

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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OFFICE OF
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August 4, 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting on MBFR -- August 8, 1978

Attached are the papers prepared by the SCC Working Group for
the August 8th SCC Meeting.

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JUL 25 2016

Christine Dodson
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Staff Secretary *for*

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS 5V.S.C. 8552
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NEXT STEPS IN MBFR

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Executive Summary

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Issues for SCC Discussion

This section presents the basic questions to be answered in formulating the next steps in MBFR. These questions, which draw on the discussion in Chapters I and II, are:

- I. Should we make any new moves in the data discussion or in other substantive issues in the near term?

- II. If we move on data, what specific moves should we make?
 - Continue to challenge the East's figures by drawing attention to their inconsistency with "approximate" figures?
 - Offer to update the figures on both sides?
 - Explore the idea for an exchange of average manning level data, which was suggested by the East?
 - Table some or all of Western estimates of Eastern strengths?
 - Reallocate our estimates of Eastern air and ground forces to correspond to their breakdown of these components?
 - Consider redefining the forces to be covered by MBFR?

- III. If non-data issues are to be included in next steps, which issues should be included?
 - Collectivity -- the question of collective vs. national reduction and limitation commitments by direct participants in MBFR?
 - Phasing -- the question of whether two separate stages in the negotiation are necessary?
 - US and Soviet manpower reductions and limitations -- what should be the size and composition?

- US and Soviet formations limitations -- should we seek limits on Soviet divisions at the likely expense of limits on US formations?
- Potential armament reductions and limitations -- possible changes in the nuclear elements offered in the West's Option III -- F-4 nuclear-capable aircraft, Pershing missile launchers and nuclear warheads -- and in Soviet tanks?

IV. Tactical considerations

The SCC may also want to review the status of NATO progress in drafting an associated measures package. In terms of next steps, the above questions draw on the possibilities presented in Chapter II to illustrate how the Western MBFR negotiating position might be modified. Not all the possibilities considered in Chapter II are addressed here, nor will Chapter II's extensive analysis of each individual element of a potential response be repeated.

Background

The Western MBFR proposal of April 1978 and the Eastern counterproposal of June appear to have set the stage for more intensive negotiations, and perhaps, for progress towards an agreement. The East has accepted, or moved toward, the Western framework, but we remain far apart on many substantive issues. The Eastern position is based on Eastern data, which asserts that near-parity exists now. The East has explicitly sought counter offers.

The following are points of contact between Eastern and Western positions:

- Ground manpower reductions by both sides to a common ceiling on ground forces of 700,000 men and an overall ground and air manpower ceiling of 900,000 men.
- Withdrawal in a Phase I agreement of more than twice as many Soviet personnel as US personnel.
- Commitments in a Phase I agreement to reductions by all direct participants.
- Withdrawal and limitation of Soviet tanks.
- Withdrawal and limitation of US nuclear elements -- nuclear warheads, F-4 aircraft, Pershing missile launchers.

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- Withdrawal of Soviet divisions.
- Equipment not reduced is not limited.
- Exchange of information by both sides on forces to be withdrawn.

The following are points of conflict:

- Using Eastern data, the Warsaw Pact would need to withdraw 105,000 men to reach the 700,000 ceiling, whereas using current NATO estimates, the amount withdrawn would be 262,000.
- Under the East's position, the US and Soviets would withdraw 7% of their forces in Phase I of an agreement while the West calls for a withdrawal of 15% of US and Soviet forces.
- The East proposes withdrawal with residual limits of 1000 Soviet tanks and withdrawal without subsequent limits of 250 Soviet mechanized infantry combat vehicles. The West calls for withdrawal with residual limits of 1700 Soviet tanks.
- The East calls for withdrawal with residual limits of 2-3 US brigades and two full-strength Soviet divisions. The West calls for withdrawal, without specifying residual limits, of 5 Soviet divisions, but includes no US units as large as brigades or divisions.
- The East proposes a complex system under which no participant can exceed its pre-reduction force level or make up more than 50% of a later unilateral reduction by another direct participant. The West proposes subceilings on US and Soviet forces but no others.
- The East proposes that if a Phase II agreement could not be worked out with terms satisfactory to both sides, then the US or USSR could release itself from its obligations. The West proposes that, even without successful negotiations after Phase I, each side would execute Phase II reductions based on commitments in a Phase I agreement.
- The East continues to press for unit and equipment reductions by non-US / Soviet participants, while the West wishes to avoid them.

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The West has given only preliminary comments on the Eastern counterproposal, saying it remains under study. In NATO, there has been a review of the Eastern position, but no discussion of what the Western response will be. We will meet with the UK and FRG in mid-September to exchange ideas on next steps in MBFR and, if possible, to agree on the outlines of a NATO response. SCC guidance is needed to prepare a US position for that meeting.

General Approach

Given Eastern acceptance of much of the framework of the Western approach, and the evident Allied willingness to pursue the current Western approach unless it becomes clear that the data problem cannot be solved, we believe certain approaches should be ruled out for now:

- abandoning the common ceiling principle;
- seeking only US - Soviet reductions in a separate agreement;
- manpower reductions without an agreed data base;
- deferring reductions and seeking only agreement on stabilizing measures;
- moving the subject matter of MBFR to another forum and area of reductions, e.g., the French-proposed European Disarmament Conference.
- seeking a "token" agreement.

I. Should we make any new moves now?

The first basic question to be decided is whether any substantive near-term moves are merited. By "substantive move" we mean a response to the East's proposal that either modifies our substantive position (e.g., on collectivity) or proposes new procedural steps (e.g., on data).

Considerations external to the negotiations -- for example, the current state of East-West relations, relations with such Allies as the French and the Germans, or the relationship of MBFR to possible US and NATO force improvements (e.g., on long-range theater nuclear systems) --

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may argue against any steps at this time. The insufficiency of recent Eastern approach on data or on other key Western concerns (such as collectivity) as reflected in the June 8 counterproposals may justify no further Western moves at this time.

Finally, significant political and military changes in both the West and East since the Talks began in 1973, or uncertainties about the direction of our current approach, may call for a fundamental reevaluation of the Western objectives to MBFR and give grounds for withholding a specific response to the East until that reevaluation is complete.

If we decide to defer substantive moves, we might provide an explicit public statement, together with a high-level bilateral approach to the Soviets, highlighting the inadequacies in current Eastern positions while demanding that the East come up with something better. This probably would not produce further Eastern concessions. And, it could create an impasse in the talks, which would be difficult to explain to various publics.

In the interim, Western negotiators would continue to press for Eastern clarification of data discrepancies and greater Eastern acceptance of the substance, as well as the form, of Western proposals. We could also table the associated measures package now under consideration in NATO.

A drawback to this approach is that it could weaken the momentum that the Allied initiative and the Eastern counterproposal have generated. It could also hamper our efforts to solve the data problem. Tabling associated measures might help sustain the talks in the interim, but such a move is likely to be considered by the East, which does not view associated measures as central to the negotiations, as a diversionary tactic by the West. This could weaken the impact of the associated measures package. More broadly, the West might appear to be pulling back from the prospect of serious bargaining and the credibility of Western interest in MBFR might be called into question. For this reason, there is likely to be little Allied support for this approach.

Therefore, we may wish to maintain the current momentum in the negotiations. This would allow us to take advantage of Eastern acceptance of our basic framework and of any potential openings suggested by the recent Eastern counterproposal, or to affirm the possibility of progress in ongoing arms control negotiations despite difficulties in other aspects of East-West relations. The questions below are designed to illuminate how best to do so.

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If we move on data, what specific moves should we make?

Pact manpower data provided by the East are more than 200,000 men fewer than US estimates. (The East claims 987,300 men in their ground and air forces subject to MBFR; the current US estimate is 1,196,000.) We are certain that the East deliberately excluded a substantial number of servicemen from its tabled figures. The East has refused to admit this.

The East is unlikely to change its negotiating position on data until it decides that it is in its interest to accept highly asymmetrical reductions. Thus, Western pressure on data probably would not be sufficient by itself to induce the kind of shift in the East's position that we seek. Nonetheless, constant pressure on this issue will be necessary to keep the West's position credible and to contribute to an eventual Eastern decision that the West will not accept equal reductions. We must, therefore, consider whether further moves in data are needed for this purpose. Moreover, we want to look for possible means of easing on Eastern decision to concede that they have a large manpower advantage.

The Allied negotiators in Vienna have reported that they have nearly exhausted the current line of questioning on data. They have asked for NAC guidance on how to proceed.

A. We can continue and expand the current Western approach to data in the negotiations. In this connection, we might:

- (1) Continue, on a selected basis, to mention "approximate" figures for the manpower levels in designated Warsaw Pact units (e.g., Soviet - Pact divisions). (This is the "assertive disaggregation approach" discussed in Chapter II.) The purpose would be to generate pressure demonstrating the internal inconsistency and implausibility of Eastern figures and to pressure the East to provide additional information on its forces. This could help focus the data discussion on areas of Eastern data of most interest to the West, but provides little assurance that it will advance the data discussion far. It may devolve to a discussion of the validity of the "approximate" data and thus put pressure on the West to justify the data, perhaps with its own intelligence estimates.
- (2) Offer to update the figures on both sides to reflect more current data rather than holdings as of January 1, 1976. Both sides agree that data should be updated eventually. This option might provide a possible opportunity for some revision of Eastern figures and would be technically desirable to provide an Eastern figure comparable with

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current Western intelligence estimates. This could, however, divert attention from Western pressure on data areas of principal interest and would revive the issue of treatment of French forces in Western data.

B. We might seek to respond to Eastern data proposals. Thus we might:

- (3) As requested by Allied negotiators, explore an exchange of "average manning levels." As noted in Chapter II, we might attempt to provide our own precise definition, press the East to supply its own, with examples, allow each side to table levels based on its own definition, or unilaterally table our own levels and definition. This would allow us to gain the initiative on this issue and remove an Eastern roadblock to further data discussion. However, this is unlikely to help illuminate the source of the discrepancy and could — if badly handled — be misinterpreted as Western willingness to cook the data.
- (4) As requested by Allied negotiators, table selected Western estimates of Eastern forces. It would be important in this case to make a strong effort at the October NATO Intelligence Conference to gain Allied agreement to estimates that are compatible with our own estimates. This would have similar purposes and puts the weight of Western intelligence behind the approach outlined in Option 1. It could, however, shift the focus of the discussion from Eastern data to Western estimates.

C. The West may want to take the more substantial step of considering different ways of defining what is to be counted on each side for purposes of computing a reduction base. Thus, we might:

- (5) As requested by Allied negotiators, agree to the East's proposed reallocation of air defense forces to the air manpower category, and ground support helicopter forces to ground manpower, thereby attempting to establish a more uniform basis for the direct comparison of force levels than currently obtains. This would reduce the ground force disparity by some 25,000, while adding to the air force disparity by the same amount. It gives greater technical authority to Western estimates and might provide encouragement to the East to revise its definitions.

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(6) The West may also want to consider the possibility of moving toward a functional / organizational definition both as a means to break the deadlock on data and as a means of possibly inducing the East to accept the concept of asymmetric reductions.

- It would focus the debate on the issue of what troops should properly be included for purposes of determining reductions and limitations, and away from arguing over which side's figures are accurate.
- If a new definition were agreed by the two sides, each could table a new set of figures without loss of face.
- If the East saw the discussion of definitions as indicating Western willingness to negotiate on the absolute size of reductions, the East might be willing to show some movement on the question of asymmetry. (Previous studies have shown that the application of different definitions could lower the absolute number of men to be reduced by each side and in some cases could lower somewhat the ratio of asymmetry. The East, however, would still be required to take substantially larger reductions than the West.)
- However, we are not now prepared to table such a definition. Extensive technical studies and political review in NATO would be needed.

In a potential data response all or some of the preceding options could be pursued. Indeed, the weight and number of data initiatives we take could be used to signal to the East the relative seriousness of our concern with the data problem. These options could be selected on the basis of their individual merits and of the relative contribution of each toward resolving the data impasse.

III. If non-data issues are to be included in next steps, which issues should be included?

The basic question is whether to modify our current position in an effort to respond to selected parts of the Eastern counterproposal and seek compromises or concessions on specific issues. The issues which we would want to consider are the following:

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A. Collectivity

Although this is an issue of great sensitivity with the Allies, especially the FRG, we might wish to seek Alliance concurrence to modification of the current Western position regarding national commitments to reductions and limits. We currently seek commitments only by the US and USSR; the Soviets seek equal treatment for Soviet and German forces. We could do this:

- (1) By providing for national commitments in Phase I by non-US, non-Soviet direct participants in MBFR to take specific reductions in (but not to accept residual national limits upon) the size of their ground force manpower in Phase II. This is a US delegation proposal.
- (2) By proposing manpower limits on stationed forces (US, UK, Canadian, USSR), as opposed to sub-limits on only the US and USSR.
- (3) By proposing that the USSR could match substantial increases by non-US Western participants so long as the common ceiling is not exceeded; the US could have reciprocal rights.
- (4) By offering full collectivity, without residual limits or sub-ceilings upon the ground force manpower of any direct participant including the US and the USSR.

Gaining Soviet agreement on collectivity may be a precondition to FRG cooperation on other MBFR issues. Conversely, FRG acquiescence on some form of national commitment may help us obtain Soviet concessions on other MBFR issues. The first option helps to meet this Soviet concern but in a relatively modest way, and is likely to be unacceptable to the FRG until the Soviets accept collectivity of limits. The second option is less attractive to the Soviets than the first; it may be a useful face-saving device for an end-game gambit. The third would give the Soviets the ability to respond to changes in German force levels, but would provide political inhibitions to any post-reduction changes in NATO force levels because it could lead to an increase in the Soviet share of Eastern forces. The fourth removes Soviet objections to differential treatment and would probably be supported by the FRG because it avoids national commitments, but sacrifices the US objective of obtaining residual limitation on Soviet manpower, unless we can find another way to establish such a limit.

All four options preserve FRG flexibility for its national force levels within the common ceiling. The fourth option might lead the West to seek other forms of national limits (e.g., the unit and equipment limits discussed below).

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B. Phasing

We might propose that the concept of a Phase II negotiation be abandoned and that all potential commitments, by the US and Soviets as well as their Allies, be negotiated and agreed to at the same time, in a single negotiating phase. Such "conflation" of the negotiation would satisfy the original Eastern interest in settling all aspects of MBFR before any reductions take place.

This approach could force early consideration of many difficult issues. The West has sought to defer resolution of some of the most difficult issues -- how many troops each European state withdraws, and possibly further US and Soviet reductions -- to Phase II. Hopefully, after a Phase I agreement had established a process of East-West arms control in Europe, as well as the concept of the common collective ceiling, these issues would prove more tractable. Moreover, the East has adopted this approach to some extent in its June 8 proposals. "Conflating" the agreement now to a single phase would require additional problems to be solved in an initial agreement and could lead both sides to settle for a more modest outcome to MBFR, in terms both of the size of reductions and of limits on forces.

C. US and Soviet Manpower Reductions

We may wish to alter the level of manpower reductions proposed by the West for the US and Soviets in Phase I, emphasize this issue in any response to related Eastern proposals, and seek to develop an acceptable compromise as a result. Two general options for a modified position on the size of manpower reductions appear possible:

- (1) Seek a lower percentage of US and Soviet manpower withdrawals in Phase I than the West has proposed (approximately 15%) but a higher percentage than the East is offering (approximately 7%). Soviet unit and equipment withdrawals would also be adjusted to correspond to this compromise percentage.
- (2) Adopt the Eastern first phase proposal for percentage manpower withdrawals (approximately 7%), but apply the higher Western 15% requirement to units and equipment to be withdrawn.

Both these options would move toward the Soviet position on the size of Phase I reductions. We might want to do this in tandem with either an increased demand on the East in some other area (e.g., seeking limits on Soviet nuclear equipment) or a reduction of what we offer the East (e.g., removing our Pershing offer from the table). This could also exploit apparent Soviet interest in bargaining on this point.

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The first option would maintain the Western focus on Soviet manpower, unit and equipment withdrawals as a package, though at a somewhat lower level of reductions than the West currently seeks. The second option could signal a diminished role for manpower in an MBFR agreement, but with an increased emphasis on the main elements of combat power — units and equipment.

D. Force Structure Limits / Reductions

Our current approach encompasses only reductions — but no subsequent limitations — on Soviet divisions. The Eastern proposals, however, suggest reductions and residual limits on units of both sides — divisions for the Soviets and brigades for the US. In light of this, we may want to consider pursuing one of the following approaches for reductions and limitations on military formations:

- (1) Reductions and residual limits on divisions for both US and Soviet forces.
- (2) Reductions and residual limits on Soviet divisions in return for reductions and limits on US brigades.

In both cases we would seek limits on the US side that would be large enough to accommodate future force changes necessary to preserve Western security.

Limits on military formations in general may be desirable in that they provide greater control over military capability than would limits on manpower or equipment, which treat a smaller part of the military power equation. In addition, limits on formations are easier to verify than manpower or equipment limits — an important aspect not only for NATO security but for eventual public endorsement of an MBFR agreement — provided that agreement is reached on definitions that would prevent circumvention.

Reductions and limits on military formations may become especially attractive if:

- the data issues cannot be resolved;
- full collectivity, which does not limit Soviet manpower, is adopted;
- we decide to do away with Option III and consequently consideration of Soviet tanks.

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However, limits on formations represent a "new" factor in MBFR, with a more direct bearing than manpower limits on the organization of forces. Accepting the Eastern idea for US - Soviet limits would entail a major revision of Allied thinking on the outcome of an MBFR agreement. Moreover, accepting US and Soviet formation limits would set a precedent for at least collective limits on European formation. NATO has not examined this issue, but the Allies would probably initially oppose formation limits.

E. Armament and Equipment Reductions and Limitations

Current MBFR positions for both the East and West involve limits and reductions of nuclear armaments by the West and conventional armaments by the East. Of primary concern to the US is how to handle the nuclear part of our MBFR offer in such a way as to (1) preserve theater nuclear force improvements and arms control options currently under study in PRM-38; (2) maintain sufficient bargaining leverage to obtain Eastern agreement to the Western program at the same time. Our current Option III offer -- to reduce nuclear warheads by 1000, F-4 nuclear-capable aircraft by 54, and Pershing surface-to-surface ballistic missile launchers by 36 with subsequent residual limits on all -- is apparently acceptable to the East. Problems it raises are:

- It constrains our ability to deploy long-range ballistic (or -- if the ballistic distinction is lost -- possible cruise) missiles in the NGA;
- It forces us to maintain an artificially high number of warheads and nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe while MBFR negotiations continue in order to maintain the negotiating weight of our proposal and to avoid unduly low post-reduction limitations;
- It appears to limit our ability to respond to a perceived increase in Soviet nuclear capability.

Alternatives to our current position which could alleviate some of these problems are:

- (1) Take Pershing missiles out of Option III.
- (2) Take F-4 nuclear-capable aircraft out of Option III.
- (3) Withdraw Option III offer entirely.

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- (4) Maintain Option III, but exclude longer-range missile launchers (e.g., greater than 1000 km) from Pershing limits.
- (5) Maintain the Option III offer but seek limits on Soviet nuclear forces.

If one of these possibilities were pursued, it might be necessary to change our position on reductions and limits on Soviet manpower and armaments. For example, if the scope of Option III were diminished -- either by no longer offering withdrawal of Pershings or F-4s -- then we could consider accepting something less from the Soviets -- for example, the 1000 tanks they offered to withdraw, vice the 1700 tanks we sought. Alternatively, we might increase our warhead offer. Without such compensating moves, the West would appear to be pulling away from serious bargaining in MBFR.

If we were to take Option III entirely off the table, we might need to drop all demands for reductions and limits on Soviet equipment (i.e., tanks) in light of the reduced negotiating weight of our overall position. At the same time, since equipment would no longer be considered in our proposal, we might wish to increase emphasis on reductions and limits on units or manpower as alternative ways of stabilizing the military balance in the reductions area.

Setting an upper bound on the Pershing range limit would allow us substantially to maintain our Option III bargaining leverage, while not constraining our long-range theater options. This would be easier for the Soviets to accept if longer-range systems are addressed in another forum.

Seeking limits on Soviet nuclear systems would help to constrain the ongoing Soviet modernization program and would alleviate the political problem of limiting US nuclear systems, while leaving Soviet nuclear systems unconstrained. Such an approach could complement options to limit longer-range Soviet systems (now under consideration in PRM-38) in a separate forum -- probably SALT. For maximum military effect, we would want to limit some of the shorter-range Soviet systems (e.g., Scud), the deployments of which are increasing.

However, seeking these additional objectives for Option III would severely weaken its bargaining weight in support of our current objectives: substantial asymmetrical reductions of Pact manpower and Soviet armored forces. This introduces new complexities and

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IV. Tactical Considerations

The principal tactical issue is whether we want to construct a comprehensive package of both data initiatives and moves in non-data areas for presentation first to NATO and later in Vienna this round; or whether we want to move first with a data initiative while developing other data and non-data moves further.

Potential elements of either a combined or a data package vary widely in time required to work them through NATO. For this reason, there is a trade-off between the weight and timeliness of any initiative and if we hope to introduce some moves to Vienna in the upcoming round, it may be necessary to defer some elements of an otherwise desirable package.

A comprehensive data and non-data package would be a weighty response to the Eastern counterproposal. It would continue pressure on the long-standing data issue and demonstrate to the East the centrality of data to the negotiations. It would also permit us to show some flexibility on non-data issues and avoid the twin dangers either of exaggerated Eastern expectation of a later more forthcoming Western response, or of dissipating momentum in the non-data areas. This approach would allow NATO to consider the linkage between strategy on data and on non-data issues.

However, the Allied negotiators have asked for guidance on new data moves on the grounds that they have nearly exhausted the current line of discussion. Attempting to connect data and non-data moves could significantly delay NATO guidance on data. Indeed, it may be difficult to obtain NATO agreement to some elements of a data package alone.

V. Associated Measures

In presenting the Western initiative in April, the Allies told the East that the West would soon have further proposals on associated measures.

At a three-week experts' meeting, July 10-28, the Allies, except for the FRG, generally agreed with American concepts for stabilizing and verification measures, but were reluctant to isolate the Germans at the

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If we were to take Option III entirely off the table, we might need to drop all demands for reductions and limits on Soviet equipment (i.e., tanks) in light of the reduced negotiating weight of our overall position. At the same time, since equipment would no longer be considered in our proposal, we might wish to increase emphasis on reductions and limits on units or manpower as alternative ways of stabilizing the military balance in the reductions area.

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conference. Further efforts will be needed to get FRG and Allied approval of guidance to the Western negotiators in Vienna.

West German experts expressed concern lest stabilizing measures adversely affect training programs and the West's freedom of action to move into the field in a crisis situation. They:

- preferred to have what amounts to a blanket exception for alert activity in the measure on prior notification of out-of-garrison activities. This position would render the measure worthless for warning enhancement.
- refused to accept the measure which would set limits to each side's out-of-garrison activity. American experts believe that this measure promises to make the greatest contribution to warning.

There was some movement in the German position on the measures during the conference -- they initially rejected the idea of addressing all out-of-garrison activities rather than just exercise, but they accepted it after lengthy discussion. The German experts admitted that these measures had raised questions which they had not fully thought through, but it remains to be seen whether they will change their view upon further consideration.

The subject of ground and aerial inspection proved surprisingly uncontentious. German experts recalled the political reservations which the FRG had expressed in connection with NATO studies in 1974, but took an active and constructive part in the discussion of alternative -- and less intrusive -- forms for ground and aerial inspection.

The West Germans appreciated the US suggestion for a quota of ground inspections as an effort to respond to Bonn's political concerns (we had suggested previously a quota system for aerial inspection); they said that they had been thinking of a challenge system in connection with extension of the area, but indicated that no position had been taken in Bonn regarding the possibility of adopting less intrusive arrangements in the reductions area alone.

The FRG did not want its forces to be subject to an exit - entry point regime, but could not provide any substantive rationale for this position. Nevertheless, it joined the Allies in endorsing the idea of having stationed forces move in and out of the area through such points with observers posted at them.

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The Allied experts voiced no objection to advance notification of movements into the reductions area, exchange of observers at out-of-garrison activities, exchanges of information about reductions and post-reduction force levels (including a requirement to explain changes in structure), non-interference with national technical means, and the creation of follow-on machinery.

The West German experts, all from the Defense Ministry, stressed Bonn's political interest in extending stabilizing or verification measures to Soviet territory. But they had not done their homework on this subject and neither elaborated a technical case nor developed any specific proposals.

What needs to be done?

With Bonn: We will need to approach the FRG soon and make a further try at persuading them to agree to effective stabilizing measures as well as probe how German views on inspection are developing.

In NATO: The International Military Staff still has some drafting to do to complete the work begun by the experts, and USNATO will press for early completion of the initial draft paper, which will invite comments from capitals on the alternative views and approaches.

Trilaterally: Shortly before the Trilateral slated for mid-September the US might submit a draft of NATO guidance on a package of associated measures to London and Bonn. This would facilitate discussion of associated measures at the Trilateral, where we should make an effort to firm-up a joint US-UK-FRG approach to the subject in NATO and seek Trilateral agreement on the stabilizing measures on notification and limitation of out-of-garrison activities.

Following the Trilateral, the US may have to make decisions on how hard to press the Germans on measures that are currently unacceptable to them and whether to forward a minimum package to Vienna, leaving these measures for further consideration in NATO.

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