



MAR 17 1977 3

~~SECRET~~
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PLANNING AND EVALUATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

19 MAR 1977
SEC DEF HAS SEEN - 3/19
MAR 17 1977
very informative
Doc #19

Administrative QC Review Applied: 13 JAN 2018/WVJ

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT. DATE 01-15-2015

SUBJECT: The Nunn-Bartlett Report: NATO and the New Soviet Threat
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

This memorandum presents a relatively unvarnished P&E critique of the Nunn-Bartlett report on the state of NATO's defenses and proposals for future action. It concentrates on those areas where we have major disagreements with or reservations about what the Senators have said. A copy of the report is attached. By separate action we are preparing your formal response to the eight recommendations in the report, as requested of you by Senator Bartlett.

Overview

The foundation for the report's recommendations is the belief that the Warsaw Pact can launch an attack with 58 divisions without giving NATO more than 48 hours warning. We are concerned that this is a "worst case" overstatement of the threat that could jeopardize support for a more realistic long-term commitment to strengthen NATO's conventional forces. Such a commitment is required because existing real U.S. and NATO defense problems cannot be corrected quickly without major funding increases. Acceptance of the Nunn/Bartlett "worst case" threat could breed despair when the additional cost implications are realized. Such a situation could suggest sharply reduced conventional forces, increased reliance on nuclear weapons, with all the danger and instability implied by such a major reversal of U.S. policy.

Serious problems exist in Europe. Prepositioned war reserve equipment stocks are virtually non-existent; forces are less than optimally deployed; ammunition stocks and storage facilities are about half of what is currently estimated as required; and units must move to storage sites to pick up ammunition before going to defensive positions. These are but a few of the recognized problems that are being corrected as quickly as funding constraints and production capacities will allow. These problems exist in the context of both unreinforced attack and the 23/30 day mobilization scenarios.

Perhaps the most serious omission from the report is an adequate consideration of costs. While on the one hand the Senators state that the NATO problem they describe can be overcome "within the framework of

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JUN 14 2016

17710177

15-MAR-2016

~~Classified by 3238E~~
~~EXEMPTED TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652, AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 1985.~~



~~SECRET~~

SEC DEF CORR No. X-0803 03/1134

330-80-007, NATO 320-2 (1000-0000-0000)

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50 USC § 552
+
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 14 Jun 2016 Authority: EO 13526 +
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(d)(1)+50 USC 552(a)(5); 10 USC 424
MDR: 15 -M-0216

~~SECRET~~

2

the political, economic, and military resources now available to the Alliance" (pg. 2) and that "This should be done without weakening powerful hedges in NATO force structure against a protracted war" (pg. 18), on the other hand they propose a "quantum jump" in conventional firepower in the short term. The obvious inconsistency is not explained.

Threat

The intelligence and foreign policy community's universal judgment is that significant deterioration in East-West relations would be required before the Pact would resolve to go to war with NATO. Such political warning was recently described by the U.S. Ambassador to NATO as "an article of faith" amongst our allies. A significant deterioration in relations would both alert NATO's intelligence reporting and political decision-making systems and lead military commanders to take such steps as are within their authority to improve the peacetime readiness of their forces. Such measures should greatly improve NATO's capability to respond quickly should the Pact begin to mobilize and/or move toward attack positions.

The report's descriptions of the growth and improvement of Soviet ground forces and of the improvement in the ground attack capabilities of Soviet tactical aircraft are broadly correct. However, we are not prepared to accept the description of "a Pact capability to launch such an unreinforced attack from virtually a standing start" (pg. 6).

Even if an attack is to be launched prior to reinforcement from the USSR, non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces, which are significantly less ready than Soviet forces, must be mobilized and assembled. Extremely complex movement of forces and supplies must take place on an unprecedented scale. Based on our familiarity with the transportation model being used by DIA, we have serious doubts about the validity of recent estimates of Pact combat unit buildup capability. We are additionally concerned that the pre-attack buildup of munitions and other essential supplies has not been adequately considered. Furthermore, a prudent Pact commander would likely take other measures, such as increasing the fraction of naval forces at sea, prior to an attack. Early attacks may minimize NATO's warning time but they also maximize Pact risk if the initial attack fails. We and the intelligence community are studying how long Pact preparations might take and how quickly NATO might see them, pursuant to PRM-10. Based on what we know now, we doubt that the Pact could assemble a force of 58 divisions (all the forces in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR) in such a way as to catch NATO prior to mobilization (pg. 11-12).

Employment of Forces (pg. 9)

Any NATO posture short of continuously manning all major defensive positions in peacetime will depend for its success on some warning. If the Pact really could assemble a very large force before NATO commanders

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date JUN 14 2016

deploy to defensive positions, then the senators' statement that our covering forces are not adequate would be accurate. If, however, Pact buildup capabilities are less than asserted, then it is more likely our covering forces will be able to do their job. In either case, it is inaccurate to picture the withdrawing covering force as "having suffered the agony of defeat" or Pact forces as "flushed with the thrill of victory". A covering force is not expected to hold ground. It trades limited space for the time needed by the main defensive forces to occupy and prepare their positions.

Political Implications

We share the senators' concern with the cumbersome nature of NATO's routine decision-making process (pg. 10). However, in a major crisis procedures probably would be greatly accelerated or bypassed and decisions by U.S., UK, and FRG leaders to mobilize would drive the process. This does not mean that the machinery shouldn't be improved. It should.

It is difficult to say what each Ally's "potential contribution" is; however, contrary to the senators' contentions (pg. 2), the defense spending of our European allies has been increasing in real terms since about 1970.

Military Implications

In most cases, the areas of weakness in NATO's posture discussed in the report (pg. 11-16) are long-standing and widely recognized. Programs are underway and others are being considered in every area. The U.S. posture which the Senators saw in Europe was largely the result of programs funded in FY 73 and earlier. During that time U.S. involvement in SEA seriously affected our capabilities in and for Europe. Programs since then aimed at improvement are only now beginning to show up in the field.

The seriousness of the East-West malpositioning of NATO forces (pg. 12) depends on just how "few" days of warning NATO will realistically have. In addition, the significant differences in ability to move forces quickly to the battle area attributed to NATO and the Pact appears to be a classic case of the 10 foot tall enemy.*

There certainly have been instances when foreign sales depleted U.S. stocks or delayed U.S. acquisition. However, contrary to the report's charge (pg. 14 and 16), shortages in war reserve stocks are not primarily the result of limited production capacity and foreign sales.

There certainly have been instances when foreign sales depleted U.S. stocks or delayed U.S. acquisition. However, contrary to the report's charge (pg. 14 and 16), shortages in war reserve stocks are not primarily the result of limited production capacity and foreign sales.

OSD 3.3(b)(1) + 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3) ; 10 U.S.C. 4124
DIA 3.3(b)(1) + 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3) ; 10 U.S.C. 424

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records Management
Date: JUN 19 2016

The total investment involved in modernizing and expanding forces and filling WRM requirements, swollen by both recent upward revisions and new types of weapons, is enormous. Limited budgets have forced us to get well slowly. We might, however, question the priorities currently assigned both to funding various parts of the total requirement and to the geographic allocation of the new U.S. equipment.

We do not agree with the report's assessment that our air defenses are inadequate (p. 22). We believe the authorized war reserve level for ICBM missiles to be too high since most studies have shown that the Pact cannot sustain a high intensity threat for more than a few days.

Force Planning Guidance

The Senators seem to be misinformed about the nature and purpose of U.S. planning assumptions. The assumption that NATO would have three weeks of warning is tied to the estimate that the Pact would need a month to deploy 30 effective divisions. This may still be a good planning assumption. The possibility of attacks sooner by smaller, less effective forces has always been recognized and contingency plans have always been made for such attacks.

As you know, in response to PRM-10 we are trying to determine what force planning factors would be most appropriate in light of the current threat. To do this we must estimate as a minimum (1) how fast the Pact can effectively buildup forces with appropriate levels of supplies at the front, (2) the lag time between the start of this Pact's mobilization and NATO's, (3) the degree to which prior political warning should be expected to alter the pre-mobilization posture on both sides, and (4) the condition (e.g., number force ratio) to be used in judging the adequacy of NATO's response. While warning time--the time between the beginning of NATO's mobilization and the war--may be the factor of greatest concern to the commander in the field, the other factors are equally (if not more) important in long range force planning.

In discussing changes in NATO's deployment posture, the senators fail to mention at least one other factor which must be considered--the impact of major eastward movement of NATO forces and an increase in their perceived readiness might have on Warsaw Pact threat perceptions. We forget too often that in their eyes we (or at least the FRG) are the bad guys. Congressman Wojahn made this point rather well in his comments on the report. The P&E view is that, all things considered, any major redeployment of forces in Germany should be much more thoroughly thought through than has been the case to date.

Milton A. Margolis
Milton A. Margolis
Acting Director
Planning and Evaluation

Attachment