

Reardon, JCS and National Policy, 1977-80

9:

view, even one limited to DOD, until diplomatic exchanges disposing of the Tarasov proposal had run their course.¹⁰⁷

(C) As a result, the review the Secretary had authorized failed to materialize until that summer, by which time the United States and the Soviet Union had reached agreement on a SALT II Treaty (see Chapter IX). Critics promptly assailed the treaty on a variety of technical and strategic grounds. With a battle over ratification looming in the Senate, the White House sought to blunt further criticism by issuing new, ostensibly tougher, guidelines (PD-50) on future arms control agreements, including MBFR, stipulating that any new accord should contribute to US security, be constructive in terms of strengthening deterrence and providing support for US allies, and show concrete evidence of limiting the arms race and reducing the risk of war.¹⁰⁸ These were, all things considered, rather vague and unobjectionable criteria. What remained to be seen was how they would be interpreted and applied.

PD-50

(C) It was against this background of growing political controversy over arms control that ISA in early August circulated a draft paper on MBFR principles and objectives for examination by the other members of the DOD task force. The author, Lynn Davis, in the past had not shown as much sympathy or support for JCS positions as Joint Staff planners would have liked. So, it was with considerable surprise and pleasure that they found her paper endorsing several key JCS positions: (1) that the West's current negotiating position contained serious deficiencies and was not viable in light of recent improvements in the East's military posture; (2) that MBFR should focus exclusively on conventional forces and leave theater nuclear matters to be addressed in SALT III; and (3) that a comprehensive and effective package of "associated measures" (i.e., verification procedures) should accompany any agreement. As one aide to the Chairman remarked after reading the paper, "We should rightfully be pleased that the ISA views track so closely with those of the JCS."¹⁰⁹

extract into file

(C) Encouraged by the tone and content of Davis's paper, Joint Staff planners hoped to use it in interagency discussions to curb what seemed to be a resurgence of interest at the State Department in a near-term MBFR agreement within the current negotiating framework. The FRG was also said to be developing similar proposals and wanted to discuss them with US and British representatives at a trilateral meeting in late September. This

Department of Energy Document Review	
1. Review Date: 11/3/5	2. Review Date: 1/3/80
3. Authority: HS, M, R, S, G	4. Authority: DD
5. Derived From: DOD	6. Authority: DD
7. Declassify On: <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4	8. Other (Specify): PD 284-288 only
9. Information [Circle Number(s)]	
10. Date of Disengagement To: NSI	
11. Comments, See DOD: Classified Info	
12. Coordinate With:	
13. Declassified:	
14. Classified Info By: <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4	
15. Other (Specify):	

¹⁰⁶ CM-271-79 to SecDef, 9 Apr 79, 8/8DS, CJCS Files (Jones), 806 NATO (MBFR).

¹⁰⁷ Memo, McGiffert, ASD(ISA), to Brown, 2 May 79, 8/8DS, CJCS Files (Jones), 806 NATO (MBFR).

¹⁰⁸ PD-50, "Arms Control Decision Process," 14 Aug 79, 8/JHO/NSC Collection.

¹⁰⁹ ISA Paper, "MBFR: Principles/Objectives," [ca. 2 Aug 79], 8/DJSM 1380-79, 7 Aug 79, 8/CJCS Files (Jones), 806 NATO (MBFR).

wa
gui
wh
III.

De
the
ing
of
nat
opi
issu
tion
so,
cur
est
ure
cei
tha
for
ate
rec

so
su
key
Ha
Pu
es
sh
pr
Br
ru
ni
10
su
sa
lar
fun
CO

110
79

111

~~SECRET~~

~~Restricted Data~~

~~Extract not for~~

Reardon, JCS & Nat'l Pol 77-80

Western Europe and NATO

92

was the first test of US arms control policy under the President's new PD-50 guidelines, and as such it was likely to set precedents, especially in deciding what the Chiefs considered the most urgent MBFR issue—the fate of Option III. Matters came to a head at an SCC meeting on 18 September 1979.¹¹⁰

(9) Going into the SCC meeting the Joint Chiefs provided Secretary of Defense Brown with a fresh statement of their views. Generally speaking, they had two objectives: to forestall any near-term MBFR agreement involving equal reductions or some similar formula; and to obtain the withdrawal of Option III, thereby decoupling nuclear reductions from MBFR. Unfortunately, the Chiefs weakened their case by offering on one key point a split opinion. Standing alone, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, the Navy chief, took issue with his colleagues' assertion that there were no near-term conventional force reductions that could be made without damaging NATO. Even so, he declined to offer any specific examples. More importantly, he concurred with his colleagues that a way around this problem might be found in establishing a cap at equal levels accompanied by sound associated measures to create a more favorable climate for reductions leading to a common ceiling. Reductions would then be contingent upon each side being satisfied that the other was in compliance with the cap, a solution to the data issue for the forces to be reduced, and, lastly, agreement on any additional associated measures (e.g., inspections) that might be required to monitor the reductions.¹¹¹

(10) From the JCS standpoint, the SCC meeting on 18 September was something of a setback. While it made gestures toward incorporating JCS suggestions, it wound up essentially reconfirming existing policy on most key points. Representing the Joint Chiefs at the meeting were Admiral Hayward and the Chairman's new assistant, Lieutenant General John Pustay. All agreed in principle that progress on MBFR would be desirable, especially in resolving data discrepancies; however, beyond this, there were sharp divisions of opinion. Admiral Hayward, speaking for the JCS, said he preferred that the negotiations avoid manpower reductions. Secretary Brown basically agreed. He thought that manpower reductions would disrupt the force improvement programs envisioned in the LTDP. But recognizing that they might be necessary, he hoped they could be held to less than 10,000. Taking exception, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, supported by the senior ACDA representative, Spurgeon Keeny, and Ambassador Jonathan Dean, the US MBFR negotiator, argued for reductions as large as possible, in order to obtain the maximum Soviet withdrawals. After further discussion, National Security Adviser Brzezinski persuaded the committee to accept a compromise, under which the United States would

Extract
checked

¹¹⁰ Agenda for 18 Sep 79 SCC Mtg on MBFR, ~~S~~/CJCS Files (Jones), SCC Mtg File (1 May 79-30 Sep 79).

¹¹¹ JCSM-282-79 to SecDef, 18 Sep 79, ~~S~~/PRD, JCS 2482/513, 757 (10 Sep 79).

255

~~SECRET~~

~~Restricted Data~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 02 2015

JCS and National Policy

offer first phase reductions of 13,000 US soldiers in exchange for 30,000 Soviet soldiers, with the Soviet reductions to be taken in the form of three divisions. In a related action, the committee also agreed to continue US support of Option III, seeking a reduction of 1,200 Soviet tanks in exchange for the removal of 1,000 US nuclear warheads, but to drop the withdrawal of any associated delivery systems.¹¹²

(U) As it turned out, the breakthrough that US negotiators hoped to see failed to materialize. Following Brezhnev's offer of unilateral Soviet troop and tank withdrawals in October 1979, NATO in December announced the early removal of 1,000 US nuclear warheads as a reciprocal gesture (see above). The net effect was to spell the demise of Option III, removing it not only from the negotiating table but also as a source of friction between the State Department and the JCS.¹¹³ Even so, the talks in Vienna dragged on, with scant prospect of an end in sight. The Soviets wanted credit toward an overall agreement for Brezhnev's unilateral troop and tank withdrawal offer and this, coupled with continuing friction over data and verification issues, spelled deadlock through the remainder of Jimmy Carter's presidency.¹¹⁴ Although the Joint Chiefs failed to obtain all the changes in the US negotiating position they wanted, neither did they have to confront a European arms control agreement they might have felt compelled to oppose.

(U) Broadly speaking, the political counterpart to the MBFR negotiations was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, initiated in 1973 at Soviet instigation. The major accomplishment of these negotiations was the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which in effect legitimized the frontiers and political arrangements imposed by the Soviet Union on Eastern Europe after World War II. Additionally, the act renounced the threat or use of force and pledged the signatories (thirty-five in all, including the United States and the Soviet Union) to respect "human rights and fundamental freedoms."¹¹⁵ Though not of great importance to the Joint Chiefs, the CSCE did attract considerable attention in diplomatic circles and gave the Carter administration what some State Department analysts considered an excellent vehicle for pursuing its human rights agenda toward the East.¹¹⁶

¹¹² Summary of Conclusions, SCC Mtg on MBFR, 24 Sep 79, ~~5~~ CJCS Files (Jones), SCC Mtgs File (1 May 79-30 Sep 79).

¹¹³ Keliher, *Negotiations on MBFR*, 86-88.

¹¹⁴ Ruehl, *MBFR: Lessons and Problems*, 21-23.

¹¹⁵ "CSCE Final Act," 1 Aug 75, in US Dept of State *Bulletin* (1 Sep 75): 323-50. John J. Maresca, *To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973-1975* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985), covers the negotiations leading to the Helsinki Final Act.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, FSD, WIIS
Date: 02 SEP 2015 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 15 -M- 0270

SUSE 552

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WUS
Date: SEP 0 2 2015

the
four
mer
and
on
Am
vie
CBI
lea
wit
que
SA
seq
CB
not
lev
tar

JC
CS
Go
vic
ou
go
wa
pa
of
an
su

tr
in
pr
Cl

11
D

11
9

11

1
N