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Doc #87



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Iran
-AWACS

(10)

8 JUL 1977

In reply refer to:
I-23011/77

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

SUBJECT: AWACS for Iran

Attached is a NSC memorandum re technological risk of sale of AWACS to Iran. It forwards a letter from Admiral Turner to GAO that seriously questions the AWACS sale of the issue of communications compromise. The position taken was not coordinated outside the intelligence community. Note that the NSC memorandum recommends that Brzezinski discuss this with you today at lunch.

Iran 4/13-77

The issue seems to hinge on the question of the NATO Link and its encrypto feature. We have not released the Link to the Iranians nor does our proposed letter of offer provide this technology. It was our plan to provide for the Iranian need through commercially available COMSEC equipment. The issue raised by Admiral Turner is not new and is no less significant than the issue we face for SPRUANCE (DD 993) on order by Iran and the F-14 aircraft in Iranian inventory. Admiral Turner's letter unfortunately does not address this solution.

David E. McGiffert

David E. McGiffert
Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 02 2018

5 July 77

330-80-0017, box 69, Iran 413.77 (9m-4ul) 1977

Prepared by: LTG H.M. Fish
X-53291/DSAA

Classified by Director, DSAA

~~SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED TO TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 21 Dec 85~~



15-m-0289

Sec Def Cont No. X-2007

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MEMORANDUM

4423

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

July 7, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

LES DENEND *D*

SUBJECT:

Intelligence Assessment of Technological
Risks Involved in the Sale of AWACS to Iran

Attached are responses to questions supplied today by Admiral Turner to the GAO. The answers were requested through the GAO by Senators Culver, Eagleton, Proxmire, Mathias, and Nelson.

Admiral Turner's letter strikes a cautionary tone regarding technological security problems involved in the sale. It was dispatched to the GAO without any coordination outside of the intelligence community. In responding to similar questions, the Defense Department assessed the technological risks as not sufficient to prevent the sale. Defense feels the generic issues raised by Admiral Turner have already been addressed and resolved in the sale of the F-14 to Iran.

The introduction of a resolution to block the sale is a virtual certainty. The letter from Admiral Turner could serve as the most potent evidence generating support for that resolution. In any case, it will be important to present a common assessment of the technological risks and the exact configuration of the AWACS we intend to sell to Iran when we testify later this month.

My recommendation is that you raise this issue with Secretary Brown at lunch and seek agreement for a meeting with Admiral Turner to resolve these issues. Admiral Turner's staff has reported to me his willingness to enter into that discussion.

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WH
Date: MAR 02 2016

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SEC DEF HAS SEEN
8 JUL 1977

7/8
See for
discussion with
Star theme at 6pm today
HB

SUBJECT: E-3A Sale to Iran

Questions have been raised on the inclusion of sensitive equipments in the proposed E-3A sale to Iran. An assessment of the risk of technology transfer to the USSR is summarized as follows.

US cryptographic devices, noninherent ECCM IFF features, and the radar warning receiver are not included in the offer of AWACS to Iran. (However, the radar warning receiver (ALR-46) has already been released for sale to Iran.) So far as COMSEC equipment is concerned, Iranian requirements are still being addressed.

FYI; E-3A core COMSEC equipment has not been approved for release to Iran and is not included in our offer. Consequently, the AWACS offer to Iran does not include US COMSEC. The JCS endorsed the sale of AWACS to Iran, providing questions concerning cryptographic devices are resolved prior to presentation of the offer to Iran. On 29 June 1977, the ASD/ISA sent a memo to the Chairman, US Communications Security Board, requesting advice of USCSB by 15 July 1977 on a COMSEC policy compatible with the security assistance offered to Iran. NSA is aware of commercial sources for COMSEC requirements. END FYI

The highest risk technology transfer would occur in the capture of the radar system itself. Detailed inspections would provide data on our state-of-the-art for tolerances and quality of radar antenna manufacture. Radar equipments themselves could be reproduced (although probably with different components, such as larger size integrated circuits). Possession of the E-3A would provide a precise means for measuring effects of ECM on the E-3A. While such knowledge would not necessarily lead to development of more effective ECM techniques for use against the E-3A, it could permit more effective operational use of any ECM capabilities possessed.

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As a matter of perspective, as the E-2C has also been proposed for sale to Iran, it should be noted that E-2C radar technology is, except for the antenna, generally as sophisticated as that of the E-3A. In some areas e.g. CFAR Constant False Alarm Rate algorithms), the E-2C is probably more sophisticated than the E-3A.

The greatest operational risk would be incurred by possession of the surveillance package of the Airborne Operational Computer Program (AOCP). This package is state-of-the-art, and the only portion of the AOCP classified SECRET. The critical parts of the package are the algorithms for passive and active tracking as well as the algorithms that handle interceptor tactics. The package necessarily also includes a weapons register of the performance characteristics of weapons being sold to Iran, such as F-14, F-16 and Phoenix.

Longer term exploitation of the AOCP and radar system would require the Soviets to have access to the ground support package, including support programs and associated documentation. These would provide access to higher order language and compatible hardware for dynamic testing and evaluation. Without such a package, the E-3A could not be supported beyond initial operations and detailed knowledge would require very difficult manual techniques to reproduce an effective E-3A capability.

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19 JUL 77 18 57 SEC DEF HAS SEEN

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JUL 19 1977

Iran (10) AWACS

In reply refer to: I-23209/77

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: AWACS to Iran

The attached talking papers are for your information and use for your meeting with members of Congress on 20 July 1977.

David E. McGiffert

David E. McGiffert
Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

Attachment
a/s

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 02 2016

~~Classified by ASD/ISA
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 11/11/85~~

Prepd by: Maj JM Rougeau/DSAA/TS/X77307
Maj KH Stuecklen/DSAA/TS/X73561

SEC DEF CONTR No. X 2135

~~UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS
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336-20-0017. box 29 Iran 41377 (9m-9ul) 1977

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
OSD 3.3(b)(1)

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 02 2016

TALKING PAPER
FOR
SECDEF MEETING WITH SENATORS

CIA
3.3(b)(1)

SUBJECT: DCI COMMENTS ON AWACS FOR IRAN



The DCI memo, as confirmed by members of my staff, was written without benefit of consultation with other appropriate Executive Branch agencies.

- Therefore, important factors were not available to the DCI which would have tempered his concerns.

These factors, when understood, should allay the DCI's concerns to the point where he will agree that on balance, AWACS for Iran is a prudent risk.

- The first factor is that sophisticated US COMSEC equipment will not be provided to Iran. Commercial sources are available to develop security systems to meet Iran's needs -- as was done in the IBEX program.
- The other factor is that the Iranian version of AWACS, other than the radar, is 1960s vintage technology.
- The lookout radar, generally, is as advanced in technology as the Iranian F-14.

It appears, then, that the risk of a 17-man crew defecting in one of seven AWACS is no more a risk than a two-man crew defecting in one of 80 F-14s (about 33 F-14s delivered to date).

Even if an AWACS were to fall into Soviet hands, back or reverse engineering would be a very difficult task.

Prepared by:
LTC L. Nebel
OASD/ISA/NESA
19 July 1977

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +505C.8 552
Date: 02 MAR 2016 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)
MDR: 15 -M- 0289

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: EO 13526
Date: 02 February 2002
Chief, Records Div. & Sec. WHS

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