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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
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15 MAY 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Key Points for Bilaterals

D McG - Please  
include this  
paper's points  
the attached  
power announce-  
ment in my  
back up book  
on bilaterals.

These are again likely to be more important than the formal sessions. I see four key issues:

1. AWACS. The Germans are of course the key. For what it's worth I think we have them but our problem is whether they'll agree in principle by the Summit. Clearly Apel is angling for a political image as a tough guy who'll stand up to the Americans (it's a pity that he came in just when such important NATO matters were at stake). If Apel doesn't agree to go along with interim funding I'd ask Cy to write Genscher--and President to write Schmidt. If Belgians too have fallen off, this (and I-HAWK) need to be taken up by Vance.

HB

2. "Common family" packages. You saw London readout on Apel/Mulley talk which cited Apel's "deeply cynical" mood about our claims on armaments collaboration. Thus our letters were most timely, since you can say that agreeing on "weapons families" is the best way to get more of a Two-Way Street. But you will have to take the lead in signing Mulley and Apel to joint Summit announcement. Since their NADs have already signed the MOU, I can't see why they would balk at announcement (attached). If they are responsive, you could suggest that your respective staffs (Quinlan, Altenburg, Komer) work out the details.

As for Bourges, even though his NAD Martre signed the MOU, Quai may not let France join in announcement. Just in case, do discuss with Mulley/Apel the fallback of merely stating in announcement that France has already been asked to join in.

3. Dutch Brigade. See Haig's latest to me (also attached). He sees it as a Mulley problem, but I doubt there's much blood left in that stone. Dutch are the real problem, to me anyway. Though we won't get Dutch at DPC or Summit, we should keep the issue alive by: (a) highlighting proposal in LTDP; (b) keeping multilateral group alive and getting Scholten to agree on a date for another meeting; (c) asking Haig to come up with other alternatives--e.g., moving UK out to move Dutch in; and (d) asking SecState to weigh in. Meanwhile you need to get across to Scholten why Dutch are being singled out this way: (1) though their corps has the longest distance to deploy in AFCENT, theirs is the only corps

I'm ready to try again at DPC

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which has but one brigade forward, and (2) we Americans need to be able to point to such Allied redeployments to prove to Congress that we are not the only ones reinforcing NORTHAG. Scholten has not personally heard you on these arguments yet. If we keep after Dutch, I estimate 2-1 chance of eventually wearing them down and getting them to reprogram.

4. LTDP Follow-Through Machinery. This is worth a try in all Brussels bilaterals, but especially with Luns. After all, it was Luns and I/S who unilaterally sidetracked this whole issue over our protests, directly contrary to ministerial guidance that it should be an integral part of the exercise. You wrote Luns, but he remains quite unresponsive. Actually, I doubt that he understands the issue. Tap Bennett thinks he's merely defending his turf. I'm more suspicious, but in any case Luns will be eager not to get too far out of step with the US. In any case, I'll bet that we'll get a lot of DPC and Summit support for strong follow-up language.

5. Remaining footnotes. It is hardly surprising that so elaborate an effort on the LTDP should lead to many national reservations (indeed there are far fewer than I suspected, and most are inconsequential). Even so, I mounted a major campaign to get most of them out of the way beforehand, precisely so that you and President would not be bothered by them at DPC and Summit. It is working. While plenty of footnotes will be left, I propose you ignore them at DPC table.

*RWK*

R. W. Komer

Attachments

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

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