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Intell

Notes on SCC June 28 Meeting on PRM-11

(N.B. The discussion often outran your scribe's pencil, so these notes are not complete)

Zbig: (1) Identified last time six issues - wants to continue discussion around those issues - resource management, line authority, tasking, accountability, requirements, output:

(2) wants areas of agreement and disagreement to present to President.

(3) Asks for Brown and Turner to summarize their proposals.

Brown: (1) What we put together was in response to Zbig's thought that there should be an option which starts with present structure and tries to improve it. May be other ways to do this.

(2) PRM-11 mentioned many problems of which 2 solvable by organizational change.

(a) On budget issue, DCI needs data access - that's what Option A proposes. Option A also has a fenced budget and DCI monitoring. Turner's paper of last week to program managers on zero based budgeting was an example of effective resource control under present system.

(b) Requirements setting - most in need of improvement to get consumer input. Describes Option A consumers committee. Question is how far to extend this consumer concept into the tasking. Senior people can't task. Option A provides for tasking committees into DCI as chairman, with user consultation, plus appeals to consumer committee.

(3) To assure data access, we should try to remove excessive need-to-know barriers.

(4) Abuses - describes Option A.

(5) Military responsiveness - I have specific responsibilities - intelligence systems can't help but be both tactical and national - no such distinction in collection systems - only in how material is used - this makes it all the more important to accommodate DCI and SecDef. Have to have close linkages all the way down the line - not just principals in Washington. Some of systems that collect missile information

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are also critical for indications and warning. Unnecessary and possibly dangerous to change line authority. In SIGINT, bad to split NSA from service SIGINT operations - would create duplication. ✓
NRO is increasingly efficient.

(6) Response to DCI tasking exists now. Describes his visits to NSA, NRO - clear that they are responding to DCI - what is not happening is responsiveness to technical change. This will come naturally with technological advance.

(7) Monolithic department of intelligence will not solve problems; will create others which will be bad.

Bell: What is tasking? Change it? Five people over DCI?

Brown: Priorities setting differs from tasking. DCI has tasking authority now. NRO responds to DCI.

Turner: Raises question re NRO response

Zbig: What if SecDef says no.

Brown: SecDef would have right to appeal under Option A - this is new. Refusal of DCI tasking has never happened.

Turner: We are close to agreement on what problems are - consumer committee, centralized tasking, data access, budget - but disagree on how to do it.

Option A relies on "restatement" of access. DCI's right of access already stated in National Security Act and 11905, i.e. for 30 years we've been entitled to data which we still don't have. Almost as vulnerable today as in 1941. More words won't work. DCI must have clout. ✓

Thought he could work out compromise. But don't have "community". Information being withheld, Congress is taking advantage of divisiveness. Centralization needed for accountability. Present system goes back 30 years. Same arguments have been made time and again over 30 years. Intelligence hasn't improved. Now is not the moment for partial biting of bullets. Middle ground is a quick-sand, not an improvement.

Zbig: Sees major movement on resources: DoD option allows more centralization.

Turner: No - has to have data and line authority is required for this.

Zbig: Appears to be agreement re setting of requirements

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Saunders: (State) - Vance would agree with proposals on setting priorities. In present system, although recognizing tactical needs, present system collegiality leads to too much material collected, etc. Need more centralization of resource management and line authority.

Zbig: What's your (Saunders') view?

Saunders: Little exposure personally; Vance speaking from DoD experience.

George Brown: Three points: (1) If go to centralization, easier to downplay dissent - this is bad. (2) tactical user needs (3) readiness for war.

Lance: If centralize, will have to face how to keep military from recreating transferred reorganizations

Jayne: - not convinced one year trial enough. Would centralize budget and tasking, but no line authority. Describes OMB option.

Zbig: describes NSC option, including emphasis on not loading DCI with management authority.

Aaron: NSC option is designed to avoid national/tactical problem operationally; same division re budget

Jayne: We don't disagree with consolidating technical collection by taking from CIA its technical collection functions

Turner: Great disservice to suggest that technical collection is primarily military.

Aaron: Outstanding characteristics of collection programs are high dollars and need for trade-offs, therefore it is sensible to consolidate. May be some loss in not bringing in HUMINT too - but no option is perfect.

Bell: Agreement on priorities board, - except perhaps shouldn't be run out of White House. Redefine tasking to include some line authority - but NSA, NRO would still be operated by military - but NSA head ought to report to DCI - but NSA would still be a military organization.

Brown# can we see other options spelled out.

Zbig: let's look in detail at priorities board; also we agree on DCI tasking - except how to do it. budget authority - relatively minor differences.

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Turner: DCI needs line authority to insure tasking and budget responsiveness

Zbig: sharp differences here

Bell: what about inspector generals; needs to be an issue

Zbig: Agrees needs to be discussed

Zbig: summarizes OMB option

Jayne: our resource approach is different from DoD

Zbig: OMB option - both tasking and budget authority more concentrated in DCI than in Option A

Brown: Clandestine collection?

Jayne: Open question - let's talk about this - how report to President if separate from DCI - politically touchy to report through NSC

Zbig: Doing it at State is not possible

Brown: If under DCI, raises questions

Zbig: DCI should be principal intelligence advisor - responsible for analysis, precisely and transmitting, but not the collector.

Turner: DCI can't be responsible for producing intelligence, if doesn't control collection

Zbig: Disagrees - INR produces better reports

Turner: INR has foreign service officers collecting

Brown: Does DCI propose authority in him to task FSO's?

Turner: We work with them; don't task them if collection is separated, DCI can't assure that getting what he needs. NSA won't give raw intelligence - alleges example of British getting raw data months before the DCI

Saunders: one of deficiencies today is that clandestine collection side is not close enough to CIA analyst side. Therefore shouldn't separate. One of reasons NSA isn't used as well as might be (?) would see advantages coming from closer cooperation.

Zbig: what should come out of this meeting?

Bell: Write up where we stand. Look at other options. Then have another meeting.

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Brown: Backup for NSC paper?

Aaron: We'll defer to OMB option.

Jayne: Give us your thoughts on our options - fine tune it

Brown: Could OMB get inputs for NSC and others in two issues -
(1) clandestine service (2) abuses

Lipschutz: Objects to IOB having abuse prevention responsibility

Turner: Would transfer IOB from watchdog to accountability role.
Need to prevent abuses.

Bell: IG's could report to DCI.

Brown: public perception problem - If IG's report to DCI.

Turner: shouldn't have IG's without line authority

Brown: would IG's reporting to DCI have responsibility for
tactical intelligence?

Turner: No

Aaron: Berlin?

Lipschutz: Suppose DCI and SecDef alternate on two year
basis as head of central intelligence body?

Gen Brown: wants JCS representative on a consumers committee;
having watched DCI since inception, part of problem is guy
trying to do two jobs - running CIA and being DCI are both full
time jobs - DCI should primarily produce intelligence for
President.

Aaron: try to identify areas of agreement and disagreement -
working group develop these plus the arguments. With this paper
plus reactions to OMB paper, decide whether to go to President
or have another meeting.

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