.

9. Implementation of my proposals could be accomplished largely under the Reorganization Act and by Executive Order. The reorganization plan would transfer NSA, NRO, [REDACTED] to the Director of Central Intelligence. The existing Executive Order 11905 would be rewritten to be consistent with the plan. Integration of like functions within the consolidated organization would be addressed in a measured way to reduce disruption to continuing important activities. Legislation on abuses and charters which we do not believe can be addressed by Congress this year would be considered in the context of the new organization.

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