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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President on Iran

PARTICIPANTS: President Jimmy Carter
Vice President Mondale
Secretary of State Vance
Secretary of Defense Brown
Dr. Brzezinski, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
General David Jones, Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Turner, Director of Central
Intelligence
Charles Duncan, Deputy Secretary of
Defense
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary
of State
General Huyser, Deputy Commander in Chief,
European Command
Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the
President
Gary Sick, NSC (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 5, 1979; 4:20 - 5:15 p.m.
The Cabinet Room

The President met privately in the Oval Office with General Huyser from approximately 4:10 to 4:20 p.m. (U)

The President opened the meeting by expressing his thanks to General Huyser for the superb job that he had done during his time in Tehran. The mission he had performed was above and beyond the call of duty. He asked Dr. Brzezinski to prepare a letter of commendation for General Huyser. He had arrived in Tehran at a time of great disarray and uncertainty. As a result of the superb work that he had done with the Iranian military, the President had developed great respect for him for his commitment, his steadiness and the great contribution he had made to US policy. General Huyser had established

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in the Iranian generals elements of the kind of constructive patriotism that we have learned to associate with the United States military. When General Huyser arrived, the President had had a sense of relief, and he was never disappointed by his performance while there. He noted that they had just completed a private talk in which General Huyser had expressed his view that the Iranian military is capable of maintaining order in Iran, and that our current instructions to the Embassy were the proper instructions under the existing situation. He had described one concern of his, however, and the President asked him to repeat that concern for the group. (S)

General Huyser noted that the Embassy operated very well in Tehran and had been very supportive of him. He and Ambassador Sullivan had known each other for a long time. However, they had two basic differences. The first was a difference of opinion about Iranian military capability. He noted that this is perhaps something that could be expected between a political man as opposed to a military man; however, he could perhaps be pardoned for believing his own appreciation was better. General Huyser's largest concern was an evaluation of what objective would most favor the United States. He thought he clearly understood through conversations with Secretary Brown every night what the instructions were. Those were to support Prime Minister Bakhtiar and his government up to and including action by the Iranian military forces to see that he was successful. This was a view that Sullivan did not share. Ambassador Sullivan thought that it was probably better to get the military forces aside and let the political forces fight it out among themselves and settle the issue, and then accept whoever won. Sullivan believed that if Khomeini established an Islamic Republic, the drift was going to go toward democracy. General Huyser, however, thought that the drift would be toward communism. He had told the President that he thought his point should be made clear so there would be no misunderstanding. (S)

The President said this had somewhat disconcerted him; however, he was not amazed. There had been some early problems in getting instructions through to Sullivan. From his messages to the President and through a newsman, the President had wondered if Sullivan was taking these instructions. He was not doubting the integrity of Ambassador Sullivan; however, when he and Secretary Vance had jointly drafted instructions, he thought that there was no question about US policy. General Huyser's understanding of those instructions was exactly what he had wanted. For us to back away from Bakhtiar would be a breach of our commitment. We had backed the Shah, and then had backed

Bakhtiar as his legitimate successor when the Shah left. The President wanted to make damn sure there was not a disparity of thought between Ambassador Sullivan and General Gast at the present time. General Huyser had assured him that General Gast had a good understanding of the situation. He also had the trust of the Iranian military. He had been involved in all of the conversations which General Huyser had held. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether General Gast shares General Huyser's views.

General Huyser said, yes. And he noted that with Ambassador Sullivan it was only a question of degree. He understood that our policy was to support Bakhtiar, and he supported Bakhtiar. However, where he differed was how far and how much force we would be willing to support in backing Bakhtiar's government. (S)

The President said that both of those differences that he had noted were profound differences. If Ambassador Sullivan thinks that Khomeini would lead Iran toward democracy, that was a very profound difference from our views. We support Bakhtiar, and we believe that the military should support Bakhtiar. There should be no equivocation in that position. He asked Mr. Christopher (Secretary Vance was delayed in arriving at the meeting) to ensure that this was the case. (S)

Mr. Christopher said that the State Department will make sure that there is no equivocation in the instructions to Ambassador Sullivan. (S)

The President said he remembered very well sitting with Secretary Vance on a couch at Camp David discussing the nature of the instructions.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered when the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State was going out to Iran.

Mr. Christopher said Mr. Twinam was going out in the immediate future. He had been the Ambassador in Bahrain and was going to accompany Secretary Brown on his trip to the Middle East, so he was being sent out a week early. This would give us a chance to hear another viewpoint from Iran. Ambassador Twinam had not been closely associated with the events in Iran, and perhaps that was an advantage under the present circumstances. (S)

General Huyser wondered whether we had heard this view before from Ambassador Sullivan.

Mr. Christopher replied that we had never heard it as clearly as General Huyser had just stated it.

The President noted that in a recent New York Times report on Professor Falk's visit to Iran, there had been an interview with Sullivan in which he was quoted as referring to his "ill-advised superiors" in Washington and other such comments. So we were aware what General Huyser had described were indeed very profound differences. Any tangible evidence of US equivocation in our policy would endanger a cohesive approach to the problem in Iran, and the firmness on the part of the military and Bakhtiar was the best approach to prevent massive bloodshed. We should use our influence to get them to stand firm. We should encourage consultations and let Khomeini channel his ideas of an Islamic Republic into a shadow-government. (S)

At that point, 4:55, Secretary Vance arrived.

Secretary Vance apologized for being late, noting that he had been on the Hill, and that he had finally succeeded in getting rid of the Committee.

The President wondered how had gotten rid of them. The Secretary had gotten his hopes up (joking).

The President then briefly summarized the meeting up to that point, noting that General Huyser says that he thinks there are two profound differences in interpretation of instructions between himself and the Embassy. Ambassador Sullivan believes that it is best to permit Khomeini to become the Prime Minister, while the military stands aloof. General Huyser thinks the military can restore order while Sullivan does not. Sullivan thinks that a Khomeini takeover would lead to democracy, whereas General Huyser thinks it would lead to communism. The President said he wanted to make damn sure there was no remaining misunderstanding. He thought that Mr. Christopher had been taken somewhat aback by this report. (S)

General Huyser clarified his view as being that Ambassador Sullivan believes the Bakhtiar government is the best solution for the US Government at this point, but there was a question of how far we would go, specifically, would we be willing to condone the use of military force in support of him. (S)

Secretary Vance wondered whether there was a lack of clarity in his understanding of his instructions, or whether these were simply his own views as opposed to his instructions.

General Huyser said that he cannot speak for the Ambassador, however, in his view the end objective of the process was not the same in the two cases. The General's understanding was that we would go to the wall to support Bakhtiar, including condoning the use of military force. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if Mr. Bakhtiar understands that position.

Secretary Brown said that he should understand it through the military. General Huyser had not met himself with Bakhtiar, but the message that he had relayed to the military should have gotten through to Bakhtiar in turn. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that if Bakhtiar gets a different view elsewhere, perhaps he would be less than clear on what our position was.

Secretary Brown said that he had told General Huyser to relay the view that our support included the use of force if necessary. (S)

General Huyser said that the military had in fact passed the message to Bakhtiar. General Jones had recently talked to General Gast in Tehran and said that General Gast had advised the Ambassador to underline the support and loyalty of the Military for Bakhtiar during his meetings with the Prime Minister. (S)

The President said he thought that when Bakhtiar closed the airports, he had shown resolve for the first time in a long time in Iran. The correct way was to show strength and force such as closing the airport, then to let Khomeini back in, in effect, with Bakhtiar's permission. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that for Bakhtiar to show resolve, he must feel that we and the military back him fully. (S)

Secretary Brown said that for that reason, letting the political elements fight it out among themselves with the military standing aside, would produce a foreordained conclusion. (S)

The President agreed, noting that the military was the only strong support which Bakhtiar had to rely on. (S)

Admiral Turner wondered if Bakhtiar's card of sending the military into the streets was likely to be called soon.

General Huyser said he would not have put it in those terms. He had encouraged the military leaders never to call the troops out into the streets; rather, he had had advised them to prepare to protect key installations, and to reduce the chances of violent conflict as much as possible. They were not certain, however, how much a minority might be able to start a violent confrontation or who that minority was or where they might lie.

Admiral Turner noted that, if Bakhtiar should arrest Bazargan as he has threatened, and the opposition take to the streets with rioting, would it not be necessary to turn the military loose to restore order.

General Huyser said that his advice had been that, if the mob wants to burn and destroy Tehran, let them do it.

Secretary Brown noted that Bakhtiar had said to us recently that he did not intend to arrest Bazargan who was an old friend of his. However, if the opposition tried to take over the ministries, they will meet that with violence, if necessary.

The President asked if the key installations included the ministries, and did the Military understand that.

General Huyser said, yes.

Dr. Brzezinski asked, if all else fails and the military must go to "option C" as we have come to call it, what kind of resistance could they expect to encounter? What kind of planning had been done for actions to follow a takeover?

General Huyser said that he had helped them conduct planning on a different mode. When he had first arrived, the military was planning to hold a coup, if and when the Shah left. However, they had no plan at all. They did not even know where the key installations were located, including the key installations in the oil fields. He'd persuaded them to give up the idea of a coup and begin planning for taking over key facilities, which included banks, ministries and key installations in the oil fields, and to ensure that they would know how to make them work. There were indications that, if the army were able to provide protection, the workers, many workers, would come back to work.

At the present time, they were facing intimidation. He knew this for a fact. For instance, we had had two checks signed for military equipment. Within a few days, copies of those checks were circulating downtown, and the person who had signed them was being threatened. He felt that the military cannot run a sophisticated government like that. He did not know where, if any place, the military has the capability to run that kind of a government. However, the concept was to restore order at key points and to start from there to develop a functioning government.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered how long it would take to accomplish such a takeover.

General Huyser said that in the case of oil and power it would be almost instantaneous.

The President asked whether the military controlled those facilities now.

General Huyser said, no.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered whether some areas might have to be conceded.

General Huyser said he felt they could control most of the country. In an old plan that was drawn up 15 years ago, they had planned to go south, and then fight their way back to the north. He had discouraged this kind of thinking, but they still keep it in mind.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if they could seal off the north.

General Huyser said, they could.

Secretary Brown said that they presumably assume there will be no outside intervention or we would come to their help.

General Huyser said that he had counseled them to concentrate entirely on the internal developments and leave the Free World to take care of outside intervention.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered how much resistance they could expect to encounter.


General Huyser said that the resistance would not be purely religious. However, there was a third party underneath the religious element, and he did not know how large it was.

Secretary Brown said that this was the radicals, the Tudeh Party and the PLO.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if there had been any defections from the army.

General Huyser said there had been some.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if option C could be done quickly.

General Huyser said, yes. They could seize control quickly and then begin building. 

The President wondered what was the highest defector to date.

Secretary Brown said that two names had been mentioned to date as not being entirely loyal to Bakhtiar, General Firuzi and Col. Azardarzin. He also noted that the retired Admiral Madani, whom Khomeini intended to appoint as his Minister of the Interior, was reported to have begged Bakhtiar not to arrest him. He saw no pattern in these events.

General Huyser agreed that he saw no pattern. He thought there may be a few defectors, and there may be some generals.

The President wondered if there were any generals that he was concerned about.

General Huyser said that at the beginning he had been very worried about General Gharbaghi and wondered whether he would in fact be willing to follow through if it should come to option C. He seemed to lack any determination. Recently we went through a threat by Gharbaghi to resign. He did not know whether this was simply a Persian way of ensuring that he had support.

The President recalled that Gharbaghi had threatened to resign after Bakhtiar had made a statement at his press conference regarding the military without first checking it with Gharbaghi.

General Huyser said that was correct, and said that Gharbaghi more recently had shown a willingness to take action if there was a takeover or an other than legal government.

Secretary Vance wondered if General Huyser knew anything about the parliament.

General Huyser said that he did not know much, that they were essentially inactive at the present time.

Secretary Brown noted that General Gast had reported concern that Khomeini might pressure enough members of the parliament to resign, that there would no longer be a quorum, thereby bringing down the government.

General Jones said that another concern was that, as Bakhtiar sent up various bills to the parliament, they might attempt to get a no confidence vote on Bakhtiar, and thereby bring down the government. General Gast did not seem too worried about this. He thought that the opposition would see the dangers of a military takeover and back away from that. Gast reports that Khomeini might take some "bold action", and this fact worried them. However, they were not able to define just what that bold action would be.

The President wondered how much conversation there had been between Khomeini and the military people before he came back.

General Huyser said there had been two contacts: the first had been General Mogadam with Behesti, in which the military had expressed solid support for the constitutional government. The second had been a meeting to prepare for Khomeini's return. There had been pressure for Bazargan and Behesti to meet with the military since that time. However, it had been suggested to Gharbaghi not to accept such meeting, except in the presence of the Prime Minister, and that had not happened thus far.

Dr. Brzezinski quoted from a cable in over the weekend which noted that General Toufanian was nervous and wished to leave the country. He thought that the senior generals shared his views, and that all wanted to leave on the same plane. He noted that they would say one thing to you and do something else, and thought they could not be trusted.


General Huyser said that report was based on one day's conversation with General Toufanian, whereas he had had 25 to 30 conversations with him. He had his ups and downs from one day to the next; however, he was still there. General Toufanian did not even have a passport, and he is one of those, he knows what will happen to him if someone else takes over. He has a rope around his neck because of charges of corruption.

General Huyser had spent a long time with Toufanian in his house, where he had discussed committing suicide and gave him a confession of his life, was very emotional. He thought the Iranian generals overall had been extremely emotional. He had met with them for seven hours straight after the Shah had left, and he thinks he understands them as well as an American can.

The President wondered whether they would be reliable in a crisis.

General Huyser said, yes. And General Toufanian would be in there with them. In fact, he might try to emerge as a leader of the group. That would be a sure way to save his neck.

Dr. Brzezinski said if all else fails and option C proves to be necessary, what are the command steps which are necessary for them to execute the plan.

General Huyser noted that the original plan was one that they started on one morning and planned to do on the next. The troops were already on alert and could move quickly. It does not take that many troops to seize the oil fields. 

The President noted that there had been a threat of a coup when the Shah left. He wondered what other times there was a possible threat of a coup taking place.

General Huyser said that the generals had looked on the mass marches on the 19th of January as a national referendum, and they feared that this would represent the beginning of a new government on the basis of people marching in the street. They were tempted to preempt at that point. Also, at the time when Khomeini returned, they felt everything was going to collapse. They felt they would lose the soldiers to the religious faction. They could not see their way through that valley. In each case, they were tempted to try a coup.

Secretary Vance wondered what accounts for the different views held by Sullivan and General Huyser.

General Huyser said there was a very different view with regard to the stamina of the military forces. Ambassador Sullivan questioned whether the troops would actually respond to an order. The fact that they would respond to an order was proved when they were ordered to protect the Armory. However, Ambassador Sullivan thinks that they will go to Khomeini's side.

General Huyser said that he had watched the soldiers on the various military bases that they have visited in other areas. They snap to, they salute, and there is a general sense of discipline. A good number of people disagreed with the idea of a show of force prior to Khomeini's return. But the military was extremely efficient and showed an effective capability to operate. General Huyser felt that there were two different opinions about the army. He felt that was perhaps good, and maybe the truth was somewhere in between. (Handwritten initials)

Admiral Turner noted that General Huyser's view was considerably different from a number of analysts who are in town. Many analysts felt that the public was so overwhelming in its support of Khomeini that even if the military controls the key installations, the public will be able to defeat them, even if it's only a passive opposition. (Handwritten initials)

Secretary Brown noted that that is indeed the way it is now.

General Huyser noted that, when he arrived in Tehran, the city was at a complete standstill. Although Tehran was noted for its massive traffic jams, when he arrived by airplane, he looked out at the city and could identify only ten cars moving in all of Tehran. Today, it is much improved. Some people thought it was crazy to plan pro-government demonstrations; however, by an honest count, they felt that between 250,000 and 300,000 people turned out to support the Bakhtiar government. This was without paying anyone, and only 48 hours notice. The reaction was extremely good. The opposition, by contrast, brought their people in by buses from outlying areas, and the figures of demonstrations were in fact exaggerated. On the 19th of January, the press reports indicated that one to three million people were demonstrating in Tehran. They observed the whole demonstration by helicopter, and using a very strict formula about how many people could be fit into a square meter, they determined that the crowds amounted to between 500,000 and 750,000. However, there was no denying that the demonstrations were well-planned and it was a very orderly crowd.

Admiral Turner noted that there may be very major differences of opinion .

General Huyser noted that the number of people who were anti-Shah was extremely high. But, now the Shah is gone.

Admiral Turner wondered if a military takeover would not revive the same feeling. People would look at a military takeover as a repeat of 1953.

The President noted that talking of a military government is in our view talking of Bakhtiar with a military force under Bakhtiar's order. Our policy was not to throw Bakhtiar out. The first priority of all of our plans is to keep Bakhtiar strong. On his orders, the military might take over key installations, including the oil fields. But that is very different from a coup, very different from throwing out Bakhtiar, and very different than a military takeover as such.

Secretary Vance agreed that this was a very important point, and it was important to make that distinction. The word military coup was frequently used to describe an alternative to Bakhtiar.

The President noted that that was even stronger grounds for support of the Bakhtiar government.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered whether Bakhtiar's chances would not be increased and the military's ability to support him would not be maintained better if the Shah should resign in favor of his son.

General Huyser said that that was a very heavy question to be asking him. He felt that such a change would probably be acceptable to the military. In that respect, it was unbelievable how they progressed in their thinking since the Shah had left. They now refer to the Shah in has-been terms. The military accepts that there must be changes in the government. The King should be a constitutional monarch; they talk about him riding on a bicycle like the King of Sweden. There has to be some form of democracy. However, the effect of an abdication in favor of his son as far as the opposition is concerned would be zero. Khomeini is bent on destroying the entire Pahlavi dynasty, and a change in favor of his son would not change that.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered, if option C should be chosen, if there would not be less suspicion of the motives of the military's intentions if the Shah had in fact resigned. He posed this simply as a hypothetical case.

The President said that his own belief was that it would not. In his view, people had written off the Shah. He had asked General Huyser in the Oval Office what communication there had been with the Shah and whether he was still in touch with the military. The Shah had told Sadat, while he was in Egypt, that he had had no communications with the military since he had left as a result of what he felt was his commitment. It was never entirely clear what his commitment really was.

The Shah now appeared to be passive and not at all vigorous. For him to step down now in favor of a strong young fighter pilot could in fact raise fears that he would make a comeback. It could arouse hopes on the part of the military and fears on the part of the opposition that in fact the monarchy was in the process of making a comeback.

Dr. Brzezinski said that was a good point. The fact was now going to be bad. He wondered whether perhaps later it would be different.

The President said that a government under Bakhtiar would be best for us. His replacement with the Crown Prince would probably disturb the situation.

Secretary Vance said that General Waters had recently been in Morocco and had seen the Shah and had talked with him. He felt that the Shah had not been in touch with anyone.

Admiral Turner said that he would respectfully like to disagree with the President that the people generally assume the Shah was gone for good.

The President said this was only his opinion, but it was based on Admiral Turner's reports. (Laughter) He said that his impression was that the Shah was not a vigorous man today. He noted that General Huyser had said that the military now referred to him as a has-been. For a while after his departure he felt that the Shah considered going back, but that this was no longer true.

Admiral Turner said he would certainly agree that the Shah was gone for good. He would only disagree that most of the people in Iran believed that the Shah was gone for good.

General Jones said that replacing the Shah at this point with the Crown Prince would merely serve to raise the profile of the monarchy and draw attention to it.

The President said that it was all right for us at this point to talk about various options, but that it was important that the military support Bakhtiar whatever comes.

General Huyser said that the senior military now were even critical of the Shah about not doing what they felt was necessary prior to his departure.

The President noted that in retrospect there are certainly things that the Shah could have done a hell of a lot better. The Shah had gone to pieces in early December or mid-December. He had turned into the shell of a man. However, despite that, he had never been diverted from his idea that he wished to avoid bloodshed. When the President had watched to CBS news report talking about the tape recording which they attributed to the Shah and in which the Shah called for civil war and asked the military to shed lots of blood, the President knew immediately that it was a forgery, quite apart from the experts. It was exactly opposite of what the Shah had in fact been urging entirely all the way through. Even to save his own ass, the Shah had not been willing to order massive bloodshed. CBS had really messed up on that report.

Mr. Jordan asked how long Khomeini would have to be back in order for him to be perceived as part of the problem.

General Huyser said that is already happening now. He recognized that he was an eternal optimist. He had been there in Iran working with a group of generals who were eternal pessimists, and he had to be success-oriented in order to do his job. However, Khomeini was going to have to show something was happening soon, or he would lose. At the present time, there was no structure, and it was merely up to whoever could grab the most. Friction was already beginning to develop between Bazargan and Khomeini. Bazargan understands the political equation in Iran. Things are improving daily. Each day while he was there in Tehran, General Huyser had noticed people were beginning to sweep the streets, pick up the garbage, even open up shops. Day by day, more shops were open. What was required now were some positive moves. He had recommended taking over the customs; there are currently a hundred trucks sitting in Turkey, waiting to get into Iran, and a hundred and sixty ships sitting and waiting in the harbor, which are carrying food and other items. The military could easily take over the customs. The only thing that Bakhtiar now controls is the airport, and he already showed that he could close that, if necessary. Opening the customs, however, would be a humanitarian thing, and he had urged Bakhtiar and the military to go for the humanitarian aspects. If the strikes were broken and people went back to work, a number of people would actually support the idea.

Secretary Brown wondered how long it would be before Khomeini would show a substantial drop in popularity; would it be days, weeks, months.

General Huyser said that he felt that it would be days.

Secretary Vance asked about Ayatollah Shariat-Madari. It seemed that he was flipping in his views. Previously, it was reported that he was keeping his distance from Khomeini. However, he is now reported saying that an Islamic Republic is not as bad as people think.

General Huyser said that, while he was there, Shariat-Madari seemed very moderate. He felt there was considerable difference between him and Khomeini's views. However, it is possible his view changed since General Huyser left.

General Jones noted that there was one small indicator over the weekend. They had released a tanker. They had decided that it was impossible to unload the Diesel oil from the tanker properly, and also decided that they had no need for it. Now they had suddenly asked for the tanker to turn around and come back. This may indicate a change. The ship was Norwegian and Defense went to State to ask the ship to turn around. This may indicate that the military is in fact planning to move. Also, there was a US Navy ship due in to deliver munitions to a naval port which did not receive a clearance to offload. However, this was a different situation, since the Navy was not ready to receive munitions. So this was a different situation than a denial of the National Iranian Oil Company to get permission for the Norwegian tanker to offload its products.

The President wondered if the Memorandum of Understanding had been signed.

General Huyser said, yes, it had been signed just before he left.

General Jones noted that the Iranians were not willing to do the same for the British.

Secretary Brown noted that the British may just have to cancel their military orders. This may be a reflection of the instructions which their new ambassador has just received, which told him not to opt for either government.

The President wondered what effect the BBC had had.

General Huyser noted the tremendous change that had taken place as far as the press was concerned. Previously, the Iranians had had no free press and no access to alternative sources of information. Suddenly they had an open press and also the BBC presenting them with a wide variety of information. They found

this difficult to accept. For a long time, they had been critical of our own press for printing information that was not favorable to them. General Huyser specifically remembered the case of Ramsey Clark when he got back and saying that 99 percent of the people in Iran supported Khomeini. They found that very hard to take, and he found it quoted to him every place that he went. However now the senior military people are beginning to recognize that it was news and they are treating it accordingly. General Rabil went out to talk to the Homofars to try to convince them to change their point of view. It was a hopeful sign.

The President asked what were the Homofars exactly.

General Huyser said that they are the technicians. They are in for 12 years at a time.

The President wondered what was their function.

General Huyser said that they wear uniforms and they perform the technical support on aircraft. Although there are some of them in the army and the navy, the primary support is in the air force.

The President asked, if in case the military must take over in order to support Bakhtiar, would that include controlling the radio and television facilities?

General Huyser said, yes.

The President noted that General Jam in one of his conversations had noted that he had, when he was Chief of Staff, devised a plan to take over the key places, if necessary. He wondered if this was familiar to General Huyser.

General Huyser said that General Gharbaghi had referred to this plan on several occasions.

The President wondered how the senior generals viewed General Jam.

General Huyser said that they were somewhat disenchanted. When he came back to Tehran, he stayed with a retired general, who was not on the side of the government. Some viewed him as something of an opportunist.

The President said he felt the same. He wondered what General Huyser's plans were at this point.

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General Huyser said that he planned to return to Stuttgart, his post.

The President asked that a confirmation of Sullivan's instructions be sent to Tehran.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS + 50508592
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